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The purpose of' this dis.sertation. is to attempt to 
understand the nature . oC philosophical disagreements in 
general and to explore the possibilities f'or synthesizing 
great and divergent philosophical systems, specif'ically by 
analyzing in great detail and ~th care, two quite opposed 
philosophic viewpoints and to explore the possibility of' 
viewing these distinct philosophies from a single and com-
prehensive perspective. Part of' the task of' the disserta-
tion is to develop this perspective. Such a unif'ying per-
spective might be discovered if' the relationship between 
truth and reality on the one hand and value on the other 
can be understood and clarif'ied in the two representative 
philosophies chosen. It is possible that in the conception 
of' truth and reality these philosophers do not disagree 
f'undamentally, but the basic decision which may be at the 
root of' their conceptions of' truth and reality may be the 
root dif'f'erence among philosophical or metaphysical systems. 
Every basic philosophical antithesis or disagreement 
may be said to submit itself' to one of' the f'ollowing three 
possibilities) 
(1) The dispute may not be reconcilable through any 
higher synthesis. If' consistency is desired one or the other 
of' two or more alternatives must be summarily rejected. For 
example, it may be the case that the only solution to the 
problem of' the status of' mathematics -- whether mathematics 
consists of' synthetic a priori, of' analytic, or of' empirical 
J 
propositions -- is to reject two alternatives as totally 
unacceptabl.e and aver the truth of' only one of' the three. 
Such a solution of' the antithes~s is opposed to a sort of' 
Hegelian synthesis l~hich, in a higher unity, incorporates 
the divergencies of a lower disunity. 
(2) Philosophical systems which are "opposites" may 
be such on the surface only. Analysi.s might disclose that 
both systems deal with a dif'f'erent set of' !'acts and, as such, 
are complementary. It is possible, for instance, that 
existentialism perhaps deals with ethical, normative 
situations primarily, whereas analytic philosophy might 
turn out to be concerned exclusively ~th scientif'ic and 
descriptive models. 
(J) It may also be possible that some philosophic 
ideas or systems which seem totally divergent and at the same 
time intransigent to synthesis are in the last analysis 
really equivalent. That is to say, instead of' dif'f'ering by 
opposition, two philosophical systems may dif'f'er merely 
because they envisage the same !'acts from a different point 
of' vantage -- that is, with a different purpose or value in 
view. For example, it might be the case that idealism and 
materiali.sm can be transf'onned into one another by changing 
the def'initions of' basic terms. If' our percepta -- that 
which we see, hear, touch, etc. -- are _designated, by 
de:finition, as "matter," or as 11 re:ferring to matter," 
materialism ensues. If' we call these same percepta and their 
4 
re:ferents 11mental events, 11 idealism follows. It is true 
that the referents of' umind 11 and 11 matter 11 are quite .dis-
tinct, yet a careful analysis of precisely what the dis-
tinction is meant to be is not easy to accomplish. Matter 
is visualized as extended~ mind as non-extended. Mind is 
purposeful, personal, and rational, matter is indi:f:ferent, 
mechanical, and non-rational. Yet idealism reduces matter 
to mind, and materialism,which :sometmres _v:i.ell7S mind as epi-
phenomenon, reduces the latter to matter. The f'inal and 
most important question to be analyzed is thisJ what is 
the dif':ference between a .mental event 11matter11 and a mental 
event 11 mind 11 on the one hand; and in a materialist or 
naturalistic account, what is the di:f:ference between a 
material event 11 matter 11 and a material event 11mind 11 ? If' 
the materialist can defend himself' in the f'ace o:f the charge 
o:f meaninglessness, it may turn out that the :fundamental 
distinction between these views is an ultimate decision, 
perhaps one conoerned with value or the satisfaction o:f 
value-claims. If' the ego looks upon the tangible, the 
immediate, and that tdlich can be visibly possessed and accumu-
lated as the ultimately good or desirable, his decision i n 
metaphysics will be :for materialism, the primacy of' things 
tangible. I:f the ego f'inds man's summum bonum in the attain~ 
ment o:f intellectual pleasures through synoptic visions, or 
in the achievement of' a meaningful existence through a :face 
to :face confrontation with God, his decision in metaphysics 
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will be for idealism. The precise connections obtaining 
between axiology and metaphysics, that is to say, which 
has logical priority, can be fully discussed only in the 
conclusion to the dissertation. 
The possibility of equivalence suggested here is 
meant to . be partially parallel to the theory of transforma-
tions in mathematics, as we have it, for instance, in analy-
tic geometry. A circle may be expressed as (x - a) 2 + 
(y - b} 2 = r 2 , and as x 2 + y2 = r 2 • We may take another 
example. It is conceivable that naturalism and idealism 
both deal adequately with the events they incorporate into 
their systems, and these events might very well be the same 
in both cases; however, naturalism views these events with a 
purpose and with a set of values as distinct from the pur-
poses and values of ~dealism as the glasses which color the 
world for an aggressive businessman are distinct from those 
which paint an omnipresent God for the religious mystic. 
The events 1..ri th l'lhich idealism deals may be the same 't>~i th 
'tvhich naturalism deals; nonetheless, the ordered arrange-
ments of these events may differ greatly. 
An event is fluid and expandable, covering an ob-
ject like an adaptable film of oil. An electron is an 
event, so is a nation and the vision of the universe from 
the aspect of eternity. That an event, as a fact, is an 
interpretation of other events, namely pure presentations, 
cannot readily be questioned. lfuich is the ultimate, 
first, or atomic event, the one which is not 
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interpreted, becomes the age-old philosophic problem of 
the given. lfuat is the uninterpreted given? This question 
probably has no answer. The problem of the given is dis-
cussed in Chapter IV. 
It must be pointed out that no attempt is being made 
in these beginning paragraphs really to solve any philo-
sophical antithesis or to find ansl~ers to f'undamental philo-
sophical disputes. The author merely seeks to clarify the 
issues to be discussed in this dissertation without, at this 
stage, becoming involved in any specific philosophical 
commitment. 
Finally, it is the purpose of' the dissertation to 
examine and to substantiate the following conclusiona 
The author started with the hypothesis, subject to 
verif'ication or denial, that metaphysical systems are basi-
cally decisions about values. Subsequently, the author 
thought he recognized that value is part of' a metaphysical 
system, and he proposed th~t the category of' explanation 
of a metaphysical system is "freedom" in Sartre's sense. To 
this, however, the :foll.owing must be added. First, the 
term metaphysical , system ,may be substituted by the looser 
term world-view or Weltanschauung, as the general pattern 
of' order 1dth which an individual experience, a person, a 
culture, or a philosopher looks at existence. The term 
metaphysics .. is restricted: it applies to systematic con-
structions exclusively, not including perhaps Russell's 
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position. Second, the author rejects the unqualified use 
of' the ultimate categ.ory of' :freedom or ":free choice" and 
substitutes :for it ~ possibility. By this substitution 
is meant that it is false, empirically, to assert that a 
world view is chosen :freely. It is rare, indeed, in actual 
:fact, that choices as :fundamental as the ones here out-
lined are delibe.rately chosen. And i:f this is f'alse, it 
is equally :false that this choice is arbitrary. vfuat the 
author does wish to say, however, is that such a choice is 
a logical(as well as to a great extent a psychological) 
possibility. The result is that world views ~ be chosen 
:freely, even i:f in :fact they rarely are. This free-
possibility is on a level so fundamental that the author 
contends that extremely diverse world views are equally 
justified. The phitosophic position, f'or example, that 
relativism is :false is one that .2.m!. be accepted .Q.!: rejected. 
In the last analysis, if someone chooses to accept some 
sort of' relativism (and this acceptance, of' course, entails 
the acceptance of' the consequences of' this kind of relativ-
ism) the only answer pessibl~ is that the absolutist 
chooses otherwise, because he is as f'ree to choose otherwise 
as is the relativist. There are of' course other reasons 
beside this kind of' f'reedom which eliminate world views f'rom 
the realm of' possibility. But the author contends that 
these reasons (which are empirical coherence or consistency) 
are insuf'f'icient to leave only ~ world view as residue. 
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The author holds that a vast, perhaps i.n:finite, number o:f 
empirically coherent world views are possible. Taking the 
position o:f mysticism . (discussed on .the chapter on Stace) 
we can even go :farther .l the mystic has chosen to reject 
reason, or, in Stace 1 s terminology, has chosen to reject 
the natural, . or temporal, order. The quintessence of' 
the author's proposal is that world views~ be chosen 
:freely. Speaking in highly general terms, whether the 
mystical experience (Stace) or the li:fe o:f reason (Russell) 
or reliance on the primacy o:f the abstractions re:ferred to 
as sensations (Hume and Russell) is the summum_bonum or the 
ultimate source o:f Truth is a matter which~ .~ chosen 
:freely. I:f reasons are given :for any d:f these positions, 
the reasons themselves must either be accepted or rejected. 
If' this process o:f decision is deliberate (and the author 
has repeatedly stated that it rarely is in :fact, but can be 
-
in principle) the ultimate :fact o:f this decision is the 
category o:f the possibility .o:f :freedom. 
The :full consequences, beyond those of' perhaps 
preparing the ground :for resolving philosophical disputes, 
o:f this "meta~metaphysics, 11 o:f this view that a world vie'\17" 
is a proposal which .£!:!l be accepted :freely, cannot be ex-
pounded in . this dissertation; this is a separate issue. 
The basic di:f:ference between personalism and the 
conclusion o:f this dissertation is that :for personalists 
(and other philosophers) a reason determines (or ideally 
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ought to determine) the choice of fundamental assumptions; 
these reasons may even be the consequences. This makes the 
assumptions not free, but true or false. The author con-
tends, on the other hand, that in the process of justifi-
cation we must g o one step further back, and assert that 
these reasons or consequences can be accepted or rejected. 
There is no doubt that these reasons exist, but lvhether we 
accept these reasons or others, these consequences or 
others, is a matter of free choice open to us even if we do 
not avail ourselves of this possibility. This situation is 
related to the refusal of being rational. 
It is false to imply, as one might, that such a 
view leads to 11 relati vism of the l-torst sort. 11 First, the 
author is not sure that it does, since he is inclined to 
refer to the kind of relativism indicated here as a 
possible free choice in turn, one 'Which others have chosen 
to reject. Second, the fact that a hypothesis leads to 
relativism does not make it false, unless one w·ishes to argue 
on pra@natic grounds. 
Since the avOl'ied purpose of this dissertation -- to 
attempt an understanding of the nature of philosophical 
disagreement in general and to explore the possibilities for 
synthesizing such divergent systems -- is a problem lrlth far 
too many ramifications . to be discussed comprehensively in 
one dissertation, further determinations or limitations upon 
the problem must be instituted. It should be understood 
at the outset that, although the precise problems discussed 
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in this dissertation are themselves specific, detailed, and 
cover a relatively narrow range, these problems must be 
conceived to form part of the larger problem of philosophi-
cal disagreements in general. Any solutions or views 
developed within the confines of these covers must be seen 
in terms of their contribution toward the solution of the 
greater, cultural problem of antithetical philosophic sys-
tems, and even to such problems as fall under the heading of 
11 the meeting of East and \'lest. 11 
This dissertation proposes to combine scholarship 
with genuine philosophical creativity. The Chapters on 
Russell and on Stace (Chapters II and III) represent an 
effort at scholarship. They are the painstaking, meti-
culous examination of established philosophic positions. 
Chapter IV propounds a scheme such that all philosophic 
positions form a sub-class within that scheme. It is this 
Chapter and this scheme which purport to be philosophically 
creative. 
11 
Method of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will attempt the problem of 
philosophic disagreements by discussing the individual 
approach to one central issue by a constellation of two 
philosophers representing as varied philosophical view-
points as possible. 
No pretense is made of having all existing philo-
sophical systems or outlooks represented in this disserta-
tion. It is felt that the comparative analysis of a small 
number of yet very divergent world-views will point to the 
true kernel issues involved in philosophical and generally 
cultural polemics. On the clear isolation of these kernel 
issues rests whatever possibility there may be of incor-
porating philosophical divergencies into a single, more 
complete, and truer world-view. 
The two philosophic perspectives chosen for dis-
cussion in this dissertation are positivism and mysticism. 
The reason that two philosophic approaches (positivism and 
mysticism) are chosen, rather than a larger number (which 
might include idealism, existentialism, and realism) is to 
bring the dissertation down to manageable size. Rather than 
deal with five philosophical positions, in which case each 
must be treated with some measure of superficiality, it 
was decided to limit the philosophic positionsto strictly 
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tl'lO, and two l1Thich can be clearly defined and satis-
factorily delimited; Russell's positivism and Stace's 
conception of' mysticism. These two positions are then 
presented and analyzed in great detail. Russell's, rather 
than someone else's, positivism has been chosen because of' 
its incisiveness, influence, and relative clarity (not-
withstanding Russell's frequent changes of' opinion). Stace 1 s 
mysticism was chosen because it is historically comprehen-
sive and is conceived with the view of meeting the natural-
istic (and therefore in some measure also the positivistic) 
criticisms and objections. 
The writer feels that if the conceptions of truth 
and reality of these various philosophies could be seen in 
clear apposition, the basic similarities and differences of 
systems can be detected and the possibility of' bringing about a 
:ve.un:ton· liTithif:l the entire field of philosophy can be ex-
plored from a simplified standpoint. 11 Truth11 and "reality" 
are terms which, of course, need to be defined comprehen-
sively, albeit slowly, in the unfolding of the subsequent 
chapters. 1'/e must assume, at this stage, a l..rorking know-
ledge and definition of' 11 truth 11 and 11 reality, 11 and discover 
how the above-mentioned men define or might define the terms 
more specifically. In Stace's case, the notion of' "value" 
must be given a similar analysis, since for mysticism value 
is a "true'' component of "reality. 11 
A discussion of the meaning of truth and reality 
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for a specific philosopher is not sufficient unto itself 
but requires an understanding of what the philosopher 
conceives the. function of philosophy to be, which ultimately 
may be a question of values, namely, how can philosophy 
contribute to man's quest for the summum bonum. In other 
ttords, an operational definition of truth such as 11 'Truth' 
and 'reality' may be defined as the ultimate objects of a 
philosopher's search" is not complete without mention of' 
values and . of' a definition of' the :function o:f philosophy. 
The assumption here is that a basic concept o:f values and 
a basic conception o:f the :function o:f philosophy are be-
trayed in any particular definition o:f truth and reality, 
that is, in the activities o:f a particular philosopher. 
The justification o:f this latter statement can only be 
:found in the individual analyses o:f truth in the following 
Chapters. 
Specifically, the method of' the dissertation is as 
:follows. Chapter II is an exegesis and an analysis of the 
philosophy o:f Bertrand Russell which unfolds what Russell 
means by 11 truth11 and l;ly "reality. 11 A separate section of' 
Chapter II is devoted to each of' these concepts. Once the 
analysis is complete, that is to say, covers the main body 
of' Russell's works, we see in detail the many assumptions 
or presuppositions and values which are necessarily in-
volved in Russell's conception o:f truth and o:f reality. 
An assumption or a presupposition is defined as 
all o:f the :follolting. It is {a) an implicit -- rather than 
an explicit and articulate -- element in a philosophic 
system, and (b) a proposition which must be asserted in 
conjunction with the philosophic system expounded. The 
logical relation between Russe.ll' s philosophic position 
or central proposition o:f that position -- and these 
assumptions is one o:f 11 i:f, and only i:f, 11 sytnbQlized by 
11 
;." Also, an assumption or presupposition is (c) a 
proposition which cannot ~ -- or, at least, ~ ll2i in 
practice -- demonstrated or proven to be true. An assump-
tion must (d) be accepted as true on grounds which, at best, 
are not :found '\dthin the philosophic position in question, 
and, at worst, are non-existent altogether. Finally, there 
is a general rule -- which might have an occasional ex-
ception -- that an assumption (e) is logically :first in 
grounding a philosophic position. More precisely, an 
assumption :functions as a premise as the ultimate prem-
iss -- to the philosophical position discussed. ,In this 
connection, an assumption might also be the antecedent in 
a conditional relation. 
Tl~e conclusion to the dissertation (Chapter rv) 
analyzes the grounds :for accepting these assumptions, the 
:foundation o:f the assent or action o:f the ,,.ill. When 
appropriate, some o:f this analysis is completed in earlier 
Chapters. 
Another section at the end o:f Chapter II deals l'iith 
1.5 
the values that are preserved in Russell's conception 
of truth and in that of reality. We then find an explora-
tion of l'lhat prompts man 1 s sincere assent to these values 
and of the relation between these values and the previously-
mentioned assumptions. 
A similar analysis is undertaken l'iith mysticism in 
Chapter III. There mysticism is analyzed as an experience 
and as a metaphysical system or theory of reality. After 
the position of mysticism -- as seen by Stace -- is pre-
sented in detail, we see the assumptions involved. The 
concept of "assumption" in mysticism is the same as that 
already defined above. One caution, however, must be ob-
served. The notion o·f an assumption such as that of a 
premise is basically a logical one. Since mysticism 
repudiates logic, more than logical assumptions must be 
discussed in order to reach the Urgrund of mysticism. 
Therefore, in addition to assumptions, we find priorities 
in mysticism. Priorities are of various sorts, and they 
are defined with care in Chapter III. 
Once ,,.e have be:fore us the various values, as sump-
tions and priorities o:f the two altogether divergent 
philosophical positions '"e can discover (a) l'ihat the 
relation is between the assumptions of these philosophical 
positions. That is to say, we might discover surprising 
• 
similarities among or detect the core di:fferences between 
these positions in terms o:f their assumptions. 1ve can also 
. 
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discover (b) what generates . assent to one set of assump-
tions and dissent to another (assuming the assumptions 
are different). Finally, (c) we can explore the possi-
bility of a general scheme which accounts for all these 
assumptions in terms of one system. This latter system, 
which is given the name 11 Heretism11 in this dissertation, 
will then represent a kind of supreme synthesis. If this 
synthesis is applicable to all philosophic positions, 
these latter then become a sub-class of the former. In 
this way, philosophical disagreements are resolved. 
In summary, an attempt will be made in this dis-
sertation to point out what truth and values are to each of 
the above two. representative thinkers. It will then be 
possible to determine more specifically in What respects 
these philosophers are similar to one another and in what 
respects they are truly different and incompatible. With 
such an outline as basis the entire problem of the possible 
integration of philosophic syst.ems into a larger or more 
comprehensive whole opens itself up for analysis. 
In more general terms, having analyzed what, for 
the thinkers mentioned, are truth and reality, we must 
decide ,,rhether their views are ( 1) incompatible, ( 2) com-
plementary, or (3) equivalent; or to indicate to what ex-
tent their views fall into every one of these three cate-
gories. 
The far off, yet attainable, prospect of eventual 
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philosophic unity has implications that are far more vital 
than the mere intellectual satisfaction of acade~ic inter-
ests. If contemporary conflicts of values can be traced 
to our civilization's general uncertainty about metaphy-
sics, then any step taken in a direction which 't"Vill neutral-
ize the corrosive e:ffects o.f the acid ot: :fluctuating meta-
physical viewpoints should be welcome. Perhaps a contri-
bution, however small, can be made to the eventual stabili-
zation of values, values which must ultimately be shown to 
be tethered onto an ineradicable metaphysics. 
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Survey of' Attempts at Reconciliation and Synthesis 
The author feels that the magnitude of' the problem 
of' philosophical disagreements has reached a peak in our 
day perhaps unknown to previous centuries. The contem-
porary logomachy has become vituperative to such an extent 
that opposing philosophies even refuse to look upon each 
other as fellow members of' the philosopher's guild. It is 
therefore easier, as a rule, to find an awareness of the 
problem of philosophical antitheses in recent writings and 
articles than in older works. 
The author has found hardly any precedence to the 
scheme developed in Chapter IV. There are hints throughout 
the literature, but nothing approaching a formal statement 
has been discovered. Consequently, very little can be said 
about past attempts to develop the position presented in 
this dissertation. 
The idea of' reconciling philosophic differences 
has not only been given expression by Hegel, but appears 
ld th some frequency in th_e contemporary literature. Here 
it is possible to survey the literature. Schiller~ Pepper, 
and Hontague deal with th;r;ee characteristic and .dif'f'erent 
solutions to the general problem of philosophical disagree-
ment. Among the most vigorous philosophical opponents 
today l'le find the positivists and the existentialists. A 
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survey of' attempts at reconc.iling these positions gives us 
an idea of' 'tofhat, specifically, has been attempted in the 
f'ield of' reconciling tlofO fundamental philosophical dif'f'er-
ences. The existentialist philosopher may be regarded as 
a kind of' contemporary mystic (which is particularly true 
of' the f'ounder of' modern existentialism, :Martin Heidegger). 
The problem of' reconciling -- or pitting against each 
other -- positivism and existentialism is, theref'ore, very 
similar to that of' positivism versus mysticism. In review-
ing the literature, we begin with general characterizations, 
applying to all systems, and then move on to specif'ic con-
siderations, applying to two systems only. 
Heidegger 1 s connection with mysticism, incidentally, 
is f'airly well established. Heidegger 1 s increasing interest 
in the mystic poets, Stephan George, Rainer l·Iaria Rilke, and 
Friedrich H8lderlin, 1 appears to give weight to the con-
tention that his basic orientation is mystical. H8lderlin, 
:for example, f'elt himself' to be 11 a messenger between 'the 
2 gods' and the people." Heidegger 11 is of' the conviction 
that the poet's mission is to 1 name 1 what he has f'ound to 
":> 
be 'holy.'"-' Such a conviction is indeed reminiscent of' 
mysticism as discussed by Stace, as well as of' the concept 
1
werner Brock (ed. and intro.), Existence and Being 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), p. 184. 
2 Ibid., P• 186. 
3 Ibid., P• 187. 
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of the numinous as explored in Otto's ~ Heilige. 1 
Tillich bases much of his Systematic Theology2 -- which 
has a mystical flavor -- on the existentialist philosophy 
') 
of Heidegger. The same is true of Spiegelberg.~ At the 
outset of ~ Bn£ ~ Heidegger apparently was of the 
conviction that the most success:ful approach "to name what 
he Lthe poei} has found to be 1holy 1114 is through the :full 
development of the kind of wonder about the world which 
the Pre-Socratics :felt. ~~d this wonder is ultimately 
nothing but to ask after the meaning of being. This analy-
sis then becomes the core o:f Heidegger's philosophy. 
Finally, the similarity between mysticism and 
existentialism is pointed out in an article by Seype11. 5 
TI2is article is discussed in the last section of this 
Chapter. 
In this section will be discussed, :first, historical 
hints at that which is the conclusion of the dissertation. 
Basically, the dissertation comes to the conclusion that 
1 Rudolph Otto, ~ Heilige (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 
1929), P• 7 • 
2Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
3Frederic Spiegelberg, ~ Living ReliP,ions of ~ 
World (New Yorlo Prentice-Hall, 1956). 
4werner Brock (ed. and intro.), Existence~ Being 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), P• 187. 
5J. H. Seypell, "Comparative Study o:f Truth in Exis-
tentialism and Pragmatism," Journal .2.£ Philosophy, 15 
(1953), P• 233· 
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differences in philosophic positions .are at root differ-
ences in values~ which in turn are -- or can be -- :freely 
and spontaneously chosen. Second, a survey of attempts 
at the general solution of metaphysical and philosophical 
differences will be seen in a discussion of William P. 
Montague's Great Visions .2.£ .Philosophy, Stephen c. Pepper's 
World Hypotheses, and F. C. S. Schiller's ~Philosophers 
Disagree? as works which are conscious o:f the problem o:f 
philosophical disagreement and which propose a general 
solution :for integration and synthesis. Third, the next 
section will discuss a sizeable number of periodical 
articles which recognize the specific current dissidence 
in philosophy brought about by such diverse views as logi-
cal positivism and existentialism, as well as articles 
which pioneer proposed trails :for eventual integration and 
synthesis. 
Historical hints.--It is hardly necessary to point 
out that the voice of re-emphasis on values, after the vast 
historical episode of positivistic and semantic neglect, is 
being heard "tdth increasing clarity over the slowly receding 
clamor :for precision and :for nothing but the simple which 
is so simple that it can be expressed t'iith unimpeachable 
precision. This dissertation seeks to reintroduce the 
extra-rational, the :freedom which violates the law o:f cause 
and effect, the authentic decision regarding man's :funda-
mental value into the total picture of philosophy. 1-Iysti-
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cism and existentialism, and also forms of idealism, have 
allowed this element to be preserved and have shielded it 
from total semantic anihilation. That type of philosophy 
whose principal interest lay in the elevation of the 
quality of the human person in keeping with the Greek 
tradition of paideia may be called humanistic or aesthetic 
philosophy. Such a philosophic orientation may also be 
termed the philosophy of culture 11 lihich deals theoreti-
cally with a practical object, the proper order of the 
human life as a l1Thole. 111 
Royce has partially contributed to the belief that 
the ultimate criterion of choice for a metaphysical sys-
tern rests on a value decision. Fundamentally Royce would 
probably be forced to disagree with the author's concluding 
position, but he suggests it strongly, noneth eless, when 
he writes, 
Idealistic doctrines • • • L;ri! attempts to g ive form 
to the spi~itual interests of humanity. It is • • • 
in • • • Lthii! sense that idealism usually seems most 
attractive to the general reader.2 
A doctrine which defines reality in terms of the 
absolute s'lf seems bound to make promin ent the 
spiritual. 
Royce makes further suggestive statements in this connection 
1 John Wild, Plato's Theory of~ (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1946), P• 6. 
2Josiah Royce, Ih& Spirit 2£ Modern Philosophy 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Inc., 1892), p. 359. 
3Ibid., p. 345 • · 
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when he comments on the spe.culative possibility that we, 
as part of' an eternal order, may well help "i2. choose ~ 
~ ~ what world this f'atal temporal world shall eter-
nally be and have been ••• This ••• was Kant's f'amous 
doctrine." 1 
Work has been done in psychology and in philosophy 
regarding the possibility that a choice of' values is at the 
root of' categorizations and conceptualizations. That an 
o~ject is a choice of' events is a familiar concept of' 
naturalism; that this choice is of' the nature of' value 
(and all that is implied by such a contention) is a vie1.,, 
at best, neglected and lef't unexplored. Sellars says that 
11 the physical existent is not an object in its own right. 
It is made an object by the selective activity of' the 
2 percipient organism." Whitehead, who is less inclined to 
"chop up 11 the universe in terms of' spatially distinct 
blocks or categories, advisedly uses the w·ord "decision" 
to designate a thing or an object, or the process whereby 
a thing is made into a thing by the understanding. The .dual 
meaning of' 11 decision 11 is important. Decision is a "cutting 
o:ff', 11 it is the delimitation of' an area or a region of' ~.3 
1 Ibid., P• 433· 
2Roy W. Sellars, Evolutionary Naturalism (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1922), P• 44. 
3sein is defined in Chapter IV; it is the continuum 
of' all-that=is, viewed in its phenomenological mode of' 
givenness or immediacy. 
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At the same time, 11 decision 11 may mean a voluntary choice of 
1 
values. Bergson views with favor the notion that cate-
gorization is basically an evaluative decision. He says 
11 the intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of 
decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into 
2 
any system." The number of systems which the intellect 
can construct out of the flux of the given is limitless. 
The division of unorganized matter into separate 
bodies is relati~e to our senses and to our intellect 
• • • Matter, looked at as an ~ndivided whole, must 
be a flux rather than a thing. 
Things, for Bergson, are categories in the sense of the 
meta-metaphysics developed in Chapter IV: 11 In the continu-
ity of sensible qualities t'll'e mark off the boundaries of 
4 bodies." It must be added, however, that there is a basis 
or motivation for choice of categorization -- a free act 
of valuation. 
Blans:hard gives a competent and comprehensive 
account of the philosophic grounds and the psychological 
evidence for the hypothesis that classification, concept-
and category-formation is a matter of the free choice of 
values. Categorization depends on the values -- inherent 
or acquired -- of the individual making the categorial 
1 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., Inc., 1929), P• 68.---
2Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. 
Hitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911), p. 1.57. 
3 rbid., P• 186. 
4 Ibid., p. 302. 
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choices. Why is a chair ~ concept? .We .might · .c.on~ 
sider the rear legs part of the floor. 
Chairs are continuous with floors and walls, but '"'ith-
out the least hesitation we discriminate parts of the 
chair from the floor with which it is continuous and 
group them into one thing • • • Indeed, there are 
writers who would say that utility is the sole ground 
for selecting any set of qualities as essential to any 
object. 1Thf only meaning of essence is teleological,' 
James "trrot e. 
Gestalt psychology has developed the theory that 
sense tends to form into a Gestalt qualities which are 
prominent at one time, forming a whole. Joint prominence 
is found when sense data move together, or when they change 
together in some way, or when they serve a single purpose. 2 
Although these characterizations are not mutually exclusive 
-- in fact, they might all be subsumed under some kind of 
purpose -- the value element in making fundamental concep-
tual categorizations is indeed evident. This is not to say 
that the psychological evidence is subject to severe 
questioning. That Gestalten are formed is based on empiri-
cal evidence, 't~hich in turn is another Gestalt of sense data 
as p rimary and indicates by what principles sense data form 
Gestalten. The reverse is equally possible: sense data can 
be reduced to ordinary language or common sense Gestalten. 
All empirical evidence for the formation of Gestalten al-
lBrand Blanshard, ~ Nature 2f ThouTht, Vol. I 
(London t George Allen and Un"tdn, Ltd., 1939 , P• 130. 
2 Ibid., P• 132. 
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ready presupposes a system of' categories. If the con-
elusion of' the dissertation is to hold it must be true 
a priori. 
Bl.ans:hard 1 s emphasis on consistency or coherence 
(the latter includes the empirical refractory) is so un-
compromising that reasoning is reduced to system-formation. 
To think is to find li"ays in which a set of' :facts can be 
said to cohere. In a way, coherence is an imposed inter-
pretation of' the fluid ~ with a view to a freely chosen 
1 
value. Such an axiological interpretation is not fully 
in l<:eeping with Blanahard 1 s view; he does help to point the 
way. Facts are not facts independent of a categorizing 
11 va1uer. 11 A :fact is a fact only relative to a system. 2 
The view of this dissertation, that a metaphysical 
system ~x is ultimately adopted over a contending meta-
physical system l>ly' not because of' logical considerations or 
observations of the empirical refractory, but because of an 
original decisio~ about values, is a pointedly focused echo 
of' a number of' philosophic viewpoints. For Berg son, the 
ultimate order of the universe is an order into '"hich mind 
classifies Sein. The criterion for the classification is 
ultimate satisfaction with the ordering. 
In a g eneral way, reality is ordered e xactly to 
1 Ibid., Vol II, P• 24. 
2 Ibid., P• 21.5. 
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1 the degree in tmich it satisfies our thought. 
The function of .our intellect is essentially practi-
cal • Things and states are only views, tru~en 
by our mind, or b~coming. There are no things, there 
are only actions. 
Blansh ard agrees with Bergson: a mathematician has 
11 solved11 a problem when a particular ordered arrangement 
of the elements of the problem gives him the sentiment of 
satisfaction; when the order is spontaneously valued a 
solution is found. 3 
Alexander points out4 that the basic difference be-
tween idealism and realism is the starting point and the 
spirit of the method employed, opening thereby the possi-
bility of interpreting these divergent metaphysics as being 
ultimately merely different choices of values. The purpose 
of metaphysics is to unify Sein into a consistent system in 
agreement trith the empirica~ facts: 11The end of meta-
physics is to understand the universe, to find a way of 
thinking about facts in general tdiich is free from contra-
diction •. n.5 
vniitehead allows for the view that systems are not 
1Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. 
l•litchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911), p. 223. 
2Ibid., p. 248. 
"=l ~Brand Blanshard, ~ Nature 2f ThouTht, Vol. I 
(London: George Allen and Um'lin, Ltd., 1939 , p. 489. 
4 Samuel Alexander, Space. Time,~ Deity, Vol. I 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 8 • 
.5F. H. Bradley, Appearance~ Reality (2d ed., 
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897), p. 120. 
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"objectively true" but . rather useful, workable, and 
valuable when he states that 
The true method of philosophical construction is to 
:frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and 
unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of' ex-
perience in terms of' that scheme • • • All construc-
tive thought, on the various special topics of' 
scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme, 
unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding 
the imagination. The importance of' philosophy lies 
in its sustained e:f':fort to make such schemes explicit, 
and thereby capable of criticism and improvement.! 
Finally, that value is central in :formulating world 
views has long been a contention of personalism. The 
specific values to be preserved are centered about the 
:fact and concept of "person." This point is illustrated 
.. 
when Bertocci writesl 
The maturing person seeks to organize his desires and 
his sense-data into a plan of' living which will even-
tuate in the realization, preservation, and increase 
of values he considers worthwhile. The order of' 
coherent purpose, in other words, transcends the order 
of th~ mechanical; the order 2f things is hardly in-
telligible unless it becomes an order 2£ means, instru-
mental to the experience and realization of an en-
visioned purpose. 2 
lAlfred N. Whitehead, Process ~ Reality (New 
York& The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. x. 
2Peter A. Bertocci, 11The Person as the Key Metaphy-
sical Principle," Philosophy .!!lS! Phenomenological Research, 
XVII (1956), P• 211. 
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Solution~ 2.f. ~general problem.--(1) Nontague's 
Visions. Iviontague feels that logical positivism and its 
influence has dealt a serious blo't..r to the entire philo-
sophie enterprise. There are afoot in the academic world 
three so-called 11 plans 11 to save philosophy. (i) Some 
academicians teach the history of philosophy rather than 
philosophy. But if philosophy has ceased to be a genuine 
field of' knowledge, why ,teach its history? (ii) Some try 
to save philosophy by teaching only ethics and asserting 
that the latter is equivalent to philosophy in general. 
Ir ethics is taught alone, that is, without the support of 
metaphysics, it will become absorbed into sociology. There 
remains (iii) the plan of those 
who may, perhaps, be called the Cambridge school. 
One thinks here of Moore and Russell, Whitehead in 
his pre-cosmological period, Susan Stebbing and other 
members of the Aristotelian Society, and of Wittgen-
stein • • • \~at is exp1icitly or implicitly advocated 
by this group is the policy of restricting philosophy 
neither to history nor to social problems, but to a 
determinedly rigorous analysis of experience and its 
categories. 
To this attempt to save philosophy from the advance 
of science I find two objections. In the first place, 
the field of refuge is very narrow·, and pretty dry. If 
metaphysical analysis is to attain the absolute rigor 
of mathematical demonstration it will be necessary to 
limit its subject matter to such bits and forms of 
experience as can be identified and defined with com-
plete absence of ambiguity. 
There would be a tendency for the new analytic 
philosophy to follow the evolution of modern mathe-
matics and tdthdrat,r more and more from the domain of 
the intuitable stuff to the domain of forms artificially 
conventionalized and, therefore, perfectly controllable. 
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In the second place • • • an increasing demand f'or 
increasing rigor will inevitably result in complete 
symbolic f'ormalization • • • The only proper people 
to handle the new metaphysical grammar 't,rill be our 
colleagues, the mathematical logicians or logisticians 
••• They will ••• set up shop f'or themselves ••• 
and • • • tal{e with them what is alleged to be our last 
:ema~ninf function of' distinctive and legitimate 
1nqu1ry. · 
1-Iontague clearly thinks that the problem of' philo-
sophie antitheses at the present time, as evidenced by the 
quarrel between logical positivism and its semantic and 
logistic sequel with the more traditional metaphysics, and 
also with existentialism, can no longer be called a dif'f'er-
ence of' opinion. The 't'lar is on. Logical positivism has set 
itself' out to vanquish mercilessly traditional metaphysics, 
existentialism, and others by branding all these n on-sense. 
Montague accepts the challenge and fulminates: 
We have heard that the Emperor Nero fiddled when 
Rome was burning • • • We philosophers are guilty 
of' a kind of' fiddling • • • We are • • • joining too 
much in the game of' logical positivism • • • The main 
bulk of' what is now called semantics • • • might be 
compared to a game more dif'f'icult than gin rummy and 
equal perhaps to contract bridge itself' • • • I 
simply cannot bear to see philosophy smother under a 
mountain of' pif'f'le, and especially at a moment in 
history when the problems of' man's world an~ man him-
self' are crying so stridently f'or solution. 
According to Montague, l .ogical positivism demands 
an excessive amount of' certainty, a certainty · which is not 
essential to the f'ulf'illing of' the proper function of' 
philosophy. 
1 William P. Montague, Great Visions £! Philosophy 
(La Salle: The Open Court Pub. Co., 1950), pp. 7-11. 
2Ibid., p. xii. 
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The abysmal gap between a metaphysician's con-
clusions and the meager data on which they are 
£ounded is not to be bridgeg by any logic o£ demon-
stration. I£ the worth o£ philosophy were to be 
measured by its certainty philosophy would be in a 
very poor lvay. 
Disillusionment and a mood o£ de£eatism is making 
itsel£ £elt throughout our entire guild. H0'\11' can l11'e 
go on with speculative theories about the constitution 
o£ reality Yhen the winds o£ scienti£ic knowledge • • • 
are sweeping around us and covering the once £ertile 
£ields o£ £ancy with the arid sands o£ £act?l 
We should rid ourselves once £or all o£ our pre-
occupation with proving our theories and engage upon 
a di££erent enterprise.2 
Montague proposes the £allowing solution in reply 
to the £undamental criticism o£ metaphysics advanced by 
logical positivism and its retinue. Montague recommends 
the "abandoning to science the quest £or certainty and 
L,Philosophl:] taking £or hersel£ the £ield of vision. 11 3 
Montague continues, 
To con£ine one's attention to the actual is to 
narrow one's spirit to brutish dimensions ••• So 
it is that the great visions o£ philosophy, even i£ 
considered merely as visions, are p~ecious and imper-
ishable possessions of our culture. 
Anyone who aspires to being educated even a little 
should know something o£ the great guesses that have 
been made in answer to the riddle of the universe --
guesses which are, indeed, the great visions of philo-
sophy, of l11'hich the historic religions constitute only 
a small fraction.5 
libid.' P• 7· 
2 Ibid., P• 11. 
3Ibid., P• 14. 
4Ibid.' P• 16. 
5Ibid., P• x. 
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Montague dral-iS a distinction between knOl'lledge of 
the ~ and knowledge of the l'lhich. Knowledge of the which 
is specific 11 scientific" knowledge; knOl'lledge of the ~ 
is knolll'ledge of t}le possibilities from which choices can 
be made. 
\fuat proof is to science, and what faitf is to 
religion, probability is to philosophy. 
Knowledge possesses two quite different levels. 
There is knowledge of the ~ and there is knowledge 
of the l'lhich. The former usually precedes the latter. 
Before we can knO'tiT which of the tl'IO possibilities is 
realized in fact lie must knO't'l, at least to some extent, 
lll'hat the possibilities are bet'tveen which a choice is to 
be made. In any pursuit of truth imaginative anticipa-
tion precedes logical proof. The proof' may be of' the 
concrete, empirical kind established by observation and 
experiment; or it may be of' the abstract, mathematical 
kind established 1:5y formal demonstration.2 
But whether the verification be inductive or de-
ductive, a knowledge of' what is to be proved must come 
before the proof' itself'. Logic can never create or 
discover; and its function, however important, is 
secondary rather than primary. It is the censor and 
the arbiter of' our fancies, not their m~~er. In short, 
it is imagination that proposes and reason that disposes.3 
Furthermore, as Aristotle's recommended life of con-
templation, the vision of' vision, like poetry, is autotelic: 
Yet, "tdlen we turn f'rom the proof's of' Spinoza to 
the philosophy they li'ere designed to substantiate, the 
vision disclosed to us is anything but paltry. It is 
sublime and majestic to a degree hardly equaled in 
history ••• A universe in which human personality and 
all its fears and hopes are concomitants of' the per-
ishable body and lacking in significance or value
4
£'or 
the impersonal l'ihole of' which they are fragments. 
1 Ibid., P• 20. 
2 Ibid., P• 11 
3Ibid., P• 12. 
4rbid., P• 17. 
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And so as with Spin~za, so too with Kant and all 
the rest -- not in their proofs but in their visions 
lies their greatness.! 
I£ philosophy, then, is intelligent guessing about 
the possibilities of facts, what is the function of the 
proofs found in philosophic visions? Proofs, although 
secondary, like corollaries, help to clarify the mother 
theorem or vision. 
But t~ile lacking the values of their primary in-
tent, the arguments of philosophy often possess a real 
though secondary importance. They may clarify the 
meaning of the vision though failing utterly to sub-
stantiate its truth. For this reason the study of a 
philosopher's vision should sometimes include the 
study of the proofs advanced in its support; and for 
the same reason a consideration of the biography of 
a philosopher, and of the age and social setting in 
'tvhich he lived, may be pertinent to an appreciation 
of his aper9u. To that extent and to that extent 
alone should the facts of philosophic history and 
the circumstances under 't'll'hich a philosophic vision t-ras 
produced be of concern to students in phiiosophy.2 
In addition to the intrinsic worth of visions, the 
latter are of use to science: 
The philosopher will follow up the envisioning 
of possibilities with clarifying analyses of their 
implications, and these may be helpful even for the 
business of observation and experiment.J 
Realizing that the latter justification of philo-
sophy as vision -- although perhaps attractive to the logi-
cal positivists against tdlich he is arguing -- malces philo-
sophy an ancillary to science, Montague quickly appends 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., PP• 17-18. 
Jibid., P• 16. 
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this quali~ication: 
It ,.,ould be • • • not merely a misunderstanding of' 
the position I am defending but a vast pity in itself 
i~ a philosophy o~ vision were to rest its main justi-
~ication on1 the occasional chance o~ its being useful in science. 
1-iontague 1 s com~orting peroration is: 
If philosophers will consent gladly and with right 
good will to embark on this voyage and sail ~orever 
the blue waterst where possible rather than proven 
truths are to be ~ound, I believe that philosophy her-
sal~ will suf~er a sea change into something which, i~ 
not rich and strange, will at least be more like her 
ancient self and re~reshingly dif~erent ~rom the dole-
ful and bedraggled creature which, during recent years, 
she seems to have become.2 
(2) Critical Evaluation o~ Montague's View. This 
dissertation takes advantage of Montague's view· o~ philo-
sophy as vision as one o~ the possibilities for integration. 
At the same time, certain details of his solution to philo-
sophical antitheses seem unsatisfactory, especially his 
discussion of certainty, his partial subjection o~ philo-
sophy to science, and his rejection of semantics as useful 
to philosophy as vision. 
In the opinion of the author of the dissertation, 
philosophy as vision of reality ~ulfills two basic rational 
needs of man. In the first place, a vision is synoptic, 
enabling man to see, comprehend, and "possess" all being at 
one view as on a map. IU1owledge may be de~ined as the 
1 Ibid., P• 1.5. 
2 Ibid., P• 13. 
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bringing into one coherent system of all available facts. 
The ultimate unity of' all knOl17'ledge must therefore be a 
single, all-comprehending vision of' reality. Man's quest 
for kno't1ledge finds its ultimate satisfaction only in such 
a synoptic vision of' all availabie, facts. And the 11 vision 11 
to which MontagU.e refers is u ·sually synoptic. In the 
second place, any ans\..rer to man 1 s quest after a sunnnum 
bonum must be justified by and grounded in a vision of' 
reality as a whole. Our vision of the world -- for instance, 
whether the universe is indifferent or whether it is cor-
dial and sensitive toward man's ultimate aspirations 
determines our value system. Philosophy as comprehensive 
vision is without doubt a fundamental vindication of' the 
importance and usefulness of' philosophy. 
On the other side of' the ledger there are a series 
of objections to Montague's view. N:ontague states that 11 if' 
certainty is to be the single goal of' the mind's activity 
it \..rould seem as though the knell of' philosophy had struck. 111 
It may l..rell prove um..rarranted to rule out a priori the 
possibility of' certainty in philosophy. After all, What ~ 
certainty? If', for example, we use a pragmatic criterion 
of truth, or a coherence criterion of truth, a vision may 
lfell be said to possess certainty within the specific frame-
work of the definition of truth involved. Certainty might 
be de~ined, not as in logic -- where it o~ten means merely 
non-contradiction or consistency (and the necessary connec-
tions found in a syllogism) within any care~ully de~ined 
system or universe o~ discourse, and where certainty is 
de~inable not by the system itsel~ but only in terms o~ a 
meta-system -- but certainty, or probability, in this case, 
may be de~ined as the satis~ying o~ certain deductive con-
ditions which are veri~iable experimentally, as is the case 
with the scienti~ic-method type of empiricism generally. 
Ivlontague, in e~~ect, rejects semantics and log ic as 
bas ically no more relevant to philosophic visions than 
mathematics or biology; yet, perhaps a semantic, conceptual, 
de~initional analysis o~ philosophy and the meaning o~ truth 
"lvill enable one to understand better Nontague 1 s o1m vie't·t o~ 
philosophy as vision. 
Nontague's concept o~ philosophy as vision is one 
o~ the proposed solutions to the problem of philosophical 
antitheses. 
The spirit o~ Montague's concept o~ philosophy as 
vision must be de~ined; also, the extent to which Montague's 
"t'lOrk is an attempt parallel to that o~ the dissertation, 
nrunely, preparing the ground ~or a metaphysical reunion or 
a system whereby dif~erences can be localized, must be 
discovered; and lastly, the relation between truth and value 
in Montague's concept o~ vision must be understood. 
First, as to the meaning o~ vision, Itfon tague holds 
that a vision serves the dual purpose of, ~irst, un~olding 
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possibilities :for logical, scientific, and philosophical 
investigations and, second, providing the beholder of the 
vision with an infinite and irreducible value experience. 
It is this latter :function of' philosophy as vision which 
gives it its foremost reason for being. 
Secondly, philosophy as vision is a possible answer 
to the problem of' philosophical or metaphysical antitheses. 
A vision is true if it is basically consistent and in agree-
ment with the known f'acts; to the extent of' consistency 
all visions might agree 'tdth one another, in principle, if 
not in specific detail. Furthermore, the basic dif':fer-
ence f'rom vision to vision is a different purpose or a 
di:ff'erent conception o:f value. Montague does not develop 
this point to its :full and logical conclusion but he cer-
tainly points to the path o:f philosophical synthesis by 
implying that philosophical dif':ferences are to be localized 
as value di:ff'erences. Metaphysical synthesis reduces to 
value synthesis. 11 1-lith regard to main interests, LmoderrJ 
philosophers may b~ divided into naturalists and humanists. 111 
The basic di:f:ference between naturalism and humanism is not 
particularly that both cover di:ff'erent :facts or that they 
are consistent or coherent in varying degrees, but that they 
represent :fundamentally distinct interests. Here, in the 
value statement regarding interest, is apparently where 
1 Ibid., P• 241. 
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philosophies really differ. If a conunon basis :for 
valuation can be found, a basic synthesis of philosophies 
also can be found. A more detailed definition of 11 value 11 
is found at the end of Chapter II. 
(3) Schiller and Personality. Schiller feels that 
philosophic disagreements are essential to the nature of 
philosophy. 11 Is there something in the very nature of 
philosophy which makes it inevitable that philosophers 
should disagree? This is the question • • • to tll'hich I 
1Yish to give a ;easoned anst'ler in the a:ffirmative. 111 In 
fact, "toleration of di:fferences and disagreements may be 
a char~cteristic mark o:f its Lj)hilosophy'iJ superiority." 2 
On the other hand, Schiller comes :forth with a 
positive program which will not only settle inevitable 
philosophic di:fferences, but which 111'ill view these differ-
ences :from a single coherent viewpoint. 
According to Schiller, philosophic disagreements are 
due to differences in the personalities of the authors. A 
philosophic system is a personal confession shrouded in a 
mystifying and misguided pseudo-objectivity. "Personality 
cannot be ignored by Philosophy; it is a fact :for H~ilosophy 
which cannot be overlooked. 11 3 
1 F. C. S. Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1934), P• J. 
2Ibid., P• 4. 
3Ibid., P• 9· 
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The historian o~ philosophy can £ind no consistency 
in any philosophy. Taken as timeless systems, in 
abstraction £rom the personality in which they were 
rooted and grew up, all are de~ective, nay incompre-
hensible • • • The_real connexions o£ the philo-
sophic systems he Lthe criti£7 criticizes may be 
psychological and aesthetic rather than logical: a 
system o£ philosophy is best regarded as a sort o~ 
poetry • • • Nevertheless he insists on viewing the 
system £rom the outside, as a logical structure, and 
not as a psychological process extending over a 
lifetime. And he thereby throws away, or loses, the 
key to understanding. 
Thus we see that Philosophy cannot £ul~ill its 
chosen ~unction o£ unifying experience without in-
cluding in its synthesis all the idioslncrasies and 
personalities which the whole a££ords. 
Philosophy has concentrated its attention on uni-
versal concepts and abstractions -- as has science --
ignoring an analysis o£ the particulars whence spring the 
universals. 11The di££erences between particulars ••• 
are simply assu~ed to be irrelevant ~or scientific purposes, 
and are ignored. 112 
One o£ the most fundamental 11 particulars 11 is per-
sonality, and when it comes to philosophic syst ems, the 
personality o£ the philosopher devising his system is the 
key to understanding truly his system. Acrimonious philo-
sophie debates are merely personality conflicts. 
LPhilosopheril carry on an inconclusive and unending 
warfare, precisely because neither side has hitherto 
penetrated to the psychological core o£ its opponent's 
creed • .3 
1 Ibid., P• 11. 
2 6 . Ibid., P• 
Jibid.' P• 12. 
Although Schiller provides us with a method of 
understanding the cause of philo.sophic antitheses, it 
still remains to be .shown -- by carrying out his program 
in detail -- to which extent a single all-encompassing 
system of the universe is possibla. Such is Schiller's 
hope for the function o£ philosophy& "Philosophy, and 
Philosophy alone, is the study of all the data, and to its 
all-embracing purpose nothing can be presumed to be ir-
relevant."1 
Schiller agrees with Montague in that valuations 
may be at the root of decisions regarding final truth. 
These roots are not called decisions about values but mat-
ters of temperament, so that psychology might become the 
science which views different temperaments from ~ point 
o£ view and becomes thereby for Schiller the ultimate 
philosophic synthesis. 
(4) Pepper's Hypotheses. Pepper's analysis of 
World Hypotheses may be viewed as another attempt at recon-
ciling philosophical systems. He partially endorses 
positivistic conventionalism, which holds that hypotheses 
generally are mnemonic and otherwise useful devices for 
collecting data. 
To the positivist a hypothesis is a human convention 
for the purpose of keeping data in order; it has no 
cognitive value in itself • • • A prediction is 
no t hing but an anticipated correlation • • • Man has 
a limited memory and a limited attention. If it were 
not for these limitations he would not need hypotheses 
1 Ibid., P• 9. 
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• • • The same data can. often be organized in 
different systems, depending upon the postulates or 
primitive concepts employed. As between two such 
systems, the one mosr economical of a scientist's 
thought is the best. 
The one difficulty with the positivistic view is 
that, based on the theory o:f types, it can allow no World 
Hypothesis. 
It Lthe theory of typeiJ states that some items in 
the universe cannot be included in a theory about the 
universe (namely, the analyzing concepts themselves), 
whence it follows that descriptions of the universe 
as a whole are meaningless. 2 
Pepper, in his estimation, saves conventionalism as a 
possible solution to philosophical disputes. If conven-
tionalism is true, different philosophical systems are 
different arrangements o:f the same facts fulfilling a 
variety of functions. Conventionalism would assert that 
what appear to be real conflicts are surface disputes only, 
cognitively without significance, since hypotheses do not 
tell us anything about the structure of' the universe. 
Positivism uses the theory of types as an argument 
against the possibility of world hypotheses. Pepper tries 
to meet the difficulty in the following way: 
Symbolic logic originated in the intention of giving 
a mathematical formulation to the concepts of' tradi-
tional :formal logic • • • We suspect that the primi-
1stephen c. Pepper, World HyTotheses (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1942 , pp. 71-72. 
2Ibid., P• 156. 
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tive ideas of symbolic logic are in large part 
derived from the categories of formism. We sus-
pect, therefore, that the Theory of Types is nothing 
more than a systematization of the categorial dis-
tinctions in formism between relations and ties, and 
that it presupposes the very world theory and the 
very difficulties of t~t theory which it is pro-
posed. to resolve • • .LThe theory of typei7 tells what 
concepts we are to exclude from an analysis in formist 
terms if we wish to avoid trouble. It probably repre-
sents an irremediable inadequacy within the formistic 
world theory, and points to a region where the theofY 
in terms of its own logic confesses its inadequacy. 
A further important point in what may be construed 
to be Pepper's attempt at resolving philosophical differ-
ences is his discussion of root metaphors. A hypothesis 
is adequate if it is a ''root metaphor, 11 tfhich is developed 
in the following way: 
A man desiring to understand the world looks about for 
a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some 
area of common sense fact and tries if he cannot under-
stand other areas in terms of this one. This original 
area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor. 
He describes as best he can the characteristics of this 
area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure. A 
list of its structural characteristics becomes his 
basic concepts of explanation and de script ion. \'ie call 
them a set of categories. In terms of these categories 
he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether 
uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes 
to interpret all facts in terms of these categories. 
As ·a result of the impact of these other facts upon 
his categories, he may qualify and readjust the cate-
gories, so that a set of categories commonly changes 
and develops.2 · 
In this way Pepper dampens the arbitrariness of 
positivistic conventionalism. A world hypothesis is perhaps 
conventionalistic, yet it also is grounded in the world 
1 Ibid., pp. 158-159· 
2 Ibid., P• 91. 
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around . us to the extent to which it is based on a metaphor 
1 derived :from the world o:f common sense. 
Pepper differs :from both Schiller and Montague in 
his partial endorsement of conventionalism, the viel'll' that 
truth is a device which orders data in a convenient :form. 
Upon :further analysis, however, conventionalism differs 
from Montague's ordering of all data in terms o:f visions 
only in that the former adds nothing to the data whereas 
the latter postulates entities and existents above and 
beyond the data themselves, such . as, for example, God. 
Otherwise . the difference between Montague and Pepper is 
merely one o.f ·value or temperamental choices. Certainty and 
the study of nature are of more interest to Pepper than 
grand visions charged with :feeling, which interest Montague. 
At this point a summary is in order. The purpose 
of the dissertation is a discussion of the nature of philo-
sophie disagreement with a view to opening paths for 
possible reconciliations. Three differing views which 
maintain that the differences are not contradictory and 
mutually exclusive are those of Montague, Schiller, and 
Pepper. The path pointed out by the three men discussed 
this far is that truth and reality are terms which perhaps 
are even more :fundamentally grounded on some prior value 
judgment, termed interest by Montague, temperament by Schiller, 
and perhaps the "purpose" for a conventionalistic organiza-
1 Ibid., P• 84. 
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tion of facts by Pepper. This is not to say that these 
three are synonymous. These are, however, related to the 
choice among. values. :t-:Iontague holds that philosophy is 
vision, and visions are not mutually exclusive but they 
are world-views differing in purpose and success. Oppos-
ing l-IOrld-views :fit into one larger world-view 1v-hich is 
111..rhat does man want to do with his kno1;;ledge? 11 Having 
decided the 1atter question, we have a criterion for the 
adequacy of a philosophic system, each system representing 
a di:f:ferent purpose or emphasis. Schiller can be viewed as 
attempting to place di:f:ferent philosophic systems into one 
larger whole when he states that philosophic di:f:ferences 
are personality di:f:ferences, and the latter all :form part 
o:f one larger system o:f psychology. The question of' truth 
is not answered because-- even i:f Schillerrs view were other-
wise acceptable -- there still is true and :false psychology. 
Pepper's viewpoint, probably the most systematic of' all 
three, is that di:f:ferent conventionalistic hypotheses --
dealing with the same set of :facts -- are reducible to one 
another, or equivalent, except that some are better mnemon-
ic devices than others. Adequate but opposing convention-
alistic hypotheses are like two logical systems, internally 
consistent, on the surface mutually contradictory, yet 
reducible to one another. 
An example of mutual reducibility is di:f:ficult to 
give and hardly ever worked out except in terms of' sweeping 
4.5 
generalizations by the positivistic representatives them-
selves. An example of' the conventionalistic theory of' 
equivalences among systems on a non-philosophic level 
might be the f'ollowing. 
Under certain laboratory conditions a severed f'rog 
egg grolfS into two smaller f'rogs, not into an anterior and 
posterior half' separately. A f'ourfold severance yields 
f'our little but complete f'rogs. Assuming these f'ew f'acts 
are the only ones available f'or theory construction (except 
the world of' common sense as a source of' root metaphors), 
which theory about this sequence of' events is true? Con-
ventionalistic positivism would have to contend that the 
f'acts can be summarized in terms of' the mnemonic device 
called 11 vitalism11 on the one hand, and "mechanism" on the 
other. If' no f'urther experimentation or evidence is brought 
into the picture, either the postulation of' a vitalistic 
purposive guide or principle which is attracted by and has 
cognizance of' a terminus or goal, or the equally postula-
tory existence of' a mechanism of' bodies and pushes within 
the cells themselves, will both account with equal consis-
tency f'or these f'acts. It must be understood that the 
postulated existents exist (until f'urther evidence proves 
otherwise) only in a "manner of' speaking;" they are mnemon-
ic conveniences. Inasmuch as vitalism and mechanism, as 
here illustrated, deal with the same f'acts, and deal with 
them lfi th logical consistency, the two theories or meta-
l.t-6 
physics are interchangeable. However, inasmuch as the two 
systems fulfill a different purpos e or vary in usefulness 
for further cognitive explorations, their truth and reality 
coefficient, for conventionalistic positivism, varies in 
direct proportion to the value of the theory. 
In answer to the question whether here are represented 
different vie1vs of' truth or different truths, the affirmative 
must be given to the former. But this question 1nll be 
answered more specifically in Chapter IV where the perma-
nent and the variable elements of truth are discussed. An 
untrue philosophical system tvould be one w·hich is logically 
inconsistent, does not agree with the facts as given, and 
(or) is contrary to the value w·hich set in motion the quest 
for the system or theory itself. This vielv is also expanded 
i n Chapter IV. 
The use of Pepper's conception of' positivism as 
an extended example to indicate the purpose of' the disserta-
tion is not intended to set the tone of the dissertation as 
a 1vhole. The author tries to avoid partisanship, his main 
purpose being that of' developing a flexible and open mind 
toward the fantastic variety of visions philosophers have 
had for the last three millenia. 
The above are three possible patterns of solutions 
to the fundamental problem of philosophical differences. 
Solution~ 2f ~particular Eroble~.--(1) Existen-
tialism Against Analytic Philosophy. For the purposes of 
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illustrating the most vociferous logomachies on the present 
philosophi.c . firmament, the anti thesis between existential-
ism and the philosophy of analysis will serve as example. 
The philosophy of analysis, termed analytic philosophy in 
this dissertation, covers such schools as positivism, logi-
cal positivism, the Vienna Circle, logical empiricism, 
semantics, artd such writers as Wisdom . and Ryle ., Stevenson 
and Moore, Russell and Carnap, Reichenbach and Wittgenstein. 
On the other side of the camp are arrayed philosophies 
which the author would like to class as humanistic philo-
sophies, those views which are principally concerned with 
questions regarding man's summum bonum. Among these we 
find the philosophia perennis, mysticism, idealism, absolute 
idealism, Thomistic realism, personalism, and, today, existen-
tialism. 
1 An article by Ritchie illustrates little more than 
the sparks engendered by the clashing of linguistic swords. 
Ritchie takes up an article by the existentialist Abbagnano, 
states its tenets, and casts his venom on the egregious con-
2 tents of Abbagano's writing. Ritchie represents Abbag-
nano's view in t he following quotation: 
Doubt, expectancy, and every concrete attitude of man 
1A. M. Ritchie, 11 Language, .Logic, and Existentialism, 11 
Philosophy~ Phenomenological Research, 10 (1950). 
2 Ibid., P• 398. 
are po~sible only because man does not knaii' what 
he is. 
Is there anything, indeed, beyond? Man asks questions, 
and so exists; when all the ~uestions are answered, 
he will know himself and be. 
Ritchie's biting sarcasm shows in his rephrasing of Abbag-
nano 1 s writing, in 11hich Ritchie attempts to separate the 
11 true 11 meaning of Abbagnano's statements: 
~fuat alone can be made of the article is the contention 
that all men strive to know themselves; no men know 
themselves yet, and when they do they will kn011T them-
selves.3 . 
Ritchie's own comment is limited to the insight that 
sufficient has been done to show how the sounding 
periods accompany vague and incompetent verbalizing, 
the sort of orchestration that terrifies the market 
place and even hypnotizes scholars • • • And the more 
inspired passages of eithe~ Kierkegaard or Hegel are 
magnificently meaningless. 
He ends with the acerbic comment that follows: 
1fuat account can be given of the copula -- or the verb 
11 to be'' -- is, naturally t a further question. It 
happens to be a philosophic one, and would not concern 
the philosophizer.5 
Meyerhoff calls attention to not-so .. gentle senti-
ments obtaining bet'\1Teen existentialism and analytic philo-
sophy when he 11rites, 
No two philosophies, we feel, could be more unlike each 
other in every respect. In fact, each loolcs upon the 
other as the very antithesis of what philosophy is or 
libid.' P• 399· 
2l:bid.' P• 401. 
3 Ibid., p. 407. 
4Ibid., p. 40.5. 
.5Ibid., P• 407 • 
ought to be. .A logical empiricist considers exis-. 
tentialism at best a harmless form of poetic picture 
language, at worst as cloudy, meaningless meta- -
physical gibberish. The existentialist, in turn, 
regards logical empiricism at best as a harmless 
intellectual game manipulating empty symbols, at worst 
as blind logic-chopping and a betrayal of the 11 gen-
teel tradition" in philosophy.l · . 
Jl.ieyerhoff also calls attention to Wittgenstein 1 s position 
that questions regax:ding man's summum .bonum, or the ques-
tions of humanistic philosophy, are no questions at all: 
Tl~e point of departure for the sharp difference be-
tween these two movements in contemporary philosophy 
comes out clearest in the following statement by 
W'ittgensteint 11 \Y'e feel that even if .ill, possible 
scientific questions be answered, the problems of life 
have still not been touched at all. Of course there 
is then no question left, and this is the answer." 
(Ludw·ig tvittgenst ein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Ne"tv York, London, 1922, pp. 186-187). Existentialism 
is of course preciselr, concerned with these questions, 
"the problems of life 1 (or existence), which \•/ittgen-
stein and the tradition of logical empiricism 
• · • . • consider unanswerable, because they cannot be 
stated in meaningful sentences.2 
Similarly, Horton \'lhite' s essay in ~ ~ 2f. .Analy-
~ is primarily an awareness of the vast philosophica1 
differences between existentialism and the philosophy of 
analysis. 3 
An article 'liThich rather than taking sides gropes for 
solutions and is one of the fe"t1T studies in its field was 
1 Hans Meyerhoff, "Emotive and Existentialist Theories 
of Ethics," ~nil..!. 2[. Philosophy, 48 (19.51), p. 769. 
2Ibid., p. 780, footnote. 
JMorton \~~ite, ~ ~ £! .Analysis (New York: The 
New American Library, 19.5.5), pp. 236-238. 
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l~itten by Walter Cerf. 1 Cerf seeks to bring into relief 
the differences betl<Jeen what here are termed analytic and 
humanistic philosophies, between positivism and existen-
tialism. Cerf 1 s dichotomy is schematized as the more 
specialized difference between logical positivism and exis-
tentialism. Cerf uses existentialism and logical positivism 
merely as illustration of a much "t-Tider cultural ri:ft \<Jhich 
he calls "the t'\'10 main tendencies in contemporary philosophy. 
The·.two tendencies are Scientism and Humanism." 2 An inter-
esting and comprehensive statement of the extent and nature 
of the struggle is found at the outset of the article: 
~be two most antagonistic schools in contemporary 
Western philosophy are Existentialism and Logical 
Positivism. They have nothing in common but the 
name of philosophy, and even that they deny each 
other. There is some kind of discussion going on 
between even such distant schools as Pragmatism and 
neo-Thomism; Existentialists and Logical Positivists 
have nothing but sarcasms for each other. To philo-
sophers familiar only '\dth the Anglo-Saxon scene 
Existentialism must appear negligible. In the 
Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, l-There 
philosophy is a much more popular pastime, Existen-
tialism has an unparalleled vogue and Logical Posi-
tivism is considered a horrible aberration from the 
naturally speculative course of philosophy. In South 
America whose philosophical life we are apt to under-
rate Logical Positivism seems to be known to almost 
nobody, whereas Existentialism, mostly in its ~erman 
and anti-religious shape, has become, quite paradoxi-
cally, the rallying point of "Liberalism," liberalism, 
in Spanish countries, being above all anti-catholicism. 
1 walter Cerf, 11 Logical Positivism and Existential-
ism," Philosophy .2.f. Science, 18 (19.51). 
2 Ibid., P• 327 • 
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Although, ironically enough, both Logical Positivism 
and modern Existentialism originaued in German speaking 
countries, the split between the two goes vaguely 
parallel 1...rith, and may have f'ound some ready echo in, 
the dif'f'erent cultural inheritance of' the Anglo-Saxon 
and Latin races.l 
The outstanding characteristic of' what Cerf' calls 
scientism~ : indicated as follows: 
Philosophy is the science of' science in that its 
principal functions consist in an analysis and justi-
fication of' the methods and means (language) used by 
the sciences, of' the concepts and presuppositions 
basic to the scienc~s, and of' the knowledge-relation, 
generally speaking. 
On the other hand, a good characterization of' humanism is 
found in this passage: 
Humanistic philosophy, comprises such dif'f'erent schools 
as Cassirer 1 s Philosophical Anthropology, Dilthey 1 s 
Philosophy of' Lif'e, Nicolai Hartmann.' s Ontology o:f the 
Spirit, some of' Pragmatism, much of' the thought in 
Catholicism and Protestantism, and finally Existential-
ism, the most fashionable of' all. By Humanism, then, 
is meant here a rather vague denominator common to all 
of' these, the striving towards a new self-understanding 
of' man, the methods of' which self-understanding are 
supp osedly independent of', and dif'f'erent f'rom, the 
methods used by the various sciences that deal with 
man and his world.3 
Humanism is characterized as being a philosophy of' value, 
af'f'irming the possibility of' a genuine moral philosophy, 
whereas scientism rejects such a possibility. "One may say, 
oversimplifying matters, that in Existentialism moral philo-
sophy swallo1vs theoretical philosophy and in Logical 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• ,328. 
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Positivism theoretical philosophy swallows moral philo-
1 
sophy." 
Cer:f points to the :fundamental :fact that "to the 
Existentialist ••• the ultimate source :from which thought 
derives what genuineness it has is ~ Erlebnis, some in-
tensely :felt experience o:f 1 la condition humaine'z whereas 
to the scientific philosopher philosophizing is motivated 
by an intellectual interest in a certain kind o:f meaningful 
and well-defined problem." 2 This situation, as will be dis-
cussed in the conclusion, illuminates the possibility that 
basic philosophic di:f:ferences are di:f:ferences in the 
choices o:f values. The starting points :for scientism and 
humanism are di:f:ferent valuations, di:f:ferent purposes. 
The :first possible grounds :for common discussion Cer:f 
:finds in the existentialist method o:f phenomenological 
description which, according to him, is also used by Logi-
cal Positivism. Both deal with problems in semantics and 
syntactics; 3 both reconstruct the given, the immediate 
presentations. 
The task shouldered by the Logical Positivist o:f a 
logical reconstruction o:f the language o:f science 
and the phenomenological intention o:f :finding :for the 
sciences an absolute :foundation in the realm o:f the 
constitutive acts o:f the transcendental consciousness 
are similar enterprises on di:f:ferent levels • • • 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., P• 329. 
3Ibid.' P• JJO. 
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Phenomenology and Logical Positivism can work to-
gether, supplementing each other, 'trl.thin the same 
orbit, although on different levels, Logical Posi-
tivism as logical analysis of' the language of' science, 
Phenomenology as analysis of the constitutive acts 
of transcendental consciousness.! 
Logical positivism and existentialism can examine 
each other in terms of' their basic assumptions or as 
the author of the dissertation would like to term it 
categorial schemes. Scientism and humanism, Ceri' seems to 
2 
conclude, can be reduced to one another. 
Cerf' points to the fact that according to the exis-
tentialist interpretation of scientism the latter is a 
Weltanschauung rooted ultimately and primarily not in facts 
or truth but in a value judgment. "Behind science and 
scientific philosophy there stands this basic Urentschei-
dung (Primal Decision) of man about himself': I am rational. 11 3 
This decision or choice of value (reason-value) is of a 
meta-rational character. 4 
Scientism and humanism are pitted lucidly one 
against the other in Cerf' 1 s summary statement that 11 to the 
Logical Positivist, Existentialism simply isn't philosophy, 
as it does not abide by the rational standards oi' meaning-
ful discourse. To the Existentialist, Logical Positivism is 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 332. 
4Ibid. 
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just one more expression o~ a meta-physical Urentscheidung, 
that, namely, o~ man as rational animal. 111 
Viewed in historical perspective the clash between 
these two viel..rs is not one ~urther ~amiloy quarrel, accord-
ing to Cer~, but is evidence of the birth pains of a new 
science: the science o~ science. "We are witnessing today 
the splitting o~~ o~ a new science ~rom the philosophical 
mother-stem, a new science of science, a kind of mathesis 
universalis, comprising Semiotics, Logic,Methodology, and 
1-ia.thematics. 112 
The two philosophies can, however, be started on 
the path to reconciliation if the logical positivist makes 
the concession of admitting that (a) his ''criterion of 
meaningfUlness is conditioned by his own meta-rational 
conception of man as rational and that (b) 'meaningful 
discourse' could still be possible, with a change in the 
standards of meaningfulness, in the meta-rationa.l sphere. 11 3 
Similarly, existentialists can profitably accept the posi-
tivist's rational rigor and "formulate clearly the condi-
tions of communicable thought in the meta-rational sphere. 11 4 
Existentialism "absolutely must gain clarity about its Olm 
language, the language of meta-rational discourse. 11 5 Cerf 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ihid., P• 333. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., P• 337. 
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here ignore.s the inf'ini te regress he advocates. Exis-
tentialism is meta-philosophy to logical positivism. To 
ask .f'or a meta-philosophy of' existentialism is to embark 
on a regress ~ inf'initum. This is not to say that such 
regress may perhaps be unavoidable. Philosophy must some-
how learn to contend with this problem of' ultimates~ Either 
there is a beginning or not. Either solution can be shown 
to be a logical contradiction, as the history of' philosophy 
testi:fies, Kant's antinomies in particular. 
(2) Existentialism and Pragmatism. Pragmatism is 
a compromise between humanism and scientism. It is a vie1,. 
between the two extremes o:f analytic and humanistic philo-
sophies. Its naturalistic bent inclines it towards scien-
tism; its ultimate :foundation on workability, its identi-
:fication o:f truth ~th value inclines it toward humanism. 
Seypell has written on the interrelation of' the two under the 
title 11 A Comparative Study of' Truth in Existentialism and 
' 1 
Pragmatism." Seypell points to the basic di:ff'erences 
between these two philosophies, but also, and :first, to the 
underlying similarities. Tl~eir :fundamental similarity is 
11 that there is a pluralism of' truth -- historical and rela-
tive, though 'working,' truths-- whatever truth may be 
1 J. H. Seypell, "Comparative Study of' Truth in 
Existentialism and Pragmatism," Journal .2.£ Philosophy, 15 
(195.3). 
2 Called here the paradox o:f ultimate circularity. 
ul 
otherwise. 
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The author of' this dissertation must point out that 
such 11 alaetheic 11 pluralism must ultimately be interpreted 
as viewing values basic to truth. lihatever reif'ication, 
f'or example, helps in remembering or grasping a situation 
and its consequences, which is a psychological phenomenon, 
is considered by pragmatism ipso f'acto to be true. In 
addition, Seypell contends, "Pragmatism and Existentialism 
have in common • • • a strong contempt f'or intellectualism 
or pure rationalism. They both feel that 1life 1 is more 
than theory, and being is prior to thinking. 112 This 
quotation can be interpreted to mean that, for reasons 
other than those just given, a choice of values is at the 
root of all truth. A metaphysical structure which enriches 
life (h£.:._, a value-judgment) is thereby true. 11These tw·o 
modern philosophies are no doubt genuinely concerned w·ith 
la~at is true f'or the sake of' a successful, rich, and deep 
,.., 
life."..J 
In the third place, these two philosophies 11 agre ~ at 
their starting point that adaeguatio intellectus £i ~ is 
an insufficient def'inition of' truth. 114 It must be noted 
that Seypell says that correspondence is not suff'icient. 
1 Ibid., P• 229. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibi.d. 
4Ibid. 
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That is not to say that correspondence can be omitted in a 
definition o£ truth. 
These similarities notlri thstanding, existentialism 
and pragmatism have their differences., differences '"hich are 
o£ a valuational sort. Existentialism and pragmatism 
arrive ultimately at different conclusions. They 
agree that 11 names 11 o£ the "universe's principle," 
as James said -- '-'God, 11 11 Matter, 11 etc. -- are · 
meaningless without being related to individual 
existence, but they have quite a different attitude 
toward the way in which "reality" fnd "being," 
respectively, 11 reveal themselves." · . 
Seypell has a great deal to say about the value basis 
o£ truth. He points out that the idea was not new to Vico, 
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. 2 He quotes from Nietzsche's 
Beyond ~ ~ Evil, "the wrongness o£ a judgment is no . 
objection to a judgment • • • The question is how £ar it is 
help£ul for life, preserving life, a preservation o£ the 
species, perhaps even regenerating the species." 3 Another 
destroyer o£ pure intellectualistic or rational conceptions 
o£ truth was Vaihinger in his ~Philosophy 2.£ As-i£. 4 
The existentialist Jaspers gives credence to the 
belie£ that value is at the root of truth -- as a possi-
bility o£ bringing antithetical philosoph~c vielipOints 
---------------·--------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., PP• 229-230. 
4 Ibid., p. 230. 
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within the ref'erence of' one system -- in his enumeration 
of' the f'our meanings of' truth. Truth means 11 (1) practical 
usefulness (Brauchbarkeit), (2) scientific evidence (~­
~), (J) moral conviction (1Therzeugung)., and (4) exis-
- . 1 
tential t"aith (Glaube.) 11 In summary, existential truth 
can best be characterized as an appeal. Existential truth 
is not static knowledge of' the essence of' an object; it is 
not purely the correspondence between a proposition and a 
real state of' af'f'airs, but truth is 11 directed toward a 
change of' the individual's attitude toward his position, 
his mission, and f'ate in the world, is -- in the last 
1 . 1 n2 ana ys1s -- an appea • 
Seypell points out, and this is particularly im-
portant f'or this introduction, that the existentialist 
conception of' truth is related to mysticism. A clue show-
ing the similarity between existentialism and mysticism un-
f'olds itself' when Seypell says that Heidegger and Jaspers 
with their somewhat mystic concept of' Existence --
which means something quite dif'f'erent f'rom just "to 
exist" and points at the core of' the possibility . of' 
human lif'e -- are .continuing the German and European 
anti-rationalist tradition which in previous cen-
turies has climaxed in such thinkers as Meister Eck-
hardt, Jacob Boehme, Pascal, and Kierkegaard.J 
Further evidence of this mystic inclination is seen in the 
1 Ibid., p. 2)0& quoted f'rom Karl Jaspers' Vernunf't 
und Existenz, PP• 62 & 72. 
2 Ibid., P• 2)1. 
Jibid., P• 233· 
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fact that existentialism is engaged in 
the attempt to overcome the subject-object split in 
mystic philosophy. In the case of Heidegger, his 
preference for the poets H8lderlin and Rilke, whose 
works he has interpreted in the light of his own 
philosophy, is particularly interesting.! 
In sununary, the basic similarity between existen-
tialism and pragmatism is that truth is fundamentally a 
value term, in keeping with the most genuine, authentic 
demands of human nature. It might be argued, in passing, 
that the difference lies in their individual theories about 
the orig in of truth. To say that truth is based on value 
may be an acceptable statement to the pragmatist, but 
existentialism must reject even the category of value as 
an adequate phenomenological description of the true origin 
of truth or enJ. ightenment. 2 
Seypell concludes by maintaining that the basic 
difference 
between J~mes on the one hand and Heidegger-Jaspers 
on the other is that the Pragmatist confines himself 
to the formal definition of truth in relation to the 
strugg ling individual (its "workableness"), and the 
Existentialists confine themselves to the formal 
definition of truth in relation to the g en eral "open-
ness" of' t h e world. They all say nothing about . "things 
a s such 11 ; they all are content with relat ions.J . 
(J) Existentialism and Emotivism. Since this dis-
sertation is concerned in part with showing the value-root 
1 Ibid. 
2 cf. ibid., p. 236. 
3Ibid., P• 240. 
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of truth as a means of synthesizing philosophic systems, 
Neyerhoff 1 s article relating emotive and existentialist 
theories of ethics1 is truly relevant. Emotivism, having 
been espoused by Stevenson and Ayer, is usually associated 
l..ri th naturalism and with analytic philosophy. 111fuat is 
lmo\11'0 as the emotive theory of ethics is generally asso-
2 
ciated with a radical or logical form of empiricism. 11 
Speaking in general terms, both emotivism and 
existentialism agree that (i) there can be no a priori 
justification of ethics, and (ii) there can be no natural-
istic justification of ethics. Both denials are grounded 
in different reasons, although both philosophies deny these 
t1.,ro justifications of ethics. :3 
I·iore specifically, these two movements of eontem-
porary philosophy have five points of contact: 1. Radical 
subjectivism. Both theories of ethics are "radically sub-
jectivist,114 which the author of the dissertation inter-
prets to mean that ethics is based on an inner, introspec-
tively discovered, consciousness of man. However, a priori 
intuitions must be specifically excluded as possible dis-
coveries of the introspective method. 2. Ethics is ulti-
mately non-cognitive. Meyerhoff illustrates this point 
lEans 1-ieyerhoff, 1!Emoti ve and Existentialist ~­
~of Ethics, 11 Journal of Philosophy, 48 (1951). 
2Ibid., p. 769. 
3Ibid., p. 770. 
4 Ibid., P• 77:3· 
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with Sartre 1 s story of the Frenchman who had to choose 
bet"tll'een mother and country, and concludes 
(a) that the problem cannot be satisfactorily analy-
zed in terms of either a metaphysical (Kantian) or 
religious (Christian) theory of ethics, (b) that the 
solution is not "empirically calculable" according to 
the utilitarian calculus or any other form of natur-
alistic ethics. Thus the same conclusion emerges: 
moral terms are unanalyzable or unverifiable; i.e., 
etlucs is ulttmately non-cognitive.l 
Choice is an ultimate for existentialism. 1vith choice, man 
creates values. A choice is a valuation. Choice, hence 
value, is at the root of our notion of wh at is true. 
J. Both vie111s endorse emotive terminology. The 
author of the dissertation contends that, vice-versa, 
emotive terminology is an attempt at phenomenological 
description of the choice situation. Sartre a g ree s that 
basically what decides the choice is sentiment. 2 The differ-
ence between the two types of' "emotivism, 11 however, is that 
f'or Ayer the ethical statement {or ejaculation) itself 
directly expresses the act of valuation; it 11 emotes 11 the 
feeling or sentiment behind it. 1ihereas for Sartre, the 
sentiment is ultimately expressed only through an action, 
not merely by verbal statements. 3 
"Both theories recognize that their analysis intro-
1 . Ib1d., p. 774; quotation from Sartre 1 s L 1 Existen-
tialisme est !!!! humanisme, pp. 44-4.5. 
2 Ibid., P• 77.5. 
Jibid. 
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duces a unique element into the situation of' ~oral choices. 111 
This element is often termed the characteristically ethical 
element; for Moore it is undefinable and irreducible. 2 ~be 
characteristic element is isolated particularly in situa-
tions representing an ethical impasse. The impasse is 
variously described as a basic, ineradicable "disagree-
ment in attitude" (Stevenson), a 11 deadlock in dis-
cussion11 (Ayer), a "fundamental clash of' wills" 
(Reichenbach), and 11 arbitrary choice" (Charner -M. Perry), 
an "ambiguous situation" (Sartre, de . Beauvoir), or 
11 existential dichotomies" (Erich Fromm), these terms 
refer to the fact that, in the case of' a moral judg-
ment, man is often confronted by a situation that is 
inherently "ambiguous," that raises problems "t"lhich are 
theoretically (not only practically) insoluble, or that 
pose dilemmas which are ultimately irreconcilable; in 
other words, a situation in ,,..hich a decision is an 
"arbitrary" act of' :faith.3 
Existentialism uses the moral choice situation as a source 
for a variety of categories characteristic of' man, such as 
transcendence, freedom, commitment, anguish, despair, and 
4 
others. This dimension of' man is interpreted as having 
special metaphysical significance. An analysis of man from 
this introspective point of' vie't...r is termed "existential 
psychoanalysis," 11 a discipline believed to be radically 
different from a purely empirical study of man and society. 11 5 
2George E. Hoore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1922), chap. 1. 
3Hans !li:eyerhoff', " Emotive and Existentialist Theo-
ries of' Ethics," Journal 2f. Philosop hy, 48 (1951), p. 775. 
l!- I b id., P• 776. 
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The term 11 emotive 11 itself is far from standard 
even t..rithin analytic philosophy proper. The efforts and 
ingenuity expended in finding suitable terminology :for the 
ultimacy o:f moral choice is evidence :for the fact that 
analytic philosophy is groping :for a phenomenological 
description o:f an internal state of a:f:fairs. 
11 Emotive 11 is the term most generally used by Ayer, 
Carnap, Stevenson, and Morris. C. D. Broad has used 
the term 11 interjectional 11 ; John Dewey, the term 
11 ejaculat0ry11 ; Reichenbach prefers the term "voli-
tional decision"; Donald C. Williams, in "Ethics as 
Pure Postulate" . (Philosophical RevietiT, Vol. XLII, 
July, 1933, pp. 399-411), speaks of. a "pure postulate"; 
others (Charner M. Perry and Abrru~am Kaplan) have 
introduced the terms "arbitrary" and 11 capricious. 11 
A great deal o:f terminological ingenuity has been 
expended in describing the same state of af:fairs. 1 
A :fourth meeting point :for the two types o:f ethics 
is in the concept o:f commitment: 
A sentence expressing an attitude, emotion, or voli-
tional decision di:f:fers :from a purely descriptive 
statement, not only by virtue o:f its concealed im-
perative nature, but also by virtue of its (at least 
potential) commitment to action. 2 
Meyerhoff is interested in pointing out similarities, 
not in establishing a synthesis between the two viet1TS. 3 He 
does shot., what some of the fundamental differences are. 
From the point of viet-v o:f logical empiricism, this 
type o:f formal analysis is all that a strictly philo-
sophical inquiry can contribute to the subject matter 
1 Ibid., P• 775. 
2 Ibid., p. 777. 
3Ibid.' p. 780. 
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of ethics. It shows the logical place of normative 
judgments in for rather, outside) the calculus of 
propositions. 
Existentialism, on the other hand, uses ethics as an im-
portant wedge into metaphysics, into the basic structure 
of man and being. 
From an existentialist point of view, this restriction 
of a philosophical inquiry in~ ethics would, to put 
it mildly, he considered trivial. Existentialism 
uses the formal analysis of the status of moral judg-
ments as preliminary (or corollary) to the construction 
of a metaphysical system, i.e., of non-empirical and 
synthetic ~ropositions, about the status of man in 
the world. 
The widespread acceptance of both emotivism and 
existentialism may well be linked to the uncertainty about 
values of the present historical age. 
The strange reinforcement, at this time, of an ethical 
position by two philosophical extremes would, I suppose, 
call for an explanation in terms of the historical 
and social conditions in which these theories make 
their appearance. Both theories appear to be peculi-
arly adapted to an age and society characterized by 
difficulties, dilemmas, and crises to which lfe have 
be.come increasingly sensitive • • • An objective situ-
ation has arisen in which individual choices have be-
come increasingly ambiguous, arbitrary, and capricious, 
and in which human beings are, in fact, called upon to 
act either on the subjective basis of personal tastes 
and moods or on the objective basis of power and co-
Hrcion -- whether it be the pressure of social con-
formity or the power of a strong arm.J 
A German article analyzing the relationship between 
existentialism and positivism was written by Wolfgang de 
1 Ibid., p. 779 • 
2Ibid., P• 780 • 
Jibid., P• 781. 
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Boer. He maintains that both positivism .and existential-
ism are rooted in the same configuration of being, exis-
tential dread. Positivism is a flight tOl\"ards objects and 
objectification, away :from 11 depth; 11 existentialism expresses 
itself by responding to the same situation with its emphasis 
on anxiety. 
Es ist ein und dasselbe ungeheure Ereignis der Seins-
verfinsterung, welches sich sowohl in der positivisti-
sche~ Flucht zum gegenstHndlich Vorzeigbaren wie in der 
existenzialphilosophischen "Angst" bekundet. In beidem 
enthllllt sich die eine Wahrheit der Verborgenheit 
des Eins :fUr den Menschen, der sich vor dieser Verbor-
genheit seiner Zeitlichkeit her versteht. In dieser 
Lage sind nur zwei 11 Antworten 11 (Rothacker) mBglich: 
Positivismus und Existenzphilosophie haben sie er,-
g:rif:fen.1 
Positivism and existentialism are the only two possible 
answers to man's basic existential situation. He leaves 
the door open for an axiological explru1ation of philosophi-
cal systems when he says 11 jede Entscheidung ••• bedeutet 
• • • ~ Ergreifen L-und_l • • • ~ VersHumen • • • Ohne 
die menschliche ivertschHtzung gibt ~ keine menschliche 
2 
Entscheidungen. 11 To accept the basic tenets, the presuppo-
sitions which are the piers to a philosophic system, is to 
make a decision. To accept the presuppositions of positivism 
is to make a free decision. Decisions are grounded in turn 
on value-judgments. Value may well be at the root of truth. 
1tvolfgang de Boer, "Positivismus und Existenz-
philosophie, 11 ~lerkur, 6, (1952), p. 21. 
2 Ibid., p. 17. 
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The specific presupposition of positivism is a certain 
dualism, where objects are empirically knowable: ~· 
Positivismus 
macht eine sehr erhebliche Voraussetzung: nimlich, 
dass die RealitRt der ansichseienden Dinge so beschaffen 
sei, dass sie sich empirisch vorzeigen und blosslegen, 
restlos gegenstindlich zur Anwesenheit zwingen lasse, 
ohne dadurch vergewaltigt, enstellt oder verstUmmelt, 
also vom Subject her beeinflusst und verindert zu 
d 1 wer en. · 
Hocking summarizes the presuppositions which must be 
accepted as a free decision and which make up the foundation 
of scientism or analytic philosophy and are characteristic 
of our age as follows: 
Wir finden folgende Annahmen, die fasst unbewusst die 
Vorstellung .· un.seres Zeitalters geleitet haben: 
Das alle Prozesse in der Natur mit mathematischer 
Genauigkeit ablaufenJ 
dass diese Genauigkeit, die im groben Geschehen 
nur approximativ ist, sich im Verhalten der kleinsten 
Teilchen vollkommen realisiert; 
dass es solche kleinsten Teilchen gibt, Atome also, 
deren jedes in jedem Zeitpunkt seinen bestimmten Ort 
in einem absoluten Raum behillt; ••• Dass man hier 
in diesen Endresultaten des Unterscheidens und Analy-
sierens die reale Welt entdeckt.2 
Hocking lists a few prejudices or presuppositions which he 
says are false, but false only inasmuch as they hinder a 
synoptic view of reality. The separation between mind and 
body is even discredited in medicine. 3 11-iost important for 
1 Ibid., P• 14. 
2William E. Hocking, "llber die gegenwRrtige Situa-
tion der Philosophie," Deutsche BeitrKge, 2, (1948), p. 537. 
3Ibid., PP• 538-539· 
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the purposes of' this dissertation., Hocking points to 11 Die 
Annahme, Analyse k8nne .llim, Weg zur Realitllt weisen 111 as a 
f'undamentally erroneous presupposition. Man is as well a 
synthesizing and a moral being. 
Hocking likewise opposes the positivistic or 
analytic presupposition, 11~ Annahme,_ ~ Mensch selbst 
~ Naturobject mUsse durch.\llissenschaf'tliche Methoden 
Vollkommen beschreibbar -~·"2 A new type of' philosophy 
is necessary, one which combines the clarity of' analysis 
or analytic philosophy and the moral weight of' humanistic 
p h ilosophy: 
Der Mensch ••• L;usi7 ... lernen ••• , mit zwei 
Ansichten von sich selbst zu leben, nicht im Cartes-
ischen Dualismus, sondern in einer Synthase, in 
welcher die eine die Andere einschliesst und inter-
pretiert • • • Der ganze Me.nsch muss dazu imstande 
sein, den von der Wissenschaf't umschriebenen Menschen 
unter den Gesichtspunkten des Wertes, der Wahrheit, 
des Rechts und der Wllrde zu beurteilen, die alle 
weder SchHpf'ungen der Wissenschaf't sind, noch durch 
wissenschaf'tliche Betrachtungsweise verKndert werden, 
sondern ganz im Gegenteil ihrerseits als Urheber aller 
wissenschaf'tlichen Untersuchung betrachtet weren 
k8nnen • .3 
Hocking does not cease to emphasize that man is a moral or 
a valuing being as much as a knowing being. 4 
(4) The Def'ense of' Metaphysics. Metaphysics is 
libid.' p. 5,)8. 
2 Ibid., p. 541. 
Jibid.' P• 546 • . 
4 Ibid., pp. 547-548. 
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neglected by both sides of the struggle for philosophic 
supremacy. Landgrebe1 tries to restitute the importance 
of the latter in the face of the accusations made against 
it. He uses the analytic as well as existential pheno-
menological method to describe or 11 prove"the importance of 
metaphysics. The state of wonder, the originator of all 
philosophizing, is at the root of all thought, including 
existentialism and positivism. 2 Man's cognitive activity 
of theorizing, or that of building categorial schemes, is 
U£ ~ ~ ~ explicit actuation, ~ cognition,-2£ 
~ bond lihich ~ h..!!q i2_ ~ whole . 2f. Being ~ ~ 
manifest ~ h!ffi• That is why, at this early stage, 
metaphysical theory clearly is not abstract and remote 
from reality but an uncovering • • • of Being, which 
gives firmness and certainty to man's existence.J 
Metaphysics is not myth nor is it poetry. Metaphysics is 
an "authentic" activity of the human being, l'iithout which 
his humanity is impoverished to the extent of non-existence. 
The follo1ving is a good phenomenological description of 
metaphysics, a description which will lend itself to show 
eventually that metaphysics is a consistent system based. on 
an original and absolute (that is, not subject to whim) 
valuation. 
Metaphysics, in its original and authentic form, had 
not been a mere ornament of life or a vain intellectual 
pastime, but that it ·was and is :£.h.! conscious exercise 
lLudwig Landgrebe, 11 Phenomenology and 1-Ietaphysics, 11 
Philosophy~ Phenomenological Research, 10, (1949). 
2 Ibid., P• 199 • 
Jibid., P• 200. 
£f. ~ :function inherent !!!. human existence, and without 
which it cannot even be human -- ~' the remembrance 
••• ~ restitution, ~ thought, 2f ~~which 
~ ll i2, :£!?£ whole of' Being and by which it finds 
security and certitude in an enveloping 11 cosmos of' 
meaning" (Sinnzusammenhang, context). This is meta-
physics seen ~ !h£ human aspect. But ~ the 
aspect o:f Being itself' -- and this is an even pro-
founder aspect -- it is, and has thus been explicitly 
understood :from Aristotle to Hegel, !h£ sel:f-manif'esta-
tion o:f Being through ~ medium 2£. human thought ~ 
cognition.! 
Jl.letaphysics is of' such outstanding importance that "the 
breakdotm of' metaphysics had been no less than the break-
~ 2! human existence itsel:f. 112 
Landgrebe further show·s the axiological basis o:f 
metaphysics by the :fact that even objects or perceived 
Gestalten in everyday experiences and certainly the struc-
tured t'lel tanschauungen are constructed t~i th a certain 
(undetermined) purpose or valuation in mind. Here Land-
grebe dra>iS from the arsenal of' analytic philosophy. One 
of' Russell 1 s basic claims to :fame is his ability to show 
ho'tv 11 things 11 are constructs with a purpose, and t>~ithout 
that purpose the things would not be what they are: 
Von UexkU11 1 s research in environmental psychology 
has given us an insight into the dissimilarities of' 
the "world f'ormulae 11 of' di:f:ferent animals and has 
shown us that precisely we can !.:!.21 proceed from the 
assumption of' a determinate world, one and the same 
f'or all, and with a known spatial arrangement, but 
that this entirely depends on whose 11 world 11 it is.3 
1 Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
2Ibid., P• 202. 
3Ibid., P• 203. 
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Even modern physics 11 has demonstrated the impossibility .Q.! 
eliminating subjectivity. 111 
(5) Naturalism and Existentialism. Hendel 2 is 
aware of the problem of philosophical antitheses as it 
expresses itself today in the logomachy between existen-
tialism and what is, for him, naturalism. 
These two groups of naturalistic and existential philo-
sophies happen to co-exist in the same cultural period, 
yet they • • • take no cognizance of each other. They 
may know one another by hearsay, but they remain essen-
tially strangers without interest in deepening the 
acquaintance -- not even wanting to bother about argu-
ment. Nothing ever seems to come to an issue ~etween 
them. They are without rapport, worlds apart. 
His paper is an attempt to bring together these mutual 
strangers in philosophy. 4 It is here where philosophies meet. 
Hendel selects Hume and Kant as philosophers who 
maintain that the given or the presentational immediacy is 
the primary fact of perception and the basis of reality, 
as the representativesof naturalism. 5 Hendel disagrees 
with the traditional, the Humean and Kantian, epistemologi-
cal starting point, intuitions or impressions. Givenness 
of this sort is highly sophisticated, abstracted, and one-
sided; it already betrays evidence of a primordial valuation. 
libid., pp. 203-204. 
2charles w. Hendel, 11The Subjective as a Problem," 
~Philosophical Review, 62, (1953). 
3Ibid., P• 328. 
4Ibid., p. 329 • 
.5Ibid., p. 330. 
• 
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Hendel consequently considers the given, the starting 
point for philosophizing, what he calls the "situation of' 
man. 11 
What I mean by "situation" is the two-fold relation-
ship between man and nature indicated in the philosophy 
of' Descartes and continuing through Kant into the 
philosophy of' the present day. 
It is not necess~ry f'or man to prove existence, or 
that anything exists, but 11 to obtain a clear and distinct 
conception of' ~ exists ~ is noticed in sense percep-
t . u2 ~on. Here he displays an analytic mood, as is seen in 
the later discussion of' Russell. 
Hendel shows that what the author would like to 
call Cartesian and lihiteheadian categorial schemes are both 
true in the sense that they are consistent; they dif'f'er in 
value. Value, therefore, becomes the f'inal criterion which 
decides acceptance.3 
Kierkegaard is an example of' a philosopher who 
explored the subjective as a way to f'ashion the groundwork 
for any true philosophy, as a means of' developing an idea 
of' the truly "given. 114 
One of' the cardinal features of' humanistic philo-
sophy as opposed to analytic philosophy is that the former 
is meant 
1 Ibid.' p. 331. 
2 Ibid., PP• 332-333· 
3Ibid., P• 33.5· 
4Ibid., P• 339· ' 
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to enable man to fulfill himself as a human being in 
all the relationships of his existence • • • The con-
temporary humanist no longer works with his eye on 
certain preconceived -models, no "pattern" of' perfection, 
no Platonic ideal, no Christ to imitate, ·no romantic 
notion of the 11 sch8ne Seele." It is each particular 
individual1himself' who is to . be cultivated into full 
existence. 
Existentialism follows the pattern of the philosophia 
perennis with one important exception: existentialism does 
not presuppose a human nature, as indicated by Hendel. The 
assumption that man has a nature . is basically unacceptable 
to existentialism (with the exception .of' Kierkegaard). 
Postulating an eternal human nature would be a case of' meta• 
physical reif'ication, not in keeping with the principle of 
parsimony. 
Further support for the view that valuation is the 
crucial criterion determining the meaning of' truth and 
reality is found in Hendel's interpretation of the philo-
sophy of' Kant, which is that "the real is only l,rhat is 
knowable in accordance with certain forms of perception and 
the categ ories of the human understanding. 112 
An ultimate existentialist category is freedom --
freedom to choose values. When Sartre is quoted as saying 
that the universe is absurd3 he is to be interpreted as 
rejecting as absurd everything that is not free. The only 
1 b" I J.d., PP• 340-341. 
2 Ibid., p. 342. 
3Ibid., p. J48. 
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truly intelligible event is the free event. Hence 
morality and values are at the root of all our conceptions 
of' the universe. 11 For the existentialist is reasserting 
Kant's great affirmation, that man exists as a free being. 111 
A final balm for the pains of' the conflict is 
Hendel's insight that 
the existential philosophers cultivate the subjective 
and "existence" without arguing with science about 2 claims to knot~ledge. There is no rivalry contemplated. 
(6) Analytic Philosophy and Hegelianism. Another 
method of characterizing two antithetical philosophic 
outlooks is by pitting against each other Hegel and Russell. 
Ushenko 3 says that the question at issue between what 
earlier has been called analytic and humanistic philosophy is 
the principle of atomicity which is the basis of' analy-
sis • • • A single statement can be a complete unit of 
meaning and therefore completely true l if we knol~ the 
logical structure or syntax • • • we have the necessary 
and sufficient equipment for the understanding of the 
statement as a whole without the aid of a wider con-
text; ••• conversely, a wider context ••• can be 
fully understood by analysis into elementary state-
ments, i. e., by translation into a set of single state-
ments, each of an elementary logical form, and a111 interrelated liTithin a specifiable logical pattern. ~ 
For Hegel, in contraposition to the philosophy o:f analysis 
or atomicity, philosophy is the science of the whole, of 
1 Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 3.53. 
3A. Ushenko, 11The Logics of Hegel and Russell, 11 
PhilosophY~ Phenomenological Research, 10 (1949), pp. 
108-109. 
4Ibid. 
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the absolute, 11 o:f reality l..rhich all things have, or con-
stitute, in common regardless of' their particular nature. 111 
Ushenko 1 s particular suggestion :for synthesis is a 
contemplation of' the possibility that metaphysical state-
ments about reality are analogous to presentations, sense 
data, or perceptual judgments. 2 Also 
the 11 absolute, 11 must be construed ••• as an implicit 
presentation o:f the logical structure o:f the whole, 
as a datum, that is, although it truces all the state-
ments o:f the dialectic to make this structure explicit.3 
(7) Existentialism and Cartesian Dualism. A rather 
extreme apposition betw·een analytic and humanistic philo-
sophy is Heinemann's differentiation between existentialism 
and its method o:f phenomenology on the one hand, and 
modern philosophy, which had its inception with Descartes 
and :found partial :fulfillment as well as self-destruction in 
analytic philosophy. The relevant passage is reproduced at 
length, as a summary statement o:f the di:f:ferent methodolo-
gies o:f existentialism and analytic philosophy. It goes 
without saying that a great deal of' metaphysics which must 
be included under the heading o:f humanistic philosophy fits 
Heinemann's non-existential categories. That is not to deny 
that these non-existential categories are the same :for 
analytic philosophy. Metaphysics generally is not as clear 
1 Ibid, P• 110. 
2 Ibid., P• 111. 
3Ibid. 
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a case of a basic recategorization of experience as is the 
case with existentialism. 
That nothing but the data or our consciousness is given 
to us, was the almost universally accepted starting 
point of modern philosophers, from Descartes and Locke 
to the present time. True, the Rationalists and Empi-
ricists differed in their interpretation of these 
data and in their terminology; but they agreed on the 
following points: (1) that the realm of consciousness 
is self-sufficient and can be studied in isolation; 
(2) that its elements are ho~ogeneous so that all of them 
may be called by the same term, t~~ich is idea in Des-
cartes' and Locke's terminology; (J) that-a:ri'alysis can 
be applied to them and that it leads to simple elements, 
t~hich Locke calls simple ideas; (4) that out of these 
simple elements (ideas) all the complex ones (ideas) can 
be formed; (5) that all our knowledge is based on these 
elements and on the activities of our mind exercised 
about them, and that it is therefore essentially a 
knowledge by construction. All these assumptions have 
to be challenged. We formulate the antithesis; (1) the 
realm of consciousness is not self-sufficient and cannot 
be studied in isolation, because the responses are 
those of the l·rhole man; they occur on, and may be 
centred in, different levels, subconscious, conscious, 
and perhaps even supra-conscious; therefore (2) the 
elements of our experience are not homogeneous, and it 
is misleading to label all of them under one term such 
as ideas; discontinuity and intermittency is an essential 
feature of our inner life; (J) it is quite true that 
analysis should be applied to psychological data; but 
Locke's analysis is based on the prototype of mathe-
matical analysis; he assumed that just as all numbers 
may be broken up into prime numbers, so it must be possi-
ble to analyse all complex ideas into simple ones; this, 
however, is a mistake; a type of analysis appropriate 
to this field should be chosen; ~.g. functional analysis, 
!·~· the breaking up of psychological functions into 
the simpler partial functions out of which they arose 
through integ ration; simple ideas do not exist, except 
in limiting cases; it can be experimentally proved that 
many of Locke's simple ideas are complex, being inte-
g rations out of subconscious elements; (4) it is not the 
case that in the development of our mind simple ideas 
precede the formation of complex ones; the Gestalt-
psycholog ists have made it probable that perception 
itself is a form-selecting and form-creating activity, 
and that what is originally given to us are complex and 
not simple elements; (5) not all our knowledge is 
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knowledge by construction; besides this type, which 
plays a great role in mathematics and physics and, 
generally speaking, in theoretical science, there is 
the important type of know·ledge by participation, ~· 
knO't..rledge which I have because I form part of a group 
or because I partake in a specific experience or 
activity.l 
(8) Summary. The third section of this Chapter 
presents a series of periodical articles and books dealing 
with the problem of philosophical antitheses generally and 
specifically. The connecting thread, among others, found 
in these articles is that the fundamental difference between 
these cultural oppositions is not logical but of a valua-
tional, decisional, or choice nature. Apparently, the basic 
difference betw·een the tt..ro philosophies is that they seek 
to achieve a different purpose, that they look upon differ-
ent things as valuable. The area of true disagreement lies 
in the value fundament, not in its logical aspect. And 
this point is a preamble to the conclusion of this disserta-
tion. 
Ritchie merely illustrates the vituperative char-
acter of the dispute. Meyerhoff and vfuite discuss the 
chasm betl..reen analytic and humanistic philosophy as the 
burning issue of our day. Cerf is the first one to present 
a systematic attempt at listing the various points at which 
these two schools of thought differ and where they coincide. 
lF. H. Heinemann, Existentialism ~ ~ .Modern 
Predicament (New Yorkl Harper & Bros., 195J), PP• 194-195. 
77 
He concludes that both can be of help to each other. Exis-
tentialism provides the emphasis on the question of speci-
fic yet hard-to-specify values, and positivism provides 
for the values of clarity and precision. 
Seypell finds in pragmatism a liruc with existen-
tialism, being perhaps the bridge between humanistic and 
analytic philosophies. Pragmatism has the interest in hard 
facts true of empiricism generally, including naturalism 
and positivism, and at the same time, pragmatism calls 
attention to the fact that value experiences are perhaps 
the hardest facts of all! Pragmatism's contention that 
truth is relative, often interpreted to mean skepticism, 
may be utilized in this dissertation to open up the possi-
bility that values are more fundamental in the ultimate 
structurization of a world-view than any logical considera-
tions. 
Hocking's article in German indicates that exis-
tentialism has called attention to the fact that to limit 
experience which is to be a valid base for a tvorld-view or 
metaphysics to what is logically pure is an arbitrary 
decision leading not to any 11 true 11 metaphysics, but to that 
metaphysics which the postulate (logical precision) implies. 
Much of the content of our experience is extra-logical. The 
same position is taken by de Boer .• 
Landgrebe returns metaphysics to its classic place, 
as the culmination of humanistic philosophy. He opens the 
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way to the vielv that the metaphysics to be adopted, the one 
which is true and corresponds to reality, is the one 
~ashioned in accord w2th our ~undamental valuations and 
decisions about values. He leaves open the possibility 
that the number o~ metaphysics which can be constructed on 
t h e basis o~ consistency and compliance with what in the 
conclusion is de~ined as the empirical re~ractory is in-
~inite; yet the metaphysical system, o~ all the possible 
ones l"lhich satis~ies an original, authentic, primordial 
valuation (such as the decision to be rational) is only one. 
The study of metaphysics is the expression o~ the human 
attempt at making this primordial value judgment or value 
choice. 
The speci~ic problems in the smaller antitheses re-
viewed are generalized by Hendel when he show·s holv the con-
cept o~ the g iven presents serious -- crucial -- epistemolo-
gical di~~iculties, yet at the sante time the given is an 
inescapable presupposition o~ any metaphysics. Holv this 
problem may be solved uill be suggested in the conclusion 
to the dissertation. Ushenko gives expression to the 
thought that a metaphysical system is an intuition -- which 
may be the intuition o~ a particular value-claim. 
A success~ul summary statement o~ the salient simi-
larities and di~~erences between the philosophic tendencies 
discussed in this section is ~ound in Heinemann 1 s l..rork. The 
excellence o~ the treatment justi~ied, to the author, the 
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lengthy quotation. 
The conclusion of the dissertation avails itself 
of many of the approaches to philosophic problems asso-
ciated in these articles with the movements of phenomeno-
logy, existentialism, and the radical empiricism of 
positivism. 
CHAPI'ER II 
RUSSELL'S POSITIVISTIC CONCEPI'IONS 
OF TRUTH AIIJ'D REALTfY 
Russell's Conception of Truth 
Introduction.--In this chapter t\"ill be expounded and 
discussed Russell's definition and use of the terms 11 truth 11 
and 11 reality. 11 The purpose of this exposition is to determine 
what values and assumptions are involved in the use of these 
terms, with reference to the question of how we decide 
among assumptions. 
Russell defends the correspondence theory of truth 
above all other possibilities envisaged by him. In defending 
his theory he is implicitly endorsing certain concomitants 
or correlates, some of which are values, others assumptions • 
.. 
Follot\"ing is laid open f'or inspection a summary statement of 
the first two parts of this chapter. 
Russell (1) uses correspondence as a definition of 
truth; (2) he is not particularly concerned about a criterion 
of truth, although (J) he feels that inferences can be made 
to reach conclusions about the validity of correspondence. 
He (4) endorses correspondence because he seems to think it 
is an adequate analysis of ordinary language, and (5) because 
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it appears to have important consequences for his episte-
mology. . (,6) Definitions, for Russell, are not merely des-
crip tive but also prescriptive. (7) He states, although 
never quite explicitly and without ambiguity, why he be-
lieves correspondence is the definition of truth. (8) The 
author of the dissertation contends that one cannot say that 
correspondence is the most adequate definition of truth 
since there is no adequate way of telling when complete 
analysis of ordinary language or common sense has been 
achieved. Furthermore, since (9) a case can be made that 
other definitions of truth are equally adequate analyses of 
ordinary language, the ultimate grounds for using corres-
pondence as a definition of truth (not in Russell's opinion, 
but in the author's analysis of him) must lie in the 
assumptions and values embodied in the correspondence 
definition of truth. The task is to uncover these assump-
tions and values. 
Eventually the dissertation will show that using 
correspondence as the definition of truth is a matter that 
is not simply correct or incorrect, but it is freely, spon-
taneously chosen, because the values and assumptions embodied 
in it can be said to be thus chosen. Russell, for instance, 
chooses his meaning of definition. According to him, a 
definition is to be in keeping with tradition, among other 
things. He chooses the values and practical advantages that 
go with this kind of definition. He does not have to, in the 
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sense that no other logical or empirical alternative is 
open to him. He chooses this definition as an expedient to 
what he considers 11 knowledge: 11 ~' correspondence of 
subjective ideas with a universe beyond. Russell's philoso-
phizing begins with the following picture of the universe in 
mind: The ego is connected (in the sense of "being influenced 
by" and 11 knolving 11 ) w·i th the universe through the agency of 
the senses, aided by the mind's capacity for deductive and 
inductive reasoning. Ee defines true knolvledge as corres-
pondence between this objective universe and subjectively 
present ideas. A definition is also chosen as practical or 
as instrumental to the acquisition of the values involved in 
kno'tvledge. 
Correspondence is a binary relation. The t"t..ro terms 
of the relation are as follows: In Russell's definition of 
the epistemological theory of correspondence, both terms must, 
in last analysis, be inunediate experiences. In his definition 
of the logical theory of correspondence, the two terms are 
experiences on the one hand, and a Ding-an-sich on the other. 
~ meanings of correspondence are used by Russell, the second 
being the crucial one. One cannot say that correspondence 
really means all this (since no criteria lvhich indicate when 
analysis is unequivocally satisfactory have been - - or ~ be 
developed); one can only say that one chooses the use of 
correspondence in this sense, since it does not contradict 
ordinary language, although it may not resolve the total 
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ordinary-language meaning. But in choosing this use of 
correspondence, Russell analytically entails the phenomenon-
noumenon dualism as one of his assumptions. Truth is defined 
in such a 1..ray that it does not exist unless ( i ) an external 
world exists, and (ii) knowledge of correspondence with that 
world is possible. It can be objected, at this juncture, 
that no other definitions of truth are possible. However, 
1..rhen we deal w·ith intuition, workability, coherence, and 
authority as theories of truth, we are not only dealing with 
criteria of truth substantiating an existing correspondence 
between phenomenon and noumenon, but we are also, often, 
dealing with new conceptions and new definitions of truth 
itself. James' pragmatic theory of truth, for example, is not 
only "a method of settling metaphysical disputes" 1 designed 
as a criterion to detect the existence of correspondence, but 
also a complete reformulation of the meaning of truth itself 
truth is transformed from the static andthe fixed to the 
flexible, adaptable, functional, and ultimately, the organic. 
The nature 2f definition.--At the basis of an attempt 
at understanding any definition whatsoever, including, of 
course, Russell's definition of truth as correspondence, the 
questions arise, (a) what is being sought in a definition and 
l vlilliam James, Pragmatism (Nelv York: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1948), p. !~5. 
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(b) what will satis£y the quest a£ter a de£inition? Russell 
surely is not interested in lexicographical or dictionary 
de£initions, since philosophical de£initions are prior to 
the £ormer and are to be consulted in establishing diction-
aries. Liketvise, Russell is not one to believe in or search 
£or ~ de£initions in a Platonic sense. Russell, who sees 
his position closer to positivism -- where philosophy is the 
examination o£ the results o£ scienti£ic experiments -- than 
to any other, 1 cannot mean by the process o£ de£ining a search 
£or the unmediated intellectual con£rontation with the Pla-
tonic eidos o£ truth. De£initions are clarifications; but 
they are clari£ications o£ ,.,hat? Definitions clari£y 11 ordi-
1 II nary anguage. In English, l..re can say that definitions 
clari£y usage in the English language. Does it perhaps £ollow· 
that t-vhat Russell seeks when he t'll"ishes to discover the de£i-
nition o£ truth is some sort o£ linguistic average or average 
use o£ >..rords? The latter question could be settled by the 
statistical su~narizing o£ appropriate questionnaires or 
observations. But this is a sociological or grammatical study, 
as is some of the work of Charles Morris, and Russell is not 
interested in the average use of a w·ord, in this sense, even 
if the average were computed £rom the linguistic habits o£ 
"learned men. 11 vlere Russell interested in such an average, 
wb.ich he is not, this concept o£ average would be as meaningless 
! Bertrand Russell, .2.:!ll: Knov;ledge o£ ~ External lvorld 
(~Jew Yorio i'l. 1'1. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929}, Introduction. 
85 
as it is useless, due to a process of cancelling-out 'l<lhich 
operates in statistical averages of this type. 
Does Russell use consensus gentium as a criterion of 
definitions? Is consensus gent~ an adequate analysis of 
the term 11 truth 11 ? He does not use consensus gentium as the 
source of his information about the nature of truth, partially 
because such consensus does not exist, and if it did, would 
perhaps not be of any use in the academic disciplines. Holv-
ever, he does appear to use 'tvhat may be termed a 11 potential 11 
or 11 latent 11 consensus gentium as 'tvhat he 't'll'ants in a definition 
of truth. A definition of truth, as he sees it, seems to be 
implicitly ca1)able 2f. universal assent -- or at least assent 
of the learned -- once it is understood. 
A final alternative analysis of what Russell means 
by definition is open. A definition can be arbitrary or 
legislated 1 (which are not necessarily synonymous terms); th?t 
is, prescriptive. Assuming that "arbitrary" and "prescriptive" 
as applied to definitions -- are not synon~nous, Russell does 
not seem to think (this point is not discussed explicitly) 
that definitions are purely arbitrary. In the first place, 
pure arbitrariness can mean very little or perhaps nothing at 
all. Even if a definition were chosen on the apparently 
arbitrary basis of a roulette wheel, the selection of the 
roulette 'tvheel itself as a mechanism of choice is not arbi-
trary. And if this difficulty could be circumvented, Russell 
would still have to deny the arbitrariness of definitions, 
1The author's distinction, not Russell's. 
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since definitions are not arbitrary as a matter of experi-
ential fact. That is, definitions fulfill a function and 
can be adequate and inadequate in serving a particular goal 
(perhaps even true or false, if we can discover something 
1'1Tith 1-.rhich a definition can be said to correspond). A 
totally arbitrary definition is useless, purposeless, and 
even non-existent due to the contradiction in its criteria, 
as seen above. The statement that an arbitrary definition 
is impossible seems to contradict t h e contention in this 
dissertation that 't-torld-vie1-rs can be chosen on an arbitrary 
or ~ basis. The dilemma is resolved by recognizing a 
distinction in levels of argument. On the present level of 
argumentation it is true that some reason must exist for the 
choice of meaning of a definition. But we are then not 
dealing here with the very ~' the very fundamental, the 
ultimate foundations of this choice. If we pursue this 
matter further, such as saying that we choose ~ for reason £, 
reason b for reason .£, reason .£ for reason d, ••• , '""e shall be 
confronted with the alternative of an infinite reg ress of 
. 
reasons or a fundamental decision as to what reasons (or 
values} we will accept • . Tl~is last choice is described, 
phenomenologically, as capable of being free and spontaneous. 
A detailed discussion of this material must be postponed until 
the conclusion to the dissertation . 
The tradition of semantic analysis, of 1-rhich Russell 
has been first an initiator and then an illustrious member, 
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is inclined to call definitions not arbitrary but prescrip-
tive: a definition is a decision or a rule on how a term is 
to be used. This decision can be based on a number of 
criteria. In one case, the overriding consideration may be 
usefulness in encompassing a class of particulars; in another, 
the prime consideration may be consistency with a scientific 
theory; in a third, the motivation may be aesthetic service-
ability; a n d, finally, the basis of choice may be simply 
conformity to 11 common usage" -- assuming that "common usage" 
is a significant term. Russell's conception of what a 
definition ought to be is not only this, ho'tvever. A definition 
is ~ an analysis of common sense or ordinary language; that 
is, an adequate definition has within it the potential of 
being a consensus gentium. That is to say, within the limits 
of common usage h'll'hich allow :for a :far greater variety of 
meanings than Russell 'tvish.es to acknowledge in his use of 
the term "definition"), Russell restricts one relatively 
narro'tv area v:herein definitions are said to be significant. 
A definition must meet t't'II'O criteria 
usage, and to Russell's prescription. 
it must conform to 
In summary, a definition, to be acceptable to Russell, 
must meet these requirements: it must (a) be prescriptive, but 
also (b) be in keeping 'tvith ordinary usage. These demands upon 
the nature of a satisfactory definition are contained in 
Russell's "tvritings only implicitly. Explicitly, he does not 
deal "tvith the issue of 'tvhat he is seeking 1vhen he looks for 
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the definition o:f a term. It is an implicit issue, in 
Russell, that a definition is limited by an analysis o:f 
ordinary language on the one hand and by a :free, voluntary 
prescription on the other. Consequently, Russell does not 
discuss the fundamental problem that it is di:f:ficult to kno't·l 
just 'tvhen an 11 adequate 11 analysis or reduction o:f ordinary 
language has been achieved. References to substantiate 
these claims can be :found in the subsequent analysis of 
Russell's definition o:f truth. It seems sensible to assume 
that roughly ~ definitions o:f truth ever seriously pro-
posed and defended are in at least partial agreement with 
ordinary language -- otherwise they could probably not be 
understood in the :first place. We must discover what the 
nature o:f Russell's prescription is in the :fact that he 
chooses correspondence as the proper definition o:f truth. 
Definition .Q.f. truth.--According to Russell, truth is 
a predicate o:f a belie:f. 1 A belief --which can be expressed 
in the :form of a sentence has "a certain kind of relation 
to some occurrence, 'tvhich in general is non-linguistic. 112 
Contrary to Ayer 1 s positivism, 3 as 'tvill be indicated later, 
1 Bertrand Russell, An Inouiry Into N:eaninc- and Truth 
(Ne'tv York: l'l. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 19lt-o), p. 28t. 
2Ibid., P• 283. 
JAl:fred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic ( New· York: ' 
Oxford University Press, 1936), chap. i. 
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Russell's vielv of truth is not entirely a question of 
empirical verifiability. An empirical belief is conceived 
as true, by Russell, in virtue of a certain referent or 
occurrence which Russell terms the 11 verifier. 111 
In analyzing the nature of truth, Russell considers 
the relation of beliefs to verifiers in a variety of cases 2 
by means of an analysis of language. Specifically, three 
statements are examined. (l) 11 I am hot," (2) 11 you are hot," 
and (J) "the sun is hot." The verifier, defined as 11 that 
occurrence in virtue of wb.ich my assertion is true (or 
1 false),"' stands in a relation of ,g_orrespondence to the 
belief it verifies. Correspondence can be verified directly 
only in sentence (l), since the verifier is the immediate 
experience of hotness. The truth of (2) and (J) in the 
sense of correspondence -- involves a great deal of meta-
physics, tvhere the term "metaphysics" is here used to refer 
to statements "tvh.ose reference goes beyond !!!X. experience. If 
truth is defined as correspondence, verifiers tvhich I knou 
must al"tvays be events in mz experience. To kno"tv the truth of 
even such a simple belief as 11 you are hot 11 1-re go beyond 
1 Bertrand Russell, !g Inguiry Into Meaning ~ Truth 
( He1v Yorlc: lv. VJ. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940), p. 284. 
2 Ibid. 
Jibid., P• 291. 
90 '• 
experience, and Russell "cannot imagine any way of discovering 
"t..rheth.er the metaphysics in question is true or false. 111 In 
reply to a possible question at this juncture as to whether 
Russell means "necessarily true or false," or II probably true 
or false, 11 the author of the dissertation ventures to affirm 
that Russell means "true or :false in any sense "t·rhatever. 11 
Follo"tving is the complete quotation: 
A great deal of metaphysics is involved in the belief 
that I can make assertions, such as "you are hot," which 
go beyond my experience. I cannot imagine any way of 
discovering "tvhether the metaphysics in question is true 
or false, but I think it is 1vorth while to state the 
assumptions involved. 2 
In Russell's view, then, the metaphysical assumptions 
involved in this definition of truth are, in the case of 
belief (2) -- the belief in other minds -- the legitimate 
analogy between my words and verifiers (the immediate feelings 
of hotness) and your words and verifiers; and in the case of 
belief {J) -- a belief in the existence of an external world 
the refractory and passive nature of sensations "t..rhich point 
to a cause for their existence other than my o1m 1..rilling. 
In addition, both the assumption of the existence of other 
minds and that of the existence of the external 11orld lvhich 
causes our sensations are neutral in terms o f the specific 
difference these beliefs make in experience. Since the beliefs 
9.1 
are about that which is beyond my experience, their 
affirmation or denial is not a change in experience. As a 
hypothesis which "simplifies the statement of causal laws 111 
these beliefs are desirable. Proof for this truth, however, 
does not exist. "There can be no argument against the 
physical £externa!l world, since experience will be the same 
whether it exists or not. Therefore, it is justified as a 
"\..rorking hypothesis. But more than this cannot be claimed. 112 
We are dealing here really with the problem of the existence 
and nature of an external world. This comes under the head 
of what Russell means by reality, not truth, and is discussed 
in the latter parts of this Chapter. In connection with the 
point of' proof', an opp onent might _say, 11 absolute proof', no! 
but probability, yes." 
This much ought to be said here in Russell's defense, 
however. i~en Russell refers to the belief' in the existence 
of' an external world as a "working hypothesis," he must not be 
· understood (as s~me ideal~sti by implication, might have 
him understood) to say that the existence of' an external world 
is probable, but that all we can prove -- and this only 1vith 
probability -- is that the notion of' an external world is a 
convenient fiction. When we make inferences from phenomena 
to noumena, from the world of' experience a nd sensations to an 
1 Ibid., P• 294. 
2Ibid. 
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external l..rorld, we choose the same class of assumptions 
about the ontological validity of reason and argument whether 
we conclude that we can prove the existence of an external 
'"'orld or say that existence is only probable. 
Russell's analysis of the nature of truth leads to a 
sophisticated, detailed version of correspondence as the 
definition of truth. Since correspondence as a criterion of 
truth works only among immediate experiences, the truth of 
beliefs transcending experiences cannot be demonstrated 
strictly, but only in a very loose sense. That is to say, 
11 loose 11 here means that for Russell the existence of an 
external ·t-~·orld is a working hypothesis, which, in last analysis, 
is no demonstration (probable or otherwise) of the existence 
of an external w·orld. 
The previous analysis of the meaning of truth refers 
to truth ,,hen it is applied to empirical knowledge about 
particulars; that is, to immediate experiences or sensations, 
and to a belief in an external world. This analysis does 
not deal l..rith truth in deductive or inductive logic, the 
latter being empirical generalizations. In reply to an ob-
jection at this point that the implication here is that there 
are three types of knowledge, the following needs be said. 
There is intuitive, deductive, and inductive knowledge. The 
first refers to sensations -- sensory intuitions -- and the 
second and third refer to discursive reasoning or inferences. 
The canons of inference are different in deductive and in 
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inductive log ic. 
\~~y does Russell choose correspondence as his 
definition of truth ? To him it is an adequate analysis of 
common sense. It is no'\v necessary to explore in detail 
Russell's v iews and criticism of the various theories of 
trut h, leading to his acceptance of correspondence, a n d 
a nalyzing the role value plays in Russell 1 s vie'\vS, as well as 
wh at are his fundamental and inarticulate assumptions. 
Russell distinguishes four theories of truth (Russell calls 
them theories, but the '\'llord 11 def'inition 11 '\II'Ould be a more 
accurate term in this connection because of the need to 
clarify the difference between a definition and a criterion 
of truth): 
I. The theory which substitutes "warranted asserti-
bility11 for "truth." This theory is advocated by Dr. 
De'\·rey and his school. 
II. The theory which substitutes "probability" for 
"truth." This theory is advocated by . Professor Reichenbach. 
III. The theory which defines "truth" as 11 coherence. 11 
This theory is advocated by Hegelians and certain logical 
positivists. 
IV. The correspondence theory of truth, according to 
'~~ich the truth of basic propositions depends upon their 
relation to some occurrence, and the truth of other propo-
sitions depe~ds upon their syntactical relations to basic 
p rop:>si tion s. 
Two questions must now be investig ated. First, is any 
of these four de:finitions a more accurate tran slation than the 
others of the uses of 11 truth11 in ordinary language? And if 
1 Ibid., p. 362. 
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not, if the choice of definition of truth is indifferent 
on the basis of common usage, then the second question 
arises~ namely, l1Thy did Russell choose correspondence as 
the so-called "true" definition of truth? 
In reply to the first question, the position of the 
author of the dissertation is very simply that since ordinary 
language is ambiguous, a definition of truth based purely on 
ordinary language could be any of these four definitions as 
well as many more. It is difficult to prove the conten tion 
that all these definitions of truth are adequate analyses of 
ordinary language. One general consideration, however, can 
be brought to bear upon this point. Nany reasons are ad-
vanced -- by the proponents of the above-mentioned representa-
tives of the various theories or definitions of truth -- that 
their theories disclose the "real" meaning that language 
attributes to the word "truth." The raison d 1 ~tre of these 
philosophic positions is, to a high degree, precisely to 
defend the validity or adequacy of a particular definition of 
truth. Without analyzing all these view·s in detail, it is 
reasonable to accept the fact that many good reasons have 
been advanced why each of these definitions might be con-
sidered an adequate rendering of ordinary language. It seems 
to the author of the dissertation that beyond this general 
statement nothing much more conclusive can be said to justify 
an analysis of ordinary language. In the first place, ordinary 
language is neither constant nor consistent, and secondly, no 
95 
criteria have ever been developed -- beyond mere personal 
intuition or the citing of examples -- 'tvhich allo'tv one to 
affirm unambiguously that an adequate analysis of ordinary 
language has been achieved. 
There are reasons, however, to be discussed later, 
for contending that correspondence is a more valuable analysis 
of ordinary language than any of the other theories of truth. 
These reasons are inconclusive, because, as noted already, 
there are no criteria which decide w·hen a 11 correct 11 analysis 
has been accomplished. Nonetheless, combining ordinary 
language, tvhich will be shown to be prescription ~tradition, 
with prescription by fiat (and this combination is Russell's 
implicit project) in such a way that fiat is limited by 
ordinary language, that fiat does not do violence to ordinary 
language, but is not as broad in meaning as ordinary language, 
should lead to a definite selection among these four. The 
situation here is not unlike Russell's treatment of strict 
implication, 'tlThich represents, not the manifold and rich 
meanings of 11 implication 11 in ordinary language, but the 
minimal requirement of implication tvhich does no violence to 
ordinary language but does exclude many shades of meaning. 
Once more, the remaining task in analyzing Russell's definition 
of truth is to discover what is the element of choice or 
cause :for assent in his :fiat that commits him to correspond-
ence as his definition o:f truth. With this issue, the problem 
o:f the ultimate justification o:f the definition o:f truth in 
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Russell lvill be 'tvell on its way to clarification. 
The assumption under which the author of' the disser-
tation proceeded in much of' the foregoing discussion is that 
all four definitions of' truth (warranted assertibility, 
probability, coherence, and correspondence) are in partial 
agreement llTith ordinary language. Russell's reasons for 
choosing correspondence over the others must, therefore, be 
examined carefully in two areas. In the first place, does 
Russell find that any of' the above contradict ordinary lan-
guage? If' so, is his contention justified? Second, what 
values are found in correspondence 'tvhich are lacking in the 
other definitions of truth? Finally, we are not only con-
cerned lvith (a) the values Russell finds in correspondence, 
but also with (b) the general epistemological consequences of' 
using correspondence as a definition and criterion of truth, 
consequences not present in the other definitions. The reader 
must be reminded at this point that the more general term 
"theory of truth, 11 lvhich Russell uses, corresponds to both 
the terms "definition" and "criterion." Russell is not only 
interested in what truth means, but also in how we can test 
for truth. Russell feels that all but correspondence theories 
of truth contradict ordinary language. The author of this 
dissertation finds his analyses incomplete. 
In discussing next, correspondence, we will leave 
aside, for the moment, the question of lvhy correspondence is 
chosen as the meaning of truth, and first examine how Russell 
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proceeds to decide between the two meanings o€ correspondence 
itself'. His choice -.;..rill be seen to involve the acceptance of' 
assumptions, and certain value considerations, or the satis-
€action o€ specific value-claims. 
A €inal comment is in order. There may be some dis-
pute as to lvhether Russell really seeks to analyze ordinary 
language. It is not immediately clear to 'lvhat extent the 
practice o€ Russell's method of analysis is a rendering o€ 
ordinary lang~age. Russell is, of course, not concerned 
(openly) "h•ith the question of" whether any def"inition of truth 
is a usef"ul definition. Quite to the contrary, he looks 
for what may be termed "adequate" definitions. An adequate 
def"inition is one that renders the 11 real 11 meaning of the word. 
And here the 11 real 11 meaning is one in 'Which no contradictions 
w·ith accepted usage can be found. It is in this latter sense 
that we can say that Russell deals, in fact, with analyses of 
ordinary language. 
~two kinds of ~orrespondence.--The nature of 
correspondence will be discussed in terms of two possible 
meanings. The two forms of the correspondence definition o€ 
truth are for Russell according as to whether experience or 
fact is taken as that l'lith 1.rhich true propositions correspond. 
If correspondence is with experience, the definition or theory 
is called "epistemological." In that case, "the basic propo-
sitions must be derived from experience, and therefore 
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propositions "t-Thich cannot be suitably related to experience 
are neither true nor :false."1 I:f correspondence is with :fact, 
the definition or theory is "logical." In this case, "the 
basic propositions need not be related to experience, but 
only to ':fact,' though i:f they are not related to experience 
they cannot be known." 2 A :fact, in this sense, must be 
interpreted as an event residing within the noumenal world. 
A :fact is something :forever beyond man's possible experience. 
C:f course, there also are experiential facts, but these are 
covered by the epistemological theory of' correspondence. 
According to Russell, :for instance, a sentence can be true 
although not verifiable (in the strict sense) -- such as 
"you are hot, 11 and 11 the 'tV'Orld exists unperceived. 11 Russell 
asserts that "verifiable sentences are a sub-class o:f true 
sentences. 11 3 Propositions corresponding with experience are 
"verifiable; 11 't'IThereas a 
true proposition is one having exactly the same kind o:f 
correspondence with a :fact -- except that the simplest 
type of' correspondence, that 'tV'hich occurs in judgments 
of' perception, is impossible in the case gf' all other 
judgments, since these involve variables. 
It :follows that :for Russell there are simple and verifiable 
as well as complex and non-verifiable meanings of corres-
1 Ibid., P• 36J. 
2 Ibid. 
Jibid.' P• J68. 
4Ibid., P• J8J. 
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pondence. The epistemological definition of correspondence 
confines truth 
to propositions asserting what I now perceive or remember. 
Since no one is willing to adopt so narrow a theory, 
we are driven to the logical theory of truth, involving 
the possibility of events that no one experiences and of 
propositions that are true although there can never be 
any evidence in their :favour.l 
It follotvs that Russell is using the logical theory 
of correspondence as his definition of truth. He is 11 driven 11 
to this logical theory because the alternative is too 
11 narrotv. 11 Truth is, therefore, defined by Russell as corres-
pondence with events outside of the realm of experience, or, 
of course, also in experience itself, such as memory. This 
is an important conclusion. Russell is not totally unam-
biguous, yet analysis of his statements, as done here, 
indicates that he holds what he calls the 11 logical theory of 
correspondence. 11 
It will now· be necessary to expound and examine 
Russell's reasons for rejecting alternative theories of truth. 
Truth ~ coherence.--In criticizing the definition of 
truth as coherence, Russell deals jointly with coherence and 
with consistency . definitions. Equating, without prior 
examination or justification, coherence and consistency is 
the first error and limitation of Russell's analysis and 
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eventual criticism. He deals with Hegel as well as with the 
positivists Otto Iiieurath and Carl G. Hempel, with Carnap and 
ui th iii ttgenstein. For Eussell, the only dif'f'erence between 
Heg el and the positivists is that Hegel 11 holds that only one 
body of' mutually coherent propositions is possible, so that 
every prop osition remains definitely true or f'alse; 111 
111hereas f'or Heurath and Hempel truth is a syntactical rather 
than semantic matter, loJhere languag e is vieloJ"ed as a system 
of tautolog ies like mathematics. It follows f'rom this 
lat ter, log ical positivist, vie"'v that 
a proposition is 11 true 11 within a given system if' it is 
consistent with the rest of' the system, but there may 
be other systems, inconsistent with the f'irst, in which 
th~ proposition in question will be false. 2 
Russell feels that basically when the theories are 
evaluated -- Hegel and the positivists espouse the same kind 
o :f coherence doctrine. Both are systems of tautologies, 
unrelated to empirical observation or reality . He seems to 
i g nore the empirical element in Hegel. 
There is no such process, according to them, as deriving 
the truth of a proposition f'rom some non-verbal occur-
rence: The world of' words is a closed self-contained 
"1·/0rld, and the philo~opher need not concern himself lvith 
anything outside it.~ 
Russell feels that the Hegelians 11 deny the distinction 
4 . 
. bet"'1Teen data and inf'erences 11 and assert 11 that know·ledge is 
lrbid., P· 17.5. 
2Ibid. 
3J.kid. 
4Ibid., p. 1.54 
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an organic whole."- For them, the~ 11 o:f truth is coher-
ence rather than conformity 1-1ith :fact. " 2 From this :follo1vs 
not only that coherence is the test, but also the definition 
o:f truth, since the Hegelian conception o:f knowledge which 
is meant to be true knowledge or truth -- is that o:f an 
organic 11hole. Beyond these statements, Russell does not 
specify a de~inition o:f the meaning o:f coherence. His :funda-
mental criticism o:f this theory o:f truth is that 11 it renders 
the part played by perception in knOl'ITledge inexplicable. 11 .3 
Answering Hegelian and instrumentalist objections to the 
e:f:fect that no datum is ne1..r, Russell contends "that there 
4 
must be a pure datum." That such a not-yet-coherent :fact 
exists is "logically irrefutable consequence o:f the :fact that 
perception gives rise to new· knowledge. 11 .5 Russell criticizes 
the Heg elian theory of truth in his Inguiry i!:!i£ :M:eaning ~ 
Truth and in his Philosophical Essays, in lvhich he criticizes 
Joachim's ~ Nature o:f Truth. 
Russell can be interpreted to mean that the positi-
vist's conception or definition o:f truth as coherence is not 
an adequate rendering o:f how we operate with the word 11 truth11 
in the English (or any other) language. The basis :for this 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid • 
.3Ibid. 
4Ibid. , p. 1.5.5 • 
.5rbid. 
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interpretation, that the positivist's coherence goes counter 
ordinary languag e, can be found in passages such as the 
follO"t'll"ing : 
On IITeurath 1 s vie"t'IT, language has no relation to non-
linguistic occurrences, but this makes many every-day 
experiences inexplicable.l 
Russell's implication here can be construed to be that 
ordinary languag e is meant to make every-day experiences 
meaningful, manageable, and explicable. Another relevant 
passag e is: 
The purpose of words, though philosophers seem to forget 
this simple fact, is to deal with matters other than words. 
If I go into a restaurant and order my dinner, I do not 
"t'll'ant my 1..rords to fit into a system '1rlith other tvords, but 
to bring about the presence of food.2 
That is to say, a coherence definition of truth does not 
take account of some of the more common (or most of the more 
common) uses of language. And, finally, 
The verbalist theories of some modern philosophers for-
g et the homely practical purposes of every-day words, 
and lose themselves in a neo-neo-Platonic mysticism. I 
seem to hear them saying 11 in the beginning was the lvord, 11 
not 11 i n the beginning 1vas · l'll'hat the word means. 11 It is 
remarkable that this reversion to ancient metaphysics ~ 
should have occurred in the attempt to be ultra-empirical.~ 
Russell rejects coherence not only because Neurath 1 s 
and Hempel's positivism overtly contradicts ordinary languag e, 
1 Ibid., P• 180. 
2Ibid., p. 186. 
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but because this type of positivism makes ordinary language 
impossible, since it makes language useless. The logical 
positivists bar any relation to experience. Their task is 
reduced to the syntactical one of cons tructing an encyclo-
pedia. An encyclopedia can be memorized in any language 
without thereby being understood. ~ connection ~ reality 
2£ empirical experience is someth~~ other ~ ~ ~ntactical 
or formal order. Russell uses the following analogy: the 
writer of an encyclopedia consults opinions. The scientist 
or expert t..rhose opinions are solicited, hot..rever, does not 
base his knowledge on other's opinions in turn, but on 
i~mediate empirical evidence. 1 By refusing to grant that 
language is connected 'tvi th empirical experience, although 
many of the consequences of this refusal must have escaped 
Neurath inadvertently, Neurath totally contradicts ordinary 
language. 
The questions posed at the beginning of this section 
can now be answered, as follows. (1) Does Russell :find that 
the coherence definition o:f truth contradicts ordinary 
language? The answer is, yes, implicitly. That is to say, 
Russell does not make this assertion in so many words, but, 
as shown , it follotvs from the context o:f his t..rriting. 
Russell's analysis purports to shou up contradictions t<Jith 
libid., p. 179 • 
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ordinary languag e, not ·to the extent that ordinary language 
openly denies the coherence definition, but that ordinary 
language cannot function in its practical endeavors with such 
a limiting definition. Ordinary language, conceived as having 
a coherence definit ion of truth, cannot fulfillthe survival 
and appreciative value-claims to be mentioned later. ( 2) Is 
Russell's implicit contention that coherence negates sur-
vival and appreciative value-claims -- justified? The answer 
here is, no. Coherence is as much an attempt to deal success-
fully 1vith problematic situations, attempts at synthesis of 
experience, as correspondence. Those 1..rho hold coherence 
definitions of truth thinlc that "coherence" is an adequate 
translation of the meaning, or at least one of the meanings, 
of "truth" in ordinary languag e. If survival -- as is to be 
discussed later -- can be successfully safeguarded by people 
espousing a correspondence definition of truth, it can be 
equally well safeguarded by endorsing a coherence definition 
of t r uth. 
Russell, unfortunately, does not deal w·ith these 
issues in an explicit sense. 
The intention and intension of languag e is conceived 
by Russell as a dualistic relation with existence, something 
which coherence ' or consistency, as he sees them, does not allol..r. 
This epistemolog ical dualism is a fundamental assumption in 
defining truth as correspondence. More of this will be 
discussed later. 
10.5 
"f,'farranted assertibility and probability. --lvarranted 
assertibility and probability theories of truth are really 
two forms of probability, according to Russell. In one form, 
111hich is acceptable to Russell, "we are never quite certain 
that a given proposition, expressed in words, is true." 1 
It seems to me that 111 p 1 is probable" is strictly equiva-
lent to ·"'p is true' is probable," and that when we say 
111 p' is probable, " 2,..,.e need some probability that this 
statement is true. 
This view of truth is that of Hans Reichenbach. The other 
form, which is rejected by Russell, "contends that the con-
cept 'truth' is an unnecessary one. 11 .:3 This latter view is 
r epresented by John. De"tvey, who substitutes the term 
"warranted assertibility" for "truth." Russell's criticism 
of De111ey is found in Chapter XXIII of !!:!. Inguiry ..i!:!..i.Q. Meaning 
~Truth, and in Russell's article in~ Philosophy of~ 
Dewey, Vol. I of the Library of Living Philosophers. The 
latter also contains Dewey's reply. 
The question to be resolved is, does Dewey' s definition 
of truth contradict ordinary language? Russell's i mplicit 
contention is that warranted assertibility does contradict 
ordinary languag e, whereas probability does not. 
The following statements can be construed as to say, 
in effect, that Dewey's concep tion of truth as warranted 
1 Ibid., p. 400 • 
21..12i.<b.. 
3Ibid. 
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assertibility contradicts ordinary language. Writing about 
true and false belief's, Russell asks, 
is the distinction betw·een "true" and 11 f'alse 11 to be 
found in the success or failure of' the effects of' 
believings, or is it to be found in some othlr relation 
which th~y may have to relevant occurrences? 
Russell endorses the latter alternative, that truth 
and falsity in belief's are determined by occurrences other 
than the success or failure of' the act of' belief' itself'. He 
11 cannot go t Ot1Tards a g reement with Dr. 2 Del..rey. 11 
In this case we see that language demands agreement 
with facts, not workability or success in practice, as the 
meaning of truth. 
Russell makes a distinction bett..reen truth and knotdedge, 
and gives "truth" a wider meaning or range than "knowledge." 
That is, a proposition can be true although we do not know, 
or even cannot know, that it is so. In g eneral, Russell 
a g rees that 11 a p roposition which is theoretically capable of 
being proved or disproved, or rendered probable or improbable, 
by means of our experience, is nevertheless true or false. 11 :3 
A view that cannot be verified in practice by some criterion 
of workability or some noticeable consequences cannot be held 
to be true on the basis of truth defined as warranted asserti-
bility. Specifically, however, Russell qualifies this former 
1 Ibid., p. 405. 
2Ibid • . 
:3rbid., P· 295. 
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assertion by stating that "unobserved f'acts can be spoken 
of in general terms, but not with the particularity that is 
possible where observed f'acts are concerned. And there is no 
reason "tvhy 1 truth 1 should not be a 'tvider conception than 
I I til knowledge. 
In vie'tv of' this distinction, we note that Russell 
conceives of' language as making reference notonly to f'uture 
experience, but also to f'acts independent of' all experience, 
f'acts with which experience must "correspond" in order to be 
true, even though unexperienceable. Russell is anxious to 
prove De,.,,rey 'tvrong, although the author of' the dissertation 
f'eels that Russell is not justified in his l1Tholesale criticism 
of' De"t,rey. The quintessence of' this discussion is that if' 
this definition of' truth (warranted assertibility) did 
contradict ordinary language -- as Russell 1.1Tish.es to shO't1T it 
does -- this definition could not be accepted by Russell in 
good f'aith. Yet Russell does not sho'tv at all conclusively, 
or even convincingly, that this contradiction exists. It is 
the purpose of' what f'ollous to substantiate this latter claim. 
The reason f'or his failure is a narrow interpretation, amount-
ing to misinterpretation of' the theory of' 't1Tarranted asserti-
bility. Just as it is necessary in connection with the 
discussion of' coherence to show why Russell might be opposed 
to some of' the metaphysical consequences of' coherence as a 
1 Ibid.' p. 308. 
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theory of truth -- whether these grounds are rooted in 
temperament or in reason -- it is also necessary to sho1v 
'tvhy Russell would be opposed to the consequences of' the 
pragmatic definition and criterion of truth, the definition 
and criterion referred to as warranted assertibility. 
In order to present what the author of the disserta-
tion deems to be Russell 1 s interpretation of De1vey, a dichotomy 
i .n the 1<rays of knowing must be established. Bergson's 
distinction between intellect and intuition is a good tool 
for this purpose. Knowledge through intuition is knowledge 
of reality as it is in itself. Knol~Tledge through the 
intellect is lmowledge of a different sort altogether; it is 
praxis, it is knol'rledge about the results of empirical 
manipulations, it is kno't..rledge about 1..rhat is beneficial or 
instrumental to biological survival. This kind of knOl11'ledge 
does not effectively make any pronouncements about the nature 
of an antecedent reality or of the thing-in-itself. Knowledge 
through the intellect classifies and generalizes those con-
junctions of perceptions (as with Hume) that serve the purpose 
of biological survival. Aristotle makes a similar distinction 
when he differentiates between contemplative or theoretical 
knowledge on the one hand, and practical and especially 
productive on the other. 
Dewey, in his instrumentalism, using warranted 
assertibility as the theory of truth, that is, as definition 
~ criterion, rejects the contemplative, theoretical, or 
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intuitive sort of knowledge altogether. Iillowledge, or 
truth in the sense of warranted assertibility, is equated 
l'll'ith productive or intellectual know·ledge as defined above. 
Truth, :for Dewey, is knowledge of productive relationships, 
not of reality as it is 11 in itself • 11 
Russell's objection to Dewey is as :follows: 
11 Inquiry 11 is neutral as between different aims: "t'll"hat-
ever we wish to do, some degree of inquiry is necessary 
as a preliminary ••• \v.hat happens as the result of 
inquiry? Dr. Dewey rejects the traditional answer, 
that I come to ~ something, and that, as a conse-
quence of my kno"t·dedge, my actions are more successful. 
He eliminates the intermediate stage of 11 knolving, 11 and 
says that the only es~ential result o:f successful inquiry 
is successful action. 
Russell :furthermore distinguishes betlveen the 
psychological phenomenon of believing and that event liThich 
makes this belie:f either true or :false: 11 Is there any relation 
between a 1 believing 1 and its environment 1r1hich allo"tvS us to 
call the believing 1 true 1 ? 11 I:f this question is answered in 
the a:f:firmative, 11 is the distinction between 1 true 1 and 
1 :false 1 t o be :found in the success or :failure o:f the effects 
of believings, or is it to be found in some other relation 
u2 '~~ich they may h ave to relevant occurrences? 
Russell contends that in order to succeed in practice 
(S), 1-ve must :first have objective knowledge (K) o:f an ante-
cedent reality. Russell says, in effect, -- when he mentions 
11 the intermediate stag e o:f 1 knowing 111 --that intuition, 
1 Ibid.' P • 404. 
2 Ibid., P• 40.5. 
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contemplation, or theoretical knowledge (K) is prerequisite 
to success in practical applications ( S). De't'ley, on the 
contrary, must be interpreted as distinguishing between two 
kinds of' know·ledge (K). He must be interpreted to dif'f'eren-
tiate implicitly between objective knowledge, knowledge of 
an antecedent reality, intuition, or theoretical knowledge 
(K
0
) on the one hand, and knowledge of' practical relationships, 
e xpedient conjunctions, (K ), on the other. p Russell's 
misinterpretation of' Dewey consists in ignoring the distinction 
between Kp and K0 • Dewey must acknowledge that ~' or 
knowledge about practical consequences, (past experience) is 
prereguisi~ !2 ~ success 1u practice (future experience). 
Yet KP' knowledge of' practical consequences, is just that and 
gives no additional information (K0 ) about an objective reality, 
an antecedent universe, or of' an intuitively contemplated 
thing-in-itself'. Russell does recognize, in part, this 
dif'f'erence between himself' and Dewey, when he writes: 
one important difference between us arises, I think, from 
the fact that Dr. Dewey is mainly concerned with theories 
and hypotheses, lvhereas I am mainly concerned lvi th 
assertions about particular matters of fact. 1 
As regards scientific hypotheses, such as quantum theory 
or the law of gravitation, I am_,dllin~ (with some 
qualifications) to accept his LDewey'~ view. 2 
But when it comes to specific beliefs such as uCaesar "t'las 
assassinated"3 or to protocol sentences, Russell disagrees 
lrbid., p. 4os. 
2 Ibid., P• lW3. 
3Ibid., P• 409. 
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with Dewey. 
Dewey contends, and Russell agrees, that theories 
such as quantum mechanics and gravitation do not yield 
information about an objective reality (K0 ) but merely con-
nect experiences in a workable and practical way (K ). p Dewey 
differs with Russell in the objective status of the referent 
of such a proposition as "Caesar was assassinated," or of 
protocol sentences. For Russell, "Caesar," "assassination," 
"past," 11 Rome, 11 and other terms requisite to understanding 
the above proposition are "objective" facts. For Dewey, the 
component parts of this statement or proposition, as well as 
the parts of protocol sentences, are practical classifica-
tions of that which James terms 11 pure experience," and do 
not indicate the subdivisions, categorizations, and classi-
fication of any objective reality. 
Truth, for Russell, here presupposes a metaphysical 
duality between proposition and referent, and an interaction 
between X and my mind so that some propositions ~ warranted. 
The proposition is true if it corresponds to the referent. 
This dualism is absent in Dewey, where truth is a kind of 
coherence within the phenomenal world; that is, truth is a 
kind of success in resolving those problems whose very exist-
ence engenders the disciplines in science and philosophy. 
Since Russell's criticism of warranted assertibility 
is based 2n ~ inadequate interpretation 2f Dewey, the 
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conclusion reached here is that Russel l' s view about 
warranted assertibi lity being contrary to ordinary language 
is insufficiently analyzed, and is inadequately unde~vritten 
by evidence. 
113 
Asswnptions and Values 
Assum]?tions._-- \'Jhat are the assumptions involved in 
Russell's conception of' truth? These assumptions are of' t11TO 
sorts. On the one hand, correspondence as a def'inition of' 
truth involves dualism -- or a special kind of' phenomenon-
noumenon dualism -- lvhich alternative def'ini tions of' truth 
do not. Coherence and warranted assertibility, f'or instance, 
are def'initions of' truth which depend, not on the corres-
pondence of' two substances, such as mind and matter, phenomena 
and noumena, or experiences and an external world, but on 
log ical and empirical relations among experiences themselves. 
Correspondence, on the other hand, is either of' an experience 
with another experience (and this dualism is presupposed in 
all theories of' truth) or of' an experience with a non-experi-
enceable f'act. ~ontological validity of' thi~ latter tyne 
of' dualism ~.be granted -- ~~existent .metaphysical 
f'act -- bef'ore the view of' corresriondence as the def'inition 
- -- - - - - -- ~---:.::.::;..;;;.=..;;;.;:..:. 
2f truth ~~ justi~ed. It is dif'f'icult to say, at this 
point , 1...rheth.er this dualism is an assumption or a consequence 
of' correspondence. It tvill be treated he r e as an assumption, 
alth ough t he best that can be stated at this time is that the 
two are intimately connected, and that to asser t correspondence 
is to a s sert dualism. 
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On the other hand, correspondence also involves 
certain value-claims. The exact direction of the relation 
here between the correspondence definition of truth and the 
value-claims in question is not quite clear. Are these 
value-claims (to be specified) the grounding axioms or are 
they the consequences of correspondence as a definition of 
truth? 1Vh.at .!§. clear is that in asserting one (that is, 
correspondence) one asserts the others, and this is the 
logical relation of strict implication. 
It is quite clear that the kind of epistemological 
dualism 1-rhich follows from correspondence does not follow 
from other theories of truth; the same, however, is not 
necessarily true in the case of value-claims. Exponents of 
theories of truth other than correspondence 'tdll contend that 
the values 'tiThich are asserted 111'1 th or preserved by their 
definitions of truth are the same as those preserved by 
correspondence. The same claim need not be made in connection 
,,.ith the assumption of dualism. 
The important point of discussion here, it must be 
emphasized, is the definition of truth; criteria of truth are 
not relevent. 
The contentions then become (a) defining truth as 
correspondence involves us in phenomenal, epistemological, 
and metaphysical dualism, a kind of 11 total 11 dualism not in-
volved in coherence or pragmatic definitions of truth. ~o 
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assert that the proper definition o:f truth is "correspondence" 
is also to assert that this kind o:f dualism obtains. (b) De-
fining truth as correspondence involves us in specific value-
claims, claims 1vhich can be classified into survival and 
appreciative value-claims. 1fuether other definitions o:f 
truth can safeguard these value-claims as well is not clear 
at present. 
Let us now disciuss the issue o:f dualism. Correspond-
ence as a definition o:f truth is endorsed not only by .ussell 
but also by rationalists1 and SOme idre.lists. . The contention 
here is that the use o:f "correspondence" involves loe ically 
and in Russell's logic, analytically-- phenomenal, epistemo-
log ical, and metaphysical dualism. To "correspond" means 
to be in some vague sense a relation o:f equality or simi-
larity. "correspondence" is a less speci:fic term than either 
11 equality 11 or 11 similarity, 11 and is therefore a "sa:fer 11 term, 
that is, a term more likely to be accurate due to its 
ambiguity. 1ve say there is correspondence betlveen the propo-
sition that I no1..,. think o:f; namely, "there are t1v0 chairs in 
the next room," and the existential :fact that there are two 
chairs in the next room. I can mean by 11 chair 11 at least t1-10 
thing s, the phenomenal chair and the metaphysical chair. I:f 
I mean the phenomenal chair, then correspondence obtains 1...rhen, 
lnescartes, :for example. Hy mental conception and 
sensory perception o:f the world are true and veridical be-
cause they correspond to the material nature o:f the world. 
The existence and goodness o:f God are the guarantees o:f this 
truth. 
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upon entering the next room, I see the chairs (Russell 
calls this kind of' correspondence, epistemological). In 
this case, "correspondence" need not be similarity, although 
it might be. I can think of' 11 chair 11 t'l1'ith no picture in 
mind, or .,;,rith merely the >,rord spelled-out in mind. In this 
case, there is nothing 1ve can call "similarity" bet>,reen my 
thought and the phenomenal chair; yet lve can say that there 
is some relation, some relevance bett,reen the . thought and the 
phenomenal object, and t,re term this special kind of' relevance 
"correspondence." In case I pictured or visualized a chair 
'lvhen I think of' 11 chair, 11 the f'ollol,ring possibilities exist. 
First, the picture I have in mind when I think of' 11 chair 11 
may be that of' a plush leather easy•chair. The chai.rs next 
door may be collapsible cheap t..rooden chairs. The similarity 
here of' image and sensation is greater than bef'ore, yet still 
f'ar f'rom an identity; there is a vagueness in this relation-
ship. This relationship is likelvise comprised under the 
head "correspondence." Second, it is possible that the 
thought or idea 11 chair 11 brings to mind or is to the mind a 
picture almost identical "t'l1'ith the sensation I have w·hen 
seeing the chairs next door. In this case, the relat~on 
between thought and perception may be highly similar or 
even identical. This limiting case is likewise e ncompassed 
in the f'ar more g eneral term "correspondence." 
If' I mean by 11 chair 11 the metaphysical chair, then 
the connection is even looser than bef'ore (this kind of' 
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II • 111 ) correspondence Russell calls log~ca . • "Identity" is not 
a proper analysis of correspondence here, since -- as 
Professor Bertocci points out in his article 11 Ivlinimum 
Requirements :for a Personalistic Epistemology111 -- i:f 
the metaphysical object is conceived as identical 'tvith the 
perception of it, error ceases to be a psychological possi-
bility. Yet a relation is believed to exist between the 
metaphysical chair and my idea of the chair -- 'tvhatever that 
idea may be -- . and the relation is such that if the meta-
physical object 1vere significantly different, the idea ought 
likewise be different. This relation, which exists, is sig-
nificant, yet not identical, is also subsumed under the term 
"correspondence. " 
The past few paragraphs revie>ved the various meanings 
that are covered by the term "correspondence." Noticeable 
among all these meanings is that correspondence is a binary 
relation. Regardless of how correspondence~ can be tested, 
1vhen 1ve ~ by truth (that is, define truth as) correspond-
ence, we mean correspondence betw·een at least t1<10 events. 
These t1v0 events, as indicated, are either two events in 
man's experience ( 11 it rains outside" is an experienced thought 
w·hich is true if it corresponds to my sensation of rain upon 
stepping outside), a past and a future event ("the building 
'tvill be finished in two years" is a true experienced thought 
1 Published as "The Nature of Cognition," Review of 
Metaphysics, VIII (1954). 
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if in t't·lO years the building is experienced as being 
finished), and an experienced and non-experienced event 
( 11 space is infinite" as an experienced thought 1..rhich is 
ultimately true if space is infinite-- in a noumenal sense). 
The crucial issue for dualism now appears , .. hen we 
wish to determine what the ontological status is of each of 
the t1 .. o terms. In the case of what Russell calls episte-
mological correspondence, the terms are of equal ontological 
status, that is to say, they are both in the phenomenal 
world. But Russell, some rationalists, and personalists do 
not mean by correspondence a relationship betw·een phenomenal 
objects alone. That is, 1vhen truth is defined as corres-
pondence, more than phenomenal correspondence is meant; 
reference is to epistemological and metaphysical correspond-
ence as 1..rell. 
:Many events 1..rhich are said to correspond to phenomenal 
objects are not in turn thought of as phenomenal. TI~ese non-
phenomenal events (such as electrons, gravity, God, the 
unconscious, unperceived events, other minds) are not part 
of man's immediate givenness at any time. Hypotheses about 
electrons are said to be true -- as far as the correspondence 
definition of truth is concerned if the propositions or 
ideas about electrons 11 correspond 11 -- in any sense of the 
word -- to the X or metaphysical object. This is the meaning 
of correspondence. 
Needless to say, it has been established that corres-
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pondence entails logically two ontological realms. For 
purposes of' terminology we can stick to Kant 1 s "\'ridely used 
distinction betl.,een the noumenal and the phenomenal l'lorld. 
1vhen tr.uth is defined as correspondence, then, in a larg e 
number of' specific applications of the term 11 truth, 11 the two 
terms of' the correspondence relation are in the phenomenal 
and i n the noumenal realm, respectively. 
These are then the propositions justified: (a) 
Correspondence, as a definition of truth, involves phenomenal 
dualism. Correspondence may be between two sensations or 
two situations-experienced or tl'IO gestalts within one 
situation-experienced. This is Russell's epistemological 
correspondence. (b) Correspondence, as a definition of 
truth, involves epistemological dualism. Correspondence be-
tlveen the proposition 11 the sun is tf miles from the earth" and 
our scientific picture of the sun -- on l'lhatever basis this 
is verified-- is again dualistic. Finally, (c), and most 
i mportant of' all, correspondence as a definition of' truth 
involves quantitative metaphysical dualism, as when corres-
pondence is bet"t17'een the phenomenal and noumenal world. 
Alternative definitions of truth, such as coherence, 
consistency, and l'larranted assertibili ty (pragmatic) seem to 
be in fact specially designed to remain within the phenomenal 
realm at all times, and thereby by-pass the problem of the 
existence and the nature of an external or noumenal world. 
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These latter definitions of' truth do not entail the phenome-
non-noumenon dualism which is characteristic of the corres-
pondence definition of truth. The coherence definition of 
truth, for instance, states that we ~ by 11 true 11 an 
organization, the ultimately coherent organization, of all 
thought, feeling, and experiences. And although 11 God 11 and 
"electrons" may be admitted by this definition of truth as 
valuable hypotheses in our quest for coherence, these hypo-
theses must be viewed nonetheless in the light of pure "as if 11 
situations, or convenient fictions. As a matter of fact, 
the entire notion of an external or noumenal world must then 
be viewed as a convenient fiction. The situation with 
warranted assertibility is parallel. The only exception to 
the notion that coherence and warranted assertibility 
theories of truth demand relations among experiences or 
phenomena only is the one case in which coherence or 
warranted assertibility are thought .to be tests or criteria 
for the existence of a true correspondence between a situation-
experienced and a metaphysical X. To this the author of the 
dissertation takes serious exception. It is a logical fallacy 
to reason that the existence of coherence entails anything 
other than the existence of coherence itself -- especially 
when the putative entailment is a metaphysical commitment of 
the magnitude here indicated, i.e., knowledge of the existence 
and the nature of a noumenal world. There is neither a 
logical-deductive step involved in proceeding from coherence 
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or warranted assertibility to correspondence, nor is any 
appeal made to inductive considerations, since there is 
no past experience -- showing that coherence leads to 
correspondence -- from which inductive generalizations are 
to be garnered. The case in question is unigue. 
Coherence, consistency, and pragmatic definitions 
of truth developed as a consequence of the crisis in 
epistemology (leading to skepticism) embodied in the philo-
sophies of Hume and Kant. It is interesting to note that 
coherence and pragmatic definitions of truth found their 
most significant development after this crisis (Hegel and 
James, respectively). The only way to avoid skepticism, after 
Hume and Kant, was to redefine truth. Since Hume and 
especially Kant sho,..red -- if' perhaps not actually or con ... 
elusively, at least judging by the historical impact -- that 
correspondence as a definition of' truth, with its implicit 
phenomenon-noumenon dualism, leads to skepticism about any-
thing noumenal, the only way out of' skepticism was to define 
anew lvhat is meant by truth. Coherence and pragmatic 
definitions of' truth redef'ine truth in terms of' the phenome-
nal world alone, that is, in terms of experiences of one sort 
or another. Correspondence with the unexperienceable is 
recognized as impossible. The epistemolog ical problem is no 
longer how to bridge the phenomenon-noumenon gap, but has 
developed into the attempt to overcome or grow ~ of the 
strictures of the dualistic phenomenon-noumenon assumptions 
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which our common sense has inherited above-all ~rom Descartes. 
I~ 't'le mean by ''truth," coherence, the moni.stic 
Weltanschauung at the root o~ this de~inition is ~undamentally 
di~~erent ~rom the dualism at the root o~ correspondence. 
Pragmatism as a de~inition o~ truth, ~or example, means by 
11 true 11 the "cash-value" (James' phrase) o~ an idea. We can 
test directly in the phenomenal 'tii'Orld, without ~urther 
epistemological assumptions, ~or coherence, consistency, 
probability, and warranted assertibility. We cannot test, 
in the phenomenal world alone, in this same direct sense, ~or 
all types o~ correspondence; we must then assume, .as person-
alistic epistemology does, that coherence is our best guide, 
test, or criterion for correspondence. 
The conclusion ~rom these last ~our pages is that the 
use of correspondence as the de~inition of truth assumes all 
sorts o~ dualisms, especially a kind of epistemological and 
metaphysical dualism.1 The next question is, what grounds can 
be ~ound for making this ~undamental assumption of' dualism, 
which carries with it the consequence of' correspondence as a 
de~inition o~ truth. 
Further evidence that assumptions are at the root o~ 
Russell's decision to adopt correspondence as a theory of 
truth is the following. It was mentioned earlier that corres-
pondence, 't'lhich embodies realism and common sense, is a non-
logical, and strictly speaking, a non-rational position. 
There are additional reasons, however, which substantiate the 
111 Dualism11 :functions a s a g ener ic t e rm refer r i n g to 
oome ego - - non- ego situation. 
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non-logical. character of' Russell's choice of' theory of' 
truth. According to Russe111 there are three types of' 
inference: (1) logical -- which is analytic and says that 
no existing event can imply any other existing event, a point 
Hume established when he showed that from an existential 
fact no consequences of' effects can be deduced logically 
(2) analogical, and (3) inductive. The latter two involve 
non-logical principles. Both analogical and inductive in-
' 
ferences purport to transcend experience. Such transcendence 
can never be achieved by logic, merely by hope, custom, and 
habit, or the postulation of' a transcendently functioning 
synthetic ~ priori, for which logic can give no warrant. This 
point of' skepticism was first worked out by Hume and later 
confirmed, with refinements, by Kant. Russell cannot answer 
Hume's and Kant's skepticism on logical grounds; yet he 
adopts the correspondence theory of truth, which, on the basis 
of Russell's own distinctions above, utilizes non-logical 
inferences. Correspondence means dualism, and to avoid 
skepticism in dualism it is necessary to postulate the 
validity of' induction and analogy through some a p riori prin-
ciples, principles which are purportedly valid throughout the 
universe albeit that they are derived from the intuitions of' 
reason alone. To accept the transcendent validity -- that 
is, validity beyond possible experience -- of any a priori 
1Ibid., pp. 360-361. 
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principle is a non-logical situation. The justi£ication 
£or this adoption must rest, o£ course, on non-logical 
grounds. 
Historically, epistemological and metaphysical 
dualism -- which are the metaphysical correlates o£ corres-
pondence -- have led to skepticism. Descartes thought to 
circumvent skepticism by £irst proving God's existence 
which presupposes what Kant later called the transcendent 
validity o£ the law o£ cause and e££ect, £or which Descartes 
never gives any proo£ beyond lumen naturalis -- and then 
establishing His limitless goodness and honesty. The argu-
ment in question is in Descartes' Third Meditation. In the 
Fi£th ~Ieditation he avails himsel£ o£ the ontological argu-
ment, which dispenses with the notion of causation. Berkeley 
dispensed lll'ith the material substratum o£ Cartesian dualism, 
and Hume £inally dispensed with rational kno"t'iledge altogether. 
Kant gave "metaphysical" or 11 noumenal 11 skepticism his bless-
ing. Russell, £inally, in order to by-pass skepticism has to 
make implicit assumptions about the rationality o£ the uni-
verse, or at least the rational knowability o£ the universe, 
assumptions which are neither £ounded on some a priori 
intuition nor on an experience. These assumptions must, 
there£ore, be vie't..red as either £reely willed, £reely chosen, 
at least as having the capacitr o£ being £reely chosen, or 
as embodying value-claims, which in turn either have been or 
could have been £reely chosen. 
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In reply to possible criticisms, the author o:f the 
dissertation must maintain the :following: the notion o:f 
skepticism here presented is not that l'lhat is not certain 
knowledge (whether logically or empirically derived) is no 
knowledge at all. That is, the claim is here ll£1 made 
as it might be made by a Cartesian -- that probability is 
not knowledge. The claim that is made here, however, is 
that our knowledge of the existence and nature of an exter-
nal world -- unless the specific assumptions which are 
isolated here ~ ~ncritically granted -- is not even 
probable. It is contended here that it is meaningless to 
infer -- even with degrees o:f probability -- from an experi-
ence to an unexperienceable under the general belief that 
the notion o:f inference, especially when dealing with the 
canons of scientific inference, is in turn an empirical 
notion, or a term which derives its validity and meaning 
from the realm of experience itself and can therefore not 
be utilized in turn, without begging the qu estion, to trans-
cend this realm o:f experience. This is similar to Kant's view. 
Values.--(1) The Value-Claims Involved in Russell's 
Conception o:f Definition. In searching :for the ultimate 
grounds :for the acceptance and justification (which are not 
synonymous terms) of a conception of the nature of truth, we 
must discover what values are or might be at the root of such 
acceptance and justification. The ensuing question then be-
comes, what is the ground :for this acceptance and justi:fi-
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cation of these values. 
The relation of value to truth must be studied 
first as the relation of value to definition in Russell's 
sense, since it is essential to determine "1\l'hy a particular 
kind of defin ition will satisfy the quest for a definition 
of truth. First, as we have seen, a definition must not 
contradict ordinary lang uag e. If it did, a new word would 
be in order. It seems to the author of the dissertation that, 
for example, i:f the prescriptive use of 11 truth11 were to be 
"mystic vision," it is certainly most unpragmatic to use the 
term "truth" in lieu of "mystic vision." It is practical, 
convenient, for the purpose especially of facilitating success-
ful communication, but also thinking and self-expression, to 
remain w·ithin the larg er outlines of ordinary languag e. The 
decision to limit definitions at least to ordinary lang uage 
is a decision that must be based on considerations such as 
the follo1~ing : commun ication is a value-claim, on e 1r1hich 
embodies the value-claims of survival and love and appreci~ 
ation. Staying in our definition of definition within the 
confin es of ordinary language preserves these value-claims 
of communication. To confine definition to ordinary usag e is, 
therefore, a practical, beneficial, utilitarian consideration, 
in relation to the function of communication. This re-
striction in t h e nature of definition is based on the value-
claims as well as the true or criticized values found in (a) 
conwunication, (b) thought, and (c) self-expression. 
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Second, to the extent that definitions are also 
prescriptive, value-claims become selective criteria. A 
prescription has. a purpose -- implicit or explicit. If the 
use of a term is legislated, whether by tradition or fiat, 
a purpose is involved. To legislate, in this case, is to 
be purposeful about the usage of words. If prescription is 
by tradition, the 11 purpose 11 of the definition is a descrip-
tive abstraction of an empirically observed phenomenon, 
just as 11 purpose 11 is a descriptive abstraction lvhen used as 
a category of explanation in the grolrlh of a frog from a 
tadpole. Here we can say that definition conforms to a 
rule, as opposed to appeals to a rule. 1 I£ prescription is 
by fiat, as >Y"ith neologisms, the author has a purpose or 
function in mind £or his term. It remains to be seen that 
purposiveness, in both these senses, involves value-decision, 
or decision about values. 
In the first place, purpose as fiat in prescribing 
the use and meaning o£ terms is an intrinsic value or a 
value-claim in the form o£ the personalistic conception of 
values. Intrinsic value is that which is "esteemed to be 
intrinsically "tvorthy as an end of human action or enjoyment. 112 
1 In this connection, see the article by Donald Schon, 
"Procedural and Material Rules," Journal o£ Philosophy, 
Vol. LIV, No. 13, June 20, 1957. 
2Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Introduction to Philoso-
l?hx.. (New York: Holt & Co., 19,51), p. 140. 
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k~ intrinsic value is the subject matter of a consummatory 
experience. Intrinsic value is the object of any interest. 
"Value means whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, 
desired, approved, or enjoyed by anyone at any time. 111 A 
true-value is a coherent interrelation of value-claims with 
other value-claims. The interrelation or coherence itself 
is esteemed and prized in turn, that is to say, is a truth-
value. For example, a neologism is created for the pur.pose 
of naming a ne't11' experimentally grounded theory in organic 
chemistry. "Purpose 11 here means, upon analysis, something 
like this: "further research '\dll be simplified through 
the creation of a new classification." This is a truth-value. 
"Purpose," here, can also mean, "the body of knowledge has 
been reduced to a smaller series of classifications, so that 
comprehension of the totality through simplification is 
enhanced." No olaim is here made that the specific reductions 
are unassailable; the example itself is hardly specific. 
l'lhat is intended here is to shO'tll' that "purpose" may reduce 
in meaning to something of the type of one of these propo-
sitions: "understanding, knowledge, and research are simpli-
fied and expedited." Purpose may reduce in meaning to one 
type of value-claim or other (such as truth-value, health-
value, or social-value). Knowledge is a value in both of 
1Edgar Sheffield Brightman, ~ Philosophy ££ Religion 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), p. 88. 
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the above senses. Knowledge is esteemed as an intrinsic 
and worthy human end; it is a value-claim in that it is 
liked, prized, esteemed, and, i:f coherently approved, 
becomes a true-value. Knowledge-value is the process o:f 
achieving coherence among statements, existential or valu-
ational. De:finitions as prescriptions by :fiat are chosen 
or prescribed because these de:finitions tend to aid the 
attainment o:f a value, that value being, perhaps, knowledge. 
In this particular conception o:f what a de:finition is, a 
value (unspeci:fied) determines the choice o:f what will 
satis:fy the quest :for a de:finition. 
What has been demonstrated this :far is !!.2!. that 
these speci:fic value-claims are the source or ground o:f 
Russell's conception o:f de:finition, but that his conception 
o:f de:finition embodies, realizes these senses o:f value-
claims, that with asserting his conception o:f de:finition, 
these values are also asserted. Nonetheless, in answer to 
the question, why de:fine de:finition as he does, one must 
conclude that the only sensible answer is, the above value-
claims are protected and realized. It might be objected that 
these are, indeed, reasons :for accepting a de:finition o:f 
truth. However, i:f the will is :free, these reasons do not 
determine the will, they only urge it. The will must :first 
have made the additional decision to be rational, to accept 
reasons as decisive to decisions. For this last decision, 
no reason in turn can be given without logical circularity, 
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since the decision to be guided by rational considerations 
in the first place can never be grounded on a reason in turn. 
In the second place, the other meaning or kind of 
definition is prescription by tradition. This kind of 
prescription is an "as if" situation similar to that of' the 
social contract theory. No such contract was ever actually 
closed or underwritten. Similarly, no deliberate choice 
of the use of terms was ever made as far as ordinary lan-
guage is concerned. Not even our linguistic ancestors, the 
Indo-Europeans living 4,000 B.C., are believed to have 
deliberately chosen their coinage of' words. Even Esperanto 
is only partially "deliberate" in this sense of choice. 
However, "as if'" analyses of empirical situations are common 
and accepted. Entities, such as atoms, gravitation, the 
unconscious, and the lif'e f'orce may be hypostatized f'or the 
purpos~of' describing an objective empirical situation. In 
this way, when we say 111 wheel 1 is 1 a circular rim and hub 
connected by spikes or a disk, made to rotate on an axis, 
and employed to reduce :friction and facilitate movement,'" 
the definition can be said to be culturally prescriptive to 
the extent that there is no necessity beyond tradition (of 
perhaps accidental _origin) to associate these particular 
groups of' words. 
How can purpose and value be related to this inter-
pretation of' what definitions are? Let us take a speculative 
and specious example which will nonetheless illustrate the 
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point. The cave man, it is conjectured, hunted. 1-Iaybe he . 
hunted gorillas. For practical purposes, such as to find 
companions for his hunt, he needed to communicate. He 
chose to imitate the ape's grunts when hunted, which grunt 
was 11 grrll.u The cave man could have imitated the gorilla's 
gait, but he did not. 11 G·rrrll" might have meant many things: 
"let's go hunting," "there is a gorilla, 11 or 11 I will barter 
gorilla meat for your stone implements." Over the millenia, 
11grrrll 11 eventuated into "gorilla." Pithecanthropus .erectus 
did not consciously examine alternative onomatopoetic ex-
pressions to discover which would suit his purpose best. 
That goes without saying. It is merely a descriptive fact 
that he used a sound to mean something. In describing this 
"choice" of words, the term "purpose" can be used legiti-
mately with the qualification that it is an "as if," or a 
root metaphor. The action is "as if" it were purposeful; 
that is, it is analogical to the overt characteristics of 
what I do when I act purposefully. Russell calls this type 
of a situation an inference by analogy. Words had the 
"purpose" of signalyzing situations important to the cave 
man. The cave man acts "as if 11 situations relative to 
gorillas are important and of interest to him, "as if 11 they 
were prized, desired, and enjoyed, as if they were valuable 
(i.e., value-claims). In conclusion, the word gathered its 
meaning because it represented a .value to the cave man. 
~ value-claim, specifically, was embodied we do not know, 
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perhaps a communicative or a social value. ~ a value-
claim ~ have been preserved, seems a highly probable 
conjecture. 
This fable is a version of the conception of the 
origin of words. The fable shows that de:Cinitions of 
ordinary language can be said to be purposive in the sense 
of prescription by tradition. In that case, a value (which 
value is not relevant) determines what definition is to be 
used. 
The discussion this far applies equally well to 
Brightman's "true-value." True-value is value-claim (an 
experience or object consciously desired) criticized coher-
ently. A stipulative or prescriptive definition by fiat is 
good if its adequacy has been explored, criticized. If 
the purpose of the neologism is to facilitate memory work, for 
example, the true-value element of this definition is the 
extent to l'i'hich criticism and analysis show that this func-
tion is fulfilled properly. Similarly, a stipulative or pre-
scriptive definition by tradition has weathered the test of 
true-value not by conscious analysis but by the evolutionary 
selectivity, being sharpened and modified over ~enturies. 
In an inexplicit, unanalyzed fashion, definition by tradition 
has distilled a definition which embodies a value. In a 
loose _sense, this value can be called true-value. Words that 
fulfilled their purpose properly were retained; others, by 
~ . " 
tradition, modified or rejected. The Greek 0\ f '{(1 , meaning 
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perhaps 11 f'irst 11 in its etymological derivation today, has 
been modified, because today we do not demand the concept 
of' Urgrund in connection with 11 archetype, r' 11 archbishop, 11 
and other derivative terms, as this concept ·was demanded 
by the Greek language in the days of' Anaximander. 
It is contended here that, according to Russell, 
'~hat we seek l'ihen we define is a valued prescription re-
lating the use of' words, within the confines o:f -- tvhich is 
the same as -- an approximate analysis of' both connnon sense 
and ordinary language. Definitions are prescriptive, in 
both of' the above senses, as well as descriptive of' ordinary 
language. A descriptive analysis of' ordinary languag e is 
the same as an ·analysis of' prescription by tradition. And 
since all prescriptions involve value 8 claims, we can say 
in conclusion that when Russell seeks a definition, he is 
dealing exclusively with prescriptions. Descriptive analysis 
of' linguistic usages, such as that of' G. E. Moore, Gilbert 
Ryle, and other contemporary analysts, is analysis o:f the 
prescriptive uses of' tradition. The earlier problem of' how 
to reconcile definitions as prescriptions and definitions as 
descriptions can be herewith considered at least partially 
resolved. Occasionally, however, 11 descriptive analysis of' 
ordinary language 11 will be used in place of' 11 analysis of' 
prescription by tradition. 11 
In this connection the following criticism has 
been made by Professor Bertocci: 11 Aren 1 t prescriptive 
definitions 1vhich last, in fact, descriptive, 
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b.2..:., related to the rele.vant world?" Prescriptive def'i-
nitions which last do so either out of' habit or because the 
values embodied are relevant today. These definitions are 
related to experience, but this is not the same as saying 
they are related to the world, especially if' we use a 
correspondence definition of' truth, where 11 world 11 may refer 
to an external, unexperienceable world. 1 
It f'ollows f'rom this analysis that when Russell 
def'ines truth as correspondence his definition is a pre-
scription of' usage which he (and tradition, by virtue o f his 
analysis of' ordinary language) f'inds valuable; that is, it 
satisfies value-claims. t~ich value-claims are satisfied 
depends on what word is being defined. In defining the word 
11 truth, 11 the value-claims satisfied are knowledge-values. 
Knowledge-values, in turn, may be instrumental to survival-
values, or may be intrinsic values. His definition is 
determined by an underlying value; that is, the value aimed 
at when the word was coined and likewise purported while it 
is continually used. At the same time, correspondence as a 
definition of' truth is thought to be consistent with an 
analysis of' ordinary language. 
The following brief' consideration also shows that 
any definition if', and only if', accepted must be prescrip-
tive. According to our analysis of' Russell, definitions 
are both prescriptive by tradition, that is, conform to the 
purposive legislation that tradition has undertaken, and 
l rhe distinction between subjective and objective 
experience is discussed in Chapter IV under 11 Some Objections. 11 
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prescriptive by fiat, that is, prescribed by an individual 
according to his individual needs or purposes. What kind of 
a statement is a definition? It is not descriptive in the 
strict sense of corresponding to an actual situation. If 
it were, we might use correspondence in turn to decide 
whether our definition of truth corresponds with the real 
state of affairsi that is, the "real'' definition of truth. 
We would then either have to postulate a Platonic Form or 
end with an infinite regress. If not descriptive, definitions 
must be prescriptive, must be decisions about how words are 
to be used. Since these decisions are not without ground, 
it follows that there is a ground for Russell's definition 
of definition and for his definition of truth. The ground 
Russell chose, as it turns out, is the one he thought will 
help his dualistic epistemology the most. 
The next topic for investig ation is what specific 
values might be embodied in or preserved by using corres-
pondence as a definition of truth, as well as what values 
are at the base of those theories of truth he rejects. 
(2) The Value-Claims Involved in Russell's Decision 
to Accept the Logical Definition of Correspondence. The 
logical definition of correspondence -- correspondence of 
phenomena with noumena, experiences with that which trans-
cends experiences, or propositions with reality is 
accepted by Russell on the grounds that "no one is willing 
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to adopt so narrow a theory" as epistemological corres-
pondence which is correspondence between phenomena alone. 
These statements must be interpreted as analyses o~ 
situations involving knowledge-claims to which ordinary lan-
guage re~ers. Why are we ~aced with this "unwillingness"? 
Because ~undamental belie~s, relevant to what we ordinarily 
call knowledge and reality and whic~ we need and presuppose 
~or the simplest act o~ daily living such as a belief in 
other minds, the permanence of the external world, and the 
validity of universal. propositions -- cannot be rejected 
without undesirable consequences. Life as we know it, to 
be lived actively, is impossible without the above belie~s. 
Survival, as we know it, is a valuei that is, it is prized, 
esteemed, approved, and desired. Survival, furthered by 
belie~ in the external world, is also a true-value, a criti-
cized value-claim. The means to that survival, especially 
the essential ones, are equally prized, esteemed, approved, 
and desired. Means to that are belie~s in other minds, the 
external world, and the validity of universal propositions. 
Logical correspondence can support these beliefs better than 
any other definition of truth. Logical correspondence is, 
therefore, founded on a value, such as survival. Epistemo-
logical correspondence is not founded on that value, because 
it does not preserve the value of survival with maximum 
ef~iciency. Epistemological correspondence leads to solip-
sism, because propositions and experiences can only corres-
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pond -- in the sen.se of' being directly verif'i.able - to my 
own experience. In that case, other minds, external objects, 
the entire world outside myself', is negated or meaningless. 
Survival is difficult, perhaps impossible, for an individual 
dealing only with dream images. 
Logical correspondence preserves also other values. 
A further example would be, the value of' love, care, or 
companionship. Logical correspondence leads to a belief' in 
other beings, beings which need, demand, and are capable of 
love, care, and companionship. Epistemological corres-
pondence militates against these value-claims because we 
would be committed to loving an image. The love of' an image 
is incomplete, infinitely inferior to an objective, independ-
ently co-existing person. Logical correspondence preserYes 
appreciative values -- the world that is appreciated cannot 
be appreciated gua dreami that is, as an appearance without 
a supporting reality beyond. Constitutive of our appre-
ciation of' the world is the unshakeable belief' that the 
world exists independently of' us. 
Many more values can be cited, but the point is made. 
Logical correspondence makes possible survival, love, care, 
and companionship, and appreciative values; epistemological 
correspondence does not. What are we to ~ .. bY corres-
pondence? Russell, in f'act, has chosen the definition which 
preserves more values and contradicts fewest. It is that 
definition which, when used, embodies and preserves a larger 
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set of value-claims .and leads to true-values. 
In other words, the choice between these two types of 
correspondence is based on or at least guided by a choice 
between values. A value is at the root of Russell's defi-
nition of truth as logical correspondence, the value found 
in the belief' in an external world and the others menti.oned. 
As a peroration, Russell comments, 
Pure empiricism • • • is believed by no one, and if 
we are to retain belief.s that we all regard as valid, 
we must allow principles of inference which are 
neither demonstrative nor derivable from experience. 1 
Some of these principles may well be the. preservation of 
certain very basic value-claims and true-values. 
Why did Russell choose correspondence as the most 
valuable prescription by fiat which is consistent with 
prescription by tradition as embodied in ordinary language? 
Russell : seeks that definition of truth which is more likely 
to preserve the value-claims of survival, love, care, and 
companionship and thinking -- values connected with survival 
and with emotional expressions -- , that one which preserves 
best those value-claims, and he therefore prescribes a 
definition of truth, but he also wishes to confine himself 
to that which common sense or ordinary language allows him. 
He does not purport to contradict ordinary language overtly. 
The world view depicted in terms of dualism, which is 
necessary for the belief in non-self entities, is the world 
1 Bertrand Russell, !!! Inquiry ~ Meaning .. ~ Truth 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940), p. J8J. 
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view Russell tacitly accepts, the pose of the l..rorld he 
accepts, when he looks upon log ical correspondence as the 
11 true 11 definition of truth. This w·orld view, p erspective, 
or pose is chosen freely. Reasons for this 1vorld view are 
part of the very picture Russell chooses, because a kind of 
rationality is within that picture. The reasons do not 
determine the choice; the choice has determined the nature 
of the reasons to follow. This is not to say the choice has 
determined the experience of brute fact which is a frequently 
attributed reason for suspecting a non-ego. Choice determines 
the acceptance of the reasons involved; choice accepts the 
particular organization £! EFesenta~ions which Russell would 
call inferences of a non-ego. 
(J) The Value-Claims Involved in Russell's Definition 
of Truth as Correspondence. Correspondence as a definition of 
truth is accepted by Russell on two grounds: (a) Corres-
pondence does not contradict ordinary language. As a matter 
of fact, correspondence seems to Russell to be a far more 
accurate analysis or more truly representative of ordinary lan-
guage than coherence or warranted assertibility. Brightman 
agrees with Russell in that correspondence is the definition 
of truth, although it cannot function as a criterion. (b) 
Correspondence preserves and embodies assumptions and values 
which Russell, by asserting this definition, endorses and 
hopes to preserve. Eo/ prescribing or choosing or deciding that 
correspondence is the definition of truth, Russell chooses, 
first of all, the assumptions and values inherent in this 
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definition. The proof for this is not that Russell 
specifically states this, but that he gives no 
other conclusive reasons for his choice of definition. 
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In this section will be discussed the values found in 
correspondence as a definition o£ truth, emphasizing, 
of course, those value•claims not discussed in the pre-
vious section. 
It must be recalled that earlier, on p. 89 , 
Russell illustrates the meaning of correspondence through 
three propositions: ( 1) "I am hot, 11 ( 2) "you are hot, 11 and 
(3) 11 the sun is hot." Propositions (2) and (3) are said to 
involve the metaphysical assumptions of the existence of 
other minds and the existence of an external worid respect-
ively. 
How do values, now, enter into Russell's definition 
of truth? No direct, oblique, or articulate reference to 
an assumption or to a value is made in his analysis of the 
statement 11 I am hot." No reference is made which can be 
construed to make truth in any way dependent on an assumption 
or value. That is to say, no such reference exists in the 
strict sense of truth as correspondence in beliefs of the 
type 11 I am hot." The correspondence between the belief 11 I 
am hot" and the awareness "I am hot 11 is an experience or 
awareness in turn. It is the experience of a relation. As 
such, this kind of correspondence is a fact, a fact of 
experience. 
However, in the case of beliefs (2) and (.3), value 
and assumptions do play a ro.le. Russell assumes with belief 
(2) that other minds exist, and with belief (3) that an 
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external world. exists. Russell assum.es the existence of' 
an external physical world and other minds in these ex-
amples. Russell argues as :follows, by analo.gy: . I have . 
experienced many times the conjunction o:f' (A) the state-
ment 11 I am hot" and (B) the sensation o:f' heat. In another 
large number o:f' cases I utter similar statements, and by 
analogy I in:f'er the existence o:f' a state in others similar 
to my state ( B). Re:f'erring to the validity o:f' this analogy, 
Russell writes, 
I do not know whether this is the case or not. In 
the absence of' evidence to the contrary, I assume 
that it is the case. This is still induction, but 
••• there can be no evidence f'or or against it, 
except the indirect evidence that, accepted as a 
scienti:f'ic hylothesis, it leads to no untoward 
consequences. 
Russell is not explicit, but this is a pragmatic argument 
f'or the existence o:f' other minds. From the point o:f' view 
o:f' strict corresponden ce, the belief' in other minds cannot 
be justi:f'ied or negated because no evidence exists. He 
chooses to believe in other minds. From this standpoint 
the belief' must be neutral; it can be neither :false nor true. 
Yet it is taken as a true belief'. In the alternation '''other 
minds exist' or 'other minds do not exist 111 the f'ormer is 
chosen. Why? Because it leads to no untoward consequences, 
we are told. If' so, why accept it? Rejection leads 
similarly to no untoward2consequences. The decision is not 
1 Ibid., P• 292. 
2untoward here means "empirically or phenomenally in-
consistent." 
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arbitrary. It mu.st be, therefore, that :for reasons not 
yet :fully explored, the belie:f in other minds is more 
desirable, in some sense other than truth, than the corres-
ponding disbelief. A valuation enters into this conception 
o:f truth, even i:f the value itsel:f be simplicity, elegance, 
or convenience. The belie:f in other minds allows the search 
:for knowledge, that is, permits the summary and heuristic 
presentation o:f experiences, and it has survival value. 
An o~ppo ·nen t · might ask here, "are there any good, 
reasoned grounds :for not believing in the existence o:f other 
minds and an external world? There are many grounds :for 
these belief's. Do you '~ant more?" . The answer to this re-
curring problem is not that ~ grounds are needed to agree 
with Russell's tacit assumptions, but that the nature o:f his 
(or o:f any) assumptions is such that no grounds ££or can 
exist. "No evidence to the contrary" is no evidence _m :favor 
2£ that :for which no evidence can exist; that is, the exist-
ence o:f an external world. The very notion o:f evidence, as 
Kant has shown, is a notion derived :from and only valid 
l'li thin the phC:momenal realm. The noumenal realm o:f God, 
:freedom, immortality, Dinge~~-~, and other minds is be-
yond any evidence or any reason. That realm is either 
accepted or rejected in practice. No logic and no probabil-
ity :forces this view on the mind o:f man. This :fundamental 
epistemological and metaphysical issue must be removed :from 
the realm o:f logic to that o:f :free choice. The choice may 
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be based on the consequences of' it, but again, man is free 
to reject reasons for accepting these consequences. \~en Kant 
applies the laws of' evidence, the laws of' causation, to account 
for the existence of' a Ding-an-sich, he is violating his own 
principles: he is using these laws in a transcendent sense. 
He himself' argues that this sense is not legitimate. 
In relation to point (2) above (p. 135}, what are the 
assumptions involved in asserting correspondence as a defini-
tion of' truth? In the first place, it may be argued that 
correspondence is closer to ordinary language than alternate 
theories because ordinary language embodies the fundamental be-
lief in the existence of' a knowable external l-torld. The term 
11 truth, 11 as a central term in ordinary language, must likewise 
embody the belief' in the existence of' a knowable external world. 
\ihen truth is viewed as correspondence, that belief' is em-
bodied in the term. To discuss the consequences of' the corres-
pondence theory of' truth is, therefore, to mention the conse-
quences of' a belief' in an existing external w·orld. Every prac-
tical action presupposes a belief' in an external world. On the 
unsophisticated, common-sense level, social relations, from 
marriage to friendship, business to teaching, from legal con-
tracts to public speeches, presuppose an external world. Sci-
entif'ic investigations make a similar assumption. Similarly, 
agriculture, industry, and transportation presuppose an exter-
nal world for the meaningfulness of' their actions. Descartes 
appears to have felt -- in his Meditations he illustrates 
this fundamental belief' of ordinary languag e -- that even God 
in His g oodness could deceive us occasionally, but one 
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deception would be far too monstrous to come f rom a good God: 
belief in an external world. Therefore, he argued, the 
external world exists. The validity of this latter inter-
pretation of Descartes can be derived, probably, from some 
considerations regarding the possibility of error in the 
face of a perfect God. This matter is discussed in ~-
tation 1!• This is not the place to analyze Descartes, but 
the following quotation indicates the direction Descartes 
takes to justify errore 
For actually it is not an imperf~ction in God that 
he has given me the liberty of Ljudging or not judging 
(oil giving or withholding assent,) on certain matters 
of which he has no clear and distinct knowledge. It 
is, without doubt, an imperfection in mrself not to 
make proper use of this liberty, and Lrashli7 to pass 
j~dgment on matters which I (do not rightly understand 
Land) conceive only obscurely and confusedli7.1 
Descartes seems to wish to show that God can de-
ceive me in little matters, matters in which I can detect the 
error. When it comes to the question of the existence of 
an external world, I cannot detect deception. This latter 
deception, and only it, would be a genuine evil -- one 
which God does not permit. 
The consequences of a belief in an external world 
are practically too numerous and obvious to list. Of course, 
they embody value-claims. "what 
philosopher doesn't believe in an external world?" In 
reply, it must be pointed out that the conception of an 
1Ren' Descartes, Meditations, trans. Laurence J. 
Lafleur (New Yorke The Liberal Arts Press, 19.51), p • .54. 
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external world is totally different from the point of 
view of a correspondence de:finition of truth than :from such 
views as a coherence definition or a definition of warranted 
assertibility. If truth is defined as the coherence of 
experiences, or the 'l:torkability of experiences and procedures 
and hypotheses towards solving certain problems, no assertion 
is made that transcends or purports to transcend the pheno-
menal world. No commitment about noumena is made. The 
problem of the existence of a noumenal world is by-passed. 
On the other hand, using correspondence as a definition of 
truth has been shown to carry with it a phenomenon-noumenon 
dualism. Correspondence as a definition of truth involves 
commitments to a noumenal world. Other definitions make 
no assertions about this noumenal world. In connection with 
the above statement that 11 the problem of the existence of a 
noumenal world is by-passed," Professor Bertocci makes the 
following comment: 
Neither Spinoza nor Hegel -- two :forms of logical 
coherence __ ... nor Bradley nor Royce; and yet they . 
distinguished the world as it appears to man and as 
it really is for God! The trouble again is that you 
(a) seem to regard phenomena as shadows rather than 
as the ~.!n part :for coherence theorists o:f' the 
non-Kantian type, (b) you forget that for them the 
i dea ~ the reality, especially when systematically 
coherent. (Note, this is not for PAB, ESB, and 
Kantians who use -- going beyond Kant -- empirical 
coherence). On warranted assertibility of Dewey 1 s 
sort -- I'm not sure, for Dewey seems to me to waver 
between a Kantian metaphrsical agnosticism and an 
Hegelian-type coherencei:f Hegel is empirically 
interpreted) • 
To the extent that Royce, Bradley., and Hegel are cogent, 
there ~ ~ noumenon in the sense of that which cannot be 
experienced, that which transcends all possible e:x:peri-
ence. The absolute is conceived as self-conscious, as a 
self-consciousness of which we are a part, or, to rephrase, 
as a self-consciousness which . ~- .can become. In the last 
analysis, the Absolute is the ·supreme coherence of experi-
ences, of conscious events. These conscious events are· 
not une:x:perienceable to me (as are "other minds 11 for 
Berkeley), but my own self-consciousness can expand to 
encompass them all. Then the Absolute will have been 
attained. A quotation from Royce will illustrate and in 
part substantiate this contention. 
God is not in ultimate essence another being than 
yourself. He is the Absolute Being. You truly are 
one with God, part of his life. He is the very soul 
of your soul • ~ • There is in the universe but one 
p~rfectly real being; namely, the Absolute, ••• 
Lansi/ the Absolute is s .elf-conscious, and • • • the world 
is essentially in .i . t ·: .s ~ wholeness the fulfillment 
!a ~ of an all-perfect idea1.1 
The correspondence theory of truth 11 is the view of 
realism and of common sense." 2 Russell candidly admits that 
truth must be so defined as to endorse, lead to, and be in 
harmony with "realism" and "common sense. 11 Wl1.y this 
insistence? With correspondence as a definition of truth, 
1 Josiah Royce, 11The Problem of Job," American 
Thought, ed. and introd. Perry !liller ( Ne,.., York: Rinehart 
& Co., Inc., 1954), P• lJ. 
2Bertrand Russell, ~ Inguiry ~ Meaning ~ Truth 
(Ne,.., York: tv. 1'1. Norton & Co., Inc., 19lJ.O), P• 357. 
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Russell has chosen to accept realism and common sense. 
Truth is def'ined . according ly. This acceptance involves 
value-claims; it is a non-logical acceptance. Correspond-
ence as a definition of' truth, by involving the belief' in an 
external world, also involves or preserves the values 
of' that belief'. It is a fact that cannot be disputed that 
these values embodied in the belief' in an external world are 
actually preserved by adopting correspondence as a theory 
of' truth. Since neither Russell's arguments for accepting 
correspondence as a definition of' truth nor those against 
alternate theories were seen to be satisfactory or even 
possible in a strictly log ical sense, the possibility of' 
oth er factors affecting the choice of' definitions of' truth 
p resent s itself. Russell does not openly assert that a 
value-claim or true-value is at the root of' his decision to 
accept correspondence as a theory of' truth. Yet the fact 
of' t h e mat ter is that certain value-claims are particularly 
well satisfied by the correspondence theory of' truth. From 
this first step, which indicates compatibility between 
correspondence and certain specific value-claims, it is not 
f'ar to the second step, showing the dependence of corres-
pondence on these value-claims. 
Finally, the values at the root of' Russell's 
definition of' truth as corresp ondence might be summarized and 
expanded as follo1..rs, in terms of .Brightm.an :' .s terminology: 
A. Consequences of a belief in the existence of' an 
external world. Here we find represented (1) uncriticized 
value-claims. A desire, for example, is described as a 
desire for object or event ~' where ~ is usually a member 
of the external world or is to be garnered from the ex-
ternal world or its manipulation. A belief in the exist-
ence of an external world is implicit in value-claims. We 
also find that (2) true-values, or value-claims criticized 
by coherence, involve an external world. The external 
world is a fundamental link in the chain of empirical 
coherences which yield a criticized value. Furthermore, 
(J) the objectivity of values, which refers to the basic 
value-possibilities of the world, involves the independent 
and permanent existence of a special kind of an external 
world, because these value-possibilities are independent 
1 
of my knowing them. Lastly (4) the concept of moral obli-
gation, as part 'of the structure of values, involves obli-
gation not only to myself and my appearances, but to an ex-
ternal world consisting, among other things, of other minds. 
I have no obligation towards dream images. 
It may not be seen to follow that values are prior 
to a conception of reality (~, existence of an external 
world). Russell, for example, doubts this kind of relation-
ship. There is, however, an unquestionable and strict inter-
relation or connection. Value v1 is connected with conception 
lpeter A. Bertocci, Introduction _~~ Philosophy 
.2!. Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 2,58. 
150 
of reality r 1 , and these are embodied in conception of truth 
t 1 , just as value v 2 is connected lll'ith conceptiol;l of reality 
r 2 , which are embodied in conception of truth t 2 • The 
function of reality in this situation is the subject of the 
next section. It has been indicated, houever, that Russell 
g ives neither complete nor convincing arguments f or a concep-
tion o:f truth, which , on a logical and empirical level, allol'IT 
one to decide betl'/eon t 1 and t 2 • Tho burden of decision 
must, therefore, rest somewhere in v 1 or in v 2 . ~·lithin v 1 
or v 2 , the source of this decision must rest on uncriticized 
value-claims. Value-claims are part of our experiences. 
\ihen abstracted or intellectualized, these value-claims 
are called descriptive ideals. Value-claims are psychological 
:facts; value-claims are there, given, as pure data in pure 
experience. A value-claim is given in experience in a much 
more fundamental sense than a theory of truth is given in 
experience. Since value-claim v 1 is connected l'li th theory 
of truth t 1 , it is the value-claim which can be said to 
determine the theory of truth. \ln.'l.en Russell accepts corres-
pondence as a theory of truth he show·s the w·orkings and the 
presence of certain specific value-claims. Value-claims 
in one sense -- are neither accepted nor rejected, they 
merely ~~' whereas theories of truth can be accepted or 
rejected on the basis of thought processes . 
Should the reader feel impelled to accuse the author 
of psychoanalyzing Russell , the :following qualifications 
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might be app.ended. It cannot be demonstrated conclusively 
due to the nature of the demon.stration demanded -- that 
value-.claims precede or cause conceptions ot: truth. What 
!& subject to demonstration, and to a successt:ul one, it is 
hoped, is that correspondence as a det:inition of truth 
logically implies the coexistence or preservation or embodi-
ment of certain assumptions, beliefs, and value-claims. 
These value-claims are, in turn, subject to rational or 
other justification. In the end, these value-claims are 
either heeded or not. A claim for James -- is obligatory 
merely because it is a claim. 
There~~ obligation wherever . there~ .~ claim. 
Claim and obligation are, in fact, coextensive terms; 
they cover each other exactly • • • Take any demand, 
however slight, which any creature, however weak, may 
make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be 
satisfied? If not, prove why not. The only possible 
kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition 
of another creature who should make a demand that ran 
the other way. The only possible reason there can be 
why any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a 
phenomenon actually is desired. Any desire is impera-
tive to the extent ot: its amount; ft makes itself valid 
by the fact that it exists at all. 
Yet to accept or assent to this claim is a matter of choice 
(or counter-claim, in the context of James' terminology), 
assuming man has free will. The question of temporal or 
psychological order is a separate issue. 
Following is discussion of non-correspondence 
theories of truth, showing what value-claims are rejected, 
1 William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the 1-Ioral 
Life," Essays.!!::!. Pragmatism, ed. and introd. Alburey Castell 
(New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 19.5.5), pp. 72-73. 
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on the basis of Russell's analyses. 
(J.:.) Value-Claims Rejected with the Rejection of 
Empirical and Logical Coherence as a Definition of Truth. 
The primary objection against alternate truth definitions, 
in relation to ordinary language, would be that these other 
definitions do not embody common sense or ordinary language. 
Coherence embodies a Weltanschauung of extraordinary 
cohesiveness and unity. The powerful sense of unity with 
the universe, of one-ness or identity with tl1e Absolute, is 
embodied in the coherence definition. Ordinary language 
to the extent that such a generalization is acceptable --
does not stand primarily for such a cohesive view of the 
world. w·arranted assertibility, on the other hand, embodies 
a relativistic Weltanschauung. It is difficult for prag-
matism to make any commitments about the nature of reality 
beyond that of pure experience, and predictions and classi-
fications derived from this pure experience. This kind of 
relativism, much of which is seen in modern physics and in 
the philosophy of science, such as in Percy Bridgman's 
Operationism, is not representative of ordinary language or 
common sense. Common sense, which supposedly is embodied 
in ordinary language, endorses a semi-absolute, static, 
antecedent reality, and is not satisfied with an everchanging 
truth. These statements about "truth" as it is used in 
ordinary language are descriptive generalizations, and the 
issue of their justification is a difficult problem. These 
1.5.3 
view·s are not Russell 1 s, of course, but have to be attri-
buted to him as following . from his position, with probability. 
Probability as a definition of truth is part of the 
correspondence definition. Reality itself is not viewed as 
probable. Knol...rledge about an absolute antecedent reality 
may well be probable, but this is due to the nature of the 
evidence and not due to the relativity of reality. The 
meaning of 11probability 11 is to . be found in the degree to 
which we can be assured of an existing correspondence be-
tween a belief and a real state of affairs. 
Russell rejects ,empirical and logical coherence as a 
definition of truth. The purpose of this section is to 
discover what attendant value-claims are rejected with the 
denial of the validity or desirability of this definition 
of truth. 
Qypassing Russell's explicit statements, it is possible 
to make some generalizations regarding coherence as a 
definition of truth. Historically, Spinoza, Leibniz, and 
Hegel availed themselves of this d~finition. Coherence is 
accepted as a definition of trut~in part, because it is also 
a workable criterion of truth, l11hich is not always the case 
with correspondence, as the problem of the existence of an 
external world shows. If we should use ~ definition and 
another criterion, the problem arises as to how the latter 
criterion can serve adequately the former definition. 
Specifically, the problem to be solved would be, how can 
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coherence among ideas and experiences as a criterion of 
truth be a guide to correspondence between a proposition and 
a real state of affairs. This, how·ever, is not the place to 
develop the lengthy controversy as to whether coherence is 
a guide to correspondence or not. 
Z.Ionism and idealism are two metaphysical positions 
that can sometimes be associated with coherence. The truth 
of thi s latter proposition depends on two kinds of verifi-
cation. In the first place, this proposition can be verified 
a posteriori or empirically, by cataloguing philosophers, 
their views, and their conceptions of the nature of truth. 
In the second place, this proposition might be verified 
a priori by demonstrating the likely existence of an inher-
ent connection between monism and idealism and the coherence 
definition of truth. The first project is far too extensive 
to be carried out here, in part because it is not always 
clear precisely what definition and test of truth a philoso-
pher uses. The a priori connection, however, is seen more 
readily. The word "coherence" itself, coming from the Latin 
cohaereo, where haereo means "to stick" and .£2. comes from 
£!:!!!h meaning "together, 11 means literally to "stick together. 11 
Things that stick together form a unity. Hence, monistic 
metaphysics such as views eng endered by unitary, cohesive 
mystic visions (Plotinus, Spinoza), and the very different 
views of the modern materialism; that .is, the naturalism 
that accompanies pragmatism and logical positivism -- may be 
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sa~d to be naturally predisposed to avail thems•lves of the 
coherence definition of truth. Monistic metaphysics has to 
decide on the nature of the ultimate substance. Mind is a 
likely suggestion, since mind is thought to be 11 given 11 
.&- • t .&- 11 II • II • • ~~rs o~ a , g~ven ~n some pr~mary sense. The next best 
candidate is a neutral stuff -- and James as well as Russell 
are qualitative "neutral monists." To admit matter into a 
metaphysical framework usually means qualitative dualism 
and inference, except in cases of particularly naive materi-
alism, such as that of Hobbes. 
Idealism is a frequent and likely adjunct to monism. 
Monism may also eventuate from a kind of rationalism: the 
assumption is that the universe can be known by thought 
processes alone; that is, the universe is an extension of 
mind. Spinoza might seem an exception. Yet his view is 
thought to have mystic origins and overtones (discussed in 
the next section); and he certainly epitomizes the ration-
alist's faith. 
There is a natural and easy connection between the 
coherence definition of truth and monism. From monism can 
f'ollo1" idealism and rationalism and mystically orig inated 
metaphysics. The empiricist temper, with its opposition to 
rationalism, will tend to reject coherence. Russell has an 
aversion to mysticism because of his position that knowledge 
is not veridical unless it is framed in a dualistic system 
of ver~f'ication and inference. 
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Russell's rejection o£ coherence as a qe£inition o£ 
truth, theref'ore, can be vie:t.ved . in the larger setting ).n l-vhich 
he equally rejects monistic views and especially idealistic 
metaphysical positions, rationalism, and mysticism. 
Russell's rejection o£ coherence may be viewed as 
a judgment on the metaphysical consequences of' coherence. 
Monism, idealism, and mysticism, £or complex reasons, are 
not prized, do not embody Russell's value-claims. 
(5) The Value-Claims Rejected with the Rejection o£ 
Warranted Assertibility as Def'inition o£ Truth. To explore 
further the place value has in determining the nature of' 
truth f'or Russell, it is necessary to analyze some o£ the 
implicit or underlying reasons f'or Russell's rejection o£ 
the pragmatic def'inition of' truth, or of' warranted asserti-
bility since Russell's explicit rejection is inadequate. 
Pragmatism, as conceived by James, is a thoroughgoing 
empiricism. James ref'ers to his position as "radical em-
piricism." James dispenses with a transcendent reality, 
existing objectively, independently of' my experience. In 
addition, pragmatism is an attempted answer to Hume's un-
qualif'ied and to Kant's modif'ied, partial, and critical 
skepticism, as was seen earlier. Kant's Second Critique, 
interestingly enough, has many pragmatic orientations. 
Russell, on the othe~ hand, is ~ a thoroughgoing empiri-
cist; the validity of' induction and of' mathematical inf'er-
ences -- both important to Russell -- are non-empirical 
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presuppositions of' our knowledge of' the external world 
(this point is explored in the next sections). To the 
extent that pragmatism entails radical empiricism Russell's 
rejection of' pragmatism must be understood as also a re-
jection of' radical empiricism. With tl1e rejection of' 
radical empiricism the values attendant to this view are 
ipso facto also rejected. What these reasons are is a matter 
that can be characterized in only the loosest terms. Tl~e 
world of' the radical empiricist is one of' no cohesiveness 
the rule of' rational law is absent. Radical empiricism 
as is so clearly demonstrated in pragmatism -- leads to a 
kind of relativity even in the conception of truth. 
Russell was first a mathematician and in philosophy 
he was first a He g elian both by early education as well as 
temp erament. In the article 11 My Mental Development," Russell 
l"'ri tes, 
Stout • • • and McTaggart betl"'een them caused me to 
become a Heg elian; I remember the precise moment, one 
day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I 
saw in a flash • • • that the ontological argument is 
valid ••• I read Bradley at this time with avidity, 
and admired him more than any other recent philosopher. 1 
I believed in the possibility of proving by metaphysics 
various thing s about the2universe that relig ious feeling mad e me think imp ortant. 
1 Bertrand Russell, 11 ~-iy Mental Development, 11 ~ 
PhilosoEhz £! Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul Arthur Sc h ilpp 
(1st ed.; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1944), p . 10. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
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I have always ardently desired to f'ind some justifi-
cation f'or the emotions inspired by certain things 
that seemed to stand outside human l~f'e and to deserve 
f'eelings of' a"t1Te . I am thinking in part of' very obvious 
things, such as the starry heavens and a stol"'ny sea 
on a rocky coast; in part of' the vastness of' the 
scientific universe, both in space and time, as com-
pared to the lif'e of' mankind; in part of' the edifice 
of' impersonal truth, especially truth which, like that 
of' mathematics, does not merely describe the "t'torld 
that happens to exist.l 
It must be granted that, on a psychological level, 
Russell began his philosophic career with a temperament that 
may be termed 11 non-empirical11 in the tradition of' the 
British Empiricists culminating ,.,ith .Hume. The possibility 
might, therefore, be entertained that Russell's rejection of' 
the pragmatic definition and criterion of' truth is no more 
than a temperamental matter, since the reasons he gives are 
f'ew and un substantial. 
This argument, of' course, is ~hominem; yet, in the 
absence of other evidence, as was contended in connection 
uith coherence, the argument may well be valid. The important 
point is that with rejecting the pragmat ic def inition of 
truth, Russell rejects radical empiricism. 
:Hore important, regardless of' the pragmatist's 
statements to the contrary, James' pragmatism tends to be 
relativistic about the values t h at make a theory true. Truth 
and world-views are seen as chang e_able, and even the nature 
of reality may vary f'rom a g e to a g e. For the pragmatist 
1 Ibid., P• 19. 
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there is no static antecedent "objective" reality. Russell, 
as a mathematician, a Hegelian, and :finally as a scientist 
is temperamentally opposed to relativism. On this tempera-
mental basis alone he would oppose pragmatism. Furthermore, 
pragmatism may entail monism, as evidenced by James' neutral 
monism. That Russell is temperamentally opposed to monism 
and its corollaries was discussed already in connection with 
the coherence de:finition o:f truth. 
Temperament, in this connection, would have two 
de:fining traits. (a) It is part o:f the constellation o:f a 
man's beliefs. A man's temperament would enable one to 
predict that he would believe ,2& 1 'ti'hen he already believes 
~' b, and £• In Russell's case, his early belief in ration-
alism (~, £, and £, in this analogy) might predispose him 
to or enable others to predict that he would reject any ex-
treme empirical position, such as pragmatism. Pragmatism 
does not make in:ferences beyond possible experience. 
Propositions are veri:fied in terms o:f :future experience, 
and do not refer to an unexperiencable Ding-~-~· (b) 
Temperament is non-rational, non-analytical. Decisions 
attributed to temperament are non-attributable to logical 
scrutiny. This applies to Russell as :follows: according to 
him it appears that a decision between warranted asserti-
bility and correspondence as definitions and criteria o:f 
truth is not possible on logical grounds alone. Since he ~ 
make a decision, it ~ be on non-logical grounds. 
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Russell, at times and only incidentally, seems to 
a g ree with the point that is made here. He hints at the 
possible relativity of truth, or at the possibility that 
truth is rooted in temperament -- dealing with value-
claims -- 't1Then he connnents, in passing, as :follO'tlTS: 
I:f I ever have the leisure to undertake another serious 
investigation o:f a philosophical problem, I shall 
attempt to analyze the in:ferences :from experience to 
tl1e world o:f physics, assuming them capable o:f validity, 
and seeking to discover 't1That principles o:f in:ference, 
i:f true, 1...rould make them valid. Whether these princ iples, 
when discovered, ~ accepted ~- t~~, -~ ~ matter 
of temperament; what should not be a matter o:f tempera-
ment should be the proo:f that acceptance £:f them is 
necessary if solipsism is to be rejected. Litalics 
minJ 
A critic might comment (in reference to the 
italics in this quotation): 11 but don 1 t leave out the ~~ 
line "tll'hich J. regard as the part you perpetually overlool< in 
Hussell. 11 The ans't1Ter to this :frequent objection is as 
:follows: is not the rejection o:f solipsism a matter o:f 
temperament, or at least a choice capable o:f :free assent? 
~That is not a matter o:f temperament, :for Russell, is a 
purely hypothetical -- not a categorical -- imperative. 
l.ill9-....!., p. 16. 
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Russell's Conception of Reality 
~nature .2! .~ problem .~ preliminary .state-
~££ Russell's position.--The point the dissertation 
>vishes to establish, that metaphysical systems are, in 
last analysis, probably a matter of free choice, can be 
argued a priori. The approach here, how·ever, is a post-
eriori. The dissertation itself is an attempt to show, 
on what might be called empirical grounds, that the view 
in question is also realized in practice. It is important 
to point out the function of the following part of Chapter 
II in relation to the dissertation as a "!'lfhole. 
Specifically, the central view is as follows. It 
is asserted that all metaphysics must be constructed on the 
model of a logical system. Any specific metaphysics is 
rarely absolutely strict in the sense of log ical connections. 
It is then called a world vie't'IT· The assumption in the 
dissertation is that many metaphysics ~' in principle, be 
made to adhere to strict logical principles. A 'tll'Orld-vie't11' 
is here defined as less articulated and less consistent 
than a metaphysics. The contention here is also, hO'tlTever, 
that 1..rhat begins as a lll'Orld-view can likel'lise often be 
structured strictly according to rules of logic, at least 
in principle, and thereby become a metaphysics. A t>Torld-
view may be 't'lorkable even if it does not adhere to strict 
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logical rules. Ordinary language is a good example of' this. 
On the basis of' the logical structure, or the poten-
tial logical structure of' metaphysics, the discoveries of' 
contemporary logicians apply also to metaphysical construc-
tions. The organization of' reality that a metaphysical 
system represents is not determined by anything ~thin the 
system itself'. Any determination of' postulates and rules 
of' procedure is based on considerations (of' a practical or 
of any other chosen -- 11 choosable 11 -- kind) that are outside 
of' the system itself'. If' these grounds f'or chasing postu-
lates are to be systematized in turn, "t~e arrive at a ne1-r 
system, which in turn has a logical structure. At one point 
we (the person who accepts or believes in a metaphysical 
position) choose to say that no more prior justifying systems 
are necessary or even desirable. These ultimate postulates 
are not justified. We can draw a category from experience 
which phenomenologically describes this ultimate act, by 
using the category of' freedom, free choice, spontaneity. To 
shol~ this is the purpose of the dissertation. The purpose 
of' ~.chapter is to sho'\v l-rhat the ultimate assumptions are 
in one philosopher's conception of reality, and then examine 
the grounds on which these are accepted and accept~. 
Since the dissertation is an ef'fort to disclose what these 
ungrounded postulates are in a variety of philosophical sys-
tems, an eff'ort, therefore, will be made here to present 
Russell's conception of' reality and show what these implicit, 
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ungrounded assumptions really are. 
In this section, the analysis will cover the specific 
nature o:f Russell's dualism or pluralism (notwithstanding 
his avowal of' neutral monism). Russell's metaphysical 
position is developed through analysis of the problem of 
the existence of' an external 1vorld. His eventual position 
reg arding the existence and nature of' the external l·rorld 
mi ght best be characterized by his conception o:f "construc-
tions. 11 The data 1vhich 1-lill eventuate in uh.atever know·ledge 
1ve can have are of tlvo sorts, sensations and common sense. 
According to Russell, sensations are the basis (starting 
point) o:f inferences about their source or cause, that is, 
the external world. Common sense, on the other hand, is t h e 
basis (g round) of know·ledge that is indubitable, since 
philosophy is -- among other things -- the Socratic or 
Cartesian analysis o:f common sense. That which cannot be 
doubted in conunon sense must, on Russell 1 s account, be 
accepted as true. 
Russell's answer to the problem of' the structure of' 
reality is relatively simp le -- f'or this dissertation, since 
the problem is related, not to philosophy, but to the field 
of' science. Russell conceives that it is the function of' 
science to answer questions about the relation s and struc-
tures obtaining among and 'tvithin the various constituents of' 
reality. Tne metaphysical nature of' t h ese constituents and 
even the very e x istence o f an ultimate reality, however, are 
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philosophical questions. As a matter of fact, the question 
of the existence of an external world is the primary 
philosophic question to Russell, since for him, the main 
function of philosophy, next to logic, is epistemology. 
That is "tll'hy ethics, to Russell, is not strictly speaking 
a part of philosophy: 
I come now to '\~That is, for me, an essentially different 
department of philosophy -- I mean the part that 
depends upon ethical considerations. I should like to 
exclude all value judgments from philosophy, except 
that this would be too violent a breach with usage • 
\fuere ethics is concerned, I hold that, in so far as 
fundamentals are concerned, it is impossible to produce 
conclusive intellectual arguments. 1 
The answer to the former problems -- the existence 
and nature of the ultimate constituents of reality -- is 
a far more difficult matter, because in this case the prob-
lem must be answered; the issue cannot be procrastinated 
by claiming the answer belongs to a non-philosophic discipline. 
Russell's ans>ITers to these problems follow· his 
development from mathematics into philosophy. Russell's 
log ic teaches him that mathematics gives us no insight into 
reality. vlhich particular mathematics is conveniently 
applicable to the "t-Torld is an empirical question. This vie't..r 
of mathematics is to be generalized to apply also to all those 
other principles which formerly were called a priori by the 
rationalists and Kant. Among these a priori principles 'tve 
find the la'\11' of conservation of matter and energy, the law 
1 Ibid., P• 719. 
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of cause and effect or of necessary connection (that from 
one existent its cause and effect can be deduced logically), 
the Euclidean nature of space, the infinite and irreversible 
nature of time, the validity of' induction, and many of' the 
laws of' mechanics. From Russell's logical conception of' 
mathematics have followed many of the positivist's and 
pragmatist's conceptions of the a priori as analytic. 
Similarly, questions raised by these a priori principles 
(and their solutions) ·- such as the beginning of the universe 
or First Cause, the validity of empirical knowledge, the 
existence of' God -- 't<fere not 11 solved" but interpreted -- by 
these same positivists and pragmatists -- as being pseudo-
questions, questions based on an erroneous conception of' 
precisely how these analytic propositions refer to reality. 
The view that mathematics is an instantiation of 
logic leads to important consequences in this dissertation. 
Hany mathematics -- as well as many logics are possible. 
In any particular instance or application, only one is chosel:l. 
The important question which must then be raised is on what 
basis are decisions regarding these choices made, and how 
definitive, absolute, ~' or ~ these choices are. 
Since Russell's vielv is that mathematics gives us no 
insight into reality, and since mathematics is part of' logic, 
it might follow that logic, likewise, gives no insight into 
reality. Russell never quite agrees to this latter point. 
Lo-gically, he is of course committed to the position that the 
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so-called la1"s of thought do not bind the universe, yet 
practically he is quite aware that such a position leads to 
epistemological and metaphysical skepticism. The strength 
of the latter has been ably defended by Hume. Russell 
therefore 1..ravers between empiricism and rationalism, a 
rationalism which at times -- in his early 1~itings --
eventuated in a kind of Platonism. Concern trlth mathe-
matics led Russell early to the belief of the reality of 
universals, which is a kind of Platonic realism. Later 
concern with science, as the only genuine vehicle of knOl'i-
ledge about the external world, led him to empiricism. 
Russell, his empiricism notwithstanding, retains a sufficient 
number of the rationalist's a priori principles to prove, 
to his satisfaction, the existence of the external world. 
These a priori principles must include the validity of 
induction and the possibility to make causal inferences from 
a perception to a cause ubeyond 11 that perception. In other 
1vords, Russell is confident that the principle of' causation 
can give information Or true knOlvledge beyond the immediate 
sensations. Kant calls this use of causation "transcendent" 
and, strictly speaking, illegitimate. 
Russell's empiricism is tempered by the belief that 
certain inferences about the existence and nature of' an 
external world are warranted. The 11arrant, however, is not 
log ical. Russell admits, albeit grudgingly, the impossibility 
of justifying his metaphysical position on a logical basis; 
1 67 
he is far too honest a thinker not to recognize his 
position. It appears that for Russell the consequences of 
a belief are instrumental in deciding the truth of that 
belief. Russell admits that the grounds for accepting his 
philosophic position are logically without foundation. 
These comments, however, are meant by Russell to be merely 
l 
asides and do not perceptibly affect his conception of 
reality. The following quotation illustrates Russell's 
position referred to here: 
Matter will be a construction built out of percepts, 
and our metaphysic will be essentially that of 
Berkeley • • • In spite of the logical merits of this 
view, I cannot bring myself to accept it, though I 
am not sure that my reasons for disliking it are any 
better than Dr. Johnson's ._ •• I know the logical 
answer to such objections Lobjections against idealism 
and solipsism!, and qua logician I think the answer 
a good one • • • · 
I cannot verify a theory by means of another man's 
perceptions, but only by m~ans of my own. Therefore 
the laws of physics can only be verified by me in so 
far as they lead to predictions of ~ percepts. If 
then, I refuse to admit non-mental events because they 
are not verif!able, I ought to refuse to admit mental 
events in every one except myself, on the same ground • 
We may go a step further. The past can only be verified 
indirectly, by means of its effects in the future; there-
fore the type of logical caution we have been considering 
should lead us to abstain from asserting that the past 
really occurred: we ought to regard it as consisting 
of auxiliary concepts convenient in stating the laws 
applicable to the future. And since the future, though 
verifiable if and when it occurs, is as yet unverified, 
we ought to suspend judgment about the future also. If 
we are not willing to go so far as this, there seems no 
reason to draw the line at the precise point where it 
was drawn by Berkeley. On these grounds I fe e l no 
shame in admitting the existence of non-mental events 
such as the laws of physics lead us to infer. Never-
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theless, it is important to realise that other views 
are tenable. 
In last analysis, Russell's argument :for the exist-
ence o:f the external world is that he nwants 11 to believe 
that an external non-mental world exists. 
It is important to note that Russell does not draw 
any particularly noteworthy consequences :from this perhaps 
pragmatic compromise. Since Russell's interest in philosophy, 
next to logic, is epistemology, he justi:fies his epistemologi-
cal writings in terms o:f answering traditional problems·. He 
has clari:fied the nature o:f the traditional problem o:f the 
existence o:f a non-mental external world, but he has not, 
as will be seen, in the estimation o:f the author o:f the 
dissertation, contributed signi:ficantly to the resolution 
o:f that problem. As will be shown, a:fter all is said and 
done, Russell assumes rather than proves that an external 
world exists; he chooses to accept or give assent to the be-
lie:f in the existence o:f an external world, rather than not. 
Hume 1 s skepticism, Kant's critical idealism, James' pragmatism, 
and Ayer's positivism embody :far more direct ways o:f attack-
ing this same problem in epistemology. 
In addition to this :first section, dealing ~th the 
problem in general, as well as with the transition to it, 
~th the general outlines o:f Russell's position as relevant 
1Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: W. w. Norton 
& Co., Inc., 1927), PP• 290-291. 
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to the dissertation, the f"ollowing sections are necessary: 
Second section, definitions of" terms; third section, Russell's 
method of" constructions, since this method is ·central to 
his conception of" the external world, and to his metaphysics 
generally; f"ourth section, the details of" the construction 
of" the external world, in terms of" data and perspectives, 
as l'iell as inf"erences and constructions; and a f"if"th section, 
Russell 1 s metaphysics. On the basis of these five sections 
it will be possible to draw up a list of assumptions which 
are necessary to Russell 1 s philosophic system, to the ex-
tent that such a system exists. 
Definitions . .2!. terms. ~-What is a postulate, an. ~ 
sumption, or a presupposition, .as used in this chapter? 
These words are used here synonymously. 
Knowledge that is systematized is organized on the 
basis of the logical model of" postulates and rules .2!. 
procedure. The postulates may be called the ground of" a 
belief" or system. These postulates are chosen for the 
system. They are not and cannot be justif"ied, ~' demon-
strated to be true, in terms of the system itself, although 
they may be justified in terms of" other systems. If" a 
justification is sought for these postulates, the justifi-
cation fuust be in terms of other systems, called meta-
systems in logic. For instance, material implication, 
symbolized by II .::::> J II iS defined to mean -- in 11 E, :::> Sl11 
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that the entire . . expression "2. ~ g," is f'alse i:f, and . onl.y 
if', 2 is true and s is f'alse. This def'inition -- as the 
term is used here -- is postulated, assumed, or presupposed. 
The answer to the question, "why should we def'ine and use 
the symbol 1 :::::> 1 as lie do?" must be given in terms other 
than the system which is def'ined by 11 ::l .t' We can say, this 
def'inition is the minimum required in linguistic usage, for 
example. But, of course, these other systems are in turn 
structured af'ter the logical pattern of' systeMatization 
itself. In the last analysis, therefore, the first postu-
late in any complete philosophy cannot be justified at all, 
as long as justification is done in terms of a system. The 
postulate is there nonetheless; it is said to have been 
chosen freely~ Since the ultimate postulates cannot be 
justified through any system at all, they are said, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, to be chosen freely, as 
already indicated, or spontaneously ~ For the .ultimate 
assumptions or postulations, no reason can be given. If 
a reason can be given, then the postulations are not ultimate. 
The term transcendent is here used in the Kantian 
sense. The term presupposes a dualism in the universe be-
tween the noumenal and the phenomenal world. Concepts and 
laws are said to function or be used in a transcendent 
sense when they are meant to apply -- in any form whatsoever 
to the noumenal world. 
After defining some of the crucial terms to be used 
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in what is to :follow, l'le can now begin with a care:f'ul 
exposition of Russell's conception of reality. 
~ nature2f. constructions.':"'-Had Russell created no 
more than his contribution to Principia . l'·Iathematica, his 
place in the history o:f' thought and in philosophy would be 
forever secure. In those three volumes (written in 
cooperation with Alfred North lihitehead), as well as in the 
earlier Principles .2.£ .1-Iathematics and in his later populari-
zation, Introduction E..Q. Mathematics,. Russell tries to 
develop mathematics out of logic. He envisions mathematics 
as an outgrot~h of log ic, as an instantiation of which logic 
is the general form. In the process he resolves a number 
of age-old logical and mathematical paradoxes. He also 
provides apparently adequate definitions o:f' hitherto almost 
inde:f'inable entities, such as number and infinity. The 
process o:f' creating numbers out o:f' logic he refers to as 
the method of logical constructions. Numbers can be replaced 
by logical constructions without losing any property char-
acteristic of number. Numbers are then said to be equival-
ent (in every mathematically important respect, but, it seems 
to the author, not necessarily in every metaphysically im-
portant respect) to these logical constructions. In this 
way, difficulties of a logical sort that had been thought to 
be inherent in mathematics can be considered resolved, simply 
because the log ical constructions l~hich are used to substi-
tute for these mathematical entities do not possess these 
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paradoxical traits. 
This l.ogical view of' mathematics is not entirely 
new with Russell. Approximations to his conclusions have 
been reached previously or concurrently preeminently by 
such. men as Peano and Frege, as well as by Dedekind, Cantor, 
and Weierstrass • 
.Among these difficulties within mathematics was the 
question of' the a priori nature of' mathematics. The 
Continental Rationalists assumed that mathematics was know-
ledge about, or applicable to, the loJ'Orld without being 
derived from the 't\Torld. A priori knowledge was thought to 
be, in some sense, innate; a priori knowledge l'!Tas cognition 
without the mediation of' the senses. Kant derived con-
clusions from the a prioricity of' mathematics that differed 
slightly from those of' the Continental Rationalists. Kant 
could not understand how man could be in possession of' know-
ledge about the world that was of' the certainty and univer-
sality of' mathematics. Since such "synthetic a priori 11 
knowledge, as he called it, was obviously not derived from 
the world (the external, noum.enal lll'orld that is thought to 
exist independently of' sensations, as well as the phenomenal 
world), he concluded that this knowledge could not apply to 
the world. By demonstrating that mathematics is a kind of' 
logic, Russell and later Lel._ris and most positivists 
thought they were able to show (in opposition to Kant) that 
mathematics is analytic rather than synthetic, and therefore 
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is no "genuine" knol..rledge about the world, phenomenal .2£ 
noumenal. The viel'l that mathematics is not synthetic 
knolvledge undermines the entire rationalistic metaphysical 
foundations, as well as the basis of the partially ideal-
istic Kantian metaphysics. Russell contributes to the 
destr.uction of the Kantian position. 
The Kantian view • • • asserted that mathematical 
reasoning is not strictly formal, but always uses 
intuitions, !·~· the ~ priori knowledge of space 
and time. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic, 
especially as treated by ProCessor Peano, this part 
of the Kantian philos_ophy is now capable of a final 
and irrevocable refutation • • • All1mathematics can be strictly and formally deduced. 
Later, in his Introduction -~ _Mathematical Philosophx, 
Russell expands the same point. 
Kant invented a theory of mathematical reasoning accord-
ing to which the inference is never strictly logical, 
but always requires the support of what is called 
11 intuition. 11 The whole trend of modern mathematics, 
with its increased pursuit of rigour, has been against 
this Kantian theory. The things in the mathematics of 
Kant 1 s day which cannot be proved, cannot be kno"tm 
for example, the axiom of parallels. ~fuat can be 
known, in mathematics and by mathematic~! methods, 
is lvhat can be deduced from pure logic. 
~ deriving mathematics from logic Russell has 
simplified -- if not resolved -- the problem of the status 
of mathematics by reducing what were two questions to one. 
The question now is, not ld~t is the nature of mathematics 
1Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (2d ed.; 
New York: li. vl. Norton & Co., Inc., 19:37}, p. 4. 
2 Bertrand Russell, Introduction to ~~thematical 
Ph.ilosophx_ ( 2d ed.; London t George Allen & Umvin, Ltd., 
1920), P• 14.5. 
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~ logic, but alone what is the nature o~ logic. With an 
answer to that latter question the ~ormer, a~ter the nature 
o~ mathematics, could also be resolved. In the last section, 
one o~ Russell's assumptions is seen in his criticism o~ 
Kant. 
Russell deals with the concept o~ number, among 
others. He seeks to reduce this concept to the terms and 
primitives and relations o~ logic exclusively, without assum-
ing the existence, nature, or de~inition o~ "number'~ in any 
separate axiomatic, postulatory, or uniquely primitive sense. 
Russell's construction o~ number is a good example o~ his 
method o~ construction. Russell rejects the view that num-
ber is an inde~inable. The notion o~ de~inition here used is 
that a logical system is a relation o~ inde~inables, the 
latter being chosen with a certain degree o~ arbitrariness. 
According to Peano, the concept o~ number is one o~ these 
inde~inables, and is a non-logical, that is, a mathematical 
inde~inable. 
Peano and his disciples • • • hold that the various 
branches o~ Mathematics have various inde~inables, 
by means o~ l'lhich the remaining ideas o~ the said 
subjects are de~ined. I hold -- and it is an important 
part of' my purpose to prove -- that all Pure Mathe-
matics ••• contains only one set of' in~ef'inables, 
namely the fundamental log ical concepts. 
"Contains" here means, "needs to contain -- but mi ght 
contain more. 11 
Russell deals ~irst l'lith the problem of' defining 
1Bertrand Russell, Principles£.!. Mathematics (2d ed.; 
Nel1T York: Ttl. 'tv. Norton & Co. , Inc. , 1937), p. 112. 
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finite cardinal numbers, or the so-called "natural numbers 11 
of ordinary arithmetic. Russell defines ca:r:-dinal number as 
nothing but a class of similar classes, as he puts it in his 
Introduction, "the number of a class is the class of all 
those classes that are similar to it. rrl This definition is 
important because it "allows the deduction of' all the usual 
properties of numbers, 'dLether finite or infinite, and is 
the only one • • • tll'hich is possible in terms of' the funda-
mental concepts of general logic." 2 
The derivation of "number" from logic is carried out 
in detail in Principia Mathematica, Volume II, *100. These 
cardinal numbers are reduced to the concept of' classes. 
Russell points out that a number, such as 12, can be inter-
preted to refer to a class having 12 members. The number 12 
can then be defined as being identical (or having a one-to-
one correspondence) with the class having 12 members. 
All finite collections of individuals form classes, so 
that what results is after all the number of' a class • 
Thus when any class-concept is given, there is a certain 
number of individuals to which this class-concept is 
applicable, and the number ~ay therefore be regarded 
as a property of the class. 
This view of' Russell is of particular importance in connection 
with the definition of' infinity, 11 since it relieves us of 
1Bertrand Russell, Introduction to l\Iathematical 
Philosophy (2d ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920), 
P• 18. 
2Bertrand Russell, Principles 2f Mathematics (2d ed.; 
Net11' York: 1'1. 1'1 . Norton & Co., Inc., 1937), p. 116. 
3Ibid., p. 113. 
1 76 
the necessity o~ enumerating the individuals whose number 
1 is to be considered." 
Tw·o classes can be said to have the same number i~ 
a one-to-one relationship obtains. It is not necessary to 
assume the number 1 1 1 as a logical primitive in order to 
de~ine the relation o~ isomorphism. Russell circumvents 
the use o~ 1 1 1 in de~ining one-to-one relationships with 
this de~inition o~ isomorphism: 
A relation is one-one l.lThen, i~ .!. and £ have the 
relation in question to z, then .!. and ~ are identical; 
while i~ .!. has the relation ~n question to z and ~' 
then z and ~ are identical. 
The class is a logical concept or a logical abstraction. So 
is the notion o~ similarity. Similarity, ~or Russell, has 
the logical properties o~ being re~exive, symmetrical, and 
transitive. 3 Number, then, is the common property o~ 
similar classes. Number, ~or example, is the common property 
o~ the class o~ pencils on my desk, the class o~ plants on 
the ~ndow-sill, the class o~ ~orks in the cupboard, and the 
class o~ chapters o~ this dissertation. These classes have 
many di~~erent properties; yet they have one common propertya 
they are all ~our. The three properties o~ the relation o~ 
similarity are such that when this relation holds between 
tllTO terms, those terms have a common property. 11This common 
libid., p. 113. 
2Ibid., P• 113. 
3Ibid., P• 114. 
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1 property we call their number." 
These common properties must be viewed as forming 
a class in turn: the class o£ the common properties o£ the 
above enumerated £our classes o£ objects. However, this 
definition o£ number, as the class of common properties, 
su££ers £rom what Russell terms 11 an absolutely fatal formal 
2 
defect." Not one property, but a class o£ properties can 
satisfy this definition. The definition, in other words, is 
too broad to be either useful or correct. In the attempt 
to remedy this difficulty, Cardinal Number is defined as 
~ class 2f ~ classes similar ~ ~ given class. "Member-
ship of this class of classes • • • is a common property of 
all similar classes and of no others • This, then, is 
an irreproachable definition of the number of a class in 
purely logical terms."3 
In order to illustrate the procedure of defining 
specific numbers, Russell defines 1 0 1 and 1 1 1 and 1 2 1 • This 
definition is carried out in Principia Mathematica, Volume II, 
*101. Specific cardinal numbers are defined as follows. 
1 0 1 is defined as the class of classes 1dlose only member is 
the null-class. Strictly speru~ing, 1 0 1 is not a number in 
the sense that 1 1 1 and 1 2 1 are numbers. The most important 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 11.5. 
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number to de:fine is '1'. Having de:fined the latter and the 
arithmetic operation of' addition, all cardinal numbers can 
be defined. '1' is de:fined as "the class of' all classes 
which are not null and are such that, if' ~ belong s to the 
class, the class without ~ is the null-class; or such that, 
if' 2E, and ;t belong to the class, then~ and l: are identica1."1 
In this manner Russell can define the cardinal number '1' 
without any reference to number itself. The only concepts 
used are identity, class, null-class, and the notion of' a 
variable, 2! and .I.• From the terms de:fined this far it is 
possible to derive all cardinal numbers and, ~~th the use 
o:f additional logical principles, the operations and 
connectives usually termed as arithmetic, such as addition 
and multiplication. Finally, it is possible to derive other 
numbers, such as :fractions, negative numbers, and ratios, 
all o:f 'l'lhich can be introduced as special relations bet'l>~een 
cardinal numbers. In Principia Nathematica and in the 
Principles 2£ Mathematics Russell gives a detailed account of' 
t h e derivation of' mathematical entities from logic. 
In addition to numbers, Russell finds the analysis 
and eventual logical construction -- o:f descriptions and 
classes important :for the philosopher. Although Russell's 
theory o:f descriptions started as a purely logical analysis 
as was the case with numbers -- the analysis eventuated into 
1 Ibid., P• 128. 
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important epistemological applications. 
Number is neither a mental nor a physical thing, 
and if' l-ie wish to avoid the use of' Platonic Forms, '"e must 
be satisfied with calling numbers descriptions of classes 
and proceed to analyze the nature of' descriptions as purely 
logical notions. This analysis is found in Chapter V of the 
Principles. 
In that Chapter Russell deals with the problem of' 
defining and denoting. The specific problem is ho'" to de-
fine a particular and how a universal is related to that 
particular. The ensuing analysis of description is intended 
to resolve eventually the problem of' the ontological status 
of' mathematics. 
TI~e fact that description is possible -- that we are 
able, by the employment of' concepts, to designate a 
thing 'tvhich is not a concept -- is due to a logical 
relation between some concepts and some terms, in 
virtue of' which such concepts inherently and logically 
denote such terms • • • This notion lies at the bottom 
(I think) of' all theories of' substance, of the subject-
predicate log ic, and of' the opposition bet'toieen things 
and ideas, discursive thought and immedia te perception. 1 
Russell's definitive, technical, and symbolic account 
of' d escriptions is to be found in Principia ~-lathematica, I, 
66-71 (second edition) and especially on pag es 173~186, 
particularly *14.01. 
Analysis of' descriptions leads to the concept, uknow-
ledge by description, 11 which is a kind of' indirect kno1..rledge, 
1 Ibid., p • .53~ 
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opposed to the notion of' immediate knowledge or, as Russell 
calls it, knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by descrip-
tion, which is really nde:finite description," is an example 
of' logical construction, since when we define or denote an 
object we describe it in terms other than itself', or in terms 
which ref'er to universal concepts and not to the object which 
is to be de:fined. Russell hopes to show that we can like-
wise de:fine or denote the external world by construction of' 
this sort, construction in terms o:f events other than that 
to be defined or denoted (the external '\..rorld, in this latter 
case). Russell defends this position in Chapter X o:f Mysti-
~ ~ Log ic. 
A relatively simple account of' how a name can be 
substituted without remainder by a description, and hence 
how one oan sub~titute a construction f'or a thing, can be 
f'ound in Chapter 16 of' the Introduction i2, Mathematical 
Philosophy, especially on pages 174-178. 
A :fuller analysis o:f description leads to an analysis 
of' the components of' descriptions, that is, universals or 
classes, which in turn, eventuate in a theory of' types. A 
detailed discussion o:f these views~ dealing primarily with 
logic, is f'ar beyond the scope of' this chapter of' the dis-
sertation, and is not necessary f'or the main purpose of: this 
chapter. Russell's theory of' descriptions is one of' his best 
known contributions to philosophy. The importance of' de-
scriptions is that we can talk of' physical objects in terms 
• 
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of constructions out of knOllTledge by acquaintance. These 
constructions are termed descriptions. Similarly, the 
definition of number is a description of number in terms 
of' classes. 
The concepts of' the construction of number, descrip-
tions, and classes, as loTell as the notion of the given or 
of knowledge by acquaintance, constitute the logical raw 
material for Russell's conception of the external 't'lorld 
as a construction. 
~ construction .2.f. ~ external .world. -~Generalizing 
from mathematics to logic -- and considering first that 
mathematics itself is a generalization from dealings with 
particulars 
alizing 11 mood. 
seems to have placed Russell in a ugener-
Russell generalized the method of construction 
and -- for the greater part of the remainder of his pro-
ductive philosophical life explored the contention that 
the method of construction is applicable to other problems 
of philosophy. 
One of the crucial problems with which philosophy, 
in its epistemological efforts, has never ceased to be con-
fronted, is the problem of hol1T we know the existence of an 
external world. Ph.iloso;phy is introduced to the college 
student often through Descartes or some suitable substitute 
(in the ep istemological field), perhaps Plato's Republic~ 
One reason for the choice of text is to present t h e student 
18 2 
with what Schopenhauer~ at the very beginning of Die \vel t 
~ Wille . !:!ill! Vorstellung, calls the first and perhaps 
crucial philosophic insight, the ~ gua !!.2!!. of philoso-
phizing, which is that of the possible unreality of the 
phenomenal or sensory world. The student is first incredu-
lous. He becomes more incredulous when he finds out 
Berkeley holds all the world is mental. When his sophisti-
cation reaches the level of graduate w·ork in philosophy he 
may find that the problem is cy--passed rather than solved. 
He loses interest in the problem. He might become a prag-
matist or a positivist and~pass the problem on highly 
complex philosophical grounds, that is, by revising the 
nature of the question itself, rather than seeking an anS\ll'er. 
The student discovers that no important philosopher ever was 
a solipsist -- although many did question our knowledge about 
the existence of the external world. He also discovers, if 
he pursues the matter with diligence, that no conclusive 
(that is, universally accepted) reason for that existence 
has ever been advru1ced. (By 11 conclusive 11 here is meant 
11 certain 11 in the Cartesian and rationalistic sense of' lumen 
naturalis, or lumi~re naturelle, as the ultimate appeal \-re 
humans have in matters of' this sort.) Furthermore, no con-
clusive reason exists to prove that the so-called existent 
external world consists of any one particular and deter-
minable nature. It is true that Feasons exist; but the refer-
ence here is to conclusive, absolute apodeictic reasons. 
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Since the basic epistemological p roblem of the 
knowledge of the existence of an external world may be said 
to b e in a state of p ermanent death, Russell hopes to make 
a substantial con tribution to philosophy by expanding his 
method of construction to a pply to this problem. In the 
process he develops a metaphysics. 
Russell's metaphysical position, or more accurately, 
Russell's views regarding the existence and nature of' the 
external world, evolved gradually through a number of' his 
books. In the Principles ££ Mathematics -- although he does 
not deal specifically with the problem of' the existence of' 
an external world -- he does consider this question to be a 
scientific one, that is, answerable through the methods of' 
inference used in science. He also tends to assume, rather 
uncritically, the existence of external objects, matter, 
minds, and universals, and our direct knowledge of' them. 1 
~oof that Russell, at this stage of his development, 
assumes the ontolog ically independent existence of universal 
concepts, is found in the fact that the only alternative to 
the thoroughgoing empiricism of the f'initist theory (that 
only particular propositions are meaningful) is the postu-
lation of' the existence of' universals. If' Russell acknow-
ledges the existence of' universals, he cannot do so on 
lcharles A. Fritz, Bertrand Russell's Construction 
of' the External World (Ne'tv York& The Humanities Press, Inc., 
19.52), P• 10. 
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empirical principles alone. Empiricism is based on ex-
perience and all experiences, in Russell's atomism, are 
particulars. The leap from the existence of particulars 
to the existence of universals is a logical one (or in-
volves the 11 transcendenttr use of logical concepts) and can-
not, in turn, be justified by experience without involving 
one in the circularity of induction. Russell assumes the 
logical validity of universal propositions. This belief is 
partially substantiated by the following quotations 
Finitism • • • calls in question propositions involving 
infinite collections or infinite series • • • If the 
finitist's principle is admitted, we must not mru{e 
any general statement -- such as 11 All men are mortal" 
about a collection defined by its properties, not by 
actual mention of all its members. This would make a 
clean sweep of all science and of all mathematics, not 
only of the parts which the intuitionists consider 
questionable. Disastrous consequences, however, cannot 
be regarded as proving that a doctrine is false; and 
the finitist doctrine, if it is to be disproved, can 
only be met by a complete theo.ry of knowledg e. I do 
U2i believe !i ~ ~ ~~ Litalics minil but I1thi~k no short and easy refutation of it is possible. 
In The Problems ~ Philosophy, external objects are 
not kno1vn directly, but they are known on the basis of 
inference. Russell admits there is no proof but only proba-
bility for the belief in matter, or an external world. Some 
of these arguments which he discusses in Chapter II --
are the simplicity that follows from having external objects, 
and also deal with the instinctive nature of our belief. 
1 Bertrand Russell, Principles 2f Mathematics ( 2d e d .; 
New York : 1v. r.v . Norton & Co., Inc., 1937), pp. vi-vii. 
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In Q)Q: Kno"t-.rledge .2:£.. .. ~ External lt1orld, especially 
in Chapters III and IV, he seems to presuppose a world or 
physics, in which some objective reality exists beyond per-
ception, although the nature of that existence is totally 
different from ~fliat appears to us in sensations. His 
primary arguments for the plausibility of t~at position are 
consensus gentium or the correlations or perspectives, and 
the causal origin of sensations or hard data (Chapter IV). 
He contends, in fact, that others corroborate what I see; 
it is likely, therefore, that some external reality, common 
to us all, does indeed exist. 
In connection with ~ Knowledge . of the External 
1'/orld it must be pointed out that Russell leans to"t..rards the 
positivistic and pragmatic position 't'lThich contends that the 
problem of the existence of the external world is born of 
common sense language and must be buried there. That is to 
say, to the positivist the putative question is a pseudo-
question. Russell leans in this direction -- since he holds 
the empiricist position that the raw material :for philosophy 
consists of sensations and common sense -- but he is not as 
thoroughgoing a positivist in this sense as are Ayer, Ry1e, 
and Wisdom. In general, Russell sympathizes with the posi-
tivists, although he recognizes the need :for certain a priori 
principles. 11 I am, as regards method, more in sympathy tll'ith 
the logical positivists than with any other existing school. 
I di:frer from them, however, in attaching more importance 
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than they do to the work of' Berkeley and Hume. 111 
In ~ Knowledge of' .!h,! External lvo rld Russell at-
tempts to substitute logical constructions for material ob-
jects or the external world. He is not strict in his inter-
pretations of this substitution, since he maintains that 
this substitution is equivalent to an inf'erence, although 
the precise nature of' the entity inf'erred is subject to a 
great deal of' speculation and f'urther analysis. This process 
of' substitution-- a kind of Occam's Razor2 --is carried 
out in detail in Chapter III, especially on pages 92-103. 
In ~ Analysis 2f ~ and ~ Analysis of' Matter 
Russell attempts the -- to him -- courageous leap of dis-
pensing with the inference of' an external object altogether. 
In former days, my apparatus of non-inf'erential know-
ledge included tables and chairs and books and persons 
and the sun and moon and stars. I have come to regard 
these things as inf'erences • • • Now, as the result of' 
an argument, I have become unable 3to accept the know-ledge of' them as valid knowledge. 
He 't~ho disagrees is likely to point out here that Russell is 
not referring to logical certainty but only to probability. 4 
In reply to this statement the author of the dissertation 
must remark that f'or Russell probability is as much part of 
1Bertrand Russell, &! Inguir;r .!.!!iQ. Meaning ~ Truth (New York: w. w. Norton & Co .. , Inc., 1940), p. 6. 
-~ 
2 Russell, Our Knowledge of' the External World Bertrand 
(New York: lv. w. Norton & ~' Inc., 1929T,~ 113. 
3sertrand Russell, ~ Anal;rsis of' Matter (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927), p. 181. 
4Induction, as the inf'erence of the unexperienceable, 
is rejected by Russell at this point. 
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logic as any kind of certainty. The theory of probability 
is part of mathematics in general, and mathematics is merely 
an instantiation of logic. 1Vhat is probable, is "certain 
in its probability, 11 so to speak. If we assert that "the 
probability of event 1 e 1 happening" is in turn probable, 
then we must ask about the status of this higher-level of 
probability, or meta-probability. W'e l..rill thus be involved 
in an endless stream of meta-probabilities and thereby 
destroy the very notion of probability itself. An infinite 
regress will eliminate probability altogetherr if for no 
other reason than that mathematically an infinite series of 
probability, when integrated, yields zero-probability, or 
the certainty of the non-occurrence o:f event 11 ert. This is a 
reductio ~ absurdum. In these l..rorks Russell tries to 
develop a position in which the belief in an independently 
existing external object can be dispensed ld th in favor of 
a logical construction out of sense data. In ~ Analysis 
£.£ ~ Russell hopes to achieve this through "neutral 
monism. 11 As it turns out, this program is not carried out l..rith 
utmost consistency, so that some sort of an inferred external 
'"orld still remains. This is seen especially in Chapters XXX 
and XXXI of ~ Analysis 2£ Matter, where causal inferences 
from perceptions to a world beyond are justified. The plan, 
nonetheless, was to substitute a construction of sensations 
for "material object11 in the belief that the construction 
without using the concept of an external world -- is in 
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every important sense equi val.ent to that belief' in the 
l 
external world. We should then be in a position to sub-
stitute the logical, that is, contradiction-less and 
knowable construction anytime that common sense or science 
demands the use of' "external world" (t~hich term is contra-
diction-full and unknOl1able). A1 though Russell dispenses 
with "material objectsu in this latter reconstruction, he 
does accept the notion of 11unperceived eventu as meaningful. 
Professor Bertocci points out here that 11 causal 
in~erences f'or an empiricist are never logical; they are 
inductive, probable." This type of' problem comes up f're-
quently in his criticism of the dissertation. What is really 
necessary in order to clarify the issue is a complete analysis 
of' induction. This cannot be done in this dissertation, 
certainly not to the degree of' completeness .demanded by the 
subject-matter itself'. What !.§. the ultimate justification of' 
the principle of' induction? Hume's tradition simply asserts 
that it is unjusti.f'iable. Th e best that contemporary positiv-
ists can do is to ref'er to these canons of' scientific in-
f'erence as definitive of' what is 11 meaning 11 in science, and 
then justify these canons pragmatically. Russell does not 
adopt such an ultra-empirical solution. To him, induction 
is a valid method of' inference about matters concerning the 
existence and nature of' an external world. How can he justify 
1 Ibid., Chapter XIV. 
this 11 transcendent 11 use of the principle of induction? He 
certainly cannot prove its validity in any empirical fash-
io n , since the very use of an empirical method presupposes 
the validity of the inductive method. Induction need not 
always be used to transcend the experienceable. If used in 
this way, ho1vever, it is not possible to demonstrate its 
validity -- not even its probability. The probable truth of 
induction can be demonstrated only on inductive grounds in 
turn. And this is a circular argument, neither proving 
anything nor rendering it even p robable. The only alter-
native open is to refer to the principle of induction as an 
a priori principle, a la'" of reason that is equally binding 
on the universe. This assumption, which is a rationalistic 
tenet, places the principle of induction at a par with the 
rationalist's conception of mathematics. Since for Russell, 
ho•.,ever, mathematics is analytic, the principle of induction 
assumes a p ose of far g reater importance in our knowledge of 
the external world than does mathematical kno1vledge itself. 
The principle of induction becomes hereby a kind of logical 
principle tvhich is binding on being in general. The author 
of this dissertation feels that Russell's theory of construc-
t ions is misapplied in the case of the problem of the exist-
ence of an external "t·rorld (because of the unsubstantiated 
acceptance of unperceived events). But this latter un-
supported statement is incidenta l to the total argument of 
the dissertation. 
Finally, in Russell's work Human Knowledge, he 
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returns to his earlier realistic tendencies and contends 
that constructions out of hard data are not enough to 
provide us with an adequate substitute for the belief in an 
external reality. 1 He is confronted with a problem that 
Hume already 
1 Bertrand Russell, Human ~wledge (New York: 
& Schuster, 1948), Part 6, Chapter X. 
Simon 
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faced, the justification of induction and similar postulates. 
Russell comes to the conclusion that .in order to have any 
knot..rledge at all, or to have any adequate substitutes for 
material objects or concepts pertaining to the external 
world, we must assume that it is possible to infer from 
perceptions to unperceived events. Such an assumption trill 
forever remain an assumption, and with it, the existence of 
the external world is no closer to demonstration than it was 
in the days of Heraclitus. According to Russell, with 
certain qualifications, "empiricism as a theory of knowledge 
has proved inadequate, though less than any other previous 
1 
theory of' knowledg e. 11 
In dealing with the precise nature of' Russell's 
construction of the external world, the discussion of it 
in this section is divided into four subdivisions: (1) a 
discussion of' data, or the raw material, presentations, the 
given, out of which constructions are fashioned. (2) Russell's 
solution in terms of his theory of perspectives. And (J) 
Russell's arguments f'or the existence of' other minds. 
(1) The Nature of Data. The given, for Russell, does 
not only consist of' perceptions, or more precisely, belief's 
about perceptions, but any beliefs of common sense, science, 
history, and other fields of knowledge. To these beliefs --
1 Ibid., P• 107. 
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l~iich. are our presentations only in the sense that our 
momentary and present consciousness is filled with these 
various beliefs -- Russell applies the Cartesian method of 
doubt. Those beliefs whose truth is indubitable (that is, 
those which are self-evident) are then called~ data. 
Those which are only probable or are prejudices of some 
importance, are called ~ data. 
In every philosophical problem, our investigation 
starts :from what may be called 11 data," by which I 
mean matters o:f common knowle4ge, vague, complex, 
inexact, as common knowledge always is, but yet 
somehow commanding our assent 'as on the whole1 and in some interpretation pretty certainly true. 
This knowledge includes the "particular objects o:f daily 
life-- :furniture, houses, towns, other people, and so on;" 
it includes "history and geography;" and lastly it also 
includes "physical science." Russell concludes that, "in 
the main, there:fore, and without absolute dogmatism as to 
this or that special portion, we may accept this mass o:f 
common knowledge as a:f:fording data :for our philosophical 
analysis. 112 
Hard data consist o:f colors, shapes, and relations, 
the kaleidoscope a non-discriminating in:fant might per-
ceive. Hard data "are coloured shapes which move, • • • are 
noises, smells, bodily sensations, the experiences which 
1 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External 
1'/orld (New York: W. \'1 . Norton Co., Inc.,l929), pp. 69-70. 
2 Ibid . 
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we describe as those of touch, and so on. There are 
relations among these items • There are recollections 
o£ some of these things • • • There are also expecta-
1 
tions." These data also include universals, since Russell 
writes of "universals by acquaintance." 2 However, further 
analysis of the common-sense belief of the truth of sensa-
tions eventually leads Russell to a position similar to 
that of empiricism and phenomenology mentioned above. 
Russell distinguishes between sensations and perceptions, 
the fQrmer being totally uninterpreted, whereas the latter 
contain interpreted gestalt configurations. Nonetheless, 
both perceptions and the purer sensations are part of hard 
data, although not separately. 
Are we to include in perception this element of uncon-
scious interpretation, or are we to include only what 
we imag ine that the same stimulus would have produced 
if there had been no such previous experience as would 
make interpretation possible? • • • The element of 
interpretation can only be eliminated by an elaborate 
theory, so that what remains -- the hypothetical bare 
"sensation" -- is hardly to be called a 11 datum, 11 since 
it is an inference from what actually occurs. This 
last argument is, to my mind, conclusive.3 
As already indicated, Russell distinguishes two 
kinds of data, hard and soft. Hard data are for him the 
genuinely given (that is, totally refractory) experiences 
1 Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis of Matter (New 
Yorkl Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927T; pp. 180-181. 
2Bertrand Russell, The Problems £! Philosophy 
( New York: Henry Holt & co:-;-n.d.), p. 1.58. 
J Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis of' ~ratter (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., . 1927), pp. 1 88-189. 
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out of 1-1hich any empiricist conception of the 'l~Torld must 
be fashioned. \ihen Russell defines data as premises, he 
uses the ordinary scientific and log ical conception of 
axioms as his model. Premises are distinguished from 
conclusions, theorems, or in£erences by the fact that no 
foundation or justification can be g iven for the former, 
while at the same time these premises function as basis 
for the latter. Hard data,in turn, are of two sorts: (a) 
alog ical atomic exp eriences, and (b) simple and self~ 
evident beliefs. Russell's plrilosophy encompasses both 
the sense-bound positivists as well as the language-bound 
Wittg e ns teins. Soft data, on the other h a n d, are beliefs 
that can be questioned or a r e only probable. This dis-
tinction runs parallel to that between primitive and 
1 
derivative knowledg e. He f urther distinguishes psychologi-
cal and log ical primitive and derivative knowledge. 2 
Most kno11Tledg e is derivative, so that hard data 
are few. Sp ecifically, bel i efs in permanent material ob~ 
ject s, in t h e existence of' an external w·orld, and in other 
minds -- all of which are part of' our immediately given 
consciousness --are nonetheless soft data. Russell's prob-
lem is hot-T these latter can be constructed out of the 
former. 
1 Bertrand Russell, .QB!: Kno1.;ledge .2.£ the External 
11/'orld (New York: W' . W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), p. 68. 
2Ibid., P• 69. 
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It is interesting to note that f'or Russell, who 
is a mathematician f'irst and a . philosopher second, some 
premises are belief's and can therefore be true or f'alse. 
Such is the conception of' premises in mathematics and 
logic. On the other hand, empiricists, pragmatists, and 
phenomenologists, such as Hume, James, and Husserl, vie't'll' 
the equivalent of' these hard data as mere givenness, 
thereness. The philosophers accept as hard data only 
alogical (atomic ~ structured) experiences, not self'-
evident belief's about experiences or relations of' ideas ·. 
Hume calls these data impressions, James calls them kno't'll':.. 
ledge by acquaintance, Lewis, presentations, and Husserl, 
subjectivity. The def'ining characteristic of' these pres-
entations is that they ~' they are there, they merely 
exist, and are not belief's which can be either true or 
f'alse. Russell distinguishes between "the belief's that 
arise immediately f'rom perception" l-vhich to him "appear to 
be indubitable, 11 and "the inferences, 11 l"Vhich "may soma-
l 
times be wrong ." Both are belief's; they dif'f'er in certi-
tude rather than in nature. 
Further evidence that f'or Russell data are not 
-only, pure "thereness," something which is, but also be-
lief's, is f'ound when he 'tll"ri tes about 
1 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge (Nel'll' Yorio 
Simon & Schuster, 1948), P• 16.5. 
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belief's :for '\'IThich no :further reason can be given. 
It is this latter class o:f belief's that are o:f most 
importance :for the theory of' knowledge, since they 
are the indispensable minimum o:f premises f'or our 
knowledge o:f matters of' :fact. Such belief's I shall 
call "data. n ·1 Litalics mini} 
Bven though these data are not here ref'erred to as "hard 
II data, they must be vie'\'ITed as re:fractory. One cannot 
change II ll yellow, . but likewise one cannot change sel:f-
evident belief's. 
(2) Russell's Theory o:f Perspectives. The theory 
o:f perspectives is Russell's solution to the problem of' 
the construction o:f the external world. Russell does not 
intend to show either that one can know that there is an 
external world nor that we know the nature o:f that world. 
t~en he deals with constructions, he is striking the posi-
tivistic pose that the questions themselves can be re-
duced to terms which '\dll make these questions superf'luous. 
When Russell deals '\dth in:ferences :from hard data, however, 
he must be understood to mean that the existence o:f an 
external world can be shown. The question o:f the specific 
nature o:f this world is relegated to the sciences, parti-
cularly physics. By reducing material objects to c1asses 
o:f perspectives -- the classes being chosen .o~ the basis o:f 
an undesignated criterion -- he hopes to accomplish :for 
epistemology '\vhat he earlier did :for the theory o:f numbers. 
1 Ibid., p. 166. 
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Russell de~ines perspectives in the ~ollowing 
manners 
The system consisting o~ all the views o~ the uni-
verse perceived and unperceived, I shall call the 
system o~ "perspectives"; I shall con~ine the ex-
pression "private world" to such views o~ the uni-
verse as are actually perceived. Thus a "private 
w·orld 11 is a perceived "perspective"; but tfere may 
be any number o~ unperceived perspectives. 
In l\iysticism .!!!ll! Logic, Russell writes, 
It is possible • • • to arrange all the di~~erent 
spaces in a three-dimensional series. Since each o~ 
the spaces is itsel~ three-dimensional, the whole 
world o~ particulars is thus arranged in a six-
dimensional space, that is to say, six co-ordinates 
will be required to assign _completely the position o~ 
any given particular, namely, three to assign its 
position in its Olffi space and three more to assign 
the position o~ its space among the other spaces • • • 
So long as we con~ine ourselves to ~ visible objects 
or to objects o~ touch we might de~ine the perspective 
o~ a given particular as 11 all particulars 1..rhich have 
a simple (direct) spatial relation to the given 
particular." 
• • • 1ve may there~ore de~ine the perspective to 'Which 
a given particular belongs as "all ~articulars simul-
taneous 1..rith the g iven particular. 11 
A 11 thing 11 then is defined as f'ollol'/S, in terms o~ perspec-
tives: 
W'e can now define the momentary common-sense "thing," 
as opposed to its momentary appearances• ~ the 
similarity o~ neighbouring perspectives, many objects 
in the one can be correlated with objects in the other, 
namely, ~th the similar objects. Given an object in 
one perspective, form the system o~ all the objects 
! Bertrand Russell, ~ Knowledge o~ the External 
\'lorld (New York: \'f. 1v. Norton & Co., Inc:-; 1929), p. 93. 
2Bertrand Russell, Mysticism ~ Logic (Londonl 
George Allen & Umdn, Ltd., 1917), pp. 139-141. 
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correlated with it in all the perspectives; that 
system may be identified with the momentary common-
sense "thing." Thus an aspect of a 11 thing 11 is a 
member of the srstem of aspects which ll the 11 thing 11 
at tha.t moment .• 
Again, in Mysticism~ Logic, Russell defines 11 thing:" 
The definition of a 11 thing11 is effected by means of 
continuity and of correlations which have a certain 
differential independence of other "things." That is 
to say, given a particular in one perspective, there 
will usually in a neighbouring perspective be a very 
similar particular, differing from the given particular, 
to the first order of small quantities, according to 
a law involving only the difference of position of the 
two perspectives in perspective space, and not any of 
the other "things" in the universe. It is this .con-
tinuity and differential independence in the law of 
change as we pass from one perspective to another that 
defines the class of particulars which is to be called 
11 one thing. u2 
In ~ Analysis .2.£ Mind, Russell gives a very defi-
nite description of perspectives and how "things" are con-
structed out of them. Contemporaneous spatial aspects are 
particulars. These are connected by the laws of perspect-
ives. Perspectives, in turn, are connected temporally by 
the laws of dynamics, to make a thing. 
We found two ways of grouping particulars, one into 
"things" or "pieces of matter," the other into series 
of "perspectives," each series being what may be called 
a "biography." ••• Given any one particular, it is 
found often • • • that there are a number of other 
particulars differing from this one in gradually in-
creasing degrees. Those • • • that differ from it only 
very slightly will be found to differ approximately 
according to certain laws which may be called, in a 
1Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External 
World ( New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc7; 1929), p. 94. 
2Bertrand Russell, Mysticism~ Logic (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917), PP• 141-142. 
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generalized sense, the laws of' 11 perspective. 11 ••• 
lve can theoretically collect t -ogether a number of' 
particulars which may be def'ined as the "aspects" 
or "appearances" of' one thing at one time ••• 
This set of' particulars may be called a "momentary 
thing." To def'ine that series of' "momentary things" 
that constitutes the successive states of' one thing 
is a problem involving the laws of' dynamics • • • 
Thus a momentary thing is a set of' particulars, while 
a thing ••• is a series of' such sets of' particulars. 
The particulars in one set are collected together by 
the laws of' perspective; the successive setf are 
collected together by the laws of' dynamics. 
Perspectives have a variety of' levels and dimensions. 
First, each sense organ has its own series of' perspectives. 
Some sensations within each of' these series of' perspect-
ives seem to be given in a more direct sense than others. 
Communication and visual recognition can take place with 
f'ar f'ewer perceptions than the totality of' the 'ti'Ords 
communicated or visible things recognized. 
For instance, we instinctively inf'er the "real" size 
and shape of' a visible object from its apparent size 
and shape, according to its distance and our point of' 
view. When we hear a person speaking, our actual 
sensations usually miss a great deal of' what he s~ys, 
and we supply its place by unconscious inference. 
Within each sense-type, but particularly within the sense of' 
sight, there are private worlds or perceived perspectives. 
Each perspective is the instantaneous total of sensations 
referring to one point in space-time. It is the relation 
of' all particulars in one moment of vision with one parti-
1 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of' Mind (London& 
George A1len & Unwin, Ltd.,-r921), pp. 124~126. 
2Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge 2f the External 
World (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), p. 73. 
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cular which has been singl.ed out as the point of' ref'erence. 
Perceived perspectives vary with position. Russell's 
def'inition is caref'ul to avoid ref'erence to a subject, 
because the latter is viewed to be a construction in turn. 
Mind is a construct out of' a neutral stuf'f' which is neither 
mind nor matter. 
The stuf'f' of' which the world of' our experience is com-
posed is, in my belief', neither mind nor matter, but 
something more prim~tive than either. Both mind and 
matter seem to be composite, and the stuf'f' of' Which they 
are compounded lies in a sense between the two1 in a sense above them both, like a common ancestor. 
The basic dif'f'erence between mind and matter is not the 
component 11 stuf'f'," but the causal laws -- one set f'or phy-
sics and another f'or psychology. "Psychology and physics 
are distinguished by the nature of' their causal laws, not 
by their subject matter." 2 
In addition to perceived or private perspectives 
(perceived by me or others), we must allow f'or the possi-
bilities of' unperceived perspectives. An unperceived per-
spective must be viewed as a potential perspective. Unper-
ceived perspectives can be perceived at another instant in 
time, or they might be unperceivable perspectives (the 
latter is not Russell's term) if' they are not even per-
ceivable in principle. As example (not Russell's), the 
f'ollowing might be of' help. A table has one particular 
1Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis ~ ~ (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), PP• 10-11. 
2 Ibid., p. 287. 
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con£iguration of lines from perspective P1 , which is the 
perspective from which I now perceive the table. And I 
just entered the room by the door. Perspective P1 therefore 
becomes part of the private world, or is a perceived per-
spective. Perspective P2 is the particular configuration 
of lines describing the table when viewed from the w±ndow. 
P2 differs £rom P1 • Since at that moment I am still at the 
door, P2 is an unperceived perspective. Perspectives are 
continuously variable. The total of possible perspectives 
of the table in the room is infinite. Chances are that 
even if one persists in looking from different perspectives 
of the table from within the room, there will always remain 
some unperceived perspectives. Finally, as an illustration 
of an unperceivable perspective, one can think of the atomic 
structure o£ the table. 
Not only do I have a series of perspectives, other 
people have similar or comparable perspectives. Russell 
must accept the evidence of testimony. In connection with 
the belief in the existence of other minds, Russell makes 
the leap transcending egocentric subjectivity. For Russell, 
the existence of other minds is an inference; other minds 
are not hard data. The next section deals with the nature 
of this inference. 
If we call the sum of B1 s perspectives about a 
certain particular, Pb, and if we call the sum of K's per-
spectives around another but similar particular, Pk, and 
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M's sum of' perspectives about a third similar particular, 
Pm -- the perspectives being such that the particular in 
all groups of' perspe.ctives is similar -- then the 11 thing 11 
is defined as the class of' all such perspectives with a 
similar particular. 
The 11 thing 11 thus interpreted is a logical construc-
tion, in many ways like that of number. "Logical construc-
tion" here means that a "thing," or more specifically, a 
material object, can be reduced to a class of' sensations. 
The class is definable in terms of' infinite and continuous 
series of' perspectives. The construction is logical be-
cause it is based on an external rule of procedure. Sensa-
tions do not organize themselves about particulars; criteria 
of' class-membership are applied f'rom without and are arbi-
trary, f'rom the point of' view of' the sensations themselves. 
To the extent that a thing is a construction, the relation 
between particulars (that is, individual perspectives) and 
the constructed thing is of' a purely deductive sort. The 
thing implies its particular perspectives. Induction does 
not enter the picture at all. The relation which is 
definitive in both things..and numbers is the relation of' 
similarity. A "thing," therefore, is the logical construct 
of' my perceived perspectives, of' the perceived perspectives 
of' others, and of' many possible but unperceived perspectives. 
A question arises about the relative place of in-
duction and deduction in the construction of a thing or an 
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object in terms of perspectives. The perspectives them-
selves, of course, are matters of sensation and as such 
are empirically ~ inductively given. On the other hand, 
once the object has been described in terms of inductively 
discovered properties, perspectives, and generalizations 
(predictions as to the nature of future perspectives), the 
definition of the object becomes a deductive matter. The 
meaning of the object is reducible to an infinite series 
of perspectives: 
where the object (0) is an object if, and only if, from 
perspective P1,we get image I 1 (or, more accurately, if we 
have perspective P1 , ~we also have image I 1 , etc.), 
:from perspective P2 l'le get image I 2 , ••• ad infinitum. lve 
here have an infinite or open series; nonetheless, the 
object 0 is defined by a 4eductively related chain of 
propositions. I:f -- a:fter the object has been thus de-
fined -- one of the i:f-then relationships is contrary to 
the facts, then the so-called object perceived is n£! ob-
ject 0 -- by definition. In this lray we neither violate 
the inductive nature of experiential knowledg e nor the de-
ductive nature of the definition o:f objects. 
It is necessary, i:f Russell intends to be as pre-
cise in his epistemology as he is in his log ic and mathe-
matics, to work out this corresponding system of perspec-
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tives in great detail. He needs to develop a Principia 
Epistemologica. One of the missing points is the estab-
lishment of a criterion deciding the nature of similarity 
between perspectives, without mention of the 11 thing 11 which 
is thus to be defined. How can one decide which perspec-
tive is a member of the class? How is one to tell whether 
a new perspective is an instantiation of a formerly un-
perceived perspective? Ho'l'i is the connection to be de-
fined which determines when one perspective ends and 
another commences? It appears that Russell hopes to find 
the answers to these questions h~hich he never asks speci-
fically) in physics. Russell is not satisfied that ~-
tinuity alone determines the boundaries of the construct, 
the object. He holds that the laws of physics determine 
the arrangement of perspectives which forms an object. 
11Thin.gs ~ those series gf. aspects which obey the ~ !!f. 
physics. 111 Russell repeats this definition in Mysticism 
~Logic: "Physical things~ those series .Qf appearances 
whose matter obeys ih2 ~ 2f physics. That such a series 
exists is an empirical fact, which constitutes the verifi-
ability of' physi.cs. 112 He neglects to say what determines 
the boundaries of a physical law, whether it is correspond-
1 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge 2f ·~ External 
1iorld (New York: li. \<II. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), p. 117. 
2Bertrand Russell, Mysticism~ Logic (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917), P• 173. 
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ence to objective facts or whether it is pragmatic 
considerations of some sort, or even coherence. 
Professor Bertocci takes exception to the use of 
11 logical 11 in connection l\l'ith constructions out of sense 
data. He contends that these constructions are "clearly 
not 'logical' but inductive." 
In line with Russell's type of argument, the con-
tention is reasonable that the fact that the laws of phy-
sics determine the boundaries of an object is a matter of 
definition exclusively, that is, a deductive, not in-
ductive, concern. ~fuat laws are obeyed by series of appear-
ances is indeed an inductive matter. When Russell contends 
that we choose to call this series a thing, however, he is 
not introducing a new inductively-arrived-at conclusion. 
He is defining his use of 11 thing, 11 and holds that this 
definition is equivalent to the usage of ordinary language. 
Russell's construction is similar to Berkeley's. 
Berkeley became an idealist. Russell, however, in the last 
analysis, is not an idealist. Berkeley analyzes matter in 
terms of mind; he reduces "material substances" to 11 per-
ceptions.11 He thereby proves not the existence of matter . 
but the ideality of all existence. Russell uses an argu-
ment similar to Berkeley's in outline but far more formal in 
its development. He has sho~n what perceptual equivalents 
we can find for "things." It is not at all clear, however, 
that this method of logical construction really solves the 
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problem of the existence and the nature of the external 
world. Russell's solution is the basis of the eventual 
positivist's contention (which is not Russell's position) 
that the problem of the existence of an (mental or non-
mental) external world is no problem at all. This problem, 
or pseudo-problem, is seen, by the positivists -- and later 
by the logical empiricists -- to be a confusion due to the 
linguistic ambiguity of a number of terms, such as "unper-
ceived," 11 matter, 11 "existence," and 11 sense perceptions." 
Russell's own eventual solution to the problem of 
our knowledge of the existence of the external world and 
the area in which he differs from Berkeley -- hinges on 
accepting unperceived events as part of' the data for con-
struction. Originally, Russell only admitted of unper-
ceived perceptions. Unperceived perceptions are not wholly 
contradictory to thoroughgoing empiricism because the un-
perceived may at any rate at least be , perceivable in prin-
ciple. Events, however, are existing particulars of which 
1 percepts are a class. It seems to the author of the dis-
sertation that unperceived events are certainly not hard 
data; to assume them demands justification. Russell's only 
grounds are non-empirical. 'rhe following quotations show 
these grounds. 
1 m~arles A. Fritz, Bertrand Russell's Construction 
of the External W'orld (Nel11' York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 
195'2")," P• 168. 
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Any inference beyond percepts (actual or possible) is 
incapable of being emp irically tested. We shall there-
fore be prudent if we regard the non-mental events of 
physics as mere auxiliary concepts, not assumed to have 
any reality, but only introduced to simplify the laliTS 
of percepts • • • 
Solipsism • is a view which is hard to refute, but 
still harder to believe.l 
1Vhat grounds have we for inferring that our percepts 
and what we recollect do not constitute the entire 
universe? I believe that at bottom our main ground 
is the desire to believe in simple causal laws. 2 
It may be objected that there is a difference be-
tween logical necessity and plausibility. That is, 11 not 
logically ac~eptable 11 may still mean 11 plausible~ 11 What this 
objection overlooks, hOl'lever, is that the probability l'lhich 
gives the plausible its credibility or likelihood of truth 
is a logically certain probability. Probability-theory is 
a brand of logic, just as all mathematics is. It follows, 
that if the probability or plausibility of an event occurring 
is .72, then this probability is certain and logical. This 
probability could perhaps be probable in turn, in which case 
the probability factor itself is reduced. Such higher levels 
of probability (or of meta-probability) are permissible pro-
vided they do not form an infinite series. In the latter 
case, however, any probability turns out to be zero. 
In these quotations Russell admits that, in last 
1 Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1927), PP• 190-191. 
2Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis .Q.[ :1-Iatter (Nelli' York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927), p. 200. 
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analysis, the belief in an existent external world is a 
wish-fulfilment, and that there is no logically acceptable 
'\1Tay to infer either the existen.ce or the nature of -the 
e xternal world on the basis of percepts. Professor Ber-
tocci frequently comments that logic, which is deductive, 
is not the same as inference, which is inductive. The 
term 11 inference, 11 however, can be used for deduction as well 
as for induction. 
Any inference is the drawing o:f a conclusion from one 
or more premisses. 'ihere t here is more than one 
premiss involved, as in a syllogism, which has two 
premisses, the inference is said to be "mediate" --
• • • \:lhere a conclusion is dra·wn from only one 
premiss, the inference is said to be "immediate." The · 
information embodied in the traditional square of 
opposition clearly pr£vides a basis for a number o:f 
immediate inferences. 
1Loring M. Copi, Introduction to Logic ( New York : 
The ]).facmillan Co., 19.53), p. 13.5. 
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Even more relevant to the use of' terms in this dissertation 
is Russell's terminologyr 
I may as well say at once that I do not distinguish 
between inference and deduction. What is called induc-
tion appears to me to be either disguised deduction or 
a mere method of making plausible guesses.l 
The criterion of' veridical knowledge used is 
simplicity~ Russell's argument f'or the existence of' non-
mental events is that certain cognitive processes are simpli-
fied. Simplicity is here to be understood in both a de-
ductive and an in'ductive sense. In the former, simplicity 
means a minimum of premisses and of mediate inferences. 
In the latter it means the fewest number of laws encom-
passing the largest number of events (which includes the 
largest number of future events, ~' predictions). The 
so-called discovery of simplicity is certainly no argument 
for the existence of an external world. A non-empirical 
principle is evoked, namely, that simplicity is a clue to 
or evidence for correspondence. Since no empirical evidence 
exists, this principle of correspondence is introduced a 
priori. It cannot be denied, of course, that there are good 
reasons for preferring the simple over the complex; but 
these reasons are extraneous to the view that sees the world 
either as a construction or as an inference from sensations. 
Russell also assumes the validity of the inductive 
1 Bertrand Russell, Principles£! Mathematics (2d ed.; 
New York: w. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1937), p. 11, footnote. 
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method as a . kind of' "carrier" f'rom sensations to the world 
b eyond. This assumption is, of course, the fundamental link 
between subjectivity and objectivity which needs demon-
stration, not assumption. Russell rejects the possibility 
of' demonstration; he does not accept this link on logical 
grounds. 
We must not expect to f'ind a demonstration that percep-
tions have external causes, which may produce perceptions 
in a number of' people at the same time. The most that 
we can hope for is the usual ground f'or accepting a 
scientific theory -- namely, that it links together a 
number of known facts, that it does not have any demon-
strably false consequences, and that it sometimes 
enables us to make predictions which are subsequently 
verif'ied • • • There can be no question o f' logical 
proof'. • •• On grounds of' logic, I hold that nothing 
existent can imply any other existent except a part 
of' itself' • 1 
Later, Russell indicates that the existence of' unperceived 
events is, in fact, 
a hypothesis designed to secure simplicity and con-
tinuity in the laws of' correlation suggested by the 
grouping of percepts. It cannot be demonstrated, but 
its merits are of' the same kind as those of' any other 
scientific2theory, and I shall therefore henceforth assume it. 
If' Russell takes these statements seriously and as 
conclusive in his view, it f'ollows that the term "external 
world 11 refers to a f'iction -- to a construct of phenomena 
which purports to point to a noumenon, but, in fact, may 
not. If' this is Russell's view, the phenomenal world has 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------
!Bertrand Russell, The ,Analysis of' Matter (New York : 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927), PP• 198-199. 
2 Ibid., P• 217. 
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not been transcended even in principle . -- not even in the 
sense of probability. It must be emphasized that, in 
Kant's sense, knowledge of noumena is neither certain !!21:. 
probable -- it is knowledge that is totally beyond the 
human understanding. The positivist will give this same 
issue a non-metaphysical, non-ontological significance by 
referring to it as a putative or pseudo-question. We end 
with sensations, and constructs made of these sensations 
which conveniently and coherently organize these sensations. 
Of a noumenal world beyond these sensations we can say 
nothing. If this is Russell's view, then these 11 f'ictions 11 
called constructs cannot serve as bases for inferences 
about an external lforld. 
The question of refractory data (mostly sensations) 
must be reopened at this point. That some data are refrac-
tory cannot readily be doubted (although the phenomenon of' 
hypnosis, leading to positive and negative hallucinations, 
throws a different light on this problem that is altogether 
S'~para:tr& from that under which epistemologists routinely 
discuss it). Yet what train of reasoning, inductive or 
deductive, can lead us :from refractory data to a noumenal 
world? At best, this kind of argument is one by analogy. 
For example, I cannot open the door that usually yields to 
my pressure. I suspect anoth er person holds the door. A 
quick look through the keyhole confirms my belief'. This is 
an occw:rence l'll'ithin the phenomenal lll'orld exclusively, and 
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t .here is absolutely no warrant to in:f'er -- even with the 
slightest degree of' probability -- that a parallel situation 
obtains between re:f'ractory sensations in general and a 
noumenal world or a metaphysical X. If' we grant this lat-
ter parallel we assume what we wish to prove, namely, that 
the noumenal world corresponds to the phenomenal ·world. 
(J) Other Minds. In order to prove the existence 
of an external world it is not only necessary for Russell 
to attempt to demonstrate the existence of' some entity such 
as matter, but also that of' other minds. In the :first place, 
the common-sense universe consists not only of external 
material objects, but also of' minds. Second, as indicated 
in the previous section, the existence of' other minds is a 
presupposition to Russell's putative solution to the 
problem of' the existence of' an external world. Other minds 
represent other systems of perspectives, and it is precisely 
those other systems in other minds which mru{e possible 
public perspectives, and hence, "things." 
The argument in :favour of' the view that there are per-
cepts, connected with other people, which are not among 
our own percepts, is presupposed in the acceptance of' 
testimony, and comes f'irst in logical order t17hen we are 
trying to establish the existence of' things other than 
our Ot17n percepts, both because of' its inherent strength, 
and because of' ihe usefulness of testimony in the 
further stages. 
1 Ibid., p. 203. 
213 
Follo"\.,ing are some of' Russell's reasons f'or believing 
in the existence of' other minds. We observe in us a number 
of' stimulus-response constellations. We are stimulated by 
a stomadl-.:a.che and observe the response in us a certain 
facial expressions, taking medicine, and pertinent words. 
We observe similar responses in other bodies and infer --
by the usual laws of' induction -- the existence of minds 
or states of' consciousness similar to ours. It should be 
noted that Russell's argument here is of' the same nature 
as his arguments f'or any independent existence. 
We note the likeness of' the physical objects called 
other people's bodies to each other and to our own 
body; we also note the likeness of' their behaviour to 
our behaviour. In the case of' our own behaviour, we 
can observe a number of correlations between stimulus 
and reaction (both being percepts). For example, we 
f'eel hunger or thirst, and then lfe eat or drink • • • 
The behaviour of' the percepts we call other people's 
bodies is similar to that of our own body in response 
to this or that stimulus • • • The argument f'or other 
people's perceptions is the same in f'orm and cogency 
as the argument for the f'uture truth of' laws of 
correlation among our own percepts. 1•le have e xactly 
as good reason f'or believing that others perceive 
what we do not as we have f'or believing that we shall 
have a perception of touch if' we stretch out our han~ 
to an object which looks as if' it were within reach. 
Russell's metaphysics.~-After examining the place 
a priori notions occupy · in Russell's empirical position, a 
f'ew statements can be made regarding the metaphysical 
nature of' the world. To Russell, the ultimate nature of 
things consists of' 11 events. 11 "Everything in the w·orld is 
1 Ibid., PP• 204-205. 
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1 
composed o'£ 'events.'" An event, as such, is neither mental 
nor material, and thus his view leads to neutral monism. 
An event is 11 something having a small finite duration and 
2 
a small :finite extension in space. 11 It is important to 
distinguish an event '£rom a datum. Russell also defines 
11 datum11 as a 11 form of words which a man utters as the result 
of a stimulus, with no intermediary of any learned reaction 
beyond 't'll'hat is involved in knowing how to speak. 11 .3 And also, 
11 all our data for knowledge of the external world must be of 
4 
the nature of percepts. 11 That is to say, not all events 
are data, some events are known only through inference. It 
follow·s, and this is of particular importance, that some 
events are not percepts, that is, they are unperceived. 
An event is a flash of lightning, hearing a tire burst, 
or smelling a rotten egg, or feeling the coldness of a frog.5 
11 1'/e infer Lr.rom sensation~ that there are events which are 
not data and happen at a distance from our own body. Some 
of these are data to other people, others ~- ~ ~ no 
~. 116 (Italics mine) Russell continues, "percepts a'£ford 
1 Bertrand Russell, f.hilosophy (New Yorkt w. w. 
Norton & Co., 1927), p. 276. 
2Ibid., p. 266. 
3Ibid. 
4
Ibid., P• 267. 
5Ibid., p. 276. 
6Ibid. 
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the logical premisses for all inferences to events that 
1 
are not percepts." As examples, Russell mentions that 
"particuLar colours and sounds and so on are events; their 
causal antecedents in the inanimate world are also events. 11 2 
Events are neutral; that is, they are neither mind nor 
matter. ~Ietaphysically speaking, perhaps the most import-
ant point Russell makes in this connection is that he 
admits of the possibility and the actuality of unperceived 
events. In doing so, he rejects the validity of pure or 
radical empiricism, and opens up the possibility of a belief 
in the existence of an external world (that is, consisting 
of unperceived events), as well as the possibility of 
making inferences about these unperceived events. Knowledge 
that an external world exists is brought into Russell's 
philosophy through knowledge of the existence of unperceived 
events. The existence of unperceived events is argued for 
on the basis of the refractoriness of sensations and of the 
metaphysical or transcendent validity of inference based on 
either refractoriness, which involves necessary causal 
connections, or on analogy or on both. That is to say, 
~~ithout unperceived events it is difficult to construct a 
coherent system or conception of the world. This may be a 
reason for introducing unperceived events into the system --
1 Ibid., P• 277• 
2 Ibid. 
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but an unperceived event remains . a convenient 11 f'iction." 
' In last analysis, w·e have no knowledge of' the metaphy-
sically independent existence of unperceived events. This 
situation warrants calling our knowledge of' the existence 
of' an external world an assumption, in terms of' this 
dissertation. In the first place, all of' Russell's argu-
ments that purportedly prove the existence of' an external 
world (and 11 prove 11 includes here the notion of' probability) 
lvere seen to presuppose its existence .2!!£! that of' a corres-
pondence between phenomena and noumena. Second, since 
Russell utilizes the basic notion of' an external world in 
all his philosophic pursuits, we must assert that what 
cannot be demonstrated to be true, yet is asserted as such, 
must indeed be understood as assumed to be true. 
This very assumption, however, is precisely one of' 
the cardinal problems demanding solution within epistemology, 
not further assumption. Because Russell does not resolve 
this basic problem, we are in a position to say that f'or 
Russell the world is viewed as having certain highly defined 
features, known prior to and without the aid of' scientific 
investigations. 
Exactly lifhat these features are is difficult to 
indicate, since these features must be viewed as part of' 
Russell's tacit assumptions about the nature of' the l'lorld, 
not his considered opinions and conclusions, although he 
may see them as such. It is f'ar easier to state ~ views 
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~ excluded by Russell .' s admission of' unperceived events 
and by his f'aith in the possibility of' making valid inf'er-
ences about them. 
The f'ollowing views are excluded by Russell's posi-
tion. Russell's view tends to exclude the kind of' monism 
f'ound through mysticism, the kind of' metaphysics which will 
be discussed in Chapter III, on Stace. In the idealistic 
monistic metaphysics, discussed there, all existence and all 
reality is experienced. All reality is experienced in that 
experience which serves as f'oundation to this metaphysical 
position. Theref'ore, any metaphysics arrived at through the 
method of' mysticism has no room f'or unperceived events. 
Russell, f'urthermore, has expressed himself' as explicitly 
opposed to any mystical view of' reality. 
Of' the reality or unreality of' the mystic's world I know 
nothing. I have no wish to deny it, nor even to 
declare that the insight which reveals it is not a 
genuine insight. What I do wish to maintain -- and it 
is here that the scientif'ic attitude becomes imperative 
is that insight, untested 'and unsupported, is an in-
suf'f'icient guarantee of' truth, in spite of' the f'act 
that much of' the most important truth is f'irst suggested 
by its means.l 
Russell's assumptions, incorporated in his def'ini-
tions of' events, data, and sensations, also exclude the 
"qualitative" monism of' Berkeley. For Berkeley, the universe 
consists of' one kind of' substance, but the substance is 
individuated or particular in terms of' f'inite minds and an 
inf'inite Mind, God. Berkeley's 11~ is percipi 11 militates 
against the possibility of' unperceived events. Berkeley, of' 
!Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of' the External 
World (New Yorks W. W'. Norton&. Co., Inc., 1929), p. 21. 
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course, allows Cor the possibility oC events unperceived 
by me. But Russell goes beyond thisl an unperceived 
event is an event perceived by no one, certainly not God. 
Russell's position regarding unperceived events 
would not necessarily exclude Spinosa's kind oC monism, 
because to the latter, perception is not definitive of an 
existent event. Russell's definition of event does not 
exclude some sort of Platonism either, on the same grounds. 
It is Royce's belief that Spinoza was basically a 
mystic. In !h2 Spirit 2f Modern Philosophy, Royce holds 
that the inspiration which occasioned Spinoza to construct 
his metaphysics was of a mystical sort, that is, experienced• 
but that the fulfilment of this inspiration came out in 
terms of a purely logical sequence, due to his training and 
. 1 disposit1on. Russell makes a similar point in Our Know-
ledge of~ External _t·lorld when he '"rites, 
The great philosophers who were mystics notably 
Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel -- • - ~ • usually took for 
granted the supposed insight of the my~tic emotion, 
• • • the sudden illuminatio~ from which they Lthe 
philosophic systemiJ sprang. 
An argument could therefore be made, on the basis of this 
point of Royce and Russell, shot\fing that Spinoza 1 s monism 
is likewise excluded from possibility by Russell's assump-
----------------------~- -- --------------
1Josiah Royce, ~ Spirit 2£ Nodern Philosophy 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1892), pp. 42ff., 46ff'., 
.53, .54, _58. 
2 Bertrand Russell, ~ Knowledge ~ the External 
liTorld ( Nel,r York: \'i. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), p. 49. 
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tions, provided one can establish a close relationship 
between Spinoza 1 s inspiration and its realization or 
intellectualized articulation. Whether Spinoza's meta-
physical position is excluded from Russell's presupposi-
tions depends on the place Spinoza 1 s mysticism occupies in 
h is total metaphysics. 
Russell's definitions, furthermore, do not exclude 
some sort of Platonism and realism. The realistic belief 
in the independent existence of universals is consistent 
with the assumption of the existence of unperceived events. 
When Russell maintains that "the non-mental events 
of physics Laril ... mere auxiliary concepts, not assumed 
to have any reality, but only introduced to simplify the 
1 laws of percepts," he not only contradicts the position he 
represents at other times (usually later in his writings), 
but he also discloses his position to be closer to idealism, 
and, if carried to extreme, ~thout the further qualifi-
cation of the existence of the unperceived, might lead to 
solipsism. If the non-mental events which we infer on the 
basis of scientific investigations are admitted to be con-
venient fictions, then these so-called "non-mental events" 
are not non-mental at all they are thoughts, that is, 
mental events, which have the putatively convenient label 
"non-mental." In a way, they are self-negating terms. 
1 Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: '\lf. W. 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1927), p. 290. 
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Russell is seen to verge on the side of idealism when he 
writes, 11 physics does not assume the existence of' matter. 111 
(The term "assume" in this quotation is ambiguous. Russell 
does not mean that physics does not assume the existence of 
matter, but proves it. He means, that physics neither needs 
nor establishes the concept or event termed "matter.") 
It must be noted, however, that Russell's position 
in this connection is flexible. Complete consistency with 
this latter quotation would lead to the position that no 
unperceived entities can be inferred. But this idealism 
is not the position Russell holds most frequently. His 
more common view is found in the following quotation: 
There are some who would deny that physics need say 
anything about what cannot be observed; at times I have 
been one of them. But I have become persuaded that such 
an interpretation of' physics is at best an intellectual 
game, and that an honest acceptance of physics demands 
recognition of unobserved occurrences.2 
That the occasional idealistic position imputed to 
Russell might lead to solipsism is pointed out by Boodin, 
when the latter writes, 
LRussel!l admits that the world of physics, on his view, 
is merely an ideal construction, in order to simplify 
his description of his subjective world. He does not 
like solipsism; but his philosophy certainly condemns 
him to it, remonstrate as he may. 
To sum up Russell's results so far: Sensations or 
1Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis of' Mind (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 6. 
2Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ~Philosophy of' Ber-
trand Russell (Evanston: Northwestern University, 194~ 
P• 701. 
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percepts, in a certain region of the brain, are the 
ultimate facts. But a region of the brain and the 
brain itself, according to Russell, are constructs for 
our convenience in simplifying our subjective data. 
To put these hypothetical constructs on a par with 
the subjective data, as figuring in one chain of 
causality, is to confuse types. The sensations of per-
cepts are the only real facts, on Russell's view. 
As Boodin points out, Russell's view of sensations is that 
they are reducible to some brain-event. This pseudo-materi-
alism finds difficulties when we recognize that the brain 
itself is a construct out of sensations first. 
The transcendent applicability of causation is a 
further element of Russell's metaphysics. He reduces causa-
tion to a construction which is a class of events which are 
in some measure analogous to the experience we call 11 will. 11 
In this fashion, Russell can construct causation out of 
sensations. What he cannQi do, without further justifi-
cation, is to use this construct as a bridge to transcend 
sensations. 
J~st as causation is a construct, so is mind. The 
:following quotation may be viewed as a summary statement of 
Russell's view of mind, as one of the comp onents of the 
metaphysical realitya 
The ultimate data of psychology are only sensations 
and images and their relations. Beliefs, desires, 
volitions and so on, app eared to us to be complex 
phenomena consisting of sensations and images 
1 Ibid., P• 493. 
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variously interrelated. 1 
Russell's view that 11 mind 11 is a construction is 
based on his doctrine of neutral monism. Mind is a con-
struct from pure experience. He tends to agree with James 
in 11 Does Consciousness Exist? 11 Other elements are con-
structed out of this neutral stuff, some useful for one 
kind of activity, some for others. 
It is important not to confuse construct with 
inference. A to·wer of blocks, for instance, is a .£2._f!-
struct out of block s. The tot..rer is reducible tvithou t 
remainder to its component blocks and their relation to 
one another. The tower ~ s not, nor does it lead to anything 
but its components. Simila rly, an object as a construct 
of sensations is merely a summation of sensations t..rith their 
interrelations. No noumenal reference or ontolog ical-X 
reference is made -- or can be made -- here. Memory is 
one of t h e "sensations" or 11 presentations 11 of or about the 
con struct which is the object. Logic functions to bring 
consistency into the organization of sensat ions or im-
pression s. 
1 Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis of ~ (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 192IT, pp. 299-300. 
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Assumptions Found in Russell's Conception of Reality 
Following are a series of clusters of assumptions, based 
on the foregoing statement of Russell's position. 
Assumption !·--The process by which Russell uses 
constructions to reduce a world-view to sensations, or to 
interpret a world view in terms of sensations, discloses 
postulates or assumptions found in his conception of reality. 
Russell does not always agree on whether the world 
is a construction or an inference. There might not be a 
difference beh!Teen these two !2£. Russell .,._ as Professor 
Bertocci has commented -- but there is a difference in fact. 
If we say the ·w·orld is a construction then we say t~e build 
or create our world. In this case, "construction" can mean 
(a) t1Te make . the world in the existentialist (especially 
Heidegger's) sense that we could just as well have~ or 
have chosen another world f'or ourselves, or (b) in a sense 
that is truer to Russell's approach to philosophy, namely 
that we £!!:.!!. construct or build the world as we experience it 
or discover it on the basis of' sensations. In this sense of 
construction, the relationship between sensa and constructs 
becomes merely a logical possibility. If', however, we say 
now that the world is an inference, ,,e are not concerned 
with logical or existential building, but with discovery. 
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Through inference we discover the nature o:f reality be-
yond sensations or appearance. The author o:f the dis-
sertation submits that construction and inference are, in 
:fact, not equi.valent relations between sensa and world, 
although Russell may not avail himself o:f these nuances. 
On the one hand, the world may be said to be a construction; 
in this case objects and theories are built with or upon 
sense data. The ra1~ materials for this kind of a world are 
the hard data of which Russell writes. The view that the 
world is a construction is~ therefore, a kind of idealism 
or even solipsism, since in last analysis, the only hard 
data are my 01m. 
On the other hand, the world may also be viewed as 
an inference, in which case hard data (and common sense self-
evident beliefs) are grounds for inferring some character-
istics of an external world. Here, the relation between 
data and world is synthetic. The implication is that the 
laws of (deductive or inductive) logic, !.·~·' the laws of 
inference, are v a ,l i. d. . . i n . . the 1~orld beyond experience. 
This is, in last analysis, a rationalistic assumption. 
Russell holds both vie1~s at one time or another. He 
shows the world ~ be a construction, and he also :feels 
that 1..re can infer an external l~orld. 
To the extent that he holds the :first view -- that 
the world is a construction -- Russell implicitly postulates 
the validity of the logical position that i:f the world ~ 
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be a construction it ~ a construction. If so, he has to 
show that it cann£! be anything else. This he does not do. 
He proves possibility, not actuality. Only an inarticulated 
reference to a simplicity criterion gives him the logical 
justification of such a step. The postulation here is of 
two sorts: ~~possible ~enough~ give probability 
2£ ~ sufficiently high degree to ~ !i acceptable -- for 
the actual; ~ 1£1 ~ simpler view ~ ~· The author of 
the dissertation contends that the first postulation is a 
logical error -- an oversight. The second postulation is one 
that can be freely chosen or rejected. There are no grounds 
Russell ever mentions for choosing these postulations. True, 
they are not frequently rejected. Whatever the case, the 
simplicity criterion cannot be grounded on simplicity again 
without circularity. Accepting the simple as true rather 
than the complex -- when such a choice is possible -- is 
an attitude or is a belief chosen 11 f'reely." 
Assumption !I·--1Vhile Russell holds the second view, 
that the '\1I'Orld can be inferred, he must be understood to 
postulate that the phenomenologically elusive1 events 
termed "hard dat a" are adequate guides to a world or reality 
beyond. There is no '\~arrant f'or this postulation·,·2 except 
~is phrase means that it is very difficult to des-
cribe ~ given phenomenologically (or f'or that matter, in any 
other way as well). In one sense, sensations~ given, in 
another sense, they are psychological or physiological 
inferences. 
2This point has been previously discussed and estab-
lished on page ;JI • 
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that its converse is equally unjustifiable. In other 
words, there is neither any justifiable way of asserting, 
not even to the lowest degree of probability, that sen-
sations do ~ refer to a reality beyond. That hard data 
do offer this guide is a common philosophical tenet since 
the days of Descartes, and even before. It may be quite 
true that we can think of no better grounds :for inferring 
the ,,-orld beyond than on the basis of refractory hard data; 
yet, the belief that liThat is refractory is not caused by 
me (an argument used by Descartes, Berkeley, Bowne, C. I. 
Le't'lis, Tennant, and Bertocci) is based on an analogy :from 
t'lithin the realm of sensation itself. And ,,e certainly 
cannot use something :found in the realm of sensation --
including the order of these sensations, as well as their 
refractory nature -- to prove that sensations can be a 
guide to 't•rhat is beyond, without begging the question. 1 
This situation is parallel to the circularity :found in 
justifying induction: namely, that only induction can prove 
the adequacy of induction. Similarly, only an analogy based 
on sensations can prove that sensations are veridical. 
If being, includi.ng the external 1--rorld, is thought 
to be subject to inference :from sensations, we acknowledge 
the rationalistic postulate that being is rational. T1Lis 
lo\_ • .t-V-c;a~n, 
on page 211. 
this point has been previously discussed 
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means that the laws of inference -- a priori laws, as ,~ell 
as those abstracted .from experience apply universally to 
(a) all possible experience and (b) to the noumenal X be-
yond sensations. This surely is a starting point, a postu-
late, a belie~ chosen, not arrived at. This belief must be 
thought of as chosen rather than as confirmed because no 
confirmation is logically possible. The nature of the 
problem and the belief is such that no conceivable experi-
ence can either confirm or disconfirm the belief that the 
la1..rs of inference apply to the noumenal X, that is, to the 
external l..rorld. Russell's second assumption then is that 
within certain limits -- ~ universe .!.§. rational.. Ih2 
~ .2.£ inference ~ .~ ~ .£.2ll. ~ ~ legitimately in 
~ .£!!!!. ~ called !!_ "transcendent" sense, .~ llt these 
~ ~ valid ~ for ~ possible experience ~ ~ ~ 
beyond possible experience. 
Assumption ~--Russell assumes ~ ~ ~ given 
ll a ~ to ~ reality beyond this given; ~ill that 
"sensations" is !!. ~which ~ its connotations adequately 
describes ~ structure .2.£ this given. That these are 
assumptions and not proven points follows from the following 
considerations. First, what guarantee do we have that by 
analyzing the given we have any clue to reality? Second, if' 
the given is defined as that which is truly present to our 
immediate consciousness, 1..re cannot say that sensations ful-
fil this requirementJ everything and nothing fulfils this 
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requirement. Sensations are rather sophisticated abstrac-
tions and interpretations of what this immediate thereness 
is; they are interpretations on the basis of a particular 
physiological conception of man, and, more specifically, 
. 1 
of the human nervous system. On the other hand, inter-
preting the given as perceptions, which '"as true of the Pre-
Socratics as well as of such early British Empiricist as 
Locke, leads to a third assumption, namely i£l ~ given ~ 
sensations presupposes ~ !9:!!Q .2f. duality .2.£ the '"orld ~ 
!lliill. "t-thich ~ ~ human ~ (conceived ~ ~ camera-like 
instrument) as ~ basis for interpreting all kno'tiTledge .2..!: 
cognitiQn. If we wish to truce the immediate givenness as the 
genuine, that is, presuppositionless, start of any quest after 
the foundation of knoldedge, it is evident that presupposition-
laden terms such as perception and sensation are perhaps not 
the best -- albeit the most co~non starting point. 
Professor Bertocci objects in this connection as 
follow·s: "But here givenness is given a different and 
peculiar meaning -- what '"e start w·i th, rather than given. 11 
The criticism resolves into a functional definition of the 
given. The ambiguity is not avoided. What we start 'td th is 
as variable as '"hat is said to be, phenomenologically, there 
or given. We start with sensations, because they ~ given. 
If we are system building, and as far as logic is concerned, 
lve can start with anyt,hi..!ll!• It may be argued that Russell 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
lA patch of yellow can be an interpretation, for ex-
ample, when it is an abstraction from the experience of a 
painting rather than the immediately given experience itself 
of the painting. 
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"does not believe in sense data." In a recent issue of: 
~ Journal !!£. Philosophy Russell writes, eonnnenting on 
Ryle' s book, ~. Concept 2f. ~' "a second point upon 
which I am in agreement l'iith him is the rejection of' sense-
data. I believed in these at one time, but emphatically 
abandoned them in 1921."1 Russell has a footnote in this 
connection, referring to his Analysis ![f_ ~~ page lln. In 
that general section Russell denies the separation of' sensa-
tions f'rom sense data. He denies the existence of' a self', 
soul, or, as he calls it, "subject," which experiences 
sense-data. The subject, he feels, can be substituted by 
constructions out of' sense-data. The lengthy quotation 
lihich follows should indicate enough of' the drif't of the page 
referred to (and adjacent ones) so that its connection 
with the journal article can be noted. 
Thus, although it may be difficult to determine what 
exactly is sensation in any given experience, it is 
clear that there is sensation, unless • • • we deny 
all action of: the outer world upon us. 
Sensations are obviously the source of' our know-
ledge of: the world, including our own body. • • l'ie 
must distinguish the seeing f'rom what is seen: we must 
say that, when l'ie see a patch of colour of: a certain . 
shape, the patch of' colour is one thing and our seeing 
of: it is another. This view, however, demands the ad-
mission of: the subject, or act, in the sense discussed 
in our first lecture. If: there is a subject, it can 
have a relation to the patch of' colour, namely, the 
sort of: relation which we might call awareness. In 
that case the sensation, as a mental event, will consist 
1 Bertrand Russell, 11 What is Mind," 1112. Journal of: 
Philosophy, Vol LV, No. 1 (January 2, 1958), p. 5. 
of awareness of the colour, while the colour itself 
will remain wholly physical, and may be called the 
sense-datum, to distinguish it from the sensation. 
The subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction, 
like mathematical points and instants. It is intro-
duced, not because observation reveals it, but because 
it is linguistically convenient and apparently de-
manded by grammar. Nominal enti.ties of this sort may 
or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assum-
ing that they do. The functions that they appear to 
perform can always be performed by classes or series 
or other logical constructions, consisting of less 
dubious entities. If we are to avoid a perfectly 
gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the sub-
ject as one of the actual ingredients of the world. 
But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing 
the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes; at least I 
see no way of preserving the distinction. Accordingly 
the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour 
simply ~ that patch of colour, an actual constituent 
of the physical world, and part of what physics is 
concerned with.l 
Since Russell has not, for a large part of his 
productive life, believed in sense-data, the assumption 
found at the outset of this sub-section, therefore, applies 
only to an earlier stage in Russell's philosophy. 
Assumption IV.--2 In his criticism of Kant, Russell 
discloses l'lhat in this Chapter will be termed the :fourth 
assumption or postulate. For the purpose of argument it 
will be de.sirable to distinguish between logical, psychologi-
cal, and metaphysical theories of mathematics. Some objec-
tion may be sustained regarding the appropriateness of 
lBertrand Russell, ~ Analysis ~ ~ (London: 
George A1len & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), pp. 141-142. 
2££:.., p.l73· . 
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these terms. But these terms appear here briefly for the 
sake of argument alone. The rigorous process of deduction 
of mathematics from logic that we find in Russell -- where 
mathematics .is an instantiation of general logical prin-
ciples is a logical theory of mathematics. This is a 
theory of how mathematics is grounded, on what basis it is 
thought to be true. This logical theory of mathematics may, 
therefore, also be termed an epistemological one. The Kant-
ian doctrine of mathematics, on the other hand, where in-
tuition of space and time is needed in order to realize and 
guarantee the truth of mathematics will be called psychologi-
~· This theory is likewise an epistemological one, be-
cause to Kant, his theory (a) indicated how mathematics was 
thought to be true, that is, it gave the grounds for the 
truth of mathematics, and (b) was a genetic one, in that it 
explained how mathematical knowledge ~ come about (it can 
come about also, of course, by sheer memorization of state-
ments taken on authority). 
Both theories have metaphysical correlates, since 
they presage commitments about the ontological status of 
mathematics. The logical theory contends that mathematics 
is analytic, derived from definitions alone, is a purely 
symbolic device, and offers no knowledge of the world. The 
psychological theory holds that mathematics is representa-
tional, (meaning thereby that mathematical truths depend for 
their justification on intuition or Anschauung), immutable, 
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and also synthetic a priori, that is, offers genuine know-
ledge about the world. 
The author of this dissertation contends that both 
the logical and the psychological theories of mathematics 
can be held concurrently. These theories are not contra-
dictory since they deal with different subjects. In one 
case we deal with the versatility of logic, in the other 
we describe the functioning of thought. The incompleteness 
of Russell's argument and the assumptions involved will now 
be developed in some detail. 
Russell's criticism of Kant may be stated in summary 
form as follows: 11 We can show that mathematics can be ex-
pressed in terms of logic. We know that the reduction of 
mathematics to logic is complete and adequate if the logical 
equivalents enable us to perform the same tasks that numbers 
would otherwise perform. That is to say, the reduction is 
complete in every mathematically important respect. It 
follows that mathematics (in al l o ther respects) is nothing 
but a type of logic." The argument has been stated pur-
posively in such a manner that it discloses that part of 
itself which is to be analyzed here. 
It is true that logical equivalents of mathematics 
can be used without difficulty in all mathematical operations; 
this does not say, however, in itself, that other, alter-
native mathematical theories (such as counting as the 
origin of numbers, intuition of space and time as prerequi-
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site to mathematical truths) are false. Logical and 
psychological theories of mathematics, as defined above, 
are not mutually exclusive. 
Russell does not show that the psychological and 
its concomitant metaphysical theories of mathematics are 
false -- he merely states that they are false. He does 
show that a logical reduction of mathematics is possible. 
But the possibility of a logical theory of mathematics does 
not entail the impossibility of a psychological one. 
It has been established in this section that there 
are at least two mathematical analyses, two types of 
mathematical reductions: logical and psychological. Russell 
accepts logical equivalences or reductions and rejects 
psychological equivalences -- with their metaphysical con-
comitants. In doing this he rejects Kant in a rather 
subtle way. 
Russell holds that the logical reduction is complete 
in every mathematically important respect. But what he 
really means is 11 in every logically important respect," 
and this begs the question. Of course there are other --
and important -- respects in which mathematics is signifi-
cant. The psychological process of thinking about mathe-
matics, through the intuitions of space and time, is indeed 
a signi:ficant and important aspect of' mathematics. His 
logical reduction specifically omits these latter important 
respects. Russell has prejudged his conclusion lvhen he 
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restricts "mathematically important" to "derivable :from 
logic." If one chooses to expand "mathematically important" 
to include 11 the psychological aspect of mathematics," then 
logical reductions are simply not adequate analyses of what 
is mathematically important. Russell's rejection of' Kant 
is :found hidden in lf'hat Russell must mean by "mathematically 
important." Russell has chosen to accept the logical mean-
ing of mathematics, and with it, the ontological implica-
tion that mathematics is no knot'fledge of reality. He has 
thereby chosen to reject the psychological meaning of 
mathematics, and with it the ontologicali correlate that 
mathematics ll knowledge ·of reality. 
If one should say the proposition, 111 God 1 can be 
reduced to 'I like to go to Church'" reduces 11 God 11 to 
psychological terms in every important behavioristic sense 
(which may well be true) one cannot conclude from these 
grounds alone that God does not exist as an independent 
entity. The original statement is correct because it 
asserts something about 11behaviorism 11 and its method, not 
because it asserts something about God. This reduction may 
be adequate behavioristically, but not, let us say, theologi-
cally. By restricting 11 adequacy 11 a priori to an exclusively 
behavioristic type of reduction, the case :for atheism is 
made. But it is made by a prior decision Which can then be 
implemented only by restricting adequacy to behavioristic 
reductions. There is no ~ to restrict adequacy in this 
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way. This restriction is a chosen matter. 
~ assumption, therefore, ~ ~~ ~ logical 
reductioq o~ mathematics is a total ~ adeguate reduction 
1:!.! ill possible senses. This is tantamount to saying ~ 
~ non-logical senses ~ reductions 2f mathematics ~ 
rejected: that is, ~ decision ~ been made i£ reject them, 
a decision has ~ ~ ~ disregard psychological analyses 
of mathematics and their metaphysical correlates. 
It is, of course, possible to adduce reasons for 
rejecting the non-logical meanings of mathematics. But these 
are non-mathematical reasons. We cannot say, 11 mathematics 
is logic;" but we must say, "we choose mathematics to be a 
type of logic;" and therefore we choose to refer to "the 
non-logical types or aspects of mathematics as not mathe-
matics at all." 
Assumption ~--llVhen Russell rejects the finitist 1 s 
principle that propositions are meaningful only when they 
refer to one or to a finite collection of particulars, he 
endorses the view that some universal knowledge exists and 
that knowledge consists in universal concepts. Needless to 
say, universal knowledge (~, knowledge lvhich applies to 
all things, or things of a kind) and knowledge of univer-
sals (in the sense of either realism or nominalism) are two 
distinct things. If we nol..r grant that knowledge is a 
1 cf., p • . 184. 
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binary relation, then what we ~ lvhen lve knolv a universal 
proposition is an ontologically independent universal con-
cept, some1~at in the fashion of a Platonic Form. 
That such universal knowledge is possible is de-
fended by Russell op the grounds that otherwise universal 
propositions '\•tOuld be false, useless, or meaningless. Since 
we 11 need 11 these universal propositions in order to have any 
knowledge at all, and since Russell has decided that know-
ledge is desirable, the validity and meaningfulness of these 
universal propositions must be justified. This justification 
is not in terms of the system itself, that is, the system 
of sensations and constructs. For one thing, lcno't'ITledge of 
universals must be non-empirical. Accepting universals is 
introducing a non-empirical postulate into an empirical 
systematic philosophy. Therefore, within Russell's system of 
empiricism, the acceptance of universals is a postulate. 
Universals, as part of the equipment of the noumenal world, 
are justified orr the belief that the rules of inference 
derived from or developed within the phenomenal world are 
applicable, in a transcendent sense, to the noumenal l'lOrld as 
well, and to the relations obtaining between the noumenal and 
the phenomenal 'toTOrlds. 
The postulates here are as follolvS: hl ~ obj eo.,. 
tive existence of universals; Russell does not specify which. 
- ·-
The existence of universals is logically entailed by Russell's 
rejection of finitism. 1£1 !h£ transcendent validity of ~ 
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rules .2.f :inference regarding ~ source .2£ .2.!:!!: know·ledge 
.£!universals; ~ hl ~b:i.nary nature of'~ knowledge 
situation, which resolves ult~ately ~ ~ binary ~ 
dualistic nature £f the world. That is to say, Russell 
presupposes -- as a logical entailment o:f his view that 
kno'tvledge is a binary relation -- epistemological ~ ~ 
as metaphysical dualism. The metaphysical dualism entailed 
is at minimum a guantitat:i.ve one. 
These postulates ~~ of' course, be justified in 
turn in terms o:f some other system: one might argue, for 
example, that the consequences of' maintaining a realistic 
position :in connection with universals are important in 
malcing for the possibility of an epistemology. What, 
specifically, this system would be, worked out, need not be 
articulated in order to defend the point at issue. This 
11 pragmatic 11 system, in terms o:f which universal concepts 
might be justified having also the logical structure of 
all systems -- must in turn have its O'tm postulates. This 
process of justification has the makings of' an infinite 
regress. ' i.herever we wish to stop we will have to say that 
these postulates are chosen freely, spontaneously, without 
ground. 
This position is established here a priori, as a 
necessary corollary :following from the nature of' any system. 
AssumEtion ~--Any system whatsoever which is part 
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of' an empirical philosophy must be introduced in a non-
empirical manner. 11 System11 is the a priori structure in 
terms of' which empirically given experiences are to be 
ordered or "interpreted." A system is the logical org ani-
zation of' experiences. A logical interpretative and 
organizational order is not, in turn, part of' these 
experiences. 
!.h..2 assumption !!!!:! .!.!, .~ .. experience ~. ~ 
subject itself' to only one possible systematization, B21 !£ 
many. The point here made ref'erence to is the same James 
speaks of' when he says, "there is nothing improbable in the 
supposition that an analysis of' the world may yield a num-
ber of' formulae, all consistent "td th the :facts. " 1 This 
assumption is not Russell's, but that of' the dissertation. 
What kind of' proof' can one adduce f'or this principle or 
assumption? The point could be justif'ied empirically; this 
is not very satisfactory. One could show that several sys-
terns coherently account f'or all the data. The variety of' 
philosophical, metaphysical, religious systems testifies to 
the probable truth of' this point. In practice, this empiri-
cal justification is, if' not impossible, at least forbidding. 
This principle could also be justif'ied logically or a priori. 
In that case, one must assert that a system is an organi-
1 i'iilliam James, 11The Sentiment of' Rationality," 
Essays in Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell {New York1 Haf'ner 
Publishing Co., 1955), p. 12. 
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zation of experience. An organization is a system of 
atomic constituents, and on the basis of this simple 
logical model, one can assert that the nature of organi-
zat i on it s e lf does not determine any ~ particular order 
of atomic events. Three atomic events can be ordered in 
fifteen different ways, for instance. (1,2,3,12,13,21,23, 
31,32,123,132,213,231,312,321.) We may choose a ny one of 
these orders, but the reasons for choice are extraneous to 
the principle of order itself. 
1 Assumption ~-- Russell goes through great detail 
and trouble to try i£ ~ ~ !! ~ at least reasonable 
i£ infer ~ existence of unperceived events. This inference 
crucial for his system -- is neither an empirically g iven 
experience, nor can it be justified in terms of his system, 
regardless of what we consider his system to be. His sys-
tern could be a set of constructions or inferences. The 
system is justified in terms of this inference of unper-
ceived events. His justification is that it is necessary 
log ically and workable psychologically, and we do it all the 
time anyhow. Whatever system we can ascribe to this justifi-
cation is subject to the same demands of systematization 
referred to in many previous instances. ~ problem 2f ~ 
existence ££ ~ external world -- which hinges on this 
l ot., p.l91. 
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transition, in last analysis -- _li !l2i "resolved" ,!!1 any 
systematic way, ~ chosen ~ be ll2 longer a problem. This 
is a fundamental assumption. 
Assumption VIII.--1This assumption may be phrased as 
follows: That which is simple ~ .~ likely .~ correspond 
~events beyond sensation .than ~which is complex. 
This view is widely held -- at least in practice 
in science. l1hat is its justification? If we have the 
choice between a simple and . a complex theory, fruitfulness 
and ease of operation conspire to urge us to choose the 
simpler one. Needless to say, simplicity is a psychologi-
cal criterion. It is of course always possible that one 
can find some empirical evidence that simple criteria are 
more likely to correspond to events than complex criteria. 
If so, s~plicity need no longer be used as a criterion, 
since we have used correspondence, a more direct and funda-
mental criterion. Furthermore, if this evidence exists --
and this point must not be belabored Russell's use of 
the simplicity criterion is based on his trust in induction. 
Induction in turn may be accepted on the basis of simplicity, 
and the circularity has reappeared. The author of the dis-
sertation believes that simplicity is a practical considera-
tion, extraneous to the system under discussion. I£ simpli-
city is justified in terms of workability and fruitfulness, 
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these are part of another system, which, in turn, is subject 
to the same requirements about postulates previously men-
tioned. Simplicity, as a guide to truth, is a chosen 
assumption. 
Assumption ~~-1This assumption may be phrased as 
follows& Induction .is ~valid method~ probable inference, 
not only within ~ phenomenal world itself, but ~ from 
the phenomenal world ~ ~ noumenal world. The relia-
bility of inference is felt to be the same in either case. 
In terms of Russell's system of empiricism, there is no way 
in which this view can be tested, hence it must be postulated. 
Any test is either one of two typesz it is an inductive 
extrapolation or a deductive inference. In the former case, 
we encounter the impossibility of justifying induction, and 
also beg the question; in the latter case we assume the 
validity of transcendent inference, which is begging the 
question. The success of Russell's theory is based on the 
reasonableness of this ninth assumption. As long as corres-
pondence is the definition of truth, there is no direct way 
of testing the truth of this view. 
Assumption !.:.:~-This assumption may be called 11~ 
transcendent validity ~ causation." Russell accepts the 
metaphysical ~ objective validity ££ the . causal theory 2f 
perception: a fundamental presupposition in his arguments 
------------------------------------------------~-------------------1~, p. 209-210. 
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for the existence of the external world. By metaphysical 
and objectivity here is meant that!! causal ,nexus binds not 
only phenomena w·ith phenomena, but also phenomena mh 
noumena ~ noumena ~ ~ other. This type of objectiv-
ity -- which is characteristic of the Cartesian school of 
rationalism -- is rejected by Hume and Kant. Hume denies 
~ three types of causal connection -- phenomena 1dth 
phenomena, phenomena with noumena, and noumena with noumena. 
Kant accepts the first through the synthetic a priori --
and rejects the second and third (phenomena with noumena, 
and noumena with noumena) because these imply the trans-
cendent use of reason, which use goes beyond the proper 
limits of reason. 
The law of causation has at least t11TO forms. In 
one form, it means that, as a general principle, every 
event is a sign to or occurs in correlation with another 
event l·rhich can be assig ned as cause and an event which can 
be assigned as effect. In the first form it may be termed 
simply the law of cause and effect or the lal'l of empirical 
correlations, and may be held jointly by empiricism and 
rationalism. In its other form the law signifies that, 
between any two events termed cause and effect, there i s a 
necessary connection. In this form -- held by rationalism 
alone -- it may be termed the law of necessary connection. 
The assumption involved here, that of the transcendent use 
causation, applies to both meanings of causation. Russell 
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is not specific as to whether the connections are real 
11 bonds 11 or mere conjunctions or correlations. I:f he means 
by causation "correlations," he must assume that correla-
tions corresponding to phenomena exist among noumena. If 
he means by causation "necessary connection," he postulates 
a metaphysical bond on non-empirical grounds. 
The refractoriness o:f perceptions is, for Russell, 
a reason to believe that events other than the perceptions 
themselves originate sensations. Russell assumes that 
differences in percepts imply differences in stimuli. The 
author o:f the dissertation contends that granting any meta-
physical objective status to the law o:f causation is already 
tantamount to granting the objective existence o~ an ex-
ternal world. T11TO reasons can be given for this connection. 
First, causation, being objective, is itsel:f a connection or 
a relation which is independent of perception; and second, 
causation points to that which is beyond perception, ~' 
to an external world. The notion of objective causation 
contains in it, analytically, the notion of an external 
world. The follo1dng quotation presents Russell 1 s position: 
It remains to say something about the inference ~rom 
percepts to events which no one perceives • • • ~ 
how much we can know about unperceived events, assuming 
the causal theory of' perception. It is sometimes urged 
that an unperceived cause of a perception must be a 
mere Ding-.ru:.-sich or Spencerian Unknowable. This seems 
to me only very partially true, if we accept the usual 
canons of scientific inference. We assume that differ-
ences in percepts imply differences in stimuli --~ 
if a person hears two sounds at once, or sees two 
colours at once, two physically different stimuli have 
reached his ear or his eye. This principle, together 
l'lith spatio-temporal continuity, suffices to give a 
great deal of' knowledge as to the structure of' stimuli. 
Their intrinsic characters, it is true, must remain 
unknown • • • 1'/h.at l'/e assume is, formally, something 
like this: there is a roughly one-one relation between 
stimulus and percept -- i.e. betl~een the events just 
outside the sense-organ and the event l'lhich we call a 
perception. 1 
This quotation shol~S that Russell tacitly assumes 
what has been attributed to him earlier in this assumption. 
On the basis of' this quotation we see that he assumes l1l ~ 
causal theory of' perception, ...l!.!l~ usual .canons .2.£ 
scientific inference, (iii) .~. dif'f'erences in percepts 
imply differences !a stimuli, ~ ~ stimuli .~ part ££ 
~ noumenal l'/Orld, hl spatio-temporal . continuity, .f!:Q.m ~ 
phenomenal 12 ~ noumenal world, Jx!l ~ one-one relation 
bet\'leen stimulus ~ percept, ~ (vii) that there ~ events 
11 just outside .~ sense-organ, 11 ~' !a ~ noumenal world. 
He ignores the fact that the history of' epistemology has con-
cerned itself' precisely with these problems, solutions to 
which he assumes rather than demonstrates. The issues with 
which he does deal may be scientifically significant, but 
they are epistemologically unimportant. Again, Russell 
chooses assumptions which will guarantee the existence of' an 
external l'/Orld. In last analysis, he chooses the belief' in 
the existence of' an external world. 
1 Bertrand Russell, ~ Analysis of' l<Iatter (Nel'l York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927), pp. 226-227. 
It seems to the author of the dissertation that 
Russell does not advance materially beyond the general 
position of the British Empiricist philosophers in his 
discussidn and attempted solution of the basic issues of 
the problem of the existence of the external world. 
Professor Bertocci 1 s comment in connection l'li th 
l 
these issues deals primarily with the refractoriness of 
perceptions. He l'lri tes that the argument from refractori-
ness 11 is more crucial than you seem to see, for without it 
there could be no reasoning to other bodies, other minds, 
and therefore to phenomenal objectivity, which leads to 
metaphysical objectivity (all of which are parts of a causal 
chain of reasoning)." The author of the dissertation quite 
agrees that refractoriness is the sine qua ~ of knowledge 
of the existence and nature of the external world. Yet this 
status -- which gives refractoriness its importance -- does 
not make it ~ (unless truth is defined in terms of what 
is important). On the grounds of Russell's correspondence 
theory of truth, there must be some evidence that refractory 
percepts are a sign to corresponding events beyond. Such 
evidence is ruled out a priori, since to test an immediate 
and intuitive approach to these events beyon~ this immediate 
and intuitive approach is a requisite. On some views of the 
coherence theory of truth, refractoriness is an acceptable 
principle to test the objectivity of sensations. Yet, as 
argued previously, coherence is no guarantee for even a 
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probability of correspondence. 
Assumption XI.--Another fundamental aspect of 
Russell's metaphysics, which is really an assumption, is 
the validity of the atomic interpretation ££ events. It 
can be argued that events are given empirically or on the 
basis of sensations as "continuous." Yet Russell finds it 
valid to express these events in terms of atomic and in-
divisible constituents: 
I think that almost everybody in th,2. philosophic t1Torld 
disagrees with me on this subject LatomismJ, but I am 
quite impenitent, because I never find arguments 
brought against my logical atomism.l 
TI1.e position taken here is that Russell may be "right" in 
his atomism-- or "wrong;" the question which remains is, 
on t..rhat basis is the belief in atomism justified. 
Bergson finds this atomic analysis of experience, 
and of' course especially toJ'hen applied to time, to be a 
fundamental error. rr.he error, according to Bergson, lies in 
the fact that t1That is disclosed to intuition is incorrectly 
2 
analyzed. One might, hot1Tever, simply maintain that 
Russell's interpretation of continuity in terms of' atomic 
events leads to certain consequences which are important to 
1 Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The R1.ilosophy of Ber-
trand Russell (Evanston: Northwestern University, 194~ 
P• 717 • 
2Henri Bergson, An Introduction !.£. Hetaphysics, 
trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950), 
p p . 24ff'. 
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him. These consequences are primarily the possibility to 
deal with perceptions in terms of mathematics and there-
fore science. 
"le can speak logically, then, only of having ~-
matic reasons for analyzing events into constituents which 
we have chosen to call 11 atomic," that is, which we have 
chosen to divide or analyze no further; we are not entitled 
to assert the position that some events are really atomic 
meaning by "really" here that no alternate analysis is 
possible. 
Assumption ~--1As discussed earlier -- and to be 
restated here Russell's belief in~ existence .££ unper-
ceived events as well as events perceived Ez. others --
is a postulated belief. 
Assumption XIII.--2Russell asserts that the scienti-
fic attitude is imperative.3 Russell does not write that 
the scientific attitude is the key to truth about the world 
in t h e sen se of correspondence; ~ chooses to accept ~ 
canons of scientific inference. The scientific method, by 
itself, does not guarantee its truth. The scientific method 
itself has to be accepted -- assented to -- or rejected. The 
1 cf., pp. 213-216. 
2 ~' p. 217. 
3Bertrand Russell, ~ Knowledge of the External World 
(New York: \lT. tv . Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), p . 21. 
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reasons adduced for accepting the canons of scientific 
inference are extra-scientific reasons. 
Russell explicitly admits that the canons of 
scientific inference are accepted on non-logical and non-
scientific, and even non-argumentative grounds; and yet, on 
the acceptance of these canons, the entire edifice of truth 
and reality, including science, must rest. Here is the 
relevant quotation, tal<:en from his "Reply to Criticism" 
in ~ Philosophy 2f Bertrand Russell: 
There are, in science, certain statements which are 
held to embody the results of observation, and certain 
others which are accepted as inferences from these 
results. The canons of scientific inference have never 
yet been formulated • • • If we are to hold that we 
know anything of the external world, we must accept 
the canons of scientific inference. Whether, when this 
conclusion has been reached, ~ individual decides .:£.2. 
accept £!:_ reject these canons, ll ~ purely personal 
affair, ~. susceptible to argument when once the issue 
has been made clear. I, as a human being, of course 
accept these canons, though as a professional logician 
I can play with the idea of rejecting one or tre other 
of them to see 1.;hat the consequ.ences would be. 
Litalics mini] 
It is significant to note that Russell here does not 
contend that he proves the validity of these canons, but that 
he chooses to accept them. As a matter of fact, he even 
states that the canons of scientific inference and ~th them 
our knowledge of an external world are a purely personal 
affair, ~ susceptible ~ arguments. By "arguments" here 
must be understood not merely logical-deductive processes 
lPaul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ~Philosophy of Ber-
trand Russell (Evanston: Northwestern University, 194~ 
PP• 718-719. 
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but any reasons whatsoever. The statement in the quotation 
"When once the issue has been made clear" re:fers to the con-
sequences and implications o:f the problem and its possible 
solutions. The dissertation contends that these consequences 
in turn imply values, and that values are chosen :freely. 
Although this passage does not represent the pre-
eminent tone o:f Russell's writings, the author o:f the dis-
sertation wishes to point out that Russell seems to agree 
quite substantially with the tenor and conclusion o:f this 
dissertation, at least in those moments during which he 
considers the problem o:f the ultimate justification o:f man's 
conception o:f truth and o:f reality. 
Assumption ~--Russell assumes that there is such 
a thing as a sensation, clearly de:fined and su:f:ficiently 
atomic or logically primitive so as not to require :further 
justification. Specifically, this means that Russell assumes 
the :following. Granted something is there, given empiri-
cally, which may subsequently be called a sensation. This 
empirical givenness in itsel:f cannot properly be called an 
assumption, 11 sheer givenness" is perhaps a better name. How-
ever, it ~ ~ assumption to state ~ ~ givenness ~ 
also given ~ ~ sensation .2.!: datum, ~ .!! speci:fied "something" 
which ~ di:f:ferentiated :from other events. This latter part 
o:f the assumption may be termed the logical or :formal ele-
ment in experience& that which classi:fies the given into 
individual sensations. Russell does not seem to admit that 
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sensations might well be viewed as highly sophisticated ab-
stractions embodying many prior principles of classification 
and analysis of the universe, such as the validity and im-
portance of the 11 ego--non-ego 11 distinction and the relation 
of language to being. 
~ further assumes by admitting of the possibility 
of unperceived events -- ih!i mental events, of which 
sensations are a sub-class -- ~ ~ clearlr distinguished 
~ non-mental events. To an idealist, like Berkeley, such 
a distinction is quite inconceivable. For Berkeley, an un-
perceived event -- which he calls 11material substance" --
is a contradiction. An unperceived event (or, more generally, 
a non-mental event) is merely another mental event, namely, 
a thought, a self-denying, contradictory thought. In the 
last analy~is, although mind is a construction for Russell 
( 11The 'stuff' of the world is neither mental nor material, but 
a 'neutral stuff,' out of which both are constructed111 ), he 
presupposes the existence of at least a mind-like thing 
distinct from other types of events. Otherwise sensations 
or perceptions would be empty terms. 
1Bertrand Russell, ~ Analrsis of ~ (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 6. 
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Conclusions 
These assumptions disclose that one of the most .funda-
mental difficulties with Russell's epistemology is his 
failure to make a clear-cut distinction between episte-
mology and science. He uses the law of induction and laws 
of inference -- all of l'll'hich are used in science -- in 
epistemology. He uses these very laws to show that it is as 
reasonable to believe in the objective existence of other 
minds and material objects as it is to believe in the 
repetition of our own subjective anticipated experiences. 
These laws are taken as equally valid when connecting 
phenomena with phenomena as when the connections enter the 
noumenal world. 
The fallacy here is in his failure to see clearly 
the relation between epistemology and science. It is the 
function of epistemology not to accept the canons of scien-
tific inference, but to examine them, analyze and justify 
them. Epistemology is the foundation of science; epistemolo-
gy is not coeval with science, or just a branch of science. 
Russell avoids fundamental epistemological questions, like 
justifying the law of induction and the other canons of 
scientific inference. The only times he writes something 
about these more fundamental points, he says that gua 
logician he can see no justifications. 
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These observations about Russell's writings corrobo-
rate the thesis here presented to the extent that Russell 
implicitly recognizes that there is no ultimate justification 
for metaphysical beliefs. He recognizes, at least qua 
logician, that metaphysical systems are chosen free1y. Yet 
these are certainly not the explicit views for which Russell 
is kno>m. 
CHAPTER III 
STACE'S MYSTICAL CONCEPTION OF VALUE, 
TRUTH, AND REALITY 
The present chapter seeks to analyze '"'hat is 
assumed and what is concurrently, albeit implicitly, assert-
ed when we affirm the validity of a metaphysics arrived at 
through the method of' mys.ticism. Stace is used here to 
represent mysticism. This choice is justif'ied because in 
his version of' mysticism we f'ind accounted f'or many of' the 
1 
naturalistic objections to mysticism, both as an experience 
and, especially, as a metaphysics or a theory of' reality. 
In def'ining value, reality, and truth a distinction 
must be made bet1"'een Stace' s explicit att .empts at def'inition 
-- 1..rhich are rare and the implicit meanings, l'lhether 
they appear to be his own or merely f'ollow f'rom his posi-
tion, regardless of' whether he states them or not. The task 
of def'ining value, truth, and reality, is f'ar from easy in 
this case, because Stace is concerned more with interrelat-
ing than with def'ining these terms. 
1The view of Stace as a naturalist in ~ and Eternity 
is based primarily on this statement: "For I do not in this 
book retract naturalism by_a jot or a tittle. On the contrary, 
I reaff'irm it in toto. 11 LWalter T. Stace, Time and Eternity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932T; P• vi~ This 
is not to say that Stace' s total vie1., is incorporated in this 
quotation. It ignores, among others, his phenomenalism and 
quasi-Leibnizian position in ~ Nature of' Reality . 
2.5:3 
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The method of the chapter is the follo1~ing: first, 
Stace's conception of a metaphysics of mysticism must be 
isolated and clarified. Second, the meaning of value, and 
of truth and reality must be abstracted from the above pic-
ture of mysticism. Third, the interrelations of value, 
2.5.5 
truth, and reality must be established and analyzed, in 
view of the analyses of value, truth, and reality under-
taken in the previous chapter. 
In discussing the mystical world view, a prelim-
inary distinction is of major importance. On the one hand, 
mysticism refers to a mystical, religious, or numinous 
experience, and, on the other hand, to an interpretation 
of this experience, to an inferred structure, or to the 
systematization of all experience "'ili th the relig ious or 
mystical experience as the focal point. This distinction 
may be said to be one between mysticism as experience and 
mysticism as metaphysics or theory 2f realit~. Since one 
of the characteristics of mysticism as experience is com-
plate unity, the question after the meaning of value, truth, 
and reality -- which is a search for differentiations 
meets with unique difficulties. It can be expected, there-
fore, that the most fruitful analysis of value, truth, and 
reality is to be found in mysticism as metaphysics. 
The distinction here alluded to must supplement a 
similar but not identical one which Stace draws between 
"pure religious mystics, -- such men as Eckhart, Tauler, 
St. John of the Cross, the authors of the Upanishads, --
1 
and philosophers such as Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley." The 
1Walter T. Stace, Time ~ Eternity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19.52), pp. 1.57-1.58. 
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"pure religious mystics" are conscious of' mysticism as 
exp erience, and also possess a relatively inarticulate 
mystical metaphysics or theory of' reality -- more 
appropriately called a Weltanschauung -- since they are 
rational human beings living also in the ,,.orld of' ordinary, 
non-mystical, experience. Philosophers such as Spinoza are 
influenced only unconsciously by the mystical experience 
("the mystical inf'lux ••• inf'luences his mind secretly 11 ) 1 
and yet have developed a thoroughly articulate(mystical) 
metaphysics. In the attempt to discharg e the task of' this 
chap ter, which is to develop a description of' the mystical 
world-picture, all these various levels of' experiential and 
metaphysical sophistication must be taken into account. 
These levels are three: mysticism as experience, as Wel~­
anschauung (relatively inarticulate and unsystematic world-
view), and as metaphysics (thoroughly articulate and sys-
tematic world-view or synoptic world-picture). 
iYhat is Stace 1 s view of mysticism as experience? 
1 Ibid.' p. 161. 
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Mysticism as Experience 
The following discussion is an exposition and an 
analysis of Stace's phenomenological description of the 
mystical experience. The description of the mystical 
experience, as developed by Stace, is divided here by the 
author of the dissertation into three groups corresponding 
roughly to a value-, truth-, and reality-experience. That 
is to say, the methodology at present requires first to 
classify all statements Stace makes in relation to mysti-
cism into experiential and metaphysical statements (the 
latter include mysticism as lvel tanschauung), and then to 
classify his experiential statements into the three loose 
rubrics of value, truth, and reality. It is hoped that by 
pursuing this method it will be possible to abstract what 
Stace does mean or must mean by value, truth, and reality, 
in the context of mysticism. 
\fuen we discuss the mystical experience as composed 
of a truth-, reality-, and value-experience, this is what 
is meant: The mystical experience is an experience not 
subject to ordinary types of descriptions • . In order to pin-
point the subject-matter for discussion, however, we avail 
ourselves of a phenomenological type of description based 
on symbolism and analogy. What we really wish to analyze 
is the extent to which the terms truth, value, and reality 
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which are terms derived from the ordinary modes of con-
sciousness -- are analogically or symbolically applicable 
to the experiential content of the mystical experience. 
In order to achieve this goal we will distinguish three 
modes -- described in terms of phenomenological analogies 
of the mystical experience: one mode, or one aspect, per-
spective, or element of the mystical experience is its ex-
perience as a truth, another, its experience as a value, 
and a third, its experience as reality. 
r.Iysticism ~ value-experience. --First of all, the 
mystical experience as value-experience is the postulation 
of a goal, an ideal the ideal of the holy. Here 11 value 11 
is synonymous with "summum bonum." This goal is one of 
transcendence. It is unspecified because it is unknown to 
ordinary experience. The ideal is the quest for something 
"more." 11 Religion is the hunger of the soul for the im-
possible, the unattainable, the inconceivable ••• Mad or 
not, this impulse lies deep do"tm in every human h eart. 111 
The quest for something 11 more 11 is at the root of all genu-
ine relig ion, because 
religion is the desire to break away from being and 
e x istence altogether, to get beyond existence into that 
nothingness where the great light is • • • To be is to 
be tied to what you are. R~ligion is the hunger for 
the non-being which yet is. 
1 Ibido' P• lJ.. 
2Ibid., P• .5. 
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Religion is that hunger which no existence, past, 
present, or :future., no actual existence and no 
possible existence, in this world or in any other 
world, on the earth or above the clouds and stars, 1 material or menta1 or spiritual, can ever satisfy. 
The area of ordinary experience which comes closest, 
perhaps, to this unique value-experience of something 11 more 11 
is art. 11 In music sometimes a man will feel that he comes 
to the edge o:f breaking out from the prison bars of exist-
ence, breaking out :from the universe a1together." 2 
An analysis of many supreme goals of life indicates 
one outstanding and pervasive characteristic, namely, that 
they represent a quest :for something "more," the attempt 
to elevate man's present state of being into something 
else, something more, to 11 creatett a higher state o:f mind 
and being. An analogical understanding of the mystical 
metaphysics can be approached through romanticism's concept 
o:f the beautiful soul. Also, Michaelangelo and DaVinci 
during the Renaissance, as well as Goethe during the Roman-
tic period, exemplified an ethics which holds it obligatory 
:for man to develop his cauac.ities to the :fullest. Nietzsche 
said that man must surpass himself. Man must create himself 
into a higher being, a being intellectually far superior to 
his present state and emotionally :far more capable than he 
is in his present relatively arid condition. During the 
romantic period this view came into full prominence. Through 
1 
Ibid., P• 6. 
2 Ibid., P• .5· 
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poetry, painting, and music, man had to create himself 
into something which he is not in his ordinary existence. 
Ordinary li:fe was called "meaningless." Man wants to be 
something 11 more." What man strives :for can only be termed 
"more" because it is not found among the existing things; 
it has to be created. 
The Renaissance or Romantic conception of the 
"beautiful soul," of man's quest for his summum .bonum being 
his quest for a higher, self-created, state of being, some-
thing "more," is often termed the ethics of self-realiza-
tion. If man realizes or develops his potentialities to 
the fullest he is engaged in a limited creative process. 
He creates something new, it is true, but his creation is 
newness with limitation; his creation already had being in 
potency before it came into actuality. 
The problem this discussion of creativity is meant 
to introduce is the following: Is Stace 1 s definition of 
religion as man's quest for something'more" the same as, 
related to, or different from the Renaissance-Romantic 
conception of the beautiful soul and the ideal of genius? 
There is a :fundamental dif:ference. Inasmuch as the 11 beauti-
ful soul" and like concepts are interpreted as being instances 
of self-realization they differ from the mystical experi-
ence -- although the concept of the beautiful soul comes 
closer to mysticism than any other "worldly" activity. The 
attainment of the state of religious experience must be 
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interpreted. as the true creation o~ a genuinely new state 
o~ being. The mystical demand ~or something "more" 
as the essence o~ mysticism and as coming ~rom man's 
innermost being -- cannot be construed to be an instance o~ 
romantic sel~-realization but must be viewed as the creation 
o~ a state o~ mind totally new. The religious demand is a 
demand for transcendence, not sel~-realization. 
The mystical experience is the standard o~ all 
values; it is the absolute from which other values derive 
their existence and validity. The perception o~ the mysti-
cal experience as value-experience is the source o~ what 
under the reality-experience is re~erred to as acosmism. 
"The eternal moment is experienced as the supreme value • 
This supreme value o~ God is contrasted by the mystic with 
1 
the worthlessness o~ the world." 
The mystical experience as value-experience em-
bodies all those emotional or psychic states which are both 
valuable and attributed to God. Value is cognized (in-
tuitively) in the mystical experience. Intuition must 
therefore be discussed both under the present heading as 
well as under the heading of mysticism as truth-experience. 
For Stace, 
the natural order ~ devoid o~ values. Taken by 
itsel~, there is no one thing in the natural order 
that is better than any other thing, except in the 
1 Ibid., P• 125. 
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1 sense of being more pleasing to human beings. 
The proposition "the natural order is devoid of 
values" is true only from a naturalistic perspective, not 
from the perspective of the divine order. Stace rightly 
perceives that "to find the scale of values ••• "t1Te have 
to look to the divine order, that is to say, to the eter-
nal moment as viewed from within. 112 This statement may 
"t1Tell be interpreted to mean that 11 value 11 has no meaning in 
the natural order, whereas in the divine order, value is 
the fundamental characteristic or apprehension. 
In the mystic experience we find the absolute apex 
of value: 
We have 
'tve find 
values, 
supreme 
to look to the experiences of the mystic 
therein, not indeed the entire scale of 
but only its highest term, its apex, its 
value.J 
. . 
Stace finds in the religious experience the aware-
ness of what has absolute value. The religious experience 
is of one 11 kind 11 only, and it is self-evidently man's high-
est good. The mystical experience carries with it -- as 
intrinsic component --the stamp of man's summum bonum. All 
other goods are to be measured in terms of their proximity 
to this supreme g ood. 11Thus the highest point, the apex, 
of the scale of values i~ fixed. 
libid., PP• 102-lOJ. 
2 Ibid., P• lOJ. 
3Ibid. 
Its justification is in 
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1 
direct experience. 11 This is an exegesis o:f Stace's view. 
It is intuitively true that things giving us value 
are closer to the religious experience than those giving 
us disvalue; therefore terms designating supreme value or 
happiness are most adequate as symbols :for the mystical 
experience qua value-experience. 
These words, love, bliss, peace, calm ••• are taken 
:from the ordinary vocabulary o:f natural modes o:f 
happiness. But we must suppose that they are the most 
adequate o:f all ethical symbols, and this must mean that 
they are 11 nearer 11 to the divine nature than any other 
symbols would be. 2 
One o:f the thorniest problems o:f ethics is to dis-
cover a criterion which justifiably allows us to distinguish 
higher :from lo't..rer values. Even a supposedly quantitative 
hedonist and utilitarian such as John Stuart I~fill intro-
duced qualitative pleasure differentiations. On what basis 
are we to decide or justi:fy which pleasures are higher and 
1.rhich lower? "Every student o:f philosophy knows that the 
problem o:f how this conception o:f higher and lower pleasures 
is to be explained or justified is :fraught 11ith di:f:ficulty. 11 3 
The :follo1nng is Stace's solution. First, qualita-
tive pleasure differentiations are intuitions, not the 
result o:f reasoning. 4 Second, disagreement as to which 
1
rbi..£:.., p. 104. 
2 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
3rbid., p. 106. 
4 Ibid. 
pleasures are highest is minimal. "It is an intuition 
universal, or nearly universal, among civilized races; 
it is not the idiosyncracy of some regional culture."1 
(Stace must be careful not to define "civilized race 11 
solely in terms of its agreeing with us on the superiority 
of certain pleasures; it is easy to beg the question.) 
In the third place, the reason that the problem of a criter-
ion of pleasure has remained unsolved as long as it has is 
due to man 1 s searching for an answer in the wrong order. 
As seen, the correct answer must be found in the divine or-
der: 
The fact that it has puzzled philosophers for two 
thousand years, has presented to them in fact a knot 
which they have not been able to untie, is due to their 
having looked for a solution of the problem always 
and only in the natural order; whereas it can be under-
stood only as an influx of the divine order into the 
natural order, an effect of the eternal moment upon 
history and the moments of time.2 
In summary it may be said that if lte "torish to char-
acterize mysticism, 1ore must begin by stating that mysticism 
is an experience of value and can be described as the 
experience of a sununum bonum, which transcends ordinary 
experiences, and which is consequently unspecified. The 
mystical experience is experienced as man's unquestioned 
summun1 bonum. ~ihether this summum bonum is one value or a 
system of values depends on the individual mystical experi-
1 Ibid. 
2lli..£1.:.. 
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ence involved. As a rule, the experience is unitary and 
not systematic, hence it represents ~ value. 
Mysticism~ truth-experience.--A large number of' 
what for Stace are characteristics of' the mystical experi-
ence can be classified as representing a kind of' truth-
experience, or representing that mode of' the mystical experi-
ence called truth-experience. The mystical experience 
possesses a compelling note and exercises a strong claim 
on man's belief's. As will also be discussed in the next 
section, the mystical experience as truth-experience repre-
sents a supreme unity, loihich may be interpreted as a supreme 
experience of' coherence. The mystical experience also is 
an intuition, vrl~ich points to Stace 1 s use of' intuition as a 
criterion of' truth. 
The inef'f'ab~, the mysterious, and the extra-logical 
are, of' course, additional and fundamental characteristics 
of' the mystical experience. \Vhy should a discussion of' 
ineffability be included under the mystical experience as 
truth-experience? The answer is that ineffability points 
to the distinctive kind of' truth that the mystical experi-
ence embodies. The author faced the choice of' placing 
ineffability under value, truth, or reality. Since in-
effability is a ,,ray of' knowing, or perhaps of' .!:!2E.-know·ing, 
and since kno'\.,rledge is perhaps more closely linked with 
truth than ,;rith value or reality, it seems plausible to 
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discuss the experience of ineffability as a form of the 
truth-experience mode of the mystical experience. 
Unit~ is an outstanding element of the mystical 
experience. The quest for understanding and :for truth is 
a quest for synopsis, coherence, unity. Love, as sho1m in 
Plato's §ymposiu~, designates a variety of unions and 
instances of unity; the subject-object fusion characteris-
tic of the religious experience is also an ultimate unity. 
The meaning of truth as applied to God or to the 
mystical experience may also be elucidated by an exploration 
of artistic truth: 
It is often maintained that art possesses a kind of 
truth, and even t;hat it is a form of kno1'11'ledge. But 
this truth and this knowledge cannot be of a propo-
sitional kind. 1 
The study of the non-propositional truth of art may throw 
light on the equally non-propositional truth about God. 
All art is some form o:f 11 shock." 2 Artistic truth 
is a sudden "thereness," a sudden presentation of' something. 
According to Stace, art :freezes a moment o:f time -- much in 
the manner o:f Schopenhauer's conception of art as the 
vision of the Platonic Idea. In this frozen moment of' time, 
standing forever still, we see "an image and symbol of' 
eternity. Time has become timeless. 113 Such an insight or 
1 Ibid., p. 117. 
2 Ibid., P• 119. 
Jibid. 
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perception of truth is a revelation. It "consists in the 
sudden and unexpected exposure to light of elements normally 
buried in the subconscious darkness." 1 Truth is unmediated, 
intuited, non-discursive. 
Truth also "means the sense or feeling of revela-
2 tion. 11 1Vhen w·e say God is truth we must be understood as 
to be saying that we know of God through a revelation. 
tfuat a religious insight reveals is God, not a proposition 
about God. "And that God is the Truth means that He is the 
content of revelation. 11 3 
What basis is there for finding 11 truth 11 !!.!! adequate 
symbol !2£ God? Stace 1 s answer is that one of the funda-
mental characteristics of the religious experience is that 
there is in the moment of mystic illumination an 
utterly irresistible sense or feeling of conviction. 
This • • • is the most powerful, compelling, coercive, 
overwhel~ing, experience of which the human mind is 
capable. 
Stace is resorting here to phenomenological description. He 
is saying that the religious experience is best character-
ized by the phenomenon of conviction, which, of course, is 
part of the natural order. But an instance of 11 being con-
vinced 11 is, according to religious insight, closer to the 
1 Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 143. 
3Ibid., P• 120. 
4 Ibid • . 
268 
state of religious experience than many other states, 
including the lack of conviction. To call God truth is, 
therefore, an adequate symbolism, because the state of 
conviction is an adequate symbol of the mystical. 
The truth-experience of the mystical experience is 
a strong sense of conviction, without .~ object. Stace 
gives a description of the content of consciousness in the 
truth moment of the mystical experience: 
There is nothing of which the soul is convinced 
except the conviction itself • • • Nevertheless 
there is the overwhelming sense of conviction. Now in 
the ordinary natural world, l~~at one is convinced of 
is ah..rays a truth, or a proposition believed to be 
true; and l'll'hat cannot be denied is also a truth. That 
the mystic should use the word truth to efpress his 
conviction is therefore entirely natural. 
The mystical experience as truth-exper~ence is 
beyond consistency ~ contradiction. It is neitherlogical 
~ illogical; it is a mystery& 
The final secret of the world refuses to yield itself 
up to a mind whose principle is the logical law of 
contradiction; so that when suoh a mind attempts to 
understand it, contradictions result. According to 
this view, the m~stery of God is essential, absolute, 
and irremovable. 
For such a statement as the foregoing to be meaning-
ful it is necessary to assume that the ego or self is capable 
of l..rhat may be called an extra-intellectual function. Lan-
guage is more than logic. 1~~en we use language to discuss 
matters transcending logic (as Stace does when he deals 
1 Ibid., P• 121. 
2Ibid., p. 1.54. 
with mysticism) we implicitly admit that language is non-
logical or supra-logical. Intuition is the name for the 
non-intellectual activity. It is meaningful to ~ntuit 
that which logic and concepts cannot express. Yet Stace 
does not disparage logic. "Both mysticism and logic have 
paramount claims on the human mind. 111 
Stace insists that the mystical experience is truth 
by intuition. The mystical experience is termed by Stace 
not a sensation or an emotion, but something slli generis, 
a slli generis intuition. A religion whose pillars are not 
religious or mystical experiences is no religion at all. 
Conceiving of an after-life in terms of a state of 
euphoria, for instance, is a basic misunderstanding of the 
relig ious point of view: 
It is true that simple-minded religious men have 
conceived their goal as a state of' continued exist-
ence beyond the grave filled with all happy things 
and experiences. But plainly such happy things and 
experiences "'..;ere no more than symbolic, and the 
happy heavens containing such things have the 
character of' myth.2 
As Stace points out, "all attempts to make religion 
a purely rational, logical thing are not only shallow, but 
t~ould, if they could succeed, destroy religion. Either 
.... 
God is a Hystery or He is nothing at all."..:> 
Stace terms 11 intellect 11 the process of' understanding 
1 165. Ibid., p. 
2 r ·d 0~ • ' P• 6. 
'> 8 . ..Jibid., p. 
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objects by means of concepts. Intuition, on the other hand, 
11 is the name given to the apprehension of the divine in 
mystical exp erience. 111 
The mystical experience is ineffable, a fact 'l~hich 
is referred to in terms of the via negativa or the negative 
divine. (Strictly speaking , however, Stace rejects the 
ineffability of the religious experience.) 2 Following is 
a brief discussion of ineffability. Ineffability means 
that the mystical experience is incommunicable, that is, 
words are basically inadequate either to express or even 
partially to communicate the content of a religious experi-
ence. Stace calls this state of affairs the Negative 
Divine. 11 God is Non-Being, Nothing, Emptiness, the Void, 
the Abyss • • • God is the great silence, the g reat dark-
ness.11.3 
Stace contends that when God is referred to as 
incomprehensible or as a mystery, the Negative Divine is 
involved. This path to God has become famous under the name 
of the ~ negati~ or Negative Theology. Meister Eckhart, 
Tauler, Dionysius the Areopagite, the Upanishads, the 
Kabbalists, and Shankara, all speak of the ~ negativa, the 
ineffability of the mystical experience. Rationally, the 
1 Ibid.' p. 41. 
2Ibid., P• J6. 
3Ibid., P• 9· 
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~ negativa is the attempt to characterize God by the 
e x clusion of attributeS.. By such a process of' "shedding ," 
the 11 Wholly Other" character of the mystical experience is 
emphasized. No attribute :for t-.rhich there is a referent in 
t h e naturalistic world is a true attribute of God. It is 
because of this stripping of attributes. that the Negative 
Divine feels justified in calling God Non-Being. In the 
strictest sense, God is not Non-Being . If it is assumed 
that a "thing" is the sum of its qualities (a point that 
has been debated throughout the history of ideas), then 
removal of all qualities yields total nothingness or non-
being . 11 A qualityless being is non-being ."l According to 
Stace, the g reat ridd le of the religious consciousness is 
hot'/ God can be both Being and Non-Being . 2 
The f ollotving is a solution to the paradox of the 
Ne gative Divine. Stace points out that both Meister Eck-
hart and Shankara come to the same conclusion regarding the 
solution of the paradox of the f'act that Go d is both Being 
and Non-Be ing. 3 This surprising cong ruence is no accid ent 
but true empirical eviden ce that mysticism, East or West, 
p roceeds from the same l~ind of experience. The tt.;o conclu-
sions were arrived at in complete indep endence from one 
another. Eckhart disting uishes between QQ.li and Gottheit; 
1 Ibid.' P• 13. 
2 Ibid ., P • 14. 
3~_!. ' P• 1.5. 
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Shankara distinguishes a higher and a lower Brahman. God 
and the low·er Bral:unan have the usual characters attributed 
to God: love, righteousness, and pol..rer. The Godhead and 
the higher Brahman are void, empty, the nameless Nothing ; 
1 the void Godhead is the ultimate ground of' the l..rorld. 
"The Ultimate is Nothingness" and "there is no such 
thing as the Ultimate" are propositions logically equivalent 
but religiously profoundly dif'ferent. 2 For the relig ious 
sense the first proposition is an attempt to utter the 
unutterable, the religious or mystical experience, by means 
of' the ~ negativa. The second proposition is a denial of 
relig ion as such. 
The Negative Divine extends its shadows even to the 
concept of' existence. 11 For to say that a thing exists means 
ordinarily that it forms part of that single system of' inter-
related experiences which "t>~e call the natural order. uJ 
Furthermore, the proposition 11 God is .25,11 is false, 
according to Stace, for all values of .2£• "God is good" is 
false, because 11 good11 is a l-rord having referents l.;ithin the 
ordinary experience, and "good" has meaning only inasmuch 
as it points to these referents within the ordinary experi-
ence. 
1 Ibid • .. 
2 Ibid., P• 20 
J-b"d 
.L ~ • ' p. Jl!- • 
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The ineffability and infinity of God is most often 
expressed in terms of paradoxes. That is to say, not that 
God is unknown to us yet kno1vn to the mystics, but that 
He is the greatest paradox of all, that He is the weighti-
est of all mysteries to the mystic himself. 
Stace does not believe in the strict interpretation 
of ineffability, symbolism notwithstanding. 
I believe that this theory of mystic ineffability, 
although it may be very widely held, is false, and 
that so long as it is1held no real understand ing of religion is possible. 
His reasons are rooted in the very nature of symbolism: 
Unless the symbol is to be mere n1etaphor, there must 
be, directly present to the mind the actual nature of 
the Godhead symbolized as well as the symbol itself. 
It means that God himself must be in some way direc tly 
apprehended, and not merely indirectly through the 
symbol • • • There must be some direct vision, other-
wise the symbolism will be empty verbiage.2 
If ineffable means non-intuitable, no doubt Stace 
is right in rejecting the doctrine o£ the ineffability of 
the mystical experience. However, ineffability may well be 
used to mean non-intellectualization or non-conceptuali-
zation, in which case Stace can have no quarrel with the 
view of the ineffability of the mystical experience. 
To say the mystical experience is strictly 
ineffable should mean more than merely complete lack of 
1 Ibid., p. J6. 
2Ibid., P• 65. 
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understanding. God is a mystery, and lllhen we assert that 
God cannot be known we do a't'ITay with the basic mysterious-
ness of God. God, if his mysteriousness is to be interpret-
ed as meaning that liTe do not know "t'IThat He is, would be quite 
clear to the mystic. Yet the overwhelming and fundamental 
fact is that 11 it is the mystic himself who finds his vision 
ineffable and .unutterable."1 The mystic vision itself does 
not clarify anything, but rather confirms the mystery of 
God. God is more truly mysterious to a mystic than to an 
ordinary imii vidual. The religious or mystical experi-
ence does not dissipate the mysteriousness of it. 2 
The reason that God or the mystical experience may 
truly be said to be ineffable or incomprehensible is that 
intellect cannot deal ldth it. Conceptualizing the mysti-
cal experience is impossible. Conceptualization consists 
of abstractions, and of generalizations, activities quite 
f oreig n to the mystical experience. In a very broad sense 
the mystical experience is quite understandable; it can be 
intuited with pristine clarity. 11That l'lhich is inherently 
incapable of being apprehended by concepts is inherently 
incomprehensible." 3 Specifically, one of the most :funda-
mental dif:ferences between the tl'!TO realms is that the 
1 Ibid.' P• 39· 
2Ib~, P• 37· 
3 Ibid., P• 40. 
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naturalistic one involves a subject-object opposition, 
whereas the mystic ~ does away ~ ~ ~ distinction. 
The subject-object distinction, discussed earlier, 
is at the root of conceptualization. With the elimination 
of that distinction, intellectualization of the mystical 
experience becomes ipso facto impossible: 
In God's self-knowledge there cannot be that separa-
tion of subject and object, that separation of this 
thing from that thing, which is the ineradicable mark 
of conceptual apprehension. At least His self-know·-
ledge cannot be less than that knowing by being, that 
identity of subject and objeot, of this and that, of 
manyness and oneness, which is called intuition. 
Indeed this is l1That God 1 s Oneness means. 
Although mysticism has a metaphysics or a theology, 
some reject the intellectualizing theology in favor of 
complete absorption in the mystical experience. Truth is 
achieved through the experience alone. Buddhism is kno"t.;n for 
the Buddha's rejection of metaphysics. According to the 
Buddha, metaphysics is an intellectual game, a pastime, a 
waste of time. The path to God is dir.ect and strictly non-
rational. Believing that metaphysical systems about God 
lvill help man reach God is a misguided illusion from which 
man must be rescued. 
Theories save no one, damn no one. There lies before 
the religious aspirant that supreme goal, that unutter-
able mystic elevation, that final blessedness, which is 
called Nirvana in J3uddhism, Heaven or God in Christi-
anity. To reach it is the only end. The means of 
reaching it can be stated and explained. They may be 
1 Ibid., P• 4;5. 
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through prayer, :fasting, concentration, meditation, 
:faith, good works, or 1-1hat not. But ~ the goal is 
:for theory, 1-1hat can be known or said about it, h01-1 it 
can be rationalized, whether it is subjective or ob-
jective, whether it can be made to yield an intellectual 
explanation o:f the origin o:f the world -- all this is 
o:f no account :for the religious man ~ ~.1 
In summary, the mystical experience as truth-experi-
ence is ine:f:fable, extralo;g-ical, (on these are based assump-
tions IV and V), a mystery; all attributes are :false, un-
true in the sense that the referents o:f these attributes are 
symbols, are analogues o:f the genuine experience they pur-
port to represent. The mystical experience is unitary, 
abandons the subject-object bifurcation, is intuited, 
extra-ratiocinative, unmediated, non-discursive; the mystical 
experience as truth-experience is a revelation, a ~ 
viction without object. Truth is also a symbol :for God 
because o:f the phenomenologically described element or mode 
o:f conviction. This "truth" is expressed or view·ed in 
terms o:f paradoxes. Finally, this truth is seen as elimi-
nating the basic e.gcr.-non-ego dualism inherent in all so-
called ordinary experience or ordinary consciousness. We 
must note, how·ever, that this ego-non-eg o :fusion is more 
part o:f the reality-mode than the truth-mode o:f the mystical 
experience. 
1 Ibid., P• 22 • 
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:!<Iysticism ~ reality-experience. --We have seen 
Stace 1 s description of' the mystical experience Ul"lder •~hat 
the author of this dissertation has called its value- and 
also its truth-mode. N'ol-r let us examine the reality-mode 
of that supreme experience. 
The distinction bet1~een that part of the mystical 
experience which has reference to reality on the one hand, 
and a systematic metaphysical superstructure such as is 
to be discussed under the head of " Mysticism as Metaphysics" 
on the other, cannot be drawn •'li th precision. An in-
exact differentiation, however, is not undesirable because 
the goal is a clarification about values, truth, and reality, 
not about the distinction between experience and meta-
physics. If this clarification can be obtained through the 
inexact differentiation between mysticism as reality-
experience and mysticism as reality-inference (or mysticism 
as metaphysical reality), the distinction is justified, 
pragmatically. 
TI"le mystical experience as reality-experience per-
ceives the i:vorld ~~moral, spiritual order, as opposed to 
the content of "ordinary experience." Naturalism is a meta-
physics, a lvorld-viel.,, a 1'/eltanschauung which envisions the 
world as "completely governed by blind natural :forces and 
laws, which are wholly indifferent to moral and spiritual 
ideals. 111 That is to say, for science, natural la,.,s are 
1 Ibid., v. 
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not prescriptive, as are the law·s in jurisprudence, but 
descriptive. The mystical or non-naturalistic view en-
visions the 11orld 11 as a moral and divine order, governed 
by spiritual :force~." 1 Here, "governed" (by lal'lS) has 
prescriptive as well as descriptive reference. The governing 
spirit introduces values and "oughtness 11 or obligation into 
the structure o:f the universe. 
Being, personality, ~' power, ~ bliss are 
:further objective referents o:f the religious experience. 
In discussing the ~ negativa, or the Negative Divine, the 
most common property o:f God is that He is Non-Being. There 
are, ho,,ever, also many positive elements in the mystical 
experience which point to a vision o:f reality. Stace calls 
these positive elements the Positive Divine. 11The most 
general characterization o:f the positive divine is that God 
is Being. 112 Characteristically God is conceived to be 
"a spirit, a mind, a person. 11 3 "His most outstanding posi-
tive characteristic in Christianity is love, in Islam power, 
. J d . . ht ' Hi d ' bl' 114 Th t' 1 111 u a1sm r1g eousness, 1n n u1sm 1ss. e mys 1ca 
reality-experience has :further qualities: 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., P• .50. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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In spite o:f the concept.ion o:f the negative divine, 
there ~ such positive characterizations. For all 
these words -- spirit, mind., person, righteousness, 
truth, beauty, knowledge, power, love, pity, peace, 
blessedness are the names o:f attributes or 
qua1ities. 1 
O:f course, it is di:f:ficult to distinguish these 
so-called modes o:f the mystical experience as reality-
experience :from these same as modes o:f value-experience. 
Since Stace is an epistemological monist when values are 
objectified or 11 discovered11 -- as they are, sometimes, in 
the mystical experience -- they are both values and com-
ponents o:f reality. These value modes, therefore, may be 
said to participate equally in the mode o:f value-experi-
ence and that o:f reality-experience, since values then be-
come a part o:f reality. 
Another characteristic o:f the mystical experience 
as reality-experience is that the distinction between sub-
ject ~object d;i.sappeau. 2 
Thus it is of' the very nature o:f the intellect to 
involve the subject-object opposition. But in the 
mystic experience this opposition is transcended. 
Therefore the intellect is incapable o:f understanqing 
it. Therefore it is incomprehensible, ine:f:fable.-
Tl~e subject-object unity is universalized in the mystical 
experience. Oneness is a :foremost characteristic o:f the 
1 Ibid.' p. .51. 
2,!_~, p. 21. 
Jibid.' p. 40. 
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mystical experience l17'hich gives an experience of reality 
at the same time. 
In God's self-knowledge there cannot be that separation 
of subject and object, that separation of this thing 
from that thing, which is the ineradicable mark of 
conceptual apprehension. At least His self-kno'tdedge 
cannot be less than that knol'ving by being, that identity 
of subject and object, of this and that, of manyness 
and oneness, 111hich is cal:J:ed intuition. Indeed this is 
what God's oneness means. 
Likewise, 
~ an experience we ordinarily mean something lrl~ich 
is before the mind or present to it. This involves 
a distinction between the mind and its experience or 
object • But the mystic experience is not of this 
kind • It is • • indivisible unity.2 
Nonism and monotheism are the articulate, metaphysical 
results of this mystical intuition. 
Unity, just as value, is an adequate symbol for 
both the mode of truth-experience and the mode of reality-
experience. The reason for this is that to the extent that 
the e xistence of the symbolism of unity is an epistemolog i-
cal issue, it involves conceptions of kno11Tledge and of the 
nature of truth. T o the extent that unity represents a 
vision of the ultimate nature of things it is a mode of the 
mystical experience as reality-experience. The overlapping 
here is not far removed from the many common issues facing 
epistemology and metaphysics, as treated in the history o f 
philosophy. 
1 Ibid., P• 1.:-.5. 
2 I' 'd OJ. • ' pp. 70-71. 
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In his Religion ~ the Modern ~' Stace a g ain 
points to oneness as one of the characteristics of the 
mystical experience. 11The essential character of this 
supreme vision • • • is that in it all discrimination, 
diff erence, multiplicity, are transcended. 111 And a g ain, 
in the mystical experience 111 all is one, 1 t h ere is no dis-
tinction of the seer from the seen (the distinction of sub-
ject from object) nor any distinction of any one thing from 
any other, no division or separation or discrimination . 112 
The mystical experience in its mode as reality-
experience also p oints to something infinite. The e x -
pression that God is infinite can be interpreted in terms 
of the Negative Divine. I n f inity is a 11 negative 11 concept; 
it means the absence of limitations, and limitations often 
mean determi nations. 
The relig ious infinite, or in other words the infinity 
of God, means ~ ~ which there .:!:..§. !lQ. oth er. In 
this sense n either space nor time could be infinite, 
since spac.e is an~"other 11 to time, and time is an 
11 other 11 to space. --' . . 
The assertion that "the finite mind of man cannot 
. 4 
understand the infinity of God 11 mean s simply t hat the 
11valter T. Stace, Religion and ~ Nodern It!ind ( New 
York : J. B . Lipp incott Co., 1952), P• 237. 
2Ibid., p. 23 2. 
31'/alter T . Stace, ~and Eternity ( Princeton: 
Prin ceton University Press, 1952T; p. 47. 
4 Ibid., p . 1~8 . 
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delimiting, determining (by intersecting universals), 
finite intellect cannot g rope w·ith the relig ious experien ce; 
but intuition can. An infinite mind is not a larg e mind 
1 but an intuitively operating mind. 
Infinity refers to that "t~hich has nothing beyond it. 
The Ultimate ••• can have nothing outside it •• 
Therefore the 't'll'Orld is the Absolute • • • The 't·Torld 
is the arena of manyness, division and relation. 
Therefore it is n£i the Absolute.2 
The mystic illumination is infinite in itself because 
there is nothing outside it, because there is 1-rithin 
it no this or that, no limiting otherness.3 
Stace says that the object of the mystical experi-
e n ce or the reality disclosed therein has 
the character of infinity in the sense that there is 
nothing outside it to bound it, for in the vision in 
which all is one there cannot be any other to form a 
boundary. This infinity of the vision is the source 
of all myths about the infinite wisdom, pOliTer, and 
know·ledge of God. 
Another characteristic of reality disclosed by the 
mystical experience as reality-experience is that consist-
ency ~ contradiction 2£ gQi ~ any relevant application 
i£ the nature of~ real. This sidestepping of logic is a 
corollary of the reality-experience as the apprehension of 
libid. 
2Ibid., p. 162. 
3 Ibid. , P• 76. 
4walter T. Stace, Religion ~ the Modern ~ (Ne"t.,r 
York: J. B. Lippincot~ Co., 1952), p. 238. 
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the oneness of reality. 1 It l!Tas also discussed under the 
mystical experience as truth-experience. Stace maintains 
that 
The Ultimate itself cannot be either self-contradictory 
or self-consistent. It is an indivisible one, with-
out parts; whereas self-contradiction means the logical 
opposition of one part to another, while self-consist-
ency means the logical harmony of one part with another. 2 
Transcendence . -- referred to by Rudolph Otto as the 
11 \fuolly Other" -- is another characteristic of reality as 
it is disclosed by the mystical experience. This was dis-
cussed also under value-experience. The mystical experience 
can be described as seeing value to be an objective, ~ 
state of affairs, hence the repetition. God's "being lies 
in a plane, order, or dimension, .wholly different from the 
system of things which constitutes the natural order. This 
is exactly the same thing as asserting that God is not 
capable of being apprehended by concepts. 11 3 
To the extent that aesthetic experiences can be con- , 
strued as being reality-experiences the mystical experience 
discloses the real as the beautiful. The divine moment 
"will also have relations of resemblance and non-resemblance. 
It will be in certa~n respects like, and in certain respects 
1This point is elaborated at the end of this chapter 
as the 12th assumption Stace makes for his philosophy of 
mysticism. 
2Ibid., p. 1.53· 
3Ibid. , p. 1.5.5 • 
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unlike, sensory or aesthetic experiences. 111 For Stace 
"there is a very close connection between the religious 
consciousness and the aesthetic consciousness. 112 
The mystical experience as reality-experience is 
causally connected ~ ~ temporal or natural order. The 
divine has 
ef'f'ects in the world. Thus the mystic influences men, 
f'ounds religious orders, works in the world. It will 
also be the case that the divine moment 1rlll be capable 
of' being produced by appropriate causes. These causes 
'tll'ill constitute what in the dif'f'erent religions is 
called the 11 path11 to salvation.:3 
Consciousness , is another element of' the mystical 
experience as reality-experience. Mysticism, favoring 
idealism, tends naturally to attribute consciousness to the 
universe. Stace's view on reality as consciousness is 
ambiguous, due, perhaps, to the unconscious influence of' 
his predominantly naturalistic views. On the one hand he 
asserts that reality is consciousness, on the other hand he 
rejects this belief'. He asserts that reality is conscious-
ness when he says that 11 in the Handukya Upanishad we are 
told that there are f'our possible states of' mind. The first 
three are waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. 114 To 
describe the fourth state, Stace quotes directly from the 
1 Ibid.' P• 87. 
2Ibid., p. 117. 
:3Ibid., P• 87. 
4 Ibid., P• 2,36. 
Mandukya Upanishad: 
The Fourth, say the wise, is not subjective experi-
ence, nor objective experience, nor experience inter-
mediate between these two, nor is it a negative 
condition which is neither consciousness nor uncon-
sciousness. It is not the knowledge of the senses, 
nor is it relative knowledge, nor yet inferential 
knowledge. Beyond the senses, beyond understanding, 
beyond all expression, is the Fourth. 1i is ~ pure 
unitary consciousness, wherein awareness of the world 
and of multiplicity is completely obliterated. It is 
ineffable peace. It is the supremi g£Od. It is One 
without a second. It is the Self. Litalics mini! 
2 This stage of consciousness is called the turtya stage, 
which is pure consciousness without an object. 
It will be assumed here that Stace endorses con-
sciousness in the non-dualistic sense designated, not only 
as a trait of the subjective mystical experience, but also 
as a trait of reality or God, notwithstanding his earlier 
objection to such identification. Stace had maintained 
that the belief that God is mind or consciousness is false 
because it is contradictory.3 His argument is, briefly, as 
follo'\ITS. 11 ~Und 1~ is defined phenomenologically as a stream 
of changing psychological states. It follows that God, as 
an unchanging consciousness, is a contradiction. 
The 'tiTord 11 mind11 • • • means a stream of psychological 
states, flowing, changing, succeeding one another in a 
time-series. Consciousness ••• cannot exist in any 
other way. It is not possible to conceive an unchang-
ing consciousness, because consciousness depends on 
2s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Nelr York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1927), Vol. :J: , pp, 170, 172. 
3\•lalter T. Stace, Religion ~the I\fodern Mind (New 
York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952), p. 221. 
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contrast, "rhich is possible only if one thought or 
percept ion :follows another with lvhich it is con-
trasted; so that a consciousness \'lhich ceases to change 
ceases to exist and passes into the darkness of 
unconsciousness ••• But that God's consciousness 
flows and changes in time contradicts that unchange-
ableness and immutability which . is attributed to 
God.l 
It seems to the author of the dissertation, incident-
ally, that Stace 1 s definition of consciousness is arbitrary, 
and therefore unnecessarily restricted. No reason is given 
for the complex assertion that consciousness fully depends 
on changing states of mind, or that consciousness is re-
ducible l..rithout remainder to states of psychological a1..rare-
ness. It is therefore assumed that, in the last analysis, 
consciousness is, after all, for Stace, one of the elements 
of reality as perceived in the mystical experience. 
In summary, the mystical experience in its phenome-
nolog ical mode of reality-experience is the experience of 
a spiritual and moral order -- an order of which it can be 
said that values are constitutive of reality. Contradictory 
reality attributes are predicated in and of this mode; the 
mystical confrontation (or introspective unity, in case the 
word "confrontation" suggests duality) is described as Being 
as well as Non-Beingi as a total Person, as well as individual 
attributes of personality, such as ~' spirit, 1.;isdom, 
power, bliss, blessedness, righteousness, beauty (the aes-
thetic) knowledge, ~' and peace. The vision of reality 
28 7 
found in this mode of the mystical experience is one of 
unity, non-duality, of the infinity of reality. Consist-
ency is experienced as inapplicable to this reality-
experience, and reality is experienced as being of a 
transcendent nature. Non-duality, infinity, lack of con-
sistency, and transcendence are equally phenomenological 
characteristics of the mystical .experience in its mode of 
truth-experience. Similarly, the aesthetic and ethical 
characteristics describable phenomenologically within the 
reality mode of the mystical experience are also found , in 
the mode of' the mystical experience as value-experience. 
A f'inal, fundamental characteristic of this mode of' the 
mystical experience is that reality is experienced as being 
constituted of' consciousness. 
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Mysticism as Metaphysics 
In describing the nature of mysticism, both as 
an experience and as a source of a philosophical position, 
it is necessary to distinguish mysticism as metaphysics --
that is, as theory of reality -- from mysticism as experi-
ence. 1Vhereas mysticism as experience involves us pri-
marily in phenomenological descriptions, mysticism as meta-
physics or theory of reality deals with inferences, de-
rived from and including this core experience. These 
inferences are about the nature of values, truth, and 
reality. They are inferences beyond and interpretations of 
the nature and content of the immediately experienced 
mystical vision. In addition to inferences, mysticism as 
metaphysics or theory of reality may be a construct, an 
empirically coherent system. That is to say, with mystical 
experiences as basis or raw material a system can be con-
structed, much in the fashion of radical empiricism £2ll-
structing a system of the world out of sensa. Just as in 
empiricism sensa -- although in themselves not the ultimately 
real -- are the fundamental clue to reality, so for a mysti-
cal metaphysics the mystical experience is equally ~ clue 
for the ultimate nature of reality. 
The discussion of mysticism as metaphysics is 
divided by the author of the dissertation into three head-
28 9 
ings corresponding roughly to a metaphysics of value, of 
truth, and of reality, parallel in execution and purpose 
to the similar distinction under mysticism as experience. 
In& mystical metaphysics ~value-metaphysics.--
Little can be said here which was not mentioned under "the 
Nystical Experience as Value-Experience." Value is primarily 
the designation of an experience, an experience of approval, 
especially by Stace in his naturalistic-utilitarian moments. 
To the extent that Stace identifies value ld th 
reality value~ given~ metaphysical status. 1 
On the other hand, Stace's metaphysical assertions 
from the point of view of a mystical metaphysics may be 
reduced to three. The mystical experience is the epitome 
of values, it is the "absolute, eternal, and objective." 2 
11hy is one value predicate more true or adequate than 
another? Why is it appropriate to say that G~d is 
love, and inappropriate to say the He is hate? •• 
If we look only at the natural order we do not find 
a scale of values • • • Naturalistic account of values 
Lindicates thai? • • • values are • • • dependent on the 
human mind, its desires and purposes. Good and evil are 
defined in terms of' human happiness or pleasures • 
The naturalistic solution of' the philosophical problem 
is a true solution ••• 3 
Mysticism as a type of metaphysical system has a 
1walter T. Stace, ~ and Eternity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952T; p. 127. 
2 Ibid., p. 113. 
3Ibid., P• 102. 
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special locus for values. The mystical experience itself 
is the supreme value. The nature of this value is ex-
plored in the phenomenological analysis of mysticism as 
experience, in its various modes. 
To find a scale of values • • • we have to look to 
the divine order ••• , to the eternal moment as viewed 
from within ••• , to the experience of the mystic •• 
We find therein, not •• 1 • the entire scale of values, but only • • • its apex. 
Stace' s explanation of hol..r value is embedded in 
reality, including the intuition that spiritual values ~ 
higher ~ ~ physical ~~ is found in the following 
passage: 
Intuition Labout valuei! is in reality an influx from 
the divine moment into the natural world • • • This 
takes place in tl'IO ways • • The great mystic carries 
0 
over into time the aura of his vision, producing moral 
and religious effects in the world • • • In the second 
place -- and this is the more important point -- the 
divine moment within the subconscious of the ordinary 
11 non-mystic 11 projects influences into the upper levels 
of his conscious life, l..rhich appear there in the :form of 
vague :feelings. These include moral intuitions, o:f 
"''lhich one is that the things o:f the mind and soul are 
nobler than the things o:f the body.2 
!h£ mystical metaphysics ~ truth-metaphysics.--It 
is not altogether easy to decide what can be included in this 
mode. Truth as a metaphysical and inferred entity could be 
either (a) any aspect of the ultimate nature of reality 
in which case a confusion (or fusion) between the modes of 
reality- and truth-metaphysics occurs -- or (b) that parti-
1 Ibid., p. 103. 
2 Ibid., p. 109. 
- - , 
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cular aspect of reality which deals with satisfactory 
criteria of truth -- such as an analysis of the ontology 
required for obtaining the isomorphic relation needed in 
correspondence theories of truth (Cartesian dualism, mind-
matter interaction, God's non-deceptiveness, etc.), or, 
finally, (c) the ontological status and the nature of 
symbolism, language, and other means of expression and 
communication. In what follows all of the above three 
possibilities will be covered. 
As t~as mentioned in connection ,,.ith mysticism in 
its mode as truth-experience, truth, for Stace, is logical 
and reasonable (empirical) in the natural order but extra-
logical in the divine, mystical order. 
That truth may be reached through concepts does 
not apply in the mystical order, because 11 to have a con-
cept of' anyt hing means no more than to know to what other 
thing s it bears the relation of similarity."1 Since t h e 
mystica l e xperience is unique, truth, in t he ordinary, 
conceptu~l-logical usage, ~ ~ apply. 
Ultimately, intuition is the source of all truth. 2 
That which is g iven through the special mystical intuition 
is given as true. Although intuitions are merely there, 
and it may be contended that the question of truth or 
1 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
2 Ibid., p. 152. 
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falsity does not arise unless predictions or assertions 
are made about these intuitions, Stace calls a mystical 
intuition a truth nonetheless. A similar case holds for 
aesthetic intuitions. 11 We find that just as the religious 
consciousness attributes truth to its object, so also --
at least in many cases --does the aesthetic consciousness. 111 
The mystical experience carries conviction ~th it, 
and the name of the conviction is truth. The intuitive 
criterion of truth of the mystical experience is not a 
correspondence, not even a coherence or consistency criterion 
o f truth at all. Truth in the mystical experience is a 
strong belief, a ·Nay of life. Truth, for Stace, is primarily 
intuition: 
The question cannot be decided by argument, nor is the 
view which we have affirmed capable of being 11 proved, 11 
if by proof 1>te mean a logical passage from things in 
the natural order to things in the divine order. 
Religious truths depend wholly on religious intuitions.2 
Truth, ho1-rever, is:. more than mere intuition, even in 
relation to mysticism. Artistic and theological or mystical-
metaphysical propositions are derived ultimately from an 
intuition. Reason, on the other hand, fulfills a crucial 
role in building a mystical metaphysics, because reason 
interprets these intuitions. This interpretation of the 
mystical experiences, as 1-rell as its relation to all other 
1 Ibid., P• 117 • 
2 Ibicl..!. , p. 1.56. 
29.3 
experiences, is mysticism as metaphysics. 
The argument is as to whether an intuition has been 
rightly interpreted, or whether the propositions so 
derived are consistent with one another. The function 
of reason is to introduce order and consisiency into 
the aesthetic system, not to originate it. 
Perhaps the most important single issue tvhich Stace 
mentions in connection with a mystical metaphysics -- lofhich 
is best discussed under its mode as truth-metaphysics 
is his explanation of how language functions ,.,hen it applies 
to religious truths. In a strict sense, all ~~ ~-
cussing the mystical experience ~ be understood symboli-
cally. 11The language both of art and religion is evocative, 
t . · t·,&'· . .&' t• 112 no sc1en 1~1c or 1n~orma 1ve. Only scientific proposi-
tions are literally trueJ "religious propositions are 
symbolically true. 113 And "a system ot: religious belief's is 
a symbolic account of the divine order. 114 
Stace asks, 11 what • • is the nature of relig ious 
symbolism? And hot., is any truth conveyed by it?" 5 There 
are various types of' religious symbolism, 11metaphor, myth, 
11 1 . d II 6 a egory, ana ogy, 1 eogram. Stace considers it an 
essential characteristic, an inescapable abstraction from 
1 Ibid., P• 14,3. 
2 Ibid., p. 120. 
3Ibid., P• 116. 
4 Ibid., P• 140. 
5Ibid.., P• 52. 
6 Ibid., P• 62. 
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all symbolism 11 that both the symbol and what it symbolizes 
should be present to the mind of the user of' the symbol. 111 
~is particular requirement demands that the religious 
experience is not totally distinct from man's ordinary 
experience. As will be seen again, this statement mili-
tates against any genuine conception of the ineffability 
of' the religious or mystical experience. Stace, however, 
contends that if the distinction between the symbol and 
what it symbolizes were absolute, no analogy or symbolism 
could ever be effective. In addition, Stace writes that 
11 all religious language must be taken as symbolical, and 
not as literal. 112 
If' analog y or symbolism is to be truly a path to an 
understanding or apprehension (it might be convenient to 
use the term apprehension to cover both intuition and 
intellection) of' the religious or mystical experience, we 
must believe that intuition, that is, the capacity for a 
mystical experience, small existing mystical experiences, 
is present in all of us, that the mystical experience 11 is 
a perfectly normal mode of' consciousness."J The very 
possibility of religious symbolism "means that God Himself 
must be in some way directly apprehended, and not merely 
1 Ibid. 
2Ibid., P• 60. 
Jibid., P• 66. 
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indirectly through the symbol • . . There must be some 
direct vision, otherwise the symbolism will be empty ver-
b . ul J.ag e. The possibility of symbolism presupposes that 
God 11 does reveal Himself to man • • in that form o:f human 
consciousness which ••• we have called intuition. 112 
It may be admitted that religious language cannot 
be taken literally but must be interpreted symbolically. 
Yet not all words serve equally well as symbolic repre-
sentations o:f God. 11 God is green" may be totally irrele-
vant. 11 God is mighty" may be a good symboli 11 God is un-
pleasant 11 may be a bad or false symbol. \Vhy? 
In order to answer questions o:f this sort Stace 
refers to his metaphysical speculation about the continuity 
of the divine moment throughout existence, in every degree 
o:f realization or manifestation. Stace writes, 
\fuat makes an existence higher or lower in this scale 
[o:f good symbol~ will be the degree in which the divine 
moment is realized in it, the depth to which, in its 
mentality, that moment is sunk in its sub-conscious, 
or the height to which it is raised, near to the bright 
light o:f consciousness, or above the threshold. In 
the mystic it is :fully conscious.3 
Stace continues describing the ever-present divine 
moment when he "t-tri t es, 
And we must surmise that, in the metal or the rock, the 
consciousness, which is its li:fe and its being, exists 
1 Ibid., P• 6.5. 
2 Ibid. 
Jibid., p. 96. 
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only in an utter blackness which 1~e may try faintly 
to understand through analogies with our own experi-
ences of sleep, hypnosis, or somnambulism. In that 
utter darkness, in that blackness beyond all black-
ness, which is not to be plumbed by any human device, 
must lie the eternal moment, buried and imprisoned, 
perhaps to be released _into the light in some in-
conceivable far off future epoch of the world. 
\'lith this speculative scheme as underlying assump-
tion, an interpretation can now be given to the nature of 
religious symbolism. It is now possible to find a criterion 
to sho1~ which symbol is more adequate and why, and which 
symbol is less adequate. Symbol ~ is more adequate than 
symbol ~ if ~ is nearer to the religious experience. "The 
relation between the symbol and the symbolizandum is not 
that of resemblance, but that of greater or less nearness 
to the full self-realization of God." 2 In the hierarchic 
chain of referents to words we can find varying stages of 
proximity to God, much in the same manner as did Plotinus. 
In the scale of being, one level is nearer to God's 
self-realization than a second if between it and that 
full self-realization there intervene fewer levels of 
being than b~t1~een the second and that full self-
realization.-" 
Consequently, symbols taken from the 11higher 11 levels of 
existence, such as personality, are more adequate than those 
taken from the lo1~er lev.els, such as plants. 
Hence 11mind11 or 11personality" are the general symbols 
which are most adequate to God, while symbols tal<:en 
1 Ibid.' p. 97. 
2 Ibid., P• 98 • 
3Ibid. 
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:from the level o:f inanimate existence, such as 
physical :forces and lumps o:f matter, will be the 
least adequate. Thus it is truer to say that God is a 
mind or a person than that He is a :force.l 
In summary, the definition and criterion o:f truth 
used in inferring or constructing a system :from mystical 
experiences is intuition. 1ihen dealing with mysticism, 
language does not :function literally but symbolically. The 
adequacy o:f the symbol depends on the level o:f realization 
or proximity to the mystical experience that the object 
used as symbol has attained. 
~ mystical metaphysics . .M. reality-metaphysics.--
As mentioned be:fore, the distinction betl1Teen mysticism as 
experience and mysticism as metaphysics is only moderately 
clear; it is nonetheless desirable to make such a di:f:feren-
tiation :for the purpose o:f defining value, truth, and 
reality. Relevant to the present topic l1Till be any inter-
pretation o:f mysticism as experience, whether this interpreta-
tion be only moderately articulate (in which case it is a 
~~nschauung) or care:fuliy worked-out (in which case it is 
a metaphysics proper). 
What inferences are drawn, according to Stace, upon 
the reality-experience o:f mysticism? l'lhat world-structure 
is derived from the :fact that one o:f the moments o:f the 
mystical experience points to a reality? 
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Philosophers such as Spinoza, Bradley, and Hegel, 
in '"hom the eternal moment or the mystical experience 't~Torks 
secretly, exemplify the kind of idealistic, monistic, and 
absolutist . metaphysics which follows from mysticism as 
experience. Stace does not expand these vie1vs beyond mere 
mention. 
God, as a "vast mind running the universe • 
• I 
1 
enormous, magnificant, powerful, intelligent, good 11 is not 
part of .the structure of the universe or reality. To the 
extent that idealistic metaphysics has supposed such a God 
to exist it is drawing unwarranted conclusions. No such 
.d . t 2 ev~ ence ex~s s. Even if such a being were to exist, this 
being could not be God, 11 for it l~Tould be merely another 
natural being. rr 3 
Theology, l-Thich, literally speaking, Stace conceives 
to be false, is (symbolically) a science of reality in a way 
parallel to natural science. "Science is an interpretation 
of sense experience, in the same way as religious beliefs 
are interpretations of mystical experience."4 The mystical 
experience is the raw· mat erial l'li th l-Thich theology fashions 
a metaphysics, the latter being the inferred sup erstructure. 
1 Ibid, p. 1.51. 
21valter T. Stace, Religion and ~Modern ~ (.Nel-l 
York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 19.52), pp. 22lff. 
31valter T . Stace, ~and Eternity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Pr ess, 19.52), P• 1.51. 
l!-!!?_iSh, P• 14 .5. 
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Various interpretations of the nature of reality 
are possible, according to Stace, on the basis of the 
mystical experience, since the universal and unchanging 
mystical experience interacts with variable physical and 
psychological conditions. These various metaphysical 
conceptions of reality are called religions. 11The differ-
ent religions are the products of different geographical, 
cultural, and historical conditions interacting with the same 
basic religious intuitions. 111 
It may be inferred from Stace's position that --
within certain very general limits -- all religions repre-
sent true vie\"ts of reality. 1fuy? Because that concept of 
reality which is called religion must be viewed as the inter-
action of a mystical reality-experience, 't>Thich is constant, 
with non-mystical or natural, physical, and psychological 
experiences, l>Thich are variable. If religion or theology, 
as metaphysics, is the joint product of a constant and a 
set of variables, such a concept as the "relativity of 
reality" is not :far of:f. 
Stace, however, explicitly avoids such relativism 
by insisting that all religious metaphysics is literally 
false, symbolically true: 
It is here that the myths of the different religions 
have their function and justification. No doubt, 
taken literally, they are false. But whether the 
w·orshipper takes them literally or recognizes them 
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as the myths they are, they perform the function of 
evoking within him those religious feelings which are 
in fact a far-off view of the divine • • • 
This is the justification of the myths and images, 
and therefore of the creeds and doctrines, of the great 
religions of the world. No doubt they tend to degen-
erate on the one side into superstitions, on the other, 
into mere intellectual abstractions spiritually dead 
and powerless • • 
A man may attach himself to any church, or to none • • • 
He may then call himself an agnostic or atheist. But 
it does not follmV' that he is irreligious, even though 
he may profess to be.l 
Relativism in mystical metaphysics is further avoided 
because Stace denies that intuitions are variable, notwith-
standing the fact that intuitions are notorious for their 
variability. He feels that changing intuitions represent 
"a considerable exaggeration, as t!Tell as a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the role of reason in knowledge." 2 11The 
objectivity of science is due to the fact that sense experi-
ences are basically the same in all men • • • 
exactly the same can be said of religion.".3 
In principle, 
Three additional and interrelated characteristics 
of the mystical metaphysics as reality-metaphysics are (a) 
that there are degrees 2f reality, so that (b), because it 
is at the bottom of the hierarchy of degrees of reality, the 
world of everyday experience is worthless, which leads then 
11'/alter T. Stace, Religion ~~ Modern ~ ( Ne't!T 
York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 19.52), pp. 246-247. 
2walter T. Stace, ~and Eternity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19.52), p. 14LJ. • 
.3Ibid., p. 146. 
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to (c) acosmism. 
\Vh.en a mystic 11 returns 11 to ordinary experience (as 
the prisoner in Plato 1 s Alleg ory of the Cave, l'lho returned), 
and 1-1hen h e attempts to reconstruct the '\'lOrld of ordinary 
experience in terms of the mystical experience, he recon-
ciles the apparent contradiction by conceiving "the idea 
of degrees o:f reality. rrl The mystical experien ce is desig-
nated as the most real, and the world of ordinary experience, 
or the natural world, has lesser degrees o:f reality, to the 
extent of being illusory. Stace maintains t hat 11 from the 
point of view o:f the divine order the natural world is an 
illusion. This is the doctrine of acosmism." 2 Similarly, 
11 i:f we take our stand "t'lithin the moment itself, it is then 
the world, the natural order, l'lhich is illusion. 11 3 
Since 11 the eternal moment is experienced as the 
4 
supreme value 11 the natural world o:f ordinary experience 11 is 
contrast ed by the mystic 1-1ith the worthlessness o:f the 
'\\"Orl d. 11 .5 
God as the most real being is a component of the 
mystical reality-experience. This experience gives rise to 
a metaphysical view· of degrees o:f being, :found already in 
1 Ibid.' P• 12.5. 
2 Ibid., P• 123. 
3rbid., P• 77-
l.,tibid.' p • 12.5. 
.5rbid. 
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Plato and Plotinus in antiquity. A concise statement of 
Stace's mystical metaphysics is the follo1dng. 
At the bottom Lot' the scale of beingl we • • • have 
•• dead matter, above it plants, then animals, then 
men, and finally those supermen 1vhom 1ve call mystics. 
What malces an existence higher or lower in this scale 
will be the degree in which the divine moment is 
realized in it, the depth to which, in its mentality, 
that moment is sunk in its sub-conscious, or the height 
to tvhich it is raised, near to the bright light of 
consciousness or above1 the threshold. In the mystic it is fully conscious. 
The relation betliTeen the t...ro orders (the natural and 
the eternal) is clarified through exploring the response of 
the mystic -- the person enveloped in the mystical experi-
ence -- 11hen he is confronted t..rith or returns to the natural 
order. Stace describes the frame of mind of the 11 returning 11 
mystic as follo1..rs: 
Because the light and the memory of his supreme experi-
ence of the eternal floods over into his ordinary life, 
the things of space and time come to assume, for him, 
that ghost-like appearance 1-1hich causes him to tb.ink of 
them as constituting a mere twilight world of shadows.2 
Stace also warns that idealistic philosophers 
throughout the history of philosophy, East and West, have 
taken 11 their belief in the unreality of the temporal LnaturaJ] 
order to be factual in character, 11 J rather than perceiving 
this as an analog ical or symbolic truth only. "Their 
assertion that the world is appearance, not reality, was 
1 I~id., P• 96. 
2 Ibid., P• 121}. 
---- -
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taken as a factual statement, not only by their opponents, 
1 but by the idealistic philosophers themselves, 11 which is 
11 probably one of' the causes of the ill-repute into which 
idealistic philosophies, such as those of' Hegel and Bradley 
••• have since fallen. " 2 Furthermore, this vie't11' of 
acosmism as factual 
has had one extraordinary ••• result, namely the 
production, by a long line of' philosophers stretching 
from Parmenides and Zeno to Bradley, of ingenious 
logical arguments intended to prove that the 1vorld is 
unreal. For philosophers believed that its unreality 
is a fact. But if' it is, it is certainly a very 
strang e and surprising fact, violently at variance 
with the plain evidence of' the senses and the reason.3 
Mysticism as reality-metaphysics may be summarized 
as follows: from the mystical experience it follows that the 
ultimate nature of' the world is any or all of' these --
idealistic, moniill.£, absolutist. God as a mind running the 
universe does not exist. The world of' everyday experience 
(the 'tvorld o:f sense) is illusory. This position is referred 
to as acosmism . God is conceived as the ens realissim...!!E!• 
1 Ibid., P• 132 • 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., PP• 133-134. 
Assumptions and Priorities 
The previous two sections of this chapter repre-
sent an extensive analysis of the philosophy of mysticism 
a view about as different from Russell's positivism as can 
be found -- as it has been summarized and interpreted by 
Stace. In the light of this analysis we liill now examine, 
as was done with Russell's philosophy in Chapter II, the 
assumptions or presuppositions or primitives that must be 
asserted as true without evidence in order to make possible 
such a philosophy of mysticism. 
In deciding what is assumed in a metaphysical system 
or a world-view or culture based on mysticism, we encounter 
the unique difficulty that all is asserted to be one. In 
the case of this extreme kind of monism it is indeed diffi-
cult to discover what the assumptions involved are. The 
difficulty is unique because the very notion of assumptions 
is a logical one, and the mystical experience purports to 
overthrow logic. To discover assumptions in mysticism 
means really _to discover foundations for that which is said 
to be without foundations; to discover multiplicity where 
there is said to be only unity; to discover schisms where 
there are said to be only harmonies. 
Viewing mysticism from the distance and detachment 
expected of an academician, some conclusions regarding 
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assumptions are possible. This is especially true in the 
consideration referred to here as mysticism as metaphysics 
or conception of reality. However, substituting for the 
difficulty of discovering assumptions in a monistic view of 
existence is the system of priorities. Eo/ analyzing priori-
ties we discover something close to assumptions within 
mysticism itself, especially within mysticism as experience. 
It is necessary to distinguish carefully between 
the categories of value, truth, and reality as human experi-
ences, and realities beyond human experiences or organiza-
tions of human experiences. Characteristic of mysticism is 
the very fact that value, truth, and reality can be called 
experiences of mystics, rather than systematic inferences; 
they represent experiential events. When these categ ories 
are referred to as metaphysical entities, then value, truth, 
and reality refer to theories about these experiences, 
inferences derived from these experiences, or even to 
theories on how to achieve these experiences. So that, for 
instance, truth as exp erience is an overwhelming sense of 
conviction of the truth, value, and reality of the mystical 
experience. Truth as metaphysics is the explanation of this 
experience, the relating of this experience to other experi-
ences in terms of empirical coherence or the deriving of 
inferences from this experience. Value as an experience of 
transcendence becomes a Platonic Idea, a vision of a good 
God, or the perception of the influx of the divine moment 
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in the world. Reality as an experience is the compelling 
sentiment to call the content of' the mystical experience 
"real." Reality as metaphysical entity, on the other hand, 
is the systematic, theoretical object of' this experience, 
or the interpretation given this experience, the existence 
of' an objective agency called God, a Person, or the Good. 
Most noteworthy in examining these interrelations is 
the identification of' value with reality. Stace points out 
that the mystic's identification of' reality with value is 
11 an ineradicable tendency of' the human mind." 1 This identi-
f'ication may well be the trademark of' mysticism, as 'l1Tell 
as of' absolute idealism: 
There exists in the • • • mind an ineradicable tendency 
to identify value with reality -- that is, if' value is 
here understood as the supreme value of divine blessed-
ness. This may be expressed in the equation 
Value = Reality 
f'ro m 't'lhich is derived the equation 
Unvalue = Unreality 
Evidences of' this are easy to f'ind in the world's 
literature • (e.g., Spinoza) • • The modern 
absolute idealists af'f'ord another example of' the 
identification of' value with reality. The absolute is~ 
f or them, the source of' values, and even value itself'. 
Similarly, truth, within the mystical framework of' reference, 
is identified with value. 11Truth, as a pplied to God, is a 
1 Ibid., P• 130 • 
2Ibid., PP • 127-128. 
J07 
value term." 1 
Equating value, truth, and reality follows from the 
mystic's emphasis on unity. This "mutual absorption" of these 
terms is the first characteristic of the interrelation of 
value, truth, and reality in mysticism. We must take the 
individual shades of meaning of these terms and see what 
significance can be attached to each of the possible inter-
relations. This will be done shortly. 
In order to discover the assumptions involved in 
mysticism, we must discuss the issue of priorities. Since 
in mysticism words are used symbolically, words are not 
identical in meaning, because symbols vary in referents. 
Value, truth, and reality can be further related to one 
another because they are differentiated from one another in 
dealing with priorities. In dealing with priorities, the 
program is as follows. In discussing interrelation and 
interdependency the question arises, which is primary, which 
is prior. Each of the meanings of value, truth, and reality 
must be taken and the reasons for and against considering 
each primary in turn must be examined. The possibility that 
none can be primary must also be explored. The meaning of 
"primacy" must be clarified. Assuming one category is prior, 
and also assuming the precise sense of the priority is clear, 
the structure of dependency must be laid bare. 
1 Ibid.' p. 116. 
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In discussing the primacy of value, truth, or 
reality, these are the meanings of primacy involved. (1) 
Primacy can mean genetically first, priority in time, ·which 
is also psycholog ical priority. In the process of reaching 
a l1Torld vie,.;, certain experiences come first chronologically 
and certain metaphysical positions come first. In other 
words, if primacy means genetic priori~, different answers 
may be garner ed under mysticism as experience than under 
mysticism as theory of reality or metaphysics. (2) Primary 
can mean logically first. Metaphysically speaking, a con-
caption of either value, truth, or reality, may be the 
logically ultimate, whereas the others may be logically 
dependent on this ultimate. If "primacy" means "logical 
priority, 11 it is hard to see hOl'l primacy can apply to mysti-
cism as experience, yet this possibility must not be ex-
eluded. However, log ical dependency must not be confused 
with reducibility. The question whether value, truth, or 
I 
reality are reducible or p erhaps even equivalent to one 
an other is a separate issue. (3) Primary can mean phenomeno-
logically first. Primacy as phenomenological priority 
applies to mysticism as experience. The question to be an~ 
swered is, which experience is g iven as focal, l'lhich e xperi-
ence seems -- upon description -- most important, most 
fundamental, central, appears most real. The question of 
reducibility can also be raised in this connection. In 
othe r words, this is what phenomenolog ical priority means. 
J09 
In a mystical experience that aspect or mode of it is 
phenomenologically prior lll'hich is given as an immediate 
intuition, not as a subsequent, discursively approached 
desideratum -- as focal, central. The phenomenologically 
prior is that aspect which is given supreme emphasis. (4) 
Primary can mean (for lack of a better name) axiological 
priority. In this case it must be decided which of the 
terms is most valuable and why. Here the issue is what, upon 
analysis, is the desideratum. (5) There may also be good 
reasons why none are primary. Rather than discuss this 
possibility separately, it will be better to bring up this 
point in connection l'iith our exploration of the above four 
possibilities. 
Mysticism ~ ~--The fact that mysticism points to 
the identification of value, truth, and reality requires 
special comment, as already indicated. Mysticism as exneri-
~ is one because its intuition is one. For the mystic 
to intuit means to encompass consciously. To him to intuit 
means to absorb in consciousness. Consciousness is experi-
enced as one. The notion of the awareness of more than one 
consciousness is to him supremely meaningless. If he 't'iere 
conscious of many consciousnesses, there still is the 
supreme unitary consciousness 'tll'ithin 't11'hich all conscious-
nesses are intuited. The mystic consciousness is intuitively 
known to be a unitary event. The phenomenological content 
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of the mystical experience has two aspects: it is the 
perception of (a) multiplicity which is at the same time 
experienced as belonging to a fundamental (b) oneness. 
Even the subject-object distinction is experienced as a 
distinction, but only 11 superficially," that is, it is 
experienced as illusion or interpreted as acosmism. Again, 
fundamentally, the mystical experience is experienced as 
one. The mystic indeed perceives the differentiations 
within the world; he eats and talks. To this extent he 
perceives disunity. Yet this disunity is perceived or 
intuited as being neither valuable, gQ£ ~' ~ ~· 
This differentiation is experienced as . a disvalue, as false, 
and as illusion or is interpreted as acosmism. Also, as 
mentioned, the supreme unity is experienced in the mystical 
experience, and it is experienced as the supreme value, truth, 
and reality. Mysticism, therefore, includes theoretically 
both unity and differentiation as experiences; yet dis-
tinction is experienced as totally "negative" and unity as 
supremely 11 positive. 11 
A similar two-sidedness is present when '\ve analyze 
the unity found in mysticism as metaphysics or theory of 
reality. The unity here is not one of intuition but of 
empirical and logical coherence. Absolute idealism, 
theologies, and religions, to the extent that these are 
genuine and complete metaphysical systems, are coherent 
accounts or syntheses of all experiences with the mystical 
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experience at the focus. Any metaphysics begins with the 
discursive, the dissociated facts of experience. These facts 
are unified, so that at the terminus of the dialectic 
process a coherent unity is achieved. Mysticism as meta-
physics is disconnected, differentiated, and multifarious 
inasmuch as this metaphysics is based on the various facts 
of experience. Mysticism as metaphysics is also unified 
to the extent that this metaphysics is a coherent (~, 
unitary) aggregate of all these factst a unity interpreted 
!g te~ 2£ mysticism ~ experience. 
To 'tll'hat extent is mysticism as experience a unity 
of value, truth, and reality? The answer to this question 
involves showing the extent to which values, truth, and 
reality, as experiences, are equivalent to one another. 
Tl~e mystical experience as value-experience reduces to its 
elements as follows: experience of transcendence, experi-
ence of the summum bonum, intuitive apprehension of this 
apex (these terms are not mutually exclusive). The state-
ments of this unity are not clear because the terms lack 
unambiguous determination. But clear definitions, when 
dealing lofith the modes of mysticism as experience, are not 
easily accessible. The following must be taken in general 
terms only. Mysticism as an experience of transcendence 
(value) is merely another term for mysticism as conviction 
(truth). The mystic is convinced (truth) that transcendence 
(value) exists (reality) or ought (value) to be realized 
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(reality). Trans.cendence (value), by the very meaning of' 
the term, is the bringing into existence of' a 11fuolly Other 
(reality). The existence of' this transcendent value is 
lrno'tm to be ~ by extra-logical intuition (truth). 1 
Transcendence (value) is an apex (value) towards which we 
strive as man's supreme good (value). This state of trans-
cendence (value) is, again by definition, a state of' con-
sciousness (reality) because only a Person (reality) can 
experience transcendence (value). These statements illus-
trate the oneness obtaining between the meanings of' truth, 
value, and reality, in mysticism as experience. This unity 
is not surprising if' we vie,, value, truth1 and reality as 
the descriptive terms of' ~~ intuited experience, namely, the 
mystical experience. 
The unity of' value, truth, and reality in mysticism 
as metaphysics or theory of' reality is the next point of 
discussion. In Stace 1 s mysticism, value as a metaphysical 
event is an instance of knowledge, is the influx of the 
divine moment into the l>iorld, is the source of' satisfying 
experience to man, and exists in a Platonic Form or in a 
Person or God. The following sentences express the possi-
bility of' this unity: Value as knowledge (value) is know-
ledge of' something, of' some object, which is the Platonic 
Idea of' any particular value, and ultimately of' the Good 
(reality) or the Absolute (reality). That this value known 
is (probably) true is known, according to solne .. :f ,orms '. of 
1 Existence and reality are synonymous for the mystic. 
JlJ 
idealism; by coherently relating (truth) all experiences. 
The identification o£ value with reality is the only 
coherent (true) account o£ the totality o£ our experiences. 
The influx o£ the divine moment into the world (value), 
which may be manifested in varying degrees o£ consciousness, 
is precisely equivalent to the degrees o£ reality (reality) 
with the ~ realissimum at its apex. The ~ realissimum 
is also the summit o£ perfection (value). That there really 
~ degrees o£ reality (reality) is knol~ because these 
degrees make £or the most coherent (empirically and logi-
cally) account (truth) o£ all experiences with the mystical 
experience at the £oeus. How do we know that this meta-
physics of degrees is really coherent? Through intuition 
(truth). We perceive intuitively (truth) that coherence 
(truth) obtains when we see the equivalence between the in-
£lux o£ the divine moment (value) into reality in terms o£ 
degrees o£ being (reality). Absolute idealism (and many 
religions and/or theologies) (reality) give a coherent 
account (truth) o£ the Platonic Forms o£ value (value) or 
o£ the divine influx in the world (value). In this way it 
. is hoped to illustrate the many-sided equivalences which 
hold between the metaphysics o£ value, truth, and re~lity. 
It is perhaps difficult to prove that mysticism as meta-
physics or theory o£ reality is unitary in the sense that 
mysticism as experience is. Nonetheless, a case can be made 
£or the posit~on that the aspects o£ value, truth, and 
1This is not to say that personalistic i dealism is 
a £orm o£ mysticism. 
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reality in the mystical metaphysi:.cs are so closely re-
lated that these form, in fact, a unity. 
It might be objected that mysticism as metaphysics 
or theory of reality is a defense or an exposition of what 
the experience reveals -- directed against other views of 
reality. If a mystical metaphysics is merelr a defense, the 
term "metaphysics" is not applied properly. If a mystical 
metaphysics is truly a theory of reality, then its function 
as defense against conflicting theories is merely an incid-
ental function, unrelated to the truth and importance of the 
metaphysics in question. 
Up to this point it has been shown that value, truth, 
and reality gua experiences can be construed as being equi-
. valent or unitary. The same has been done with value, 
truth, and reality gua metaphysics. It now remains to be 
shown that value, truth, and reality gua experiences are also 
equivalent to value, truth, and reality gua metaphysics. 
Only then would mysticism -- in all senses of the word, that 
is, qua experience and gua metaphysics -- be a total unity. 
Here, the author of the dissertation can see no unity. As 
an experience, mysticism may well be a unity of truth, value, 
and reality. As a metaphysical system ending in an Absolute 
or God or a Platonic Form of the Good, mysticism may well 
end in a unity. But we end with two distinct unities, an 
experiential one and a metaphysical one. The metaphysical 
unity purports to include the experiential unity as one of 
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the elements brought into the larger synthesis. That is to 
say, reality is always richer than experience. As long 
as a mystical theory is not the same as an experience, an 
experience upon which a system is based, as long as the 
distinction between experiences and metaphysics, where the 
former constitutes the raw material for the latter, is 
taken seriously, a unity between mysticism gua experience and 
gu~ metaphysics is not really possible to draw. The one 
exception would be if the experience itself purports to give 
the total metaphysical picture. 
In summary, leaving aside the separation between 
experience and metaphysics, it can be said that the reasons 
for referring to mysticism as being either an instance. of truth, 
value, ~ reality is that the latter are intimately inter-
connected. Truth and reality are the highest values; value 
and reality are the highest truths; and value and truth are 
the supremely real. Notwithstanding the unique element of 
total unity found in mystical philosophies an attempt must 
be made to deal with assumptions in forms of priorities. 
Genetic priority.--The next question to be discussed 
is which, among value, truth, and reality, is primary ~ The 
first type of priority is genetic or temporal or psychologi-
cal priority. Priority in relation to development. In 
mysticism as experience, which is genetically prior and why? 
Since in mysticism as experience value, truth, and reality 
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are one, as shown above, the question of genetic priority 
is in many ways inappropriate. The experience is one of 
value, truth, and reality. The question is, which ones are 
first and last, genetically, in that experience. There is 
one sense, however, in which value, truth, and reality, as 
experiences, may each be genetically prior in turn. The 
mystic may experience the mystical experience as an experi-
ence of y~lu~ first, and subsequently experience it as p er-
taining to reality and as being true. Similarly, the mystic 
might experience the mystical experience first as t~ue and 
then find it a supreme value manifested in reality. Finally, 
the mystic might see in his experience a manifestation of 
reality which subsequently seems to him to be true and a 
supreme value. How do these various intuitions affect a 
theory of mysticism? In mysticism as experience, the ques-
tion of genetic Eriority is a question of temperament or 
of environmental accident. Due to the symbolic function of 
language, whether the mystical experience is seen genetically 
first as value, truth or as reality depends on which symbols 
are closest at hand to the mystic. 
lfuat proof can be adduced for this position? First, 
there is no internal necessity whatsoever for the genetic 
priority of either value, truth, or of reality. Second, 
any of the three categories (value, truth, or reality) has 
the potential of being genetically prior. That is, the 
assertion that any of these three categories can be geneti-
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cally prior is neither logically inconsistent or contra-
dictory, nor is it intuitively impossible. Third, since no 
logical grounds can be advanced for favoring the unequivocal 
primacy of any one category, the possibility of various 
genetic priorities must be justified and accounted for in 
terms such as temperament, association, and environment, 
since some temporal origin must be found and other possi-
bilities have been eliminated. To the extent that the 
mystical experience, albeit an unbreakable unity, can be 
said to have genetic priorities, and to the extent that the 
concept of 11 proof 11 is relevant in the present discussion, 
the foregoing should prove that it is sensible to attribute 
these priorities to events "external" to the mystical 
experience itself. In connection with genetic priorities · 
in mysticism as experience, the question of decision does 
not come up. 
In mysticism as metaphysics, the question of genetic 
priority arises anew. In the genesis of a metaphysical 
system, each of the three categories has a claim for priority. 
ifuat is meant by genetic or temporal priority in building 
a metaphysical system? ifhat comes first in bui1ding a 
system? Genetic priority must not be confused with axio-
logical and logical priority. The only sense in which any 
of the three categories can be genetically prior in the 
structuring of a metaphysics is in terms of purpose. The 
question becomes what the purpose is in the mind of the man 
:us 
who develops a theology, a religion, or a system of' ab-
solute idealism. 11 Purposing 11 precedes, in time and develop-
ment, all other actions of' a metaphysician. It must be noted 
with care that consequences and purpose are not wholly 
separable. Purpose ref'ers to the motivation which initiates 
the structuring process. Yet the motivation is termed 
purposive precisely because it envisions certain terminal 
conseguence~ or ends. Genetic priority also means priority 
in the sense of' looking f'or consequences. rfuat consequences 
are considered f'irst in structuring a metaphysics? 
Under mysticism as metaphysics we will, theref'ore, 
discuss genetic priority in the sense of' purpose. The 
purpose of' a mystical metaphysics (which includes religion, 
theology, and absolute. idealism) might be i£ reach ~ 
truth, ·which, in the metaphysics of' mysticism, may mean a 
type of' coherence due to the preeminent sense of' unity. 
1-lysticism, f'rom this point of' view·, relates all experiences 
't,;ith only a vie't-r to their coherence, regardless of' other 
~onsequences. The purpose, the genetically prior, in the 
1 theoretician is, then, coherence. In this sense, a mystical 
1This is not to say that the prevailing occupation 
of' the mystic is to perf'ect the coherence of' his system by 
meticulous preoccupation with detail and logical nUances. 
Quite the contrary is the case. Concern ,with philosophy, and 
especially logic, is anathema to genuine mystical insight. 
The best that can be said here in def'ense of' the coherence 
of' a mystical metaphysics is that such coherence is a dis-
tinct possibility -- and theref'ore of' interest and importance 
to the philosopher -- not an actuality f'requently f'ound in 
mystical practices. 
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metaphysics competes ~th science; mysticism (such as may 
lead to absolute idealism, for example) asserts that it can 
g ive a more coherent account of the totality of experiences 
than a purely scientific attempt at coherence. (It must be 
remembered by the reader that when truth is discussed under 
mysticism as metaphysics, truth lrill be referred to as 
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coherence, with the qualifications mentioned in sections 
of' this chapter.) A know·ledge of' reality is the product of 
this quest af'ter truth. I~owledge of' this reality is seen 
to be a value. Truth, here, is genetically prior. 
Similarly, the purpose of a mystical metaphysician 
might be ~ reach, through understanding, ~ ultimately 
~· Having decided that the purpose of' speculative 
thought is to reach an understanding of reality, it is sub-
sequently agreed ~ ~ mystic ~ coherence is the best 
way to reach such an understanding. Such a true understand-
ing of' reality is that reality is constituted of' values. 
Finally, genetic priority in the sense of' purpose may equally 
well apply to values. The purpose of a mystical metaphy-
sics, such as a religion, a theology, or a system of' abso-
lute idealism, may be~ reach man's summum bonum, ~ 
supreme value. It may turn out that the only way to reach 
man's state or experience of transcendence (value) is 
through a coherent account of all experiences (truth), which 
leads to a mystically centered conception of reality in-
cluding, f'or instance, the notion of degrees of' reality 
(reality). 
The following exemplifies this positionl In the 
~/sticism of the Bhagavad ~' the summum bonum or enlight-
enment -- the value-mode of' the mystical experience can 
be achieved through Jnana Yoga or Jnana Marga, the \fay of' 
Knowledge or Truth. This vlay leads to knotfledge of the 
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ultimate reality, which is the identity of the Atman with 
the Brahman. 
Genetic priority is relevant transversely (between 
experience and metaphysics) as well as horizontally (among 
experiences and among metaphysical categories) in mysticism 
as experience and mysticism as metaphysics. That is to say, 
speaking horizontally, the categories of value, truth, a nd 
reality can be in turn genetically prior as experiences 
since the purpose may be the achieving of an experience of 
value, truth , . or reali t y -- as well as me taphysics -- since 
the purpose of mysticism may be the establishment of a 
structured metaphysical system, with an accounting of value, 
truth, or reality as its ultimate fact, or basic event. 
Speaking transversely, mysticism having as purpose an 
experience (either of truth, value, or of reality) may be 
achieved through a particular kind of metaphysical conception 
of truth, reality, or value. Similarly, achieving the 
ultimate purpose of a particular metaphysical coherence or 
metaphysics (with value, truth, or reality as its genesis) 
is possible through accounting for the various value-, 
truth-, and reality-experiences characteristic of mysticism. 
This is not to say, of course, that coherence is the pecu-
liar province of the mystic. The monism characteristic of 
mysticism, however, exemplifies one type of coherence. 
It is now the task of this dissertation to select 
from this congeries of relations possible in the sense of 
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genetic priority among the categories of value, truth, and 
reality, that set of relations which appears as temperally 
or psychologically primary. We cannot ask -- and this is 
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very important -- which set of relations are true, valuable, 
or real, without begging the question, because the question 
itself deals with the relations of precisely these terms --
truth, value, and reality. The only question 't'lhich can be 
asked legitimately is 1mich of these categories is prior 
in the above sense. A specific genetic priority is either 
an experiential fact, or a metaphysical, systematic potenti-
ality. 
The earlier result must be reaffirmed: no genetic 
(temporal, psychological) priority can be assigned on in-
ternal grounds. Genetic priority is an accident of tempera-
ment and of environment and association. The accidental --
rather than necessary -- nature of genetic priority, however, 
does not mean the relativity of value, truth, and reality. 
The meaning and nature of these categories -- uithin mysti-
cism -- both as experiences and as metaphysical entities, are 
fixed. The relations obtaining among them, like1dse, are 
not arbitrary. Only genetic priority itself has been shown 
to be arbitrary in the sense that this kind of priority is 
not determined by the internal structure of either value, 
truth, or reality. 
In searching for assumptions, we discover that as 
far as genetic priority is concerned, mysticism is pre-
supposition-free. 
Since the genetically prior in mysticism as meta-
physics or as theory of reality could be either the quest 
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after truth, value, or reality, it is possible to assert 
that what actually is prior in any one given case or system 
can be a matter of free decision. The choice is not bound 
by the nature of mystical metaphysics or theories of reality. 
Since there is no empirical nor logical necessity for a 
specific choice, the priority would be a decision without 
at all affecting the validity of the mystic metaphysical 
system. 
Logical EFiority.--The next topic to be discussed is 
logical priority. Of the three categories (value, truth, and 
reality), \.rhich is logically prior? Logical priority, which 
is distinct from reducibility or equivalence, must be de-
fined. Priority in this sense is predicated on the assump-
tion that we are dealing with a metaphysical system. Mysti-
cism as metaphysics is a relational organization of all 
experiences giving a certain focal position or interpreta-
tion to the mystical experience itself. This metaphysical 
system is in some sense valuable, true, and real; it also 
contains •1Tithin it value, truth, and reality. Nysticism as 
metaphysics or as a theory of reality is a logical and 
empirical system of priorities (given exp eriences and intui-
tively as well as inductively certain logical connections 
such as consistency and empirical coherence) and theorems 
(the coherent organization of this given). 
It follows that logical priority is of three sorts. 
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li'irst, experiences are 1og.ica11y prior because they con-
stitute the raw material of a metaphysical system such as 
sensations in certain kinds of empiricism. Second, logical 
connections (sometimes referred to as rules of procedure) 
and empirical (i.e. inductive) connections are prior be-
- -
cause they constitute the basic 11 g1ue 11 for the metaphysical 
s y stem. Third, certain sub-systems within the larger meta-
physical system may be the logical foundations for the 
system as a whole. Separating the issues in this manner 
will facilitate the task of discovering in what sense value, 
truth, or reality are logically prior. 
Viewing mysticism as experience, no logical priority 
can be assigned to any of the categories in preference to 
another. Mysticism as experience includes value, truth, and 
reality, ~ experiences, as has been pointed out in the 
early part of this chapter. As experiences, value, truth, 
and reality have all an equivalent status -- that of' rat., 
material for metaphysical structuring . Viewing mysticism as 
metaphysics or a theory of reality, on the other hand, truth 
has logical priority. 
It is true that by looking for logical priority t"fe 
have already prejudged the issue as to tiThich category is 
primary. The search for log ical priority, of course, must 
postulate that, in some sense, logical connections are at the 
true root of a mystical metaphysics or theory of reality. 
I-Iotvever, in mysticism, truth is more than logic or consist-
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ency: it is a sense of mystical conviction. Truth, in 
mysticism is mystical intuition, the synthesis of ordinary 
intuition and coherence, because, in some cases, the 
mystical experience is the intuitive over-all view of 
existence. The primitives of mysticism as metaphysics are 
two, experiences and their logical connections. Logical 
connections belong to the category of truth. However, in 
the mystical metaphysics these logical conn~ctions are ~ 
intuited through the extra-logical function of the mind or o:f 
language, as has been pointed out repeatedly. Logical 
connections are therefore true by mystical intuition (in the 
sense of supreme and inescapable conviction). 
Again, logical priority in the first and second sen-
ses, the quest for raw· materials and their 11 glue, 11 places 
truth above the other categories. The ral\1' materials in the 
logical construction of a metaphysical system are the experi-
ences h ·ll1.ich include all three categories) and their 
connections, both in the sense of ordinary common intuition 
as '\'ll'ell as in the sense of coherence, and also, and lastly, 
in the sense of mystical intuition, the sense of mystical 
convincedness. Truth, value, and reality, ~ elements of 
the mystical experience, in combination with truth in ~ 
senses, experiential and metaphysical, constitute the raw 
material or the logically prior for mysticism. The meta-
physical conception of value and reality is based on t h is 
interaction. The anSl'll'er to the question, which category is 
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logically prior, is 11 truth. 11 Logical priority in the third 
sense, as a sub-system within mysticism itself, falls 
squarely on the metaphysical vie"tv of truth, 'tiThich is the 
answer to the question posed. 
Logically prior can also mean 11 reason for • II 
The reason for accepting a certain view· of reality and of 
value is that there are good reasons for such acceptance; 
these views are accepted because they are coherent. To 
this extent truth, as coherence, is logically prior to a 
mystical-metaphysical view of reality -- "t~hich is accepted 
because it is coherent -- and to value. This is, then, an 
additional reason for the priority of truth in the relation 
bet1.reen value, truth, and reality 't·lithin the frame"'·lork of 
mysticism. 
A decision enters the picture here only to the 
followi~g extent: To seek for coherence among the elements 
of a mystical metaphysics is a possible choice. Some 
philosophers have accepted the logical method of constructing 
a metaphysical system by taking account of the mystical 
experience. Stace, to the extent that he is a naturalist, 
or is able to view experience from the perspective of the 
natural or temporal order, is a philosopher of this per-
suasion. Other philosophers have rejected the method of 
logical systematic constructions altogether and been satis-
fied "'..rith the experience itself. Stace, 1.-Ih.en he vie"''II'S mysti-
cism from the perspective of the eternal order, embraces 
this latter decision. 
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Phenomenological Eriority.--The next case in point 
is which category is phenomenologically prior. Phenomeno-
logical priority means descriptively central or irreducible. 
Phenomenologically prior is that which is disclosed, in 
experience, to be immediate and central in importance. 
Phenomenological priority refers to that which is non-
discursive. The question here is, what experience is 
exEerienced as of supreme truth, supreme value, and supreme 
reality. If we say, for example, that a feeling of love is 
really a feeling of security, we engage in phenomenological 
reduction. Experientially speaking -- within the frame-
work of mysticism -- one is partially justified in saying 
that an experience of value is really an experience of truth 
or an experience of reality. Due to the experienced unity 
of these categories, such reduction is legitimate. For 
example, a mystic who finds that the mystical experience is 
first and foremost an experience of self-transcendence, a 
sense of the summum bonum (that is, of values) is inclined 
(and justifiably so) to say that reality- and truth-experi-
ences are really value-experiences, that is, reducible to 
value-experiences. Similar reasoning applies to truth- and 
reality-experiences as phenomenologically prior. As before, 
phenomenological priority in reference to mysticism as 
experience is a matter of temperament, association, and en-
vironment. There are no internal reasons why any of these 
three experiences should be unequivocally or permanently 
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prior. If it is said that reality is really a value 
concept (which is the case with pragmatism), it is equally 
just to call value an aspect of reality. 
Metaphysically speaking, . the situation is di:f.ferent. 
There is no priority of any sort. If value, truth, and 
reality -- in a metaphysical sense are independently 
meaningful none is really another. A description of value 
as a Platonic Form is related~ £Bi .~ identical with God. 
It is true that a phenomenological description of value, 
truth, and reality as metaphysical entities is a strange 
sort of thing. The term "phenomenologically prior" should 
be equated completely with 11 that to which all else is re-
ducible." Truth is not reducible to the reality of a 
Platonic Form or the influx of the divine moment into an 
axiological scale of being, although it might be contended 
that such an account of value-claims is the most coherent 
account possible. Similarly, it might be contended that 
reality is God, or an objective Person. Nonetheless, to give 
a reason for a belief in a particular structure of reality 
and of value is markedly distinct from reducing value and 
reality to truth. It is the case that coherence is the 
reason for the mystical metaphysical conception of value and 
reality; but this was discussed under logical priority. 
H~enomenological priority is, therefore, unjustified meta-
physically but justified in mysticism gua experience. Value, 
truth, and reality, as metaphysical entities, are intimately 
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related to one another, but they are not reducible to one 
another. 
The fundamental and important aspect of this priority 
is the following: phenomenological priority is not a matter 
capable of decision or choice -- and the reason for this is 
an important one. Phenomenological priority deals with an 
analysis of experience qua pure givenness. 1¥e deal here 
lvith the refractory par excellence, not l!Tith that which is 
subject to the possibility of a free choice. What is 
described phenomenologically is precisely that portion of 
any world-view which is U2i subject to the whims of freedom. 
Whatever objective reality there is, is to be found through 
the phenomenological exploration of what is refractory in 
experience. To isolate this refractory is precisely the 
purpose of the phenomenological method. The refractory 
nature of some experience is a given fact -- judgments about 
~ significance are possible, and we must not confuse the 
two. 
Axiological priority.--Next, axiological priority 
must be discussed. As was the case with logical priority, 
the result of the investigation might be predetermined by 
the nature of the question asked. If we ask, what is most 
valuable, it should not be surprising that we will find 
value itself most valuable! However, what ultimately con-
cerns us here is ~ value is ~ valuable. The question 
is, which of these categories is the most important one. 
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1ihat does the question itsel~ mean? This question must be 
analyzed in terms o~ the ~allowing ~ituation. 
Reality is an organization o~ all experiences accord-
ing to an empirically coherent pattern. Is there only one 
possible conception of reality, according to Stace's view 
on mysticism? Is there only ~ coherent organization o~ all 
~acts? 1 No, in one sense, and yes, in another. In one sense 
the-re are many possible yet coherent organizations o~ all 
~acts, according to Stace's mystical position. Religions, 
which are world-views and purport to be, as metaphysics, 
coherent organizations o~ all facts, are inconsistent with 
one another, yet they are all true, in Stace's sense o~ being 
expressions -- adequate to the cultures ~rom which they 
sprang -- o~ one and the same original mystical intuition or 
experience. Theologies, similarly, contradict one another, 
yet they are each true, in Stace 1 s sense. There are anum-
ber of systems o~ reality terminating in the ~ realissimum, 
such as God, the Good, or the Absolute. Conceptions o~ 
reality along these latter lines are, likewise, o~ten in-
consistent with one another; yet again, they may all be true, 
in Stace's sense. Reality is a mixture o~ the mystical ex-
perience-- universally the same --and the individual's 
particular temperament, associations, and historical, 
cultural, and geographic past and present environment. Be-
cause of this unique mixture 111hich is the experience o~ 
reality, there can be many systems o~ reality, all of which 
111 All facts" here means ttall available ~acts." 
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are, in themselves, coherent accounts of the mystical 
experience and all other experiences, even though they may 
disagree with one another. 
One must guard against relativism, however, to the 
extent that -- from the point of view of mysticism -- only 
those conceptions of reality are ~ which have the mysti-
cal experience, consciously or unconsciously, at the f'oci. 
Mysticism, therefore, allows for a certain amount· of 
relativism1 within strict limits. This is not to reject 
coherence as criterion of truth. Any mystical account of 
experiences must have the mystical experience itself at its 
focus, but the total organization must nonetheless be one 
of empirical coherence. 
Whatever definition of truth a philosopher finally 
decides to accept, he must then define truth unambiguously. 
If it is intuition, all mystical intuitions agree; if it is 
coherence, only one meaning of coherence exists, and this 
meaning of truth is recognized with certainty as an intui-
~· But there are numerous ways in which the same facts 
can cohere. The mystical -experience is unchanging; reality, 
as a coherent organization of experiences, can have many 
possible shapes or patterns, due to the very nature of 
coherence. No a priori argument e.xists which rules out more 
than ~ coherent account of all facts. We can therefore say 
that the types of coherences called reality can vary. Truth 
~is. ·r,ef_ers to the relativity of what is "real. 11 
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is not relative, reality is, partially. 
Hol..rever, is there :gositive :groof? Is it possible 
to prove the assertion that more than one coherent aggre-
gate of all the facts is possible? To establish this con-
tention is of central importance for this dissertation. 
! posteriori the question has no answer. No totally coher-
ent system exists until (a) all facts have been discovered 
and (b) absolute tests of coherence have been devised and 
carried out. By these "tests" is . meant the following: In 
order to discover whether a theory is a coherent account of 
an extr~ordinarily large number bf facts (~ available facts, 
that is) a practical method or test must be devised to dis-
cover the existence of this total coherence -- otherwise a 
lifetime would hardly be long enough to examine all these 
facts and their relations to see if coherence obtains. 
Furthermore, a particularly brilliant philosopher might see 
lack of coherence . precisely where heretofore the presence of 
coherence l..ras axiomatic. The only possible answer must be 
sought ~priori. There is no a priori argument in existence 
which excludes the possibility of many genuinely coherent 
1 
systems of facts. This neither proves that many true sys-
terns of reality are possible, nor does it even give assur-
ance that an a priori reason against the possibility of many 
1~hat these facts are cannot be ~tated. Since a 
system cannot be called "metaphysical" until it makes 
assertions about ~ facts, it is neither possible nor 
necessary to enumerate these facts. 
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true systems will never be discovered. On the other hand, 
the manifoldness of ultimate reality is not specifically 
excluded. Two points may~ to corroborate Stace's 
relativistic leanings, relativistic in the sense pointed out 
here, that is, that many systems of reality are possible. 
First, the actual existence of many metaphysical systems, as 
well as religions and theologies -- each of 't,..hich has 
brilliant and tenacious supporters -- gives empirical support 
to the many possible accounts of reality. Second, the struc-
ture of the coherence criterion itself -- which necessitates 
the notion of degrees of truth -- opens this leaning toward 
relativism. Correspondence as a definition of truth, on 
the other hand, implies an absolute. It implies ~ reality 
and ~ knowledge about it that is true. Coherence, however, 
is a mental activity, not a bridge between reality and mind. 
There is one major argument against the relativity 
of reality. Coherence as a criterion of truth will not 
cease to function until ~ super-coherent system covering 
all other systems has been discovered. If a second such 
super-coherent system should be unearthed, the coherence 
criterion demands the creation of a super- super-coherence 
which will envelop both super-coherent systems. This pro-
cess follows from the definition itself of coherence. The 
answer to this objection is as follows. We have here an 
infinite regress. If the supporters of some form of absolut-
ism accept this objection to relativism, they 't,..ill have 
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endorsed the possibility of such an infinite regress, 
which means at the ~ time ~ partial endorsement 2f the 
multiplicity £! possible interpretations £f reality. The 
only true system, in the sense of the only genuinely, that is, 
completely coherent system, is at the end of the line of 
super- and super-super-coherences. Yet the line is infinite, 
that is, has no end, which is to say that no such end exists, 
that no such ultimate coherence can exist. It may, therefore, 
not be unreasonable to agree with Stace, for whom, from the 
point of view of mysticism, reality, as the organization of 
facts around the mystical experience, is relatively relative! 
Professor Bertocci, who rejects the possibility of 
more than one coherent system of facts, will answer this 
relativistic position in somewhat the following way. "This 
relativism is like saying that in view of the available 
facts in a mystery-story several people could have committed 
the same murder. But the real solution is: Which one is 
the most likely one in view of the data?" 
To this objection the author of the dissertation has 
three replies. First, the analogy between a mystery-story 
and a metaphysical system is faulty. A mystery-story deals 
with a carefully delimited number of facts for which there 
is only one 11 solution 11 or one coherent account. The same is 
not necessarily true of interpretations of ~ facts. Second, 
the murderer involved and his act, are one of the fac5s of the 
situation, which is the mystery-story. We infer this fact 
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from other facts. The inference relation here is quite 
different from inferring the existence of electrons on the 
basis of trails in a cloud chamber, or inferring the exist-
ence of God on the basis of the abstraction of change found 
in nature. We might say that the murderer and his act are 
of the same ontological type as the other facts in the 
mystery-story, whereas the electron and God are both differ-
ent ontological types from the facts that are given in 
evidence for their respective existence. The difference in 
ontological types is that the "facts" of the mystery-story 
are the kind that are capable of direct or immediate or 
even sensory experience, whereas electrons and God (except 
in mysticism) are not at all experienceable in this same 
sense. Finally, what is called "facts" in a mystery-story 
is already a "coherent interpretation of the given. 11 That 
is to say, a 11 fact 11 is a freely chosen organization of 
experience for the sake of the preservation of a value. A 
fact, in other words, is not a fact in any inexorable or 
absolute sense but varies with and depends upon context. 
This point is expanded in Chapter IV. At this juncture it 
might be quite possible to give a different series of facts 
or classifications as descriptive of the given situation. 
The question of axiological priority can now be 
asked lrith a better understanding of the real issues in-
volved. With the postulation of a multiplicity of concep-
tions of reality from which to choose, how is this choice to 
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be accomplished? Since coherence is fixed and conceptions 
of reality variable or multiple, the question becomes, what 
determines the nature of the variable. The answer, almost 
by default, since only one candidate is available, is a free 
decision, meaning thereby any decision. Free choice is the 
most important determinant in deciding ·what is real. 1 It 
must be emphasized that this conclusion regarding the free 
choice of truth and reality is contingent on the possibility 
of a plurality of coherent interpretations of all facts, 
interpretations which are internally consistent yet mutually 
contradictory. The "coherent systems 11 referred to here are 
not equivalent to untested or unverified hypotheses. 
N:an has the burden to decide which system of reality-
metaphysics is to be chosen on the basis of a truth-meta-
physics which is coherence. This is a fundamental conclusion. 
vlhat would be two equally coherent accounts? Stace suggests 
religions: He maintains that they are all true, that is, 
coherent. One might further suggest any number of conflict-
ing metaphysical theories. Analysis might conceivably dis-
close that only one system is genuinely coherent. But this 
cannot be t he p lace for such all-encompassing analysis. 
One of the conclusions of axiological priority is 
that -- in the context of this discussion of mysticism 
truth is refractory, is not a matter of choice. Truth is 
1 Real, in this context, is synonymous with "theory 
of t h e real. 11 
.3.38 
experienced as coherence~ as the coherent organization of 
experiences themselves. Reality, in this perspective, being 
that coherent organization, can vary, that is, is not re-
fractory. It follows that the choice among possible coher-
ent accounts of experiences the choice among possible 
candidates for 11 reality 11 -- is a matter subject to decision; 
it is a ~ possibility. 
Assumptions 
We are now dealing more particularly with the 
logical relations involved in the metaphysics of mysticism 
and abandoning phenomenological descriptions. An assumption, 
or nresupposition, as used here and used in Chapter II, is 
a proposition that must be asserted (although as a rule ll 
not asserted by the philosopher whose assumptions are being 
scrutinized) ~ the assertion of the major tenets of a 
metaphysical position. The logical relation bet"t-teen an 
assumption and the metaphysical system is one of 11 i:f, and 
only i:f 11 or II = 
-
II 
1. The present assumption is derived from considera-
tions of mysticism in its phenomenological mode of value-
experience. The experience of value, found in the mystical 
experience (and this is true of~ experiences) is not a 
freely chosen presupposition. Quite the contrary, an 
experience, such as this value-experience, is a refractory 
fact. A clarification is necessary here. To be thoroughly 
precise, it must be asserted that whether the experience 
itself occurs or not is at least to some degree -- a 
matter o:f choice. \jhat is not subject to choice is the 
guality o:f the experience, once had. That the mystical 
experience is an experience o:f the nature of man's summum 
bonum is not subject to choice, is not an assumption or a 
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presupposition. On the other hand, the mystical experience 
itself is subject to choice in the sense that we can choose 
the path, if not the grace that is equally necessary (depend-
ing on the theology in terms of which this statement is made). 
It is assumed or presupposed that it is desirable to choose 
the mystical experience ., or, simply, a mystic chooses the 
path which~ lea1 h!ffi (he hopes) !£~state of ecstasy 
referred i£ ~~mystical experience. 
2. The next assumption is that of the possibilit;z 
of ~ mystical experience. This is also derived from the mode 
of value-experience. The mystical experience is not only 
viewed as (a) a fact, but also (b) as a goal. As a goal 
it can be seen -- universally -- to be a possibility. As 
a fact, we must either have faith or search for evidence. 
Yet 11 searching for evidence 11 is a procedure or an event 
occurring within the naturalistic realm, a realm which the 
mystical experience discloses as illusory. To seek evidence 
for the existence of the mystical experience is like seeking 
for evidence (and consider it valid) in a dream for the 
existence of a waking state. 
Evidence for the mystical experience can be sought 
only from the naturalistic perspective. The term 11 evidence 11 
is meaningless from within the mystical experience itself. 
The presupposition is that the mystical experience 
exists, and (which is related) that it is a possibility. If 
viewed only as a possibility, it is a goal. 
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.3. Another assumption in Stace's approach to 
mysticism is the :feasibility, .2.!:. ~ truth, .Q.f. talking .2.f. 
~ perspectives ££ ~ orders. The question here to be 
asked is, what is the ground :for stating that there are two 
perspectives, the naturalistic or temporal one, and the 
eternal or mystical one. Are there perhaps three, or just 
one? How absolute, how unchangeable is the statement that 
the proper interpretation of existence and experience is in 
terms of two (and especially the specific onesenunci.ated) 
perspectives? \ihy not three, or just one? Stace chooses 
to viel"" existence in terms o:f this particular bifurcation. 
4. The :fourth assumption is ~ possibility £! 
transcendence. Another version o:f this assumption is that 
the term 11 transcendence 11 is a truly meaningful term. The 
summum bonum of' the mystic 11 surpasseth understanding; 11 it 
is ineffable. This means that the mystic's summum bonum 
surpasses ordinary logical or rational experience. Mysti-
cism expresses itself in paradoxes. Paradoxical statements 
-- ostensively in violation of the law o:f excluded middle 
~ accepted ~meaningful. Another way of stating this 
assumption is in terms of a meaning criterion. Just as the 
positivist chooses his meaning criterion in such a 1-.ray that 
metaphysical and poetic statements are excluded and that 
scientific and protocol statements are included, the mystic 
chooses ~ meaning criterion to include and accept paradoxes 
and analogies, and at the same time so as to exclude and 
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reject literal statements, statements in a sense- or 
object-language. 
5. Related to the previous assumption is the 
position or presupposition that "extra-logical or extra-
rational cognition" is a meaningful -- and perhaps a 11 valid 11 
-- term to use. When the mystical experience as truth-
experience is experienced as ineffable, and when the mysti-
cal experience as reality-experience is vie·w·ed as infinite, 
the assumption is made that extra-logical cognition is 
possible and ~ the ultimate nature o:f reality ~ itself 
extra-logical. The assumption here also is that it is 
meaningful to talk o:f ineffability and infinity. 
6. vfuat, in turn, is involved in the assumption 
that ineffability is possible and meaningful? Involved is 
that the totality of experiences is not exhausted by the 
terms 11 reason, 11 11 emotions, 11 and 11 sensations. 11 Instead of 
classifying all non-mystical experiences i nto these three 
classes, we might profitably use Professor Bertocci 1 s nine 
classes. In this case we state that the totality of experi-
ences is not exhausted by man's activities of "sensing, 
remembering, imaginin~, tl1inking, feeling, emoting, oughting , 
willing, and appreciating. 111 The totality of most men's 
experiences may be exhausted by these classes of experiences. 
1 Peter A. Bertocci, 11 The Person as the Key Metaphysi-
cal Principle, 11 Philosophy ~ Phenomenolot'sical Research, 
Vol. XVII, No • . rr ( De cember, 1956). 
The mystical experience is said to be altogether extraneous 
to these classi:fications o:f man's 11 natural 11 experiences. 
That this possibility exists is not obvious, and is assumed 
i n any mystical 't'lorld-view. Involved or assumed in this 
notion of ine:f:fability is that once the mystical experience 
has been obtained, 't'le l'rill and can intuitively compare that 
experience with experiences listed under the other categories 
o:f reason, emotions, and sensations, and l'le '\dll recogn ize 
that the mystical experience is altog ether di:f:ferent :from 
these. 1"/e assume that, since language derives :from the 'tvorld 
of reason, emotions, and sensations, languag e cannot deal 
with tha t new experience. 
When Stace contends that the 11 theory of' mystical 
ine:f:fability • is :false 111 he, in fact, admits that he 
make s the above assumption. That is to say, :for Stace it 
must be meaning:ful to talk of inef:fability, since i n ef'fa-
bility really re:fers to some type o:f experience. And if 
this re:ference is true, then it is incorrect to say that all 
human experiences are analyzable in terms of' reason, :feelings 
or emotions, and sensations. 
7. The next assumption is derived from mysticism as 
metaphysics. Unity is present in truth, value, and reali ty , 
when it comes to mysticism. That the metaphysics is on e of' 
unity presupposes, on the metaphysical level, that it is 
11\falter T . Stace, ~ and E~ernity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952), p. J6. 
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Eossible !£ dispense ~ subject-object bifurcations. Now, 
in fact such is not done, such is not the case 
think, write, or feel 1'lithout such bifurcation 
one cannot 
except in 
the case of the mystical experience. The experience itself 
is necessary in order to open up such a possibility. It 
stands to reason that the conception of unity in the mysti-
cal metaphysics presupposes an inkling or a spark of the 
experience itself. 
On the logical level, a unitary, coherent view or 
interpretation of all facts is not actually experienced, 
but is in fact only a logical possibility. That is to say, 
one can utter the '\'lords 11 the subject-object bifurcation does 
not exist 11 in the same 1-ray as anyone can utter the '\'lords 
11 space and time are infinite;" yet it is quite clear that 
neither proposition can be visualized or clearly conceived. 
The assumption is that there is meaning in these words. But 
the meaning can exist only in the :face or memory of' t h e 
mystical exp erience itself'. It follows that conceiving ~ 
the possibility of the mystical metaphysics presupposes ~ 
mystical experience itself, even in minimal :form. In a way, 
all those 't'lho contemplate the possibility of' mysticism are 
partial mystics already . 
8. Consciousness is viet'/ed by Stace (in his position 
on mysticism) as fundamental to the conception of the mysti-
cal reality. Reality is experienced as being pure conscious-
ness. ~he assumption here can be expressed as :follows: 
strictly speaking, no w·ord applies literally to the mystical 
exp erience. If consciousness is to apply to the mode of 
reality-experience, the term "consciousness" must be taken 
symbolically. Such symbolism means one of t"tfO thing s, or 
both. (a) Consciousness is a fruitful root-metaphor in 
tenns of which we can express or describe the reality mode 
of the mystical experience. Consciousness, of course, is 
a metaphor derived :from the ordinary or naturalistic mode of 
experience. It is a personal decision, capable of free 
choice, to accept consciousness as a root-metaphor. (b) 
Consciousness is a clue to the reality mode of the mystical 
experience. Consciousness represents a spark invading the 
realm of ordinary or natural experience, a spark spring ing 
from the mystical experience itself. Consciousness may then 
well be used as a metaphor or, as Stace 'tvould put it, as a 
symbol. The symbol is meaning ful only because it already 
gives a hint at what it symbolizes. This symbol, then, is 
~ pur£ metaphor. ~ assumntion ~ is ~ consciousness 
~ discovered introspectively ~ ordinary experience ~ ~ 
sign 2!'.. symbol -- !!:_ spark -- pointing to .!b£ reality ~ of 
~ mystical experience. This has been seen to be an assump-
tion, not a fact. 
9. In using intuition as definition and criterion 
of truth (mysticism as truth-metaphysics), Stace assumes, of 
course, that intuition is an adequate definition a nd criteri-
on. If -.;-ve assume intuition to be an adequate definition of 
truth we assert, in fact, that truth is an inunediat·e con-
frontation, an immediate vision or experience. This 
definition of truth limits the truth to the experienced. 
\~Lat is inferred (~, not experienced) can only be true to 
the degree that the process of inference itself is experi-
enced or intuited as true. fu1y inference unrunbiguously 
beyond experience is not encompassed by this definition 
of' truth. It follo"tli'S that mysticism as a metaphysical 
inference from the mystical experience is seriously limited 
by this definition of truth. In choosing intuition, Stace 1 s 
mysticism chooses a limitation l~Lich may be characterized 
as a kind of subjectivism, since using intuition as the 
meaning or de.finition of truth does not carry with it that 
referen ce to an other, a non-subject (object), which, for 
instance, is the case with correspondence as a definition 
of truth. 
The choice of' intuition as a criterion of truth 
carries with it the assumption that what the lumen naturalis 
illuminates as convincing or beyond doubt is binding on the 
universe. If we postulate a duality bet1veen experiences and 
the universe, intuition as a criterion of truth involves the 
assumption that what the mind sees as irrevocable or true 
is true in the world as 't'.rell. This assumption carries w·ith 
it the need to postulate a connection or closeness of some 
sort bet"t1feen experiences {or the mind 1..rhich may be vie"'.'>]'ed 
as the center of these experiences) and the world beyond. 
If' this connect ion (the nature of' t-Jhich need not be speci-
fied here) exists, the world becomes an extension of mind, 
or, of course, vice-versa, that is, the mind is seen as an 
extension of the world. In either case, rationalism or 
idealism (or both) ensue as types of' metaphysical systems 
following upon using intuition as a criterion of truth. 
~ assert intuition ~ ~ criterion 2£ truth is to assert 
~ very close ll.!!!f £f. !!!Y-~ ~ ~ "t..rorld. 
If we reject the duality bett..reen mind and t-Torld in 
connection with analyzing intuition as a criterion of truth, 
then this criterion implies a high degree of subjectivity. 
b~at is experienced as true is true because this truth applies 
only to the experienced subjectivity in the first place. 
The situation here is identical with the one discussed in 
connection with intuition as a definition of truth. 
10. In relation to assumption 5, Stace must be 
understood to assume the possibility of' symbolism. A "tvord 
must be able to mean t1hat it does not obviously refer to. 
A '\'lord must be able to evol::e, not only point. Similarities 
bettveen the symbol and l..rhat it symbolizes must lead to ne1v 
conceptions, nelv experiences, ne"t'IT realizations. 1'Je can 
never refer to the mystical experience directly, but we can 
hint at it and consequently perhaps bring it about by means 
of symbolism. The assumption here is that the function of' 
language -- as well as the fundamental relation between 
language and being -- is highly complex, that is, not ex-
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elusively referential. By assigning to symbolism a central 
place in the conception of a true mystical metaphysics, 
Stace tacitly rejects the simple conception of language 
found among linguistic or logical analysts. For the latter, 
in the duality of language and w·orld or language and ex-
periences, each word and each combination of words has a 
customary event or experience (or cluster or family of events 
or experiences) to which it refers. This act of reference 
is called meaning. Stace 1 s assumption, evidenced by his 
use of symbolism, is, in fact, that part of the events or 
experiences can be created by language itself'. A mystical 
experience can be brought into actuality, a whole new con-
ception of' existence can be realized, through the trans-
formations within language. Symbolism can transform our 
ordinary 't'lOrld-view to a mystical one. This transformation 
which can occur, for instance, through the symbolism found 
in scriptural parables -- is called conversion. The accept-
~ .2.f. symbolism assumes an intimate, ~ sometimes causal, 
interrelation behv-een lan:5uage ~ being. 
11. This assumption may be called that of ~ 
possibility .Q.[ acosmism. To view the world of ordinary 
experience as illusion, as unreal, is to transfer the meaning 
of' the term 11 real. 11 Stace implicitly interprets the 1v-ord 
ttreal 11 to mean a kind o:f commitment, a ltind of basic choice. 
Naturalism is characterized by calling the natural order ~' 
by conm1itting itself' to this order, by valuine; this order. 
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N:ysticism commits itsel:f to the eternal order; it 't..rith-
draus allegiance f'rom the natural order. The fundamental 
assumption in the possibility of' acosmism is that 11 reaiity 11 
is ~ unQ£..anging, absolute, and discoverable, but rather 
is ~ te.rm. applica~ egually ~' 2£. 't'lith egual legitimacy, 
to at leas~ two separate realms .2£. ord~. Neither order 
has the prerogative of' being 11 really11 real. Both are 
equally real. The difference lies in the f'act that to assign 
reality to one or to the other involves a major (or the major) 
commitment in a person's world-vie't-; and lif'e. Reality, to 
some extent, is not something antecedently existent and to 
be discovered but rather, reality is in a very real sense 
something to be chosen, to be decided upon. 
12. This chapter on mysticism is based on Stace's 
conception of' the my stical experience and attendant meta-
physics. The reason f'or this choice is (a } Stace 1 s adequate 
a n d rather comprehensive treatment of mysticism, and (b)his ear-
lier 't'lell-k nO't\rn over-all naturalistic position. Stace, con-
sequently , i n cludes naturalism, which he calls 11 the only 
purely rational philosophy111 in his highly sympathetic and 
empath ic analysis of mysticism. 
Beyond this point there are disagreements between 
Stace and the position tak en in this dissertation. The 
dissertation asserts that several metaphysical systems can 
be equally eohe.rent .. , Ell11pirical1:y -- 't..rhich includes log ical 
1 Ibid.' p. 161. 
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consistency. It follo't-rS that a logically consistent and 
empirically coherent metaphysics of mysticism is a distinct 
possibility and perhaps even an actuality somewhere among 
i:;he multifarious systems of Oriental or Occidental mysticiam. 
Stace rejects the possibility of consistency in a mystical 
metaphysics 111hen he 111-ri tes, 
The attempt to state the nature of the Ultimate in 
logical propositions necessarily produces contradictions.l 
Contradictions necessarily break out in all phil~so­
phies whose source and inspiration is mysticism. 
Pl-'lilosophies based on mys;icism always contain ir-
resoluble contradictions. 
Contradictions allv-ays break out in their Lmystics 't1Tho 
't1TOuld ordinarily be called philosopherJ philosophies, 
in spite of their efforts to suppress or conceal them. 
The contradictions cannot be got rid of, because they 
lie at the very center of the mystical source from 
uhich these philosophies proceed. But the philosopher 
is usually not a1-1are of this situation. He therefore 
struggles to rid himself of the coni:;radictions. For 
to have contradictions,in his system is contrary to 
his p rofessional code.~ 
The difference of opinion can be settled, or at least aired, 
by a careful analysis and subsequent definition of consist-
ency. The author of the dissertation thinks of the connect-
ives 't-rithin a mystical metaphysics -- the relations obtaining 
among the empirical components of this metaphysics as 
having a consistent logic of their o1m. The logic of 
1 Ibid.' p. 157· 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid. , P • 158. 
!J-Ib' ~d., P• 160. 
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naturalism might contrad ict the lo gic of mysticism -- but 
i nt ernally e a ch log ic is (or can be ma de to be) con sistent . 
The position this dissertation ultimately takes is that 
the decision b etween logics is a choice rather t han a so-
called objective and discoverable con stituent of reality. 
The fundamen tal assumption h ere is t hat Stace chooses to 
accept ~ log ic £f. n aturalism ~ ~ so-called 11~r: 
log ic, the log ic which defines consisten~ for all other 
logics, ~ logi c which is the measure of adeguacy for all 
other logics, the logic to vrhich ~ oth er logics mus t be 
reduced .2.E. of t-rhich they ~ be £ sub-class, ~' ul timat el,y, 
~ logic which ~ definitive of reality. He thus never 
quite escapes h is naturalism, h is g enerous efforts notwith-
standing. To him, the log ic of mystical metaphysics is 
alogical. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
CONCLUSION: THE BASIC ROLE OF FREEDOM .AND CHOICE IN 
THE STRUCTURE OF TRUTH AND REALITY 
Introduction 
The broad purpose o~ the dissertation is to ~ind 
means to settle or at least understand philosophic disputes 
~rom a single point o~ view. The two individual philoso-
phers discussed were brought in to show the structure o~ 
representative divergent philosophic viewpoints and to open 
the path ~or possible intellectual reconciliation. The more 
speci~ic purpose o~ this writing is to show that the solu-
tion o£ the above problem depends on showing 1dlat the 
author believes to be the case at this stage o£ his philoso-
phic maturity -- that truth and reality are ultimately 
£ounded on and determined in their nature by a £ree choice 
o~ values. 
A necessary but not su~£icient criterion o£ truth 
and reality is here called the set o£ determinates, one o~ 
l{hich is consistency. The dissertation contends that any 
good metaphysical system consists o~ a consistent arrange-
ment o£ all available £acts, or events, or existences. 
Tl~ese available ~acts lend themselves to perhaps an in£inite 
variety o~ interpretations or consistent arrangements. The 
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basis upon which one rather than another o£ the infinite 
variety o£ metaphysical possibilities is chosen is due, in 
last analysis, to a :free choice of values. Such is the 
contention o£ this dissertation. 
This phenomenon called 11 £ree choice of' values" can-
not be defined with utmost exactitude f'or reasons 1;-.rithin 
its own nature; nonetheless, it is at the root of' all 
decisions :for assent or dissent in respect to metaphysical 
systems. 
• 
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Metaphysics and Meta-Metaphysics 
Metaphysics attempts unification of the totality 
of experience. The natural motion of the human mind is 
to•.;ards increasing cohesiveness or unification of its 
experiences. Thought proceeds from the lesser unities of 
concepts and objects, through theories in science and 
axiology, and classifications, on to a finality l'll'lich, by 
extrapolation, appears to unfold into an ultimate and total 
oneness. Therefore to understand means to unity. The mind 
is one because the stream of consciousness is intuitively 
continuous and one. To lmo"t.; is for the mind to assimilate, 
absorb, or possess the greatest possible number of experi-
ences at one time in one vision. The mind's method of 
knowledge or assimilation is therefore unification. The 
mind seeks the highest peal<: from which to survey all exist-
_ence. Absolute lcno1-rledge -- such as Aristotle 1 s God contem-
plating himself, or Spinoza~s eternal vision of monolithic 
Substance -- is absolute unification of all experiences. 
Absolute unity is unity not only of far and near, that is, 
of space, but also of past and future. The unification of 
past and future into a present totality is termed "eternity." 
The end of thought, consequently, is one eternal all-in-
clusive vision held by one mind. 
On the non-metaphysical level of semantic analysis, 
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the terms 11 uni:fication o:f experience," 11natural motion of 
the human mind," 11 cohesiveness, 11 11 the unity of' mind," 
11vision, 11 11 eternity, 11 and others, are in want o:f unambigu-
ous de:finitions. Such "unambiguity, 11 hol..rever, -- l"lhich, 
in one view, might demand the concept's resolution into sensa 
and logical patterns, and possibly also into dispositions 
is an impoverished replica o:f the phenomenological pleni-
tude o:f meaning. It lrlll thus be su:f:ficient to justify 
as inescapable the abundant use o:f terms l..rith relatively 
unspeci:fic definitions. 
Given the above de:finition o:f metaphysics, the 
purpose o:f this Chapter is to analyze the problem o:f meta-
physical di:f:ferences and to seek a pathway towards their 
resolution. The platitude that metaphysical logomachies 
exist has meaning on two levels. First, metaphysical sys-
tems contradict one another by accepting di:f:ferent and 
opposite ultimate principles o:f explanation. Idealism 
opposes materialism by the (simpli:fied) ·contradiction that 
the only and the ultimately real is mind, as against the 
proposition that the only and the ultimately real is matter. 
Monism opposes pluralism .on similar grounds. Second, meta-
physical systems oppose one another by claiming various 
degrees o:f inclusiveness and coherence. Metaphysical sys-
tems 't'lhich are in apparent opposition may be vie't..red as 
components of a Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis chain 
in 'td~ich just about each new system incorporates all previous 
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ones. In final analysis, probably both of these two views 
of metaphysical logomachie.s are true. The present Chapter 
seeks resolution for both types of conflict. 
This Chapter contains statements proposing ways to 
resolve or at least localize metaphysical disagreements. In 
the light of the first view of the nature of metaphysical 
logomachies -- the contradictions about what substance is 
ultimately real -- a so-called meta-metaphysics must be 
found to subsume all particular metaphysics as instantiations 
of itself. In the light of the second -- Hegelian -- view of 
the nature of metaphysical disputes, the meta-metaphysics 
here discussed purports to be the end of the chain of 
increasing coherence. 
The following is an attempt to construct a scheme 
sufficiently comprehensive to allow to derive from itself 
any possible metaphysics. This structure is referred to as 
a meta-metaphysics. While metaphysics may deal with cate-
gories, here we deal with meta-categories into which these 
metaphysical categories can be classified or from which they 
can be derived. These meta-categories (which, for the sake 
of simplicity will henceforth be re:ferred to simply as 
"categories") are foura the given, value-choice, classifi-
cations, and the determinates. Each category must be de-
f'ined with care, their interrelations uncovered, and the 
heuristic properties of such a scheme explored. In addition, 
it must be noted that many of these categories give birth 
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to others, called subcategories. 
~ given.--The defining characteristic of the given 
is twofold. :fi'rst, the given is there, thrust, presented. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, from this perspective, every-
thing is given: sense perceptions as well as concepts or 
constructs. Second, the given is defined by its function 
within the confines of individual metaphysical systems. The 
given is that which functions as the ground or logical basis 
for inferences about. the nature of reality. From this per-
spective, however, not everything is given; for example, 
sense perceptions and concepts can both be viewed as philo-
sophical pestal~ rather than given. 
The given as defined in this paper is symbolized by 
~ , as indicating the summation of all experiences and con-
structs and as being partially equivalent to Heidegger's 
use of§.!!!!,, or the general metaphysical use of "Being." 
The given, or Z:. , might be defined, therefore, as the syn-
thesis of two antithetical definitions of the given. First, 
as indicated above, ~ is defined by its thereness. The 
given is an existence, something to be discovered, to be 
recognized., to be apprehended. In this way, everything is 
given. However, the lack of differentiations within this 
concept makes it non-heuristic, which is<_among the psychologi-
cal causes for the abandonment (in some places) in recent 
times of ~~ Being, or Beingness as a fundamental subject 
/ 
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for philosophic discussion. Second, the given is defined 
by its function, to be the starting point, the basis, of a 
metaphysical view of reality. The given as function is 
variable, but it does have specific content. Metaphysics 
differ in what they construe to be the unchanging basis 
upon which the systematic superstructure is to be grounded. 
The given., or ~ , must therefore be a synthesis 
of the two definitions of the given. Let us term the given 
as everything or as existing, as .. .§.2!!1 or Being., temporarily 
Se' and the given as function, Sf. The total meaning of ~ 
must then be defined as the logical sum of Sf · and Se. ~ 
is one of the basic categories of the meta-metaphysics 
explored in this paper. It consists, however, of two contra-
dictory notions. To avoid confusion, therefore, let us term 
S , Sein or Being as everything, simply 1:. , as the real, 
e-
genuine, true, and important definition of the given, and let 
us call S -- a regional designation within ~ f -- simply 
by s. Sis the specific metaphysics', not the meta-meta-
physics' meaning o:f the given. 
lVhat has been done here, in fact, is to separate two 
meanings out of' "the given" and we have reformulated our 
definition. The symbol " l: 11 corresponds to the "thereness, 
presentation" aspect of' the given (which becomes the author's 
definition of "the given"), whereas the symbol ''s" corres-
ponds to the functional definition o:f the given, the specific 
content. S is the given for a metaphysical system; ~ is 
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the given for the meta-metaphysics developed here. 
~ ' formerly Se, the given as everything , is a 
more comprehensive n otion than Sf' the given as function, 
now referred to as S. S is a designation, delimitation 
w·ithin L . Everything is given as e xi stent in the sense 
of 11 being there 11 or being a "presentation." A metaphysics, 
or an epistemology, chooses an area '\~ithin the given, S, 
which is g iven the label ~' £L source of information 
about ~ ~· In a sense, then, the given is everything 
and part of everything. rrhis rather non-rational definition 
has these advantages: {1) It is general enough {by virtue 
of L ) to contain '\dthin it all latent phenomenolog ical 
accounts of the given. vn~atever may be leg itimately called 
11 the g iven11 -- and legitimacy is determined by the function 
the g iven occupies in a metaphysical system is included 
in L · (2) It is specific enough to cover the g iven of 
all metaphysical systems -- actual and potential -- because 
of the variable S. Yet this variable is the defining char-
acteristic of the g iven. The g iven really is everything 
-there is { ~ ), yet a metaphysics singles out a region 
w·ithin everything to call the given {s). That reg ion , S, 
is called real, or a clue to or g round for reality, and the 
remainder of everything ( J: - S) is reduced to or inter-
preted in terms of or through this given s. 11 S" and 11 root-
metaphor 11 are not the same. A root-metaphor may or may not 
be part of the g iven in experience. The root-metaphor 
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indicates the nat ure or structure of the organization of all 
available facts. The root-metaphor (such as a machine in 
mechanism) is at best ~ of the facts of experience referred 
to as 11 g iven, 11 certainly not the totality of these g iven 
f acts • . Th e g iven as ~ occupies a leading position in 
the categorial scheme of this meta-metaphysics. The 
position of the g iven is determined 
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by the relati.on it has li'ith the other . categories of' a . meta-
metaphysics. The given, before it is specified and de-
limited by the nature of' any particular metaphysics, is ~ , 
or everything.. The given., . af'ter . it has been absorbed by a 
particular metaphysics, becomes s, or the raw material f'or a 
specific metaphysical system or superstructure. The given, 
~ , may therefore be viewed, not as a strict category 
since it is nothing differentiated f'rom anything else -- . 
but as the only non-category or anticategory. This fluidity 
precludes any generalized metaphysical commitments, such 
as may lead to a 11 block universe." By defining the given 
ambiguously, or at least fluidly, room is allowed for such 
divergencies as between Heraclitus and Parmenides, Bergson 
and Royce. Furthermore, the basic ambiguity in the given 
allows for rationalistic as well as empiricist metaphysics, 
and also makes room for non-rationalistic positions such as 
existentialism and mysticism. The element of non-rationalism 
must be introduced at the root of' the meta-metaphysics to 
allow for the eventual synthesis o:f such divergent express-
ions of linguistic givenness as poetry and logic, sensation, 
sleep, and non-existence, and even to permit an analysis of' 
rationality itself. 
Only S can function as the basis of' a metaphysical 
system. The concept ~ leaves nothing to be added as a 
structure on the raw data. The given as function (S) is 
present in all metaphysics. Yet the specific content is 
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extraordinar.ily variab1e. The, given. may be sense data, 
impressions, pure experi.enc.e, presentations, . objects ., events, 
ordinary language; connnon sense, conunon knowledge., man's 
state !!!, medias~: his everydayness, man's existential 
situation, his con~rontation lvi.th nothingness, and choice. 
The given may be one, any number, or all, of these possi-
bilities, or additional possibilities. 
To ~urther clarify the meanings of the given, let us 
analyze the question, to what extent the given is really a 
category. A category is art ultimate principle o~ classi~i-
cation. From the point of view o~ ~ , S is truly a cate-
gory, because S is one area o~ L The notion o~ ~ 
' 
on the other hand, classi~ies nothing; all classi~ications 
are within 2:. ; there is nothing outside L 
represent the other side o~ the ~ence to ~ • 
which can 
Lis akin 
to pure Being or ~· Sein, .. or 2: , phenomenologically 
conceived, is so ~luid and so basic that it cannot be cate-
gorized. It follows, there~ox-e, that L may appropriately 
be termed acategorial or an anticategory. Strictly speaking, 
~ or ~ itsel~ can only be discussed in a very general, 
perhaps metaphorical, analogical., or poetic way, or in any 
other non-conceptual manner that may seem appropriate. Con-
ceptual precision, and this is :fundamental, is merel.y one 
mode of L or Being. 
The terms definition, delimitation, determination 
are all inaccurate when they are applied to characteriza-
tions o:f .Being or L . All these terms designate the 
intellectual . activity of cutting o:f:f (Whitehead calls it 
11 decision 11 ) one area of a larger whole. When. '2:_ is 
characteri.zed., no larger whole :from .which an area can be 
delimited exists. The notion o:f L represents the largest 
area of all; it includes all areas. The referent of any 
term is a limitation o:f ~ • This all-encompassing 
property of ~ gives it the right to be called the only 
anticategory. Any generalization as to the function of 
words, generalizations which may be considered to be the 
business o£ semantics and especially of semiotics., may very 
well apply to liOrds universally, but ~-~- :fundamental .. 
exception of_ k..~ Any theory of the :function o£ words ipso 
facto does not apply to how the word or symbol "2:. :functions. 
This is true because 2: does not classify, as do cate-
gories; ~ is acategorial. Also, ~ is not a construct; 
rather, all constructs are within L Since '2: does not 
designate as other words do ., 2:. can, conceivably, be char-
acterized paradoxically. In a way, 2::_ is everything and 
nothing. ~ is the summary whole, as well as being repre-
sented (as Sein) in all its parts. .2:_ can only be char-
acterized phenomenologically, and even this latter attempt 
must :fail, since phenomenology is inescapably tethered to 
language. And language is only one mode of ~' L ; it 
is only one area within L . The languages o:f literature, 
poetry, mysticism, and religion present evidence :for these 
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extralogi,ca1 uses of' language .. 2_ is both logical . and. 
extralogical and must be charact.erized .with these limita-
tions (or possibilities for expansion) in mind. 
In sununary, the given is ambiguous. For the purpose 
of a meta-metaphysics, the given as the . ral-r material for 
metaphysical construction is defined as ~ , or everything, 
to the extent that everything is thePe, present ., thrust 
upon us in one way or another. But we must not forget that 
when dealing within metaphysical systems, the given becomes 
s, or a specified set of experiences, delimited from L by 
more or less precise criteria. A synonym for 2_ may be Being. 
The anticategory 2_ gives birth to all categories. 
N:etaphysical systems are arrangements of or 1-'lithin L . 
The given, or Being, , gives birth, as it "tiere, by inter-
nal differentiation, to categorizations within it, which are 
valuation~ choice (referred to as value-choice), and the 
determinates, which in turn combine to form classifications. 
~ choice ... .2f.. values .~. the ,determinates. --The anti-
category of the given or Being, as ~ , is to be divided 
into the free and the refractory, the free and the unchange-
able. The anticategory Z. itself is undifferentiated. This 
is the first . level. The meta-metaphysics developed here 
differentiates this anticategory into categ ories. These 
differentiations occur at "higher1,1levels. The differentiation 
of 2:_ into the free and the refractory occurs .on the second 
level. 1ve refer to a segment of the totality of our experi-
3 6.5 
ences, that is~ to a segment of the anticategory ~ , as 
choice situations~ as instanc.es of free choosing or as 
occasions in tmi.ch . free choice would at least have been 
possible or relevant . Choice usua11y entails a valuation, (v), 
because choice (when 11 ethical 11 ) is a commitment to some 
specific values. The fields of ethics and axiology generally 
make thi.s area o:f' the anticategory ~ or Being their 
province. This area of L is termed here the category of 
free-choice or of :free-possibility. lie could use the term :f, 
"value-choice" to point out that the type of' choice here 
re:ferred to is a commitment about certai.n values. This cate-
gory is associated -- to which extent is not analyzed in 
this Chapter -- with the words consciousness, awareness, 
sel:f', and I. On the other hand, that part o:f' experience or 
of the anticategory 2._ or Being which is not subject to 
cho:i..ce is termed ~ determinate. . This area o:f ~ could 
equally be termed the "realm o:f' possibilities," since 
choices are garnered :from this realm. The determinate, (.d) in 
turn, has two components: logic --which reduces to con-
sistency or self-consistent or non-contradictory systems --
and what may be called the empirical refractory, primarily 
sense experience. The existence and nature o:f' the deter-
minates is :frequently used as argument :for the independent 
existence of' an external world. Since I appear not to be 
the cause or author o:f' either the laws of' logic or the 
requirements :for consistency, n or of' the empirical givenness 
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-- that precise conf'iguration o:f colors and shapes I see 
lmen I open my eyes, or that particular aggregation o:f 
sounds and harmonies I hear when I am attentive to a 
symphony -- there must be a cause or author extraneous to me, 
responsible for my logic and sensa. This cause or author, 
for example, is matter :for Descartes, and God :for Berkeley. 
The requirements :for systematic consistency are not subject 
to choice. These requirements are discovered or deduced or 
intuited, they are not freely postulated. Similarly, the 
empirical re:fractory is not subject to choice. Some sense 
perceptions ba.ve-.a nature and con:figuration l-.rhich, through the 
exercise o:f my :free will or capacity :for choice, I cannot 
change directly. Sense perceptions are discovered, not 
created. 
On the third level of categoreal differentiation liTe 
:find the important category of classi:fication, with its 
sub-categories o:f concepts, objects, theories, and meta~ 
physics. The category o:f classification is the result of the 
interaction o:f the categories of :free valuation or :free 
choice (value-choice) with the category of the determinates. 
The product o:f such intermingling makes up the bulk o:f what 
is called knowledge: concepts, theories, and metaphysical 
systems. 
Logically, before analyzing the category o:f classi-
:fication, the category of :free-value-choice should be brought 
into relie:f. For purposes o:f easier exposition, hO't\Tever, . 
comments on f'ree-value-choice l11'ill be postponed to the end.1 
Classif'ication."'7~A classification (or a term) is 
a region, or an extension, ~dthin the given, or Being, that 
is, within the anticategory ~ , which has been singled out 
by a criterion, the intension, of' the pattern of' classif'i-
cation in question. This kind of' classification is called 
a concept. Another type of classification is a sensory 
Gestalt. Certain sense perceptions are collected to the 
ex.clusion of' others. This collection or Gestalt may be an 
object, and its criteria are instinct, interest, training, 
or cultural-linguistic heritage, as well as the objective 
traits of' the sense perceptions themselves, such as the 
parallel motion of' several sense perceptions, their con-
tiguity in space and time, etc. Designating a region of ~ 
as a classification is accomplished through ldlat is called a 
regional criterion. The region designated is the extension 
of' the classification (or of the term), and the criterion 
is the intension of the classification (or of' the term). 
Delimiting an area of' 2.. by means of' "reduction to 11 or 
"construction out of' ••• 11 is done through constructional 
criteria. A construction is often confused ldth an inference. 
Electrons, the unconscious, and other minds are constructions, 
not inferences. The identity of the murderer in a mystery-
story is an inference, not a construction. According to the 
view here proposed, one of the most frequent errors f'ound 
1The log ical is 1 and the empirical refractory is r. 
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in metaphysics is to at':firm .the existence o:f an in.:ference 
when what we have, in :fact, is a construction. An in:ference 
o:f the metaphysical kind (electron, unconsciou.s, other minds) 
would represent a transcendence of L . Yet, in vie1,r of 
the radical empiricism proposed here, there can be no 
t 1 • 1 t t :f th t h ' h ' • II • II on o og~ca sa us or a w ~c ~s not ~n ~ .sense . g1ven. 
Classifications also have levels o:f :further di:f:fer-
entiation, and o:f complexity and comprehensiveness. Some 
concepts inc1ude .others, some objects include others. Also, 
a construct may in. turn be an element o:f another construct. 
n~ere is no limit but convention to the number of these 
levels. Sometimes, :for example, when a concept becomes 
excessively complex, when its internal relations are such 
that 11 concept 11 is no longer an applicable appelation, the 
classi:fication may become a theory. A theory, on one view·, 
is an interrelation o:f concepts or objects or both. Similar-
ly, the interrelations and :final uni:fications o:f theories 
can be given the .name "metaphysics." The meta-metaphysical 
category o:f classification is one with vast di:f:ferences and 
complexities l-.ri thin it. The di:f:ference between a concept 
and a metaphysics is merely one o:f the degree o:f complexity 
and comprehensiveness into which the g iven, ~ , has been 
organized, and the extension or area o:f the given, ~ , 
'tofhich has been uni:fied. 
In summary, a regional criterion is one which meta-
phorically or symbolically "stakes out" or describes a 
particular area of givenn.ess or thereness, L 11 Mammal 11 
is a term .characterized by being a .class name, a word having 
a certain extension; it covers a clearly defined series of 
animals or entities found within experience, within Being, or 
• Regional criteria designate the extension of class 
names or class concepts. They are called . regional because., 
in a sense, they circumscribe a region or an area of L . 
Constructional criteria are of the reductive, inferential, 
and construct type. An object may be thought of as a de-
limited a.rea of 2:_ • In that case, the criterion char-
acterizing or delimiting the object is regional. The same 
object,however, may be conceived as being a construct of 
sense data. The object is then said to be reducible to 
sense data. 
!1!2. . creation of . classification. :-7-It is now· necessary 
to see holll' the process of classification comes about by the 
interaction of the categories of free-choice-of-values with 
that of the determinates. The classificatory agency, some-
times referred to as the s~lf, is confronted with the deter-
minates. The empirical .ref'ractory, consisting mostly of 
sense data, is pregnant with an infinity of possible inte·r-
pretations. ~ These interpretations are accepted as 11 true 11 or 
11 real 11 if they are internally consistent, and if they are 
"true to the facts, 11 that is, if these interpretations take 
account of all relevant events within the empirical refrac-
tory. Yet even with these restrictions many true systems of 
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interpretation exi.st. Ptolemy's interpretation of the 
solar system is as true as that of Copernicus, Kepler, or 
Newton. That is to say, all these systems account (or can 
be revised to account perhaps 'l-tith the addition of some 
ad h2£ hypotheses --) for the totality of the empirical 
refractory relaJcing the solar system, the telescopic ob-
servations, in terms of . perfectly self-consistent systems. 
However, only one system is accepted. Consistency 1-Tithin 
itself and. with the empirical refractory is, therefore, not 
enough to determine the truth of a system. A choice must be 
ef'fected , f'rom among a large number of possibilities. The 
choice is ultimately a free one, chosen on the basis of 
value considerations. Every classification represents a 
choice. A classification is a principle or method of 
isolating one area of 7 f'rom all of 2_ , or constructing 
a concept or an object out of 2. Choice handles and 
molds and shapes and differentiates 2: into classifications. 
The criteria on the basis of which classifications are chosen 
vary up to infinity. One criterion of choice of classifi-
cations may be conduciveness to understanding. The given, 
~ , may be better understood or assimilated through 
classifications ca, cb, cc than through classifications 
em, en, co • 
.Another criterion for classification may be the ful-
fillment of an artistic or ethical desire for a higher state 
of mind, for a more fully developed intellectual and 
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especially emotional and appreciative capacity. Friedrich 
Sch~egel's and .the Romantic's and Transcendentalist's con-
cept o:f the "aristocracy o:f beauti:ful souls" or "the 
intuitions o:f a :free spirit" may be the terminal purpose of' 
a classi:fication o:f the given, L . A poetic view o:f ~ 
is then organized., as was the case with Novalis. The truly 
ultimate criteria :for choice o:f metaphysical systematiza-
tions are :fundamental value commitments within limits set 
by the requirements o:f the determinates, the empirical 
re:fractory and consistency. elassi:fications ea, Cb, Cc 
satis:factory to Russell --may be without . purpose or value 
to Novalis, although the scheme may be thoroughly sel:f-
consistent and correspond to the empirical :facts. Novalis 
may :find that classi:fications em, e n , C0 are conducive to the 
development ·of' a Romantic higher or transcendental state o:f 
being or 11 beauti:ful soul." Novalis 1 choice o:f classi:fica-
tions re:flects, not the nature o:f the determinates, but a 
:fundamental value-choice. Oriental philosophy, :for example, 
makes distinctions between various stages o:f consciousness 
as :foundations :for conceptions o:f reality. We have, among 
others, the stag e o:f dreamless sleep, the dream stage, and 
the waking stage. We can make :further distinctions by 
bringing in an. aesthetic and a holy stage, :for example. ~ 
choice _ .Qf. ~- .Qf. ~.sta.ges .. M .~ ,:foundation . .2.!: . cen ter 2.£ 
gravity .2f. ~- system !.2, ~ . .2£ -~ ~ _:fundamental _pre-
suppositions 2f any metaphysics. The name usually given 
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to that stage is 11 truth11 and 11 reality. 11 In that stage of' 
a"'vareness or on the basis of those experiences l'll'hich w·e honor 
lvith the title 11 real 11 or "clues to the real, 11 our meta-
physics is rooted. 11e vie\v all other stag es from the per-
spective of this one stage. Mystical metaphysics, for 
instance, has chosen a type or stage of awareness as central, 
as the point of vantage for a perspective on all experiences, 
lvhich is altogether different from the perspective chosen 
by a positivistic metaphysics . In general, one can say that 
Russell and the mystic are both right. They differ only in 
that they choose a different series of experiences or a 
different stage of consciousness as foundation f'or their 
respective perspectives on reality or metaphysics. These 
t"'vo metaphysics are not surds i.."l 1:.... They are mutually contra-
dictory albeit internally consistent. If we use a corres-
pondence definition of truth it would be meaningful to say 
that, speaking 11 objectively, 11 one or both are wrong. In 
terms of' the philosophic position here defended, holll'ever, 
truth and reality are ultimately matters of free choice, 
not of discovery. Truth and reality are reducible in · 
meaning to free choice. The position taken here is not 
that truth and reality are hidden, can not be discovered 
as a kind of skepticism might have it -- but that these 
terms have a meaning not ordinarily recognized. 
In a more general sort of "''ll'ay, the development of 
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categories or concepts is to be interpreted as follows: 
~' L , is a continuum l-rhich lends itsel:f to an infinity 
o:f reg ional divisions, much in the same manner as an infinite 
number o:f real estate lots may be staked out :from an orchard. 
The mind is, therefore, confronted with an infinity o:f possi-
bilities. The orchard may be divided into ten, one hundred, 
or one thousand equal or unequal parts. One part may con-
sist of three different areas -- not adjacent; and so :forth. 
The number o:f subdivisions and classifications is infinite. 
Contradiction between two metaphysical systems means, in 
this analogy, the conflicting subdivisions two contractors 
might make, In the end, only one contractor is chosen. 
The choice is a free choice o:f values. The method ulti-
mately adopted, therefore, cannot be one based on 11 reality 11 
or 11 nature 11 or 11 the :facts, 11 because these :facts (being 
the determinates d) do not lend themselves to 
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merely one division, bit' it i ·s -an ultimate and spontaneous 
decision, based on an authentic :free choice. The value, 
on the basis of which these subdivisions are chosen is, 
perhaps, the ability to sell and build. But these choices 
are, inasmuch as the "nature of' things" is concerned, quite 
arbitrary. Cassirer makes this point when he writes, 
Classification is one of the :fundamental :features 
of human speech. The very act of denomination depends 
on a process o:f classification. To give a name to an 
object or action is to subsume it under a certain class 
concept. I:f this subsumption were once and :for all 
prescribed by the nature o:f things, it would be unique 
and uniform. Yet the names which occur in human speech 
cannot be interpreted in any such invariable manner. 
They are not designed to refer to substantial things, 
independent entities which exist by themselves. They 
are determined rather by human interests and human 
purposes. But these interests are not :fixed and in-
variable. Nor are the classifications to be :found in 
human speech made at random; they are based on certain 
constant and recurring elements in our sense experience. 
Without such recurrences there would be no :foothold, no 
point :for support, :for our linguistic concepts. But 
the combination or separation o:f perceptual data de-
pends upon the :free choice o:f a :frame of re:ference.l 
Our classifications generally depend on our basi.c 
interests as well as on our need :for recognizing certain 
2 
similarities and certain differences in preference to others. 
The psychology o:f perception has made substantial progress 
in developing experimental results regarding the arbitrary 
nature in which infants develop concepts of objects. An 
1 . ( Ernst Cassierer, An Essar .£g ~ New York : 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 19SJT, PP• 172-173• 
2John Hospers, ~ Introduction ~ Philosophical 
Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), p. 20. 
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object is an area o~ ~ singled out -- within the limita-
tions o~ 1 and r -- for a purpose. 
The psycholog y o~ speech and o~ the mental development 
o~ children (l'lilliam Stern, Charlotte BUhler, Heinz 
11erner, and others) has sho'lm that the articulation 
o~ the world into objects • • • is only the outcome of 
a process o~ articulation inextricably connected with 
the 11 per~ormance 11 o~ language and o~ naming things.l 
The value, decision, choice, spontaneity, autonomy, 
or ~reedom which gives the critical assent to a value, which 
in turn determines an ordering o~ Sein and thereby makes it 
true ma y be a vector pointing to a great variety o~ direc-
tions. The value which decides the eventual adoption o~ a 
speci~ic metaphysics may be (i) obtaining a pleasant e mo-
tion; (ii) attaining an elevated state o~ mind; (iii) 
achieving peace o~ mind; (iv) accounting ~or all empirical 
~acts; (v) synthesizing the totality of experiences; (vi) 
the creation o~ beauty; (vii) the concept o~ duty; (viii) 
placing the religious experience in the center of' Ivl ; etc. 2 
Such ~ree choices o~ values may lead to reduction 
of all ~ to either mind or matter, or 'l..rill (Fichte and 
Schopenhauer), or it may lead to the bi~ur.cation o~ ~ 
into mind and matter, the divine and the natural order, the 
world o~ appreciation and t h e world o~ description,3 the 
given and in~erences or construct, et _cetera. 
1Ludwig Landgrebe, "Phenomenology and Metaphysics, " 
Philosophy~ Pheno,menological liesear~, 10 (1949), p. 203. 
2rhe symbol ~or metaphysics is "M." 
3Josiah Royce, ~ Spirit o~ Moder~ Philosophy 
( Bo ston: Houghton, Mi~~lin & Co., 1892), p. 411. 
376 
Bergson has pointed out that, strictly speaking, 
any arrangement of ~ is some form of order or system. 
Disorder and chaos are equally as systematic as any 
ordered system. An algebraic expression can be found for 
the perfect circularity of a coin (order) as well as for 
the unusual configuration of a hopelessly entangled length 
of twine (disorder). From the point of view of a certain 
evaluation or purpose the former is useful while the latter 
is annoyingt hence one is 11 ordered11 and the other is 
11 chaotica 11 "So I call the absence ot: this order 1 disorder.• 
At bottom, all there is that is real, perceived and even 
conceived, in this absence of one of the two kinds of order, 
is the presence of the other. 111 
Stace 1 s account of how the rationalizing intellect 
wishes to do away with the mystery of God because mystery is 
a notion inconsistent with the rest of the intellect's 
rationality is an example of a free choice of values. Con-
sistency of certain facts (the rationalistic free commit-
ment) is more important than accounting for the religious 
experience. The supreme value for the rationalizing intellect 
is 11 to make religious truths palatable to common sense and 
. 2 
logic." 
Freud's reifications of his ordered arrangements of 
1Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New Yorkt Henry 
Holt & Co., 1911), pp. 232-233. 
2
walter T. Stace, ~ ~ Eternitv (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952), P• 15. 
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~ are admitted even by him to be :fictions. The uncon-
scious is not only a :fiction., but a contradiction no subtler 
than that o:f a square circle. Yet the concept o:f the un-
conscious is o:f a use:fuln.ess . o:f the :fir.st order l~hen it 
comes to valuational and practical matters. The unconscious 
11 e:x:ists, 11 11 is real, 11 11 true, 11 because ll 1§. useful, hence 
valuable. Idealistic metaphysics are practical in the sense 
that these views endorse the spiritual and ethical values 
and place the latter centrally in the ultimate ~vel tanschauung 
o:f man. It is this latter usefulness which makes idealism 
true and real. A corollary o:f this view is that probably 
all great philosophers are right in that they do not violate 
1 or r. Their differences (and l~hat gives opposing views 
the justification to call them :false) reside in the area o:f 
values only. 
~ choice E.f.values.--A :few specific statements 
regarding value and choice must be made at this point. A 
phenomenological description o:f the anticategory 2: , the 
given, experience, Sein, or Being, includes an account of a 
' -
central situation, one which may be termed the self, ego, 
agent, :freedom, choice, awareness, subject, etc. One 
characteristic o:f this subject is :free choosing, choosing 
mostly on the basis of values. Free choices are of varying 
degrees o:f complexity and deliberateness. Choosing dessert 
in a restaurant is deliberate, choosing life's ideals may 
be unconscious, yet 't~e are :free to the extent that liTe can 
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change the goal, or that at least we could have chosen 
otherwise. Since the number of' possible objects, concepts, 
theories, and metaphysical systems, that is, the number of' 
classifications and levels of' classifications within ~ 
' 
is nearly (and perhaps actually) infinite, and yet the actual 
number of' such.- classif'ications is quite finite, a selective 
process of' choosing classifications must be postulated. 
This process is carried out by the valuational function of' 
consciousness, which is choice. The anticategory L does 
not divide itself' into only one, unambiguous, unchanging, and 
unchangeable set of' classifications. ~ lends itself' to 
infinite classifications. Only a limited number are chosen 
to be called true and real. At the root of' this choice is 
the free choice of' specific values. The f'ree choice involved 
in valuation is therefore the ultimate ground of' truth and 
reality. A metaphysical system is real and true if' the 
consistent classification of' the empirical refractory is 
freely chosen, or capable of' being so chosen, and judged 
valuable. 
Further amplification is needed. The original, first, 
and genuine ef'f'ort at systematizing ~ , isolating specific 
areas of' ~ for a given purpose, or constructing systems 
or objects f'rom within the ~ or :2_ may be called the 
first and original category or archcategory. The arch• 
category is the original impetus f'or all categorization, 
what in German might be expressed as the Urkategorie. The 
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Urkategorie is the origin o~ categorization; the beginning, 
the arche, the archcategory. 
In constructing, perceiving, or understanding a 
world, man adopts some attitude from within Sein, ~ • 
Man's original attitude toward ~or 2_ is a choice, a 
decision, one which at least has the possibility (and at 
times the actuality) of being ~' spontaneous,. autonomous 
-- it is a creation M .nihilo since the choice of world-
view, the original choice of values in the face of ~ or 
from within ~, is a bold and uncompromising violation 
of the cause and effect chain essential to the phenomenal 
world. Man's primal, original, authentic choice is the 
creation of a cause and effect chain. Once the choice has 
been established, the chain follows inexorable natural 
laws. :aut the original establishment of this chain is 
described phenomenologically as a spontaneous, autonomous, 
free choice of values. 
The order of freedom contradicts the order of 
natural law. The first solution, determinism, closes its 
eyes to the self-evidence of the fo.rmer to safeguard the 
consistency of the latter. Kant's empiricist bent, in 
keeping with Butler's dictum, used by Moore in his Principia 
Ethica, that everything is what it is and not another thing, 
led him to the second solution, a position later continued 
with variations by James, that no fact of experience can be 
rejected merely because it presents regional logical in-
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consistencies. Kant, there~ore, established the two orders, 
the phenomenal .(deterministic) and the noumenal (:free). 
Stace estab~ishes the two . orders . o~ the divine and the 
natural with a similar problem in mind. Sartre 1 s existen-
tialism, the third solution, looks upon the phenomenal 
world as absurd because it stands in opposition to the ureal" 
world, the world o:f valuation, ~reedom, and choice. The 
precise structure o:f the phenomenon o:f :free choice o~ 
values is one o:f the two philosophic irreducibles or ulti-
mates, Sein, or ~ , is the :first irreducible. All other 
terms or classifications can be traced or reduced to these 
two irreducibles. 
The aoategorial Sein, symbolized by 11 L, 11 and the 
archcategory, symbolized by n:f, 11 (:free choice of values), 
are the two pillars upon Which the view here presented rests. 
The anticategory ~~ . L , engenders a world f'or 
man through the archcategory, :f. Free choice o:f values, £, 
immediately begins a process o~ categorization, which is its 
way o:f dealing with Sein. Freedom, f', divides ~ into it-
self' and non-itself, into choice and non•choice, into the 
free and the determined, into what is here technically 
termed :free value choice or the archcategory, f, and the 
determinates, d. The f'irst act of this f'undamental function 
:f is to categorize itself as apart f'rom the rest of ~· 
The first act of' :freedom is to set off itsel~ f'rom the rest 
of being, ~' or ~ • This setting-of'£ may be the 
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establishment of any one of the following categories: I, 
ego Sel .&" soul mind doubter "valuer," or such an .in-
' ,L ., ' . ' . ' 
definite phenomenological event as Heidegger 1 s In-der-Welt-
~.1 In Hegelian fashion, freedom engenders non-value 
or the determinates. The determinates in turn., for the 
purposes of understanding., is divided into the categories 
of (i) the empirical refractory, as well as (ii) the rigid 
category ~~ : logica1 consistency. Free choice of values, f, 
is then opposed by the determinates, d, of empirical re-
fractoriness, r, and consistency, 1. 
Significance.~-The consequences of this meta-meta-
physics can only be mentioned in capsule form at this time. 
This categorial scheme can be justified in terms of the 
following possibilities' 
(1) Here is a scheme for the resolution, by locali-
zing the genuine differences, of metaphysical disputes. 
Metaphysical differences embody the choice of value differ-
ences, differences of individual choices. The final answer 
to metaphysical differences is to be f'ound in the phenomeno-
log ical anatomy of free choice. Varying metaphysical systems 
can be internally consistent (or can be made so with addi-
tional ef'fort and hypotheses). It is a chosen value 
orientation alone which attaches the definitive and exclusive 
1Martin Heidegger, ~ ~ ~ (Tllbingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 19.53), PP• .52-17.5. 
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label of "true" and 11 real 11 to one particular configuration 
of the components of Being or Z::. 
(2) . As a corollary to number (1), this meta-meta-
physics points up the central role of free choice as well 
as of value in metaphysics and also in all lesser instances 
of classification. 
(J) On the basis of this meta-metaphysical scheme, 
individual metaphysics are seen to fulfill specific func-
tions. The study of world hypotheses becomes first of all 
the study of freedom, choice, and value. 
(4) It follows from number (J) that metaphysical 
systems may be constructed consciously with values in mind. 
A metaphysics may be constructed with the articulate and sole 
purpose of manifesting or embodying a chosen value. This 
may then lead to 
(5) the creation of new and more adequate metaphy-
sics. The methodology of creating metaphysical systems will 
then be a systematic study, substituting the intuitive trial-
and-error method of constructing metaphysics. A more ade-
quate metaphysics is not one which, in some sense, has 
greater freedom, but one which consciously and effectively 
embodies the values chosen in the Urentschluss. 
(6) Since value is at the root of classification in 
general, it is not metaphysics alone that is affected by the 
considerations in this conclusion. Scientific theories 
already recognize that specific values (simplicity, elegance, 
utility, fruitfulness) play a major role in determining 
which scientific hypotheses and theories are said to be true 
or even correspond to reality. The same analysis must be 
applied 
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to concepts and objects -- as Q-estalten. Here our habits of' 
conception and perception are so entrenched that inordinate 
practice and ef'f'ort is required to ~ sense perceptions 
in dif'f'erent configurations and to develop names f'or new 
classes, new aggregates of' actual and possible sensations. 
Rather surprising results might spring f'rom such "trans-
classifications." Hypnosis is an example of' transclassif'i-
cation at the level of' objects and concepts. Transclassi-
:f'ied objects and concepts might f'orm the basis o:f' new theo-
ries and hypotheses which could perhaps lead - - only experi-
mentation can confirm this guess -- to scientific advances 
where the present object and concept classifications lead 
to an impasse. Behaviorism and operation ism are t't..ro random 
examples o:f' attempts in the direction o:f' transclassi:f'ication 
(through reduction, in these cases). 
The author has of'ten been concerned about giving a 
name to the position he is defending in this dissertation. 
~mny names suggest themselves but must be rejected because 
of' cacophony. "!•leta-metaphysics" is one of' these names; 
another is 11 axiotism," or "acategorial axiotism," which 
emphasize t h e reliance on value, or on the anticategory ~rr 
and value. Further suggestions, based on some of' the key 
words of' this philosophic position, were 11 eleutherism11 (f'rom 
~ / . / . E-A~11 Q~f l.d... , :freedom), 11 dynatism 11 (f'rom 'CD ~v v llll t:'ov-, possi-
. ; 
bility), "automatism" (f'rom tftu C. C),J-.& co_s , acting o:f one's own 
will). All were rejected :for rather obvious reasons. The 
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best candidate yet is 11 Heretism," :from c;Alf E'<r""tj (choice) 
( 
or ~LfE-tt. ko r (able to choose), provided it is not con-
:fused with heresy or heretic. I:f we now wish to emphasize, 
not only the choice :factor at the root o:f metaphysical 
conceptions and world views, but also the :free or spontane-
ous character o:f that possible choice., we might call this 
position by the cumbersome neologism 11 eleutheric Heretism." 
Further _exposition . .2f .Heretism.--The :final decision 
:for a metaphysics is on the basis o:f the answer to the 
question o:f what should a metaphysical system primarily 
accomplish. Is it unde.rstanding, clarity, or justice, or 
love, or the creation o:f a higher state o:f consciousness? 
The :free decision about values made in response to these 
questions determines whether .any one o:f the in:finity o:f 
possible metaphysics is true, and whether it represents 
reality. Questions a:fter truth and reality are questions 
about value-decisions. Heretism is neither absolutism nor 
relativism, since absolutism is a series o:f metaphysics 
based on the :free endorsement .o:f the values o:f rigidity and 
:firmness and . security; whereas relativism is perhaps the 
archcategorial acceptance o:f the values o:f individualism, 
variability, :flexibility, and unencumbered sel:f-assertion 
as the basis :for interpretation o:f §.!!!!! 
The two systems discussed in the previous Chapters 
and comments :from the First Chapter :ful:fill the :following 
:functions. First they provide the raw material :for the meta-
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metaphysi.cs in terms ot: which .. metaphysical differences can 
be isolated, understood, and placed on a common footing. 
Phenomenology, ~, sense data, values, consistency, 
philosophy as vision, t-rere concepts proceeding from the 
various thinkers discussed. Second, the viet-rs discussed 
seem to be, upon the analysis given them in the individual 
Ghapters and in this one, ultimately founded on a free 
choice of' values, not on any other non-personal or so-
called 11 objectiven characteristics. Third, further analy-
sis of' these views in the light of' the present Chapter will 
add weight to the contention that a decision on free choice 
of' values is at the root of' all metaphysical systems, is the 
core of truth and reality. 
The conclusion of' this dissertation does not assert 
that philosophical disputes are not real or that they are 
easily resolved. The real issues in philosophical disputes 
are localized. They are res.tricted to an. understanding of' 
values, and ho1'11' man's free l'll'ill operates in choosing basic 
values. All philosophical disputes ultimately are disputes 
regarding the free choice of' values, not of' truth and 
reality as in some sense independent of freedom and choice. 
The analysis of' freedom itself, therefore, becomes the 
ultimate and fundamental task of philosophy. Such an. analy-
sis, ,.,hen completed, must entail all civilized human thought, 
since scientific, ethical, aesthetic, religious, and 
political systems are either sub-systems of a metaphysics 
or are themselves instances of metaphysical systems, with a 
:free choice among possibilities as its basis. It :follo"'~s 
that metaphysical systems may be viewed as partially equi-
valent, since each is a . different categorization of ~. 
based on a series o:f different :free choices about values. 
Excluding the element o:f :freedom, all complete categoriza-
tions of' .§.tl.n. (~. metaphysics) are logically equivalent, 
which means that each of these metaphysical systems encom-
passes, interrelates, or accounts :for all available :facts. 
The scheme here presented attempts to put the conceptual 
house of philosophy 11 in order 11 in the sense that it is 
hoped that eventually all philosophic systems can be ex-
pressed in terms of the meta-metaphysics here presented. 
In order to substantiate :further how truth and 
reality are ultimately rooted in :freedom, and .. how such a 
relationship allO"''IS :for the interpretation o:f metaphysical 
differences :from one meta-metaphysical point o:f view, another 
term must be introduced at this stage. This term is sym-
bolized by the letter 11 M, 11 and designates a completed or 
:fulfilled metaphysical system. I:f the definition o:f philo-
sophy or of metaphysics is "the synoptic vie"''l o:f all avail-
able :facts, 11 :M is an expression :for that view. ]11 is the 
systematization o:f the totality that is ~ • M is not a 
local or regional systematization, as is the case with the 
categories or classifications, C; :H is the system of the 
"''lhole. 
This dissertation illustrates two varie-ties of M's: 
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Russell's positivism (~~) and Stace' s mysticism (M5 ). The 
generalizations made here about these M's or metaphysical 
systems are intended to be generalizations covering all 
metaphysical systems. These generalizations are five: · 
First, all adequate lv1 1 s have L in common. That 
is to say, an adequate metaphysical system is one which 
incorporates or deals 't\Ti th all-there-is. A complete meta-
physical system is an organization of all givenness, of all 
events, qualities, and relations that are ever 11 p resent 11 in 
any sense of the word. 
Second, all M1 s avail themselves of a variety of 
criteria of classifications, both regional and construc-
tional. M1 s a g ree in some of these criteria, but disag ree 
in many. Metaphysicians must not differ in L , nor must 
they abandon the quest for classification. They do diff er, 
however, in the individual systems of classification that 
they have chosen. 
Third, the determinates (d), as their name indi-
cates, are constant and unchang eable for all :ft-1 1 s. Logical 
consistency (1) as well as the empirical refractory (r) 
must be the unchangeable constants of' d. Metaphysics do 
not depend alone for as their common ground, but also d, 
which, of course, is an area within ~ • The refractory is 
11 given 11 and so is the intuition of' the necessity of con-
sistency 11 given." 
Fourth, the constants or determinates (d), which 
are r and 1, allow for a variety (perhaps infinity) of 
different M's. This point has been discussed repeatedly 
in the previous Chapters. The structural difference be-
tween Russell's positivism and Stace's mysticism was 
pointed out to illustrate the structural difference between 
the metaphysical systems, M, of analytic philosophy or 
positivism and of mysticism. All these systems or M's 
dealt '\Yi th a more or less constant L , (ideally they should 
deal l·Tith an absolutely constant E_ since ill. facts are 
all facts no more, no less) and all these !·i' s are (or, 
ideally, should be or could be made to be) in accord with d. 
Yet these systems were thoroughly different from one another 
in just about all of their details, and in their inter-
pretation or categorization of 2: • On the basis of d 
alone, all these systems, M, must be recognized as (at 
least potentially) equally "true," and as equally repre-
sentative of the nature of 11 reality." What makes one system 
true and real as opposed to another is the free, spontane-
ous, autonomous decision of the will to accept that logical 
configuration (1) of the empirical refractory (r). 
Fifth, all M's have in common the fact that the basic 
decision for calling them true or real, which in this dis-
sertation is the same as their being true and real, is 
rooted in man's free acceptance of one of the possible M 
categorizations of ~ ; and this acceptance is, or is 
based, on the free choice of a value (f). All M' s have f' 
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as their decisive factor. Although it may be said that 
all M's are basically alike because they all are rooted in 
f, it is equally true that M's differ precisely at their 
f point. Because, although all M1 s are based on~ f, 
each f is a different decision and is based on different 
values. 
~ objections.--Among the fundamental difficulties 
of the position presented and defended in this dissertation 
are these four. (1 ) Does Heretism imply that the world is 
what one wants it to be? (2) Granting the validity of 
Heretism, how is even communication possible? (.3) How does 
Heretism avoid solipsism? and finally (4) Is there not 
some ambiguity in ~ , which sometimes is all of being and 
sometimes only that part which is given to ~? 
The answers to, or discussion of, these points will 
be in the reverse order of the questions themselves. By 
dealing first with the fourth question -- which is also the 
mos t difficult one the others can be resolved more readily. 
Heretism is a kind of radical empiricism. Only that 
has being which is in some sense given or presented. In 
this manner, for example, the future has being only as anti-
cipation, and the past, as memory. Past and future are 
telescoped into what we eall the present. A noumenon has 
being only as an idea of a noumenon. An electron has being 
only as a convenient fiction. 
It is obvious that this statement warrants justifi-
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cationi yet it functions as an assumption (a basic category, 
2: ) in Heretism. Heretism does not propose to be a 
metaphysical position (as a commitment to radical emp iricism 
might indicate) but a meta-metaphysical perspective ~ 
metaphysical positions. Therefore, the only justification 
for the radical empiricism here assumed is that nothing 
that is not an experience has any meaning. Heretism does 
not hold that non-experiential and non-experienced events 
exist but are not known; it does not even hold that non-
experiential and non-experienced events do not exist. 
Heretism maintains that the non-experiential or non-experi-
enced event is a term without meaning, bhat it is a self• 
contradictory notion. 
This radical empiricist commitment of Heretism 
parallels Berkeley's position on matter. The difference 
between Berkeley's position and the one developed here is 
that the empiricism and idealism of Heretism is far more 
11 radical 11 than that of Berkeley. A commitment to radical 
empiricism entails not only the meaninglessness of matter, 
but as well the meaninglessness of any non-experienceables, 
such as other minds. This would tend to lead to solipsism, 
since the only immediate experience is my own. 1 It follows 
that being and being an experience or being present or 
presented or 11 given 11 in any sense ·whatever are equivalent 
1This point will be continued later. 
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terms. 11 Being 11 and "presentation" are synonymous. It is 
not possible to give any meaning whatsoever, other ~ 
that of ill_ presentational content, to the expressions "being 
1 that is not given, the unexperienced, the noumenal world." 
1'ie now come to the next question, what about solip-
sism? The author knows of no philosopher endorsing this 
position, and he 't~ill not be the first one to accept this 
often-referred-to never-held philosophic position. Here the 
author must make reference to some Oriental versions of 
mysticism. The Hindu (Shankara's Vedanta) position that the 
Atman is the Brahman which is not unlike the position of 
11Testern mystics such as Meister Eckhart, St. John of the 
Cross, and Plotinus -- is subject to the same accusation of 
solipsism as the radical empiricism espoused by Heretism. 
However, and here enters the crucial distinction between 
solipsism and its negation, the proper sentence expressing 
the solipsism involved in the Atman-Brahman unity is ~ 
"only I exist" but g "only God exists." It is solipsism of 
the Divine Nature. And this is not really solipsism. 
Heretism is not a commitment to mysticism. But 
this insight of the mystics will help Heretism avoid the 
charge of solipsism. Heretism maintains that the organization 
of experience (~) is subject to choice. On the most 
fundamental level, this organization of 2: is into eg o and 
1This radical empiricism, incidentally, is presupposed 
in the philosophic use of the phenomenological method. 
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non-ego. Hol~ever, whatever definition we give to the 11 ego," 
the presentational immediacy or the given includes ~ 
than the ego. The ego is part -- and a small one at that 
of' the totality of' the experienced presentational immediacy 
which Heretism identifies with Being. The ego can be thought 
of' as a body, passing states of' consciousness, a soul, and 
many other possibiliuies. In each case, to say that the 
total presentational immediacy is 11 in 11 or "exhausted by 11 
or "coextensive with" this ego is patently false. And it is 
false not only on the basis of' argumentation (mediate 
inference) but also on immediately intuited or experienced 
grounds (immediate inference). Solipsism thus means that 
only one portion of' the presentational immediacy has being, 
l~hereas the rest does not exist at all. Otherwise, the 
statement 11 only I exist" is either false or meaningless. It 
is a dominant characteristic of' mysticism to dispense with 
this initial bifurcation of' Being into an ego and non-ego. 
On the basis of' this defense against charges of' 
confusing the metaphysically and the epistemically given and 
the accusation of' solipsism, the remaining two questions can 
be answered without hesitation. 
The possibility of' communication, instead of being 
a problem in Heretism, quite to the contrary, can be solved 
perhaps only in terms of' the radical empiricism of' Heretism. 
Communication between two altogether separate entities, like 
two minds, is indeed a problem unless we dispense with the 
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absolute nature of this separation in the first place. 
Communication, for Heretism, is simply one concept which 
needs to be defined and developed in order to bring con-
sistency to the decision to organize 2: into a pluralistic 
universe. 
The first question, 11 is the world t..-hat we want it 
to be? 11 can now be anst..-ered as follows. · To the extent that 
contains vast regions of refractory presentations 
(sensations, causal chains, logical rules), the w·orld is 
~ what we want it to be. To the extent that this refrac-
tory material lends itself to more than one organization, 
the world !.§_ ,.,.hat we ,.,-ant it to be. This is the "simple 11 
answer to the question. 
A far more complex answer to the same question would 
be to analyze the question itself. The question is not 
asked in a vacuum. Quite to the contrary, the asking of 
the question is evidence of the prior differentiation of 
l: into the regions of ego and non-ego. The question it-
self indicates that a perspective or pose or stance on 
E has been taken already. The term "I want," for example, 
in this kind of analysis, discloses itself to involve the 
following: 11 does that part of the presentational immediacy 
classified as ~ ~ have control over the structure of 
the remainder of' this presentational immediacy?" If' this 
is the meaning of 11 the world is what I want it to be" the 
answer is no. The question of whether a decision (Urentschluss) 
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about the world is possible has been asked after such a 
decision has already been tru{en, and ~ the perspective or 
organization of that decision. The question, therefore, is 
not addressing itself to the claims of Heretism, but to 
something altogether different: it is addressing itself to 
a problem resulting from one particular Urentschluss. 
Definition 2£ ~ phenomenological method used.--
Having pointed out where, to the mind of the author, ~I's 
agree and disagree, to what extent they are reducible to 
one another, and to what extent they are complementary, it 
is now possible to give a more precise definition of the 
method of phenomenology. 
Traditionally, phenomenology is defined as the 
logos of the phenomenon, the study of appearances. Pheno-
menology is the attempt to describe what is given, what 
appears as it appears, and not to provide interpretations or 
the postulation of explanatory substrata. Phenomenology 
emphasizes the inviolability of the given and of experience, 
and the undesirability of excess assumptions. As was seen 
throughout this dissertation, such a definition of pheno-
menology is inadequate on two counts. In the first place, 
the term 11 given11 is not useful because it is ambiguous. 
Everything is 11 given 11 in one way or another. An object is 
11 given 11 in experience, an emotion is 11 given 11 in experience, 
but so is a substratum, an atom, or the unconscious given 
qua construct, postulate, or assumption. Even the noumenon 
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is given as a concept. The given, as the method of pheno-
menology, is meant to isolate the. area of appearances for 
the sake .of' philo.sophic discussion. If' the given can be 
equated with .§.2!ll, the delineating effectiveness of' 11 given 11 
is terminated and the "given" world is a river flowing into 
the great ocean of Sein. In the second place, the term 
"given" indicates an area of' fruitless and inescapable 
dispute. What is really given, a set of sense data, 't"'hich 
are then arranged dr constructed or fashioned into a Gest-
alt called an object; or is the reverse the case? Is per-
haps the object as it is useful or useless or pleasant or 
unpleasant or indifferent to the beholder what is truly 
given, and sense data represent a supremely sophisticated 
philosophic analysis of the object? There is no answer to 
this question -- except the one given in this dissertation, 
that categorizations are arbitrary and infinite in possi-
. bilities. Categorizations depend on purpose, on value. 
Categorizati?ns are axiotelic. The phenomenon to be studied 
in phenomenology is not capable of definition, hence a 
different definition of phenomenology will be attempted. 
· Phenomenology as defined here may be the ans'\1Ter to 
the paradox of ultimate circularity. The anticategory, or 
~ , Sein,and the archcategory free choice of values, f, 
cannot be discussed with anything approaching logical pre-
cision because both terms designate the pre- and extra-
logical, in addition to the logical. Phenomenology is that 
linguistic activity which does not require of itself to 
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remain "tvithin one categorial scheme or metaphysical outlook 
1•1. Certain fundamentals of one metaphysics can best be 
discussed from the point of' vie"t,.r o:f other metaphysics .. 
Phenomenology is the method of' analysis which 11 skips around" 
from 1'-1 to H, using any category derived from w·ithin any 
M, using only psychological usefulness or the ability to 
communicate as criterion or guide. 
k ind of 11 saltatory11 activity. 
Phenomenology is a 
For example, one may talk of an idealist concept of 
mind or self in terms of (i) Dasein, (ii) sense data, or 
(iii) a soul. All three categories are extraneous to an i-
dealist system M, yet for the purposes of' expediency, which 
avoids logical precision, Dasein, sense data, or the soul 
may be truly helpful terms to use for explaining what the 
function of the category of' mind is within the idealist's 
system M1 itself. Similarly, to call Dasein or In-der 
Welt-sein a man, a human being., an ego, a construct of im-
pressions, a self', a soul, etc., is contradictory within 
Heidegger's system proper (which would have to be desig-
nated as~~). Yet these equivalents are the psychological 
expedients conducive to understanding. 
When it is desired to define or discuss freedom, 
the free or spontaneous, autonomous choice of' values, f', 
the phenomenological method as here defined must be used. 
Also, the discussion of' Heretism in general must be viewed 
as a phenomenological approach in the sense of' phenomenology 
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described above. It is in this way that the paradox of 
ultimate circularity is a .voided. Without the above 
definition of phenomenology, a discussion of Heretism, or 
of a meta-metaphysics, would have to be grounded in a meta-
meta-metaphysics, and so on ad infinitum. Al.so, without the 
above definition of phenomenology in mind, any discussion of 
freedom, f, would have to be clothed in an even more funda-
mental archcategory, and so on ~._infinitum. "Freedom" is 
a small category within theM of common sense (Mc5 ). As 
such, "freedom" is quite distinct from the archcategory f. 
"Freedom" as part of the M of common sense, (Mc5 ), is 
thought of as subjective. It is a category proper in turn. 
Since the language of phenomenology is saltatory, it is 
quite appropriate to use terms developed within the M of com-
mon sense (or any other M) and apply them to the archcate-
gory f within the framework of a meta-metaphysics. The 
infinite regression of the paradox of ultimate circularity 
is thereby avoided. And this is a fundamental conclusion. 
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Interpretat-ion of: Russell 1 s Positivism 
in Terms of: Heretism 
Ba.sic . concepts. --It is now necessary to show in 
detail rather than in generalities that the philosophic 
position developed in this conclusion (sometimes, without 
intent of: vanity or af:f:ectation, referred to as Heretism) 
a .p p1d.Ets · t .,o.. the analyses of' Russell 1 s positivism and Stace 1 s 
mysticism. Also, we must examine the degree to Which this 
conclusion is related to the proposals for philosophic 
unity examined in Chapter I. To achieve these goals we must 
analyze and review (since remarl{s along the lines that here 
follow have been made throughout the dissertation) the 
source of assent of: the assumptions and priorities involved 
in positivism and mysticism. 
Each of: the elements of: the priorities and assump-· 
tions will be located within the meta-metaphysical frame of: 
reference developed in this last Chapter. 
The symbols which we have in terms of which a 
philosophical position can be expressed and evaluated are 
~= ~' which is everything, to the extent that it is 
given, there, presented, in any sense whatever of 
these words. It is Being. ~includes even noumena, 
but only as presentations, ~' as ideas of: non-
. ideas. 
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d ,. The determinates. That l1Thi.ch is unchangeable or 
refractory in experienc.e. Its components are 
1 a The logical refractory, which is the minimal de-
mand for consistency or non-contradiction, but can 
often be more, such as implication, and 
r = The empirical refractory, which is that element of 
sense-experience which cannot be altered by the 
mere 11 wish11 of man, and which is subject to certain 
11 laws, 11 called 11 laws of nature." 
v .. Value. This symbol does not represent value in the 
abstract, but any specific value-claim, as l1Tell as 
criticized- or true-values. And finally it also --
and most frequently represents a value-possibility. 
Value in this sense is not fixed or refractory, but 
it represents a series of possibilities -- to be 
made into actualities. 
f = The human experience o·f freedom, spontaneity, 
autonomy in the act of choice. This experience, to 
the degree that it is significant for the present 
meta-metaphysical scheme, is usually the free choice 
of a specific value-possibility. 
C = Classification. Any organization of elements within 
~ are designated .by this .symbol. This organiza-
tion can be a Em or an object ., depending on 
whether concepts or sensations make up the classifi-
cation or delineation of an area within ~ Each 
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classification embodies .or preserves one or · 
several values, and classifications are chosen 
on the basis o:f these values. These choices ~ be 
altogether :free. 
M = Metaphysical system. This symbol represents a 
purportedly complete and organized version o:f ~ 
This organization is fixed to the extent of' which 
1 and r are fixed. Also, each organization em-
bodies one or several specific values. These 
values, being possibilities, can be chosen :freely. 
To this latter extent, this organization (M) is 
flexible. The anslier to the question "what is 
reality?" is 11 M ~" 
• 
a = Atomic constituents of L . It is improper to· . . contend 
that L... is atomic in its ultimate presentation. 
Whether it is to be viewed as continuous or discon-
tinuous is a matter of decision. However, since 
one o:f the most common analyses o:f L: is in terms 
o:f mathematics or mathematics-like methodologies, 
we must assert the existence o:f numeric or atomic or 
individual components which make up any ¢ .( tha:t is , 
the atomic constituents of the presentations that 
make up an object or an idea). This concept (a) is 
introduced here :for the first time. 
S = The Given. This symbol stands for that area or 
class o:f experiences (C) within ~ ( ~ ) which 
:functions as the basis :for an epistemology or a 
metaphysical system (M). S is subject to choice 
(:f), since in the history o:f philosophy numerous 
and mutually exclusive classifications (c). o:f 
~ ( L ) have :functioned as the given ( S). 
' Values .in ~conception .2! truth.--We must :first 
analyze, in terms o:f the concepts developed :for this con-
clusion, Russell's conception o:f truth. Truth is de:fined 
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as correspondence. Correspondence, :for Russell, was seen to 
mean 11 total 11 (i.e., phenomenal, epistemological, and meta-
physical) correspondence. Most important o:f all these, how-
ever, is the entailment o:f metaphysical correspondence. 
1 It was shown in the second part o:f Chapter II that corres-
pondence entails tl'IO ontological realms. To name these 
realms the author o:f the dissertation resorted to Kant's 
:famous distinction bet't'/een phenomena and noumena. 
Russell does give reasons :for endorsing a pluralis-
tic theory o:f reality. These reasons were investigated in 
the third and :fourth sections o:f Chapter II. In defining 
truth, however, he does not give reasons:for this pluralism; 
Chapter II has shown that he assumes, specifically, a pheno-
menon-noumenon dualism. Metaphysical dualism is shown to be 
the logical ~ qua nsu o:f his definition o:f truth. We 
must examine the grounds :for accepting this assumption. 
lc:r., PP• 115:f:f • 
These grounds, as was sholm (and only as far as his 
conception of truth is concerned, not his theory of reality), 
can only be found in the specific values that are preserved 
by and embodied in a correspondence definition o:f truth. 
These values (v) are in turn accepted, ultimately, by 
a free and autonomous act of choice (f). Next, these values 
must be analyzed. 
The nature of a definition of truth as correspond-
ence is based on 1, r, and v. The constants 1 and r are 
the demands of language, communication, and consistency. 
This organization represents not one but a class of systems. 
The variable v, on the other hand, determines a specific 
organization of 1 and r. Russell must select one particular 
v, on the basis of freedom and autonomy. The v chosen 
determines that particular organization of r and 1· t~hich 
will endorse and preserve this chosen v best. The organi-
zation referred to here as 1 and r is, in part, a dualistic 
metaphysics, or a dualistic classification (C) of ~ or 
~ • This dualism endorses or preserves certain values. 
These specific values are uncovered in the section on values 
in Chapter IIl. Once these values are apparent, we must 
examine the source of man's (or Russell's) assent to them. 
In dealing with values, we must first investigate 
the value-claims involved in Russell's conception of 
1 C:f. , pp. 12.5ff • 
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definition in general ., bef'ore dealing with the value-claims 
associated with particular definitions of' truth. We must 
then examine the source of' assent of' these values, having 
already established. that these values determine (with the 
exception of' 1 and r) the nature of' these definitions. For 
Russell, .a good definition is one which (a) does not contra-
dict ordinary language, and (b) helps preserve epistemologi-
cal and metaphysical dualism. These points were established 
in Chapter II. 1 
The requirement (a) above preserves the values 
f'ound in communication, thought, and self-expression; 
whereas (b) l'ias sholm to preserve knowledge-values, which 
may include the instrumental values of' simplicity and memory, 
and may be, in turn, a means to the attainment and preser-
vation of' survival-values. With these values as the deci-
sive foundation of' the meaning of' definition itself, we can 
assert that these values must be af'f'irmed bef'ore Russell's 
meaning of' definition can be af'f'irmed. The values indicated 
are among a large number of' value-possibilities. It takes 
a f'ree and autonomous act of' man, an act f'or which man is 
held (by himself' and others) f'ully responsible, to assent 
to these values, to accept them, to choose them. This f'ree 
choice is the element f' in Russell's conception of' the 
nature of definition. The logical order is f'rom f'ree 
choice to the definition. The order of' the investigation 
1£.t:., pp. 126f'f' • 
of these issues is the reverse: from the definition do1~n 
to its ultimate assumptions, ending with the free choice 
of values. 
Second, we must investigate the value-claimsinvolved 
in the logical def'ini.tion of correspondence t as opposed to 
the epistemological definition of correspondence. These 
value-claims, it was shown, involve the simplest acts of 
daily living. Many of these value-claims can be summarized 
in the overall value-claims of survival and efficiency to 
achieve that survival. Other value-claims accepted and 
preserved, as was shown, are love, care, companionship, and 
appreciative-values. It was also shown that the episte-
mological definition of correspondence does not preserve, 
but rather tends to deny, these value-claims. It was also 
shown that various consistent definitions of truth are 
possible. To choose the one that preserves the values 
enumerated is not to choose on the basis of' logic (1) or 
empirical refractoriness (r) but on the basis of a specific 
value ( vJ. This choice of a value as primary, as a goal of 
importance, is a free and autonomous choice (f). This choice 
of' a value is an 11 Urentscheidung~" 
Third, l'le must analyze, in terms of the meta-meta-
physical scheme here provided, the value-claims invol.ved in 
Russell's definition of truth as correspondence. One of' his 
reasons f'or accepting t~s definition of truth is that it is 
in keeping with (or at least does not contradict) ordinary 
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J.anguage. This reason is subj.ect to the . same analysis as 
the discussion of' the vaJ.ue~claims of' communication., thought, 
survival, and self-expression. All these value-claims (v) 
are embodied in ordinary language.. The desire, determination, 
and decision _to preserve or be guided by ordinary language 
is the desire, determination, and decision. to preserve these 
vaJ.ues. This decision is a f'ree, autonomous and spontaneous 
choice (f'). 
Another series of' vaJ.ues associated 'rlth the corres-
pondence theory of' truth is that which f'ollo,..rs from a belief' 
in other minds and external non-mental objects. In addition 
to the vaJ.ues mentioned earJ.ier, these values are aJ.so 
simplicity, elegance, and convenience, kno,..rledge-values, and 
f'inalJ.y most of' the values of' so-called everyday living. 
These latter values are those embodied in 11 the unsophisti-
cated, common-sense level, social reJ.ations, f'rom marriage 
to friendship, business to teaching, from legal contrac t s 
to public speeches ••• , scientific investigations • 
. . ' 
agriculture, industry, and transportation."l 
One may be tempted to think of' these many vaJ.ues as 
"natural," 11 inescapable, 11 and 11 all-inclusive. 11 However, if' 
we compare these vaJ.ues to those endorsed and preserved by 
acosmism (as seen in Chapter III), we can readily see that 
11 ordinary language" and "everyday living" stands for only 
~ range of' values. 
1.9.£.!., p. 144 . 
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Correspondence, therefore, is the logical defini-
tion of truth one ought to accept if one is interested in 
the preservation of the above-mentioned value-constellation 
(v). In last analysis, the decision to accept these values 
as opposed to, for instance, the values embodied in acosmism, 
is a free choice (f). \~ether man decides to embrace the 
commitment of the values of mysticism or the commitment to 
the values of positivism is, in the last analysis, a matter 
of a free and autonomous decision or choice (f). 
In the fourth place, we must examine the value-claims 
that are rejected ;ITith the rejection of empirical and logical 
coherence as a definition of truth. The rejection of coher-
ence 'ti'as sho;,rn to be, in a general way, the rejection of the 
metaphysical positions of monism, absolute idealism, and mysti-
cism. Each of these metaphysical vie'ti'S, in turn, is the em-
bodiment of one or of a constellation of specific values (v}. 
Russell's decision against this theory of truth is a free, 
responsible, and autonomous choice (f) to reject the values 
that are embodied in these metaphysics. Russell's Urentschluss 
(f) is that of accepting certain values (v1 ), which entail 
the rejection of other value-claims as disvalues (-v2 ). 
These disvalues (-v2 ) are embodied in certain ultimate and 
total organizations of ~ ( L ) , called the metaphysics 
of monism (1\~onism), the metaphysics of absolute idealism 
(:Mideal.ism), and the metaphysics of mysticism (Iv~ysticism). 
Finally, these metaphysical positions are embodied in the 
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coherence definition of truth. The coherence definition, 
therefore, is ultimately grounded .on a :free choice~ or an 
autonomous decision (f'). The ground for coherence is cer-
tain values, the ground for these values is the "groundless," 
that is 11 free, 11 choice. In this way, Russell's reject-ion of 
coherence is a free decision. The meaning of truth is 
freedom. ~ It is also : tru~ that freedom is the ultimate 
determiner of' the meaning o:f truth. 
Fifth, we now come to the value-claims that are 
rejected with the rejection o:f warranted assertibility as 
the definition of truth. The rejection o:f warranted asserti-
bility was seen to entail the rejection of radical empiri-
cism. Radical empiricism was shown to lead to a type of' 
relativism and "looseness" in the conception of' the world 
and its values. Russell's rejection of' this relativism l.'las 
shown to entail the acceptance o:f a static and :fixed uni"':" 
verse, especially in relation to the values embodied. This 
desire for fixed, static, reliable, objective, and absolute 
values was admittedly a temperamental matter with Russell. 
Russell's Urentschluss (f') here was a . choice of' 11 objective 
values" (v). That is to say, values as objective, as em-
bodied in the universe, are chosen as "more desirable" than 
values as subjective, as matters of personal lll'him. This 
choice is free and autonomous. With this choice goes, at 
minimum, a quasi-rationalistic metaphysics, such as that of 
Russell. Or, to put it in another way, a rationalistic 
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(or, in Russell 1 s case, a quasi-rational.istic) metaphysics 
embodi.es this choice of' the desirability of' objective 
values. Furthermore, this quasi-rationalistic metaphysics 
was shown to disclose itself' in the rejection of' radical 
empiricism.. Finally., radic.al empiricism was seen to be 
entail.ed by the definition of' truth as l-rarranted asserti-
bility. In this way we can see hol-r the rejection of' 
warranted assertibility as definition of' truth is a f'ree 
choice of' values. 
Assumptions .~ ~ conception .. £1: . ~ity. -:-1ve must 
now analyze, in terms of' the concepts developed for this 
conclusion, Russell's conception of' reality. 
1. The f'irst assumption relevant to the present 
discussion is 11 the simpler viel"l is true. 11 As was sho1m, 
Russell's conception of' reality depends ultimately on the 
unqualified assertion of' this assumption. This assumption 
embodies a knol-rledge-value, a memory-value or a heuristic-
value. The totality of' the continuum of' experience, ~ 
' 
is not, in itself', simple. Simplicity represents one parti-
cular organization of' E. . '\\Then this organization is 
reg ional it is a classification, categorization, a term, or 
an object, C. When this organization is total, it is a 
metaphysical system, M. Simplicity as the criterion of' 
organization of' 2:._ embodies the above-indicated values (v). 
The acceptance of' or assent to these values is prerequisite 
to the acceptance of the truth or validity of' the basic 
Lno 
"simplicity of reality. 11 The phenomenological structure 
of this act of assent is one of a free and autonomous choice 
of values ( f ) • 
2. The next assumption is likew·ise a very funda-
mental one. It is an. assumption made not only by Russell 
but by a large number of philosophers. It is that "the 
universe is rational. The lal'ITS of inference are used and 
can be used legitimately in what can be called a 1trans-
cendent1 sense, that is, these laws are valid both for all 
possible experience as well as beyond possible experience." 
This assumption makes possible knol'!Tledge of an external 
lvorld. It therefore embodies all the value-claims of such 
a belief, as discussed before. Yet lV'e do not ~ the truth 
of this assumption; we decide it. 
The genesis of this assumption is as follo'\vs. · The 
totality of ~ designated by ~ is bifurcated (for the 
sake of values discussed elsewhere) into, first, an ego--non-
e g o distinction and ultimately into a phenomenon-noumenon 
dualism. Phenomena represent one organization of Sein, ~ 
and noumena represent an altogether different organization 
of that part of ~ which has not been organized into 
phenomena already. Noumena have been described phenomeno-
logically in this dissertation as "self-negating ideas." 
This bifurcation of L in itself already embodies an 
Urentschluss, f, of a value v 1 • The bifurcation also in-
cludes, analytically, in its meaning the impossibility of 
' 
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joining or relating these tl..ro organizations of' L 
(Cphenomena and Cnoumena) through any valuable (v2 ) con-
nection, such as that of' C9.l:!:..~spondence and interaction. 
This latter conclusion represents Hume's skepticism. If' 
1ve now def'ine kn01<1l edge on the basis of' truth as corres-
pondence, and on the basis of' an interaction bet-,;.;een these 
t"tiO realms, then that know·ledge h-thich is indeed a funda-
mental value-claim, v2 ) is impossible. This impossibility 
is called skepticism and embodies the rejection of' this 
latter value-claim ( -v2 ). Yet 1.;e have f'reely decided and 
chosen to endorse (f') and accept ~ v 1 (the values em-
bodied in total noumenon-phenomenon dualism) and v 2 {knO"t'l-
ledge-values embodied in noumenon-phenomenon correspondence 
and interaction). This situation is a logical contradiction 
based on apparently conf'licting value-claims (v1 and· v 2 ). 
We make the further Urentschluss (f') to preserve both 
values. To avoid the logical impasse thereby engendered 
we need to give assent to an ~ ~ hypothesis, which be-
comes the assumption of' the rationality of' the universe, 
and the assumption of' the apodictic, universal, transcendent 
validity of the la1..rs of inference and the law of' causation. 
The point presented here is an analysis in terms 
of' the categories of' Heretism of' one of' the most fundamental 
issues in the history of' philosophy. The basis f'or any 
solution of the central problem of' epistemology is a free 
and autonomous choice. 
3. This assumption is really a cluster of' three. 
11 (a) . that the given is a clue to a reality beyond this 
given; and (b) that 'sensations' is a term which with its 
connotations adequately describes the structure of' this 
given; and (c) the given as sensations presupposes a kind of' 
duality of the world and man which uses the human eye (con-
ceived as a camera-like instrument) as the basis for inter-
preting all knowledge or cognition." Russell has eventually 
rejected (c), But he has never denied or changed (a) and 
(b). 
Assumption (b), 11 that 1 sensations 1 is a term which 
with its connotations adequately describes the structure of 
this given," embodies a commitment to a particular region 
of' ~ , designated in this dissertation as S, which func-
tions as the given. · It has been shown in this dissertation, 
however, that there is no one and absolute answer to the 
question as to what constitutes the content of' given. Its 
content is variable from metaphysics to metaphysics and from 
epistemology to epistemology. Its form, which is determined 
by its function, is a constant from one system to another. 
The given as 11 thereness 11 and "presentation" can be anything, 
given the phenomenological method. The choice of sensations 
from the totality of' L as the S for Russell's metaphysics 
(Ssensations for MR) is a good example of the kind of' free 
and autonomous choice or decision (f') discussed in this 
Chapter. This choice of S determines the fundamental struc-
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ture of tl)e metaphysics in question (MR). 
Assumption (a), "that the given is a clue to a reali-
ty beyond this given, 11 is of a different sort. The exact 
relationship between the given S and the total metaphysical 
structure or organization of Sein, ~ , is difficult to 
analyze. The meta-metaphysics developed here views this 
relationship as a logical rather than an ontological one. 
The metaphysics is, basically, a construction out of S. 
Russell, his theory of constructions notwithstanding, views 
this relationship as an ontological inference. The dis-
cussion of the value-claims and free choices involved in 
this ontological or transcendent inference has been rather 
fully covered in the analysis of the second assumption. 
4. The fourth assumption is a rather involved one. 
The assumption, as stated in Chapter II, is this& 11 a logi-
cal reduction of mathematics is a total and adequate reduction 
in all possible senses. This is tantamount to saying that 
all non-logical senses and reductions of mathematics are 
rejected: that is, a decision has been made to reject them, 
a decision has been made to disregard psychological analyses 
of mathematics and their metaphysical correlates." 
The point here made deals with the heart of Russell's 
logic. A fully adequate analysis of this point demands a 
chapter in itself, not a small section. It has been shown 
that, in the realm of possibilities as determined by 1 and r 
(where 1 stands for the laws of all possible log ics based on 
consistency, and r stan.ds for the refractory psychological 
images and description of thought-processes) many inter-
pretations of mathematics exist. Russell chooses one of 
these as the ~ one. This choice (which is shown to be 
free and autonomous) carries with it that conception of 
reality which follows from the view of mathematics as 
analytic. This view is that of the positivistic metaphy-
sics, as opposed to that of rationalism, for which mathe-
matics is both synthetic and a priori. The positivistic 
metaphysics here endorsed embodies, in turn, specific value-
claims. The choice of mathematics as analytic (and it is a 
free choice, (f), not a discovery) is the choice of the 
values, (v), embodied in the metaphysics of positivism (MR). 
The ultimate foundation of positivism is a free choice. 
5. This assumption also is a cluster of three: The 
assumptions are 11 (a) the objective existence of universals; 
(b) the transcendent validity of the rules of inference 
regarding the source of our knowledge of universals; and (c) 
the binary nature of the knowledge situation, which resolves 
ultimately into the binary or dualistic nature of the world. 11 
The ultimately free nature of (c) above has been 
amply discussed in some of the previous assumptions (2 and J) 
and need not be reemphasized here. The only point l'iOrth 
mentioning in connection with the binary knowledge relation-
ship referred to here is that the two terms are an idea that 
corresponds to a universal rather than to a so-called 
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material or physical object. 
Assumptions (a) and (b) are necessary to account 
:for the possibility o:f objective knowledge of' universal 
principles, and to account f'or the objective ~xistence o:f 
these universal concepts respectively. In other words, 
(b) is the ground :for (a), which, strictly speaking, makes 
(b) the genuine assumption. The transcendent validity o:f 
inference and causation, in turn, was disc.ussed in connection 
with assumption 2. 
6. This assumption, which is "that experience does 
not subject itself' to only one possible systematization, 
but to many, 11 is one o:f the :fundamental s't atements o:f this 
dissertation. This :fact allows :for man 1 s :free and autono-
mous choice to be the deciding !'actor in what is to be con-
sidered real. 
7• This assumption is 1'that it is at least reasonable 
to in:fer the existence o:f unperceived events.n W'e have here 
the assumption that the transcendent use of' inference is 
possible but yields only probability. And probability is 
a ~uf':ficient warrant :for knowledge. However, as was shown 
extensively in Chapter II, the existence o:f unperceived 
events cannot be demonstrated, that is, in:ferred, either 
in the strict sense o:f prdo:f or the looser sense of' proba-
bility. Such a belief' is therefore an assumption rather than 
an inference. This assumption, in Russell 1 s case, was 
shown to have the :function o:f making possible a proo:f :for 
the probable existence of an independent and non-mental 
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external world. This latter belief leads to the preserva-
tion of the value-claims already discussed. The ultimate 
reasQ.!! for urging the acceptance of this assumption .of the 
existence of unperceived events, therefore, lies in the free 
and autonomous choice (f) of the values preserved by the 
belief in an external l"lorld. The acceptance of unperceived 
events is strictly an ad h2£.hypothesis, whose truth is 
assumed to account for the specific values (v) chosen (f). 
8. This assumption, which states that "That which 
is simple is more likely to · correspond with events beyond 
sensation than that which is complex," is a variation of 
assumption 1. In this case, however, the use of 11 true 11 is 
restricted in meaning to 11 correspondence. 11 Once we recog-
nize that Russell must assume that simplicity is a clue 
that an idea corresponds to some ontologically objective and 
independent state of affairs, we see that no proof exists 
for this kind of belief. This belief, an assumption in this 
case, is willed to be true because the values thereby em-
bodied are willed or chosen (f). This assumption is basic 
to Russell's metaphysics (~); basic to this assumption is 
the embodiment of a specific class of values (v); and basic 
to these values is man's free and autonomous assent to them 
(f). 
9. This assumption states that "Induction is a 
valid method of probable inference, not only within the 
phenomenal world itself, but also from the phenomenal world 
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to the noumenal world. 11 Here we have .a special case of 
the transcendent use of inference. Inductive inference is 
more important for Russell's quasi-scientific conception of 
the world than other types of inference. Induction already 
presents logical difficulties when applied to the phenomenal 
realm alone. When applied in addition to the noumenal 
realm, the difficulties are shown to be such that the trans-
cendent validity of induction can only be thought of as an 
assumption -- an assumption that is tru e - fundamentally 
only because of the assent given to it. This assent is 
free (f) and it incorporates the assent of a value. The 
specific class of values involved is that of the value-
claims embodied in the belief in the existence of an exter-
nal l'iOrld. 
10 . This assumption is a complex centered around 
causation: 11 the transcendent validity of causation. Russell 
accepts the metaphysical or objective validity of the causal 
theory of perception." The specific individual assumptions 
that make up this complex were listed as seven. Russell was 
sholm to assume 11 ( i) the causal theory of perception, ( ii) 
the usual canons of scientific inference, (iii) that differ-
ences in percepts imply differences in stimuli, (iv) that 
stimuli are part of the noumenal world, (v} spatio-temporal 
continuity, from the phenomenal to the noumenal t,rorld, (vi) 
a one-one relation between stimulus and percept, and (vii) 
that there are events 1 just outside the sense-organ,' ~~ 
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in the noumenal world." 
The basic assumption of the transcendent validity of 
causation is another sub-class under the general assumption 
referred to here as the transcendent validity of the laws of 
inference. No more needs to be said here about it. It was 
analyzed under assumption 2. 
11. This assumption is that of' "the atomic inter-
pretation of events." It was shown earlier in this Chapter 
that ~ or ~ , as it is 11 in itself, 11 cannot be said to 
be either atomic or continuous (notwithstanding that for 
purposes of' argument it is often referred to here as con-
tinuous). \fuen lve designate any area of ~' Z: as an 
event which is atomic (a), lve thereby make it subject to 
mathematical treatment and methodology. ~ is capable of' 
atomization; but this is not to say that it is -- in 11 reality 11 
and at all times -- atomized. For aesthetic purposes, for 
instance, atomization might turn out to be a disvalue, and 
therefore inappropriate or 11 false. 11 
The mathematical treatment of L: is extremely use-
ful for the attainment of a certain type of knOl1Tledge- and 
survival-values. These knowledge-values have to do with 
prediction, summarization, and control. Russell has made 
the Urentschluss f (as perhaps most people have done) to 
endorse the above-specified knowledge- and survival-values. 
Logical atomism is a necessary requirement for the protection 
of these values {v). The decision to accept these specific 
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values, in turn, i.s a free and autonomous choice. 
The atomic interpretation of events is a basic 
commitment about the nature of reality. This commitment is 
one 11 that could be otherwise," on the basis of the logical 
structure of systems (1) and the empirical refractory (r); 
yet it 11 is not othet'l'iise" due to the free and autonomous 
decision (f) to embrace the many value-claims (v) satisfied 
through the atomic interpretation of events. 
12. This assumption, which states that "there are 
events perceived by others," is a sub-class of the assump-
tion of the existence of unperceived events in general. 
This 1..ras discussed under assumption 7. 
1:3. Russell assumes "the validity of the canons of 
scientific inference. 11 This is one of the very few assump-
tions that Russell, at least occasionally, recognizes as 
assumptions; and what is more, he recognizes that they are 
ungrounded choices. He writes that "these .canons . . 
J;.'ri} not susceptible to argument. 111 
Important as this statement is as evidence for the 
truth of the interpretation of Russell's positivism proposed 
in this dissertation, it does not need further comment or 
substantiation. 
14. The new and important part of this assumption 
is that "mental events can be clea-rly distinguished from 
lpaul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ~Philosophy of Ber-
trand Russell (Evanston: Northwestern University, 194~ 
P• 719 · 
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non-mental events." As Berkeley has shown, this distinc-
tion is at best questionable . The position of' Heretism 
' proposed in this dissertation is . that L can be organized 
(among a near-in:finity of' possibilities) either as totally 
composed of' matter (materialism), o.r as :fully accountable 
in terms o:f mind (idealism), or as divisible into mental 
and material portions (qualitative dualism). The assump-
tion that mental and non-mental events are distinguishable 
is, in :fact, the commitment to the qualitative dualistic (or 
pluralistic) organization of' Sein, L . The ground :for 
this commitment is to be :found in the value-claims that are 
embodied in and preserved by this ontological qualitative 
dualism. The value-claims associated t'll'ith dualism, as they 
:follow, for instance, :from the use of' correspondence as the 
def'inition of' truth, were discussed in the section on 
values, previous to this one on assumptions. A commitment 
to dualism is a commitment to these specific values. And 
a connnitment to these specific values is a choice :for tth.ich 
man is responsible, because the choice or commitment is an 
Urentschluss, which is to say that it is :free and autono-
mous ( f'). 
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Interpretation of Stace's Mysticism 
in Terms of Heretism 
Mysticism~ experience~~ theory 2£ reality.--
Speaking now in general terms, mysticism as experience must 
be interpreted as follows. Each of the modes of this 
experience that is analyzed in Chapter III (truth-, reality-, 
and value-experiences) is a specified and limited area 
within ~ This assertion, of course, holds of ~ events. 
These individual elements of the mystical experience, being 
areas of Z. , are C. 
The mystical experience as_ an experience of a 
supreme unity has been analyzed as being the convict~on 
that a state of transcendence exists and ought .~~ realized. 1 
This, as far as the experience itself is concerned, is an 
empirical refractory organization or class of events (c) 
l'lithin L . 
Mysticism as metaphysics, of course, is !vi. But it is 
a special kind of M, namely Mm. For mysticism as a theory 
of reality 1 and r are the same as for any other position, 
including positivism. Mystical metaphysics does not and 
cannot deny the existence of refractory experiences, nor 
does this theory of reality endorse contradictions. This 
statement needs to be defended. Regarding the latter 
1 Cf., pp. 311-312. 
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(contradictions), it must be recognized that mystics speak 
in paradoxes. But this is only to show that ordinary lan-
guage, or the temporal order, does not apply to the mystical 
theory of' reality. Mystical metaphysics, 1.dth its insistence 
on unity and consciousness and superlative supra-rational 
experiences, has its o~m definite logic and consistency. 
This is true also because, strictly speaking, to be incon-
sistent is to say nothing, is to deny what one asserbs. 
Silence would be better. And when the mystic uses paradoxes 
and ostensibly denies what he af'f'irms, he really denies 
the temporal order and af'f'irms the eternal order. In the 
extreme mystical pronouncement 11 God exists and He does not 
exist, 11 the denial is of' the proposition as it ref'ers to 
the temporal order, and the af'f'irmation is as the proposi-
tion applies to the eternal order. 
Regarding refractory experiences, it must be recog-
nized that the mystic does not deny the existence of such 
experiences. Mystics continue to eat and walk and sleep. 
In extreme cases, where we have behavior that might be 
interpreted as under the influence of' hypnotic trance, as in 
yoga, the so-called refractory sensations are no longer 
refractory. Yet the samadhi -- or mystical -- experience may 
well be the empirical refractory to the mystic. 
The mystic has recognized the (or one) mystical 
experience as one of' many experiences. Once had, the nature 
of the experience is given and f'ixed, and as such is an 
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empirical refractory (r). The experience is also experi-
enced as a value or value-claim, and thereby becomes a 
value-possibility, an experience which can be chosen as 
the summum bonum or as man's ultimate commitment (v). The 
mystic transforms this value-possibility into a co~nitment. 
He commits his existence to the repetition, development, 
and propagation of that experience. This commitment is 
experienced as a free, spontaneous, autonomous choice of a 
value-possibility (f). With this decision (f) as ground, 
L is reorganized from the metaphysics or world-viet~ of 
common sense (M ) -- or from 'l~hatever other metaphysics 
cs 
the mystic comes, such as skepticism, perhaps, (M 1 ) --s,.; 
into the metaphysics of mysticism (M ). The mystical meta-
m 
physics, endorsing acosmism, looks upon the world as unreal. 
This acosmism represents the decision to refer to the mysti-
cal experience or value-possibility as ~' source of iQ& 
re.~, or source ££ truth. The class of sense-events (C) 
which fall under the institution of marriage, for instance, 
(involving persons, husband, wife, and children, objects, 
usually referred to as "property," such ashouse, furniture, 
food, cars, feelings, responsibilities, and concerns) be-
longs to the temporal order, to the world declared unreal 
by acosmism. The nature of these experiences, insofar as 
their nature is empirically refractory, is not and cannot 
be changed by the mystic. Yet the vows of chastity and 
poverty that some mystics or would-be mystics take purport 
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to remove man's interest or desire or contemplation ~or 
these things. This "detachment" is achieved by removing the 
common-sense decision (~cs) which terms this class o~ 
sen se-events (C) as real and as true-values, and substituting 
~or it the mystic's decision (~m) to call this same class 
of sense-even~unreal and of no genuine value. !£ h2£ 
hypotheses are then brought to bear on this acosmism in 
order to "explain," that is, make consistent (1) this 
assertion of acosmism. These ~ 82£ hypoth eses consist 
sometimes in re~erence to "matter," 11 effluxes," 11Veil o~ 
r.Iaya," 11 ignorance," "appearances," and others. 
The decision o~ freedom (~) is instrumental in 
choosing the ~ull meaning o~ classifications -- such as 
con cepts and sense-objects. This ~reedom (~) is the ~inal 
agent, within the limitations set by 1 and r, that ma k es a 
thought or a sensation ~ and ~' or untrue and unreal. 
The same obtains in the total metaphysical system o~ a 
mystic (M ). Within the limitations set by 1 and r, the 
m 
agent (~) makes a metaphysics or theory o~ reality either 
true or ~alse, either real or unreal. 
Priorities. --The ~ollol1Ting is a statement about how 
the system o~ priorities fits into the meta-metaphysical 
scheme o~ Heretism. 
Genetic priority deals primarily with experiences. 
The extent to which either a truth- or a value- or a reality-
experience is genetically prior is a matter of the empirical 
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refractory (r) and is not subject to choice in the sense 
of f. Genetic priority may be due to such influences as 
temperament, education, or environment, and does not 
necessarily involve a~ choice (f). On the other hand, 
it may be ilnportant to a mystic .to consider either the 
truth- or the value- or the reality-experience as geneti-
cally prior. In this case he might, conceivably, choose 
this priority freely, autonomously. 
Logical priority applies _mainly to mysticism as 
theory of reality. This priority involves choosing what 
will function as the 11 given." ( S) for this particular meta-
physical system. It has been pointed out in this Chapter 
that Sis subject to choice (f). That which functions as 
the given for a particular metaphysics or epistemology can 
be such a class of events as 11 sense-data,tt or the "intui-
tions of reason," or the completed and complex "Gestalten," 
or a "mystical experience,u and others. The mystic chooses 
(f) to call that the 11 given 11 or the "source of information 
about reality" which will make it possible to preserve, 
complete and enhance the mystical experience, to build a 
life, a whole existence, around that experience. In some 
metaphysical cases (and Stace 1 s analysis of mysticism is an 
example of it) this 11 given 11 (S) is the mystical experience 
itself. 
Phenomenological priority deals with the refractory 
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gua refractory in experience. 1 9¥ definition, therefore, 
this element of mysticism is not subject to free choice. 
It is the empirical re~ractory (r) in mysticism. For ex-
ample, that an experience of a patch of red described 
phenomenologically looks red is not subject to free choice. 
That one can look the other way, of course, is subject to 
free choice. In other w·ords, the fact that there may be a 
priority (or reducibility) among the modes of truth-, value-, 
and reality-experience in a mystical experience is a 11 fact, 11 
an empirical irreducible and unchangeable. 
Finally, axiological priority indicates that (i) 
a mystical experience is 11 given 11 as a refractory value-
claim or value-experience (r) and (ii) this value is chosen 
or accepted freely and spontaneously (f) as a summum bonum, 
a foundation for a theory of reality, and as a true clue to 
the real. 
Assumptions. --Now follo1~s a statement of how· the 
assumptions involved in Stace 1 s view of mysticism ~it into 
the meta-metaphysical scheme developed here under the name 
o~ Heretism. 
1. The ~irst assumption o~ Stace 1 s conception o~ 
mysticism is "a mystic chooses the path which will lead him 
to the state o~ ecstasy referred to as the mystical experi-
ence.11 This choice has no logical necessity for its being 
1 ££..:.., P• JJO. 
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made in the direction of mysticism. It might have 
psychological necessity in some cases. There are cases, 
however, andthese are the crucial ones, in which the choice 
o"£ life's path is capable of being free and autonomous (f). 
The free choice (f) of this path is the assent and endorse-
ment o"£ a specific value (v), which in turn is the basis 
"£or a speci"£ic theory o"£ reality (~~). The phenomenological 
structure of' the value-claim which is a mystical experience 
is refractory, f'ixed, and 11 discovered. 11 The choice or 
endorsement of and assent to this value-claim is f'ree. This 
freedom is the clue to man's responsibility in relation 
to his choice of values, and ultimately of' man's responsi-
bility in relation to what he considers real and true. 
2. The second assumption is that of "the possibility 
of a mystical experience." This is part of' the empirical 
ref'ractory (r); it is an empirical "£act. Whether a mystical 
experience is possible or not is an empirical fact that is 
either true or false according to the ordinary logic of' 
induction (which can be an expa nsion of 1 or a combination of' 
rand 1). Here there is no element of free choice. 
3. This assumption ref'ers to Stace 1 s particular 
approach. It is 11 the feasibility, or the truth, of talking 
of two perspectives or two orders." Stace wishes to place 
mysticism in a perspective ~th naturalism with the hoped-
for result that naturalists will look favorably upon mysti-
cism, or with the hope that mystical statements -- as 
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interpreted by the mystic himself' -- can be shown to be 
consistent (1) with a thoroughgoing .naturalism. He asserts, 
in f'act, that ,2' is -- in reality -- dichotomized into 
two parts or regions (C) or orders: the temporal and the 
eternal. The reason for this bifurcation of L is that 
Stace can then account f'or both mysticism and naturalism 
tdthin the confines of a consistent (1) metaphysics. The 
bifurcation of ~ into the orders of time and that of 
eternity is a decision (f) which is based on a kno'\~ledge­
value (v), or other value, which is thereby preserved. 
Here Stace's larger metaphysical scheme is seen to be ulti-
mately founded on a free choice of a value. 
4. This assumption "accepts paradoxical statements 
• f 1 II as meanJ.ng u • Or, to put it in another way, 11 the mystic 
chooses his meaning criterion. 11 This assumption points to 
the fact that the very meaning .Q.f meaning .· is subject to free 
choice (f). The mystic chooses to call certain language-
formations meaningful and others meaningless. This choice 
hinges on (i) the nature of the experience he wishes to 
preserve and enhance (the nature of which is not subject to 
free choice), (ii) the realm of all possible language-
formations (which is a combination of pure logic (1) and 
empirical givenness (~) such as actual languages), and 
finally (iii) the value-aspect or value-claim of that experi-
ence. All these three elements are refractory. But there 
are many such refractory systems. What mal{es this system 
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true and real is a fourth (iv) characteristic, the assent 
(f) that is freely given (but need not be given) to these 
elements which make up meaningfulness. This assent is the 
selective factor that chooses which among the number of 
possible language-formations is the meaningful one, 1ihich 
is the one to be accepted on the basis of a meaning criterion 
to be developed. 'rhis freely chosen meaning criterion then 
determines the meaning of truth and reality. 
:;. This assumption is that "extra-logical cognition 
is possible and that the ultimate nature of reality is it-
self extra-logical. 11 Here we have the results of a mystical 
meaning criterion. Logic here refers to certain types of 
metaphysics, including, of course, Russell's positivism. 
Positivistic modes of expression or language-formations do 
not lend themselves to the preservation and enhancement of 
the mystical experience. These modes o.f expression, leading 
to disvalues {-v), are rejected as not descriptive of the 
true and real. This rejection is based on a disvalue, which 
in turn is rejected by a free choice (f). 
6. This assumption states that 11 the mystical experi-
ence is said to be altogether extraneous to these classifi-
cations of man's 'natural' experiences." This makes a 
mystical experience ineffable. Ineffability in this sense 
is the demand for a ne't11' language. This new· (mystical) lan-
guage is then referred to, by the mystic, as the true refer-
ent to reality. This new language makes possible the under-
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standing and apprehension of mystical experiences, a claim 
that cannot be made by ordinary language. This apprehension 
which is made possible is a value. The mystic is one l\"ho 
has freely and autonomously chosen to endorse (f) this 
value (v), to lead his life hoping to attain or preserve or 
propagate this value, and ipso facto he must choose the new 
language as the true language, as the true representative 
of reality, as that language which alone can deal with 
reality. 
7• This assumption is that 11it is possible to dis-
pense 1vith subject-object bifurcations. 11 This statement 
means that common-sense metaphysics {M ) as well as many 
cs 
others presuppose the validity of the I--non-I dichotomy, 
and that mysticism rejects it. This rejection is an empiri-
cal and logical possibility, which means that the same 
totality of experiences ( ~ ) can be organized into ~ 
totality (Brahman-Atman) or into two (ego--non-ego) which 
make up the totality ( Z:... ) , or into any number of basic 
classifications. Each ordering has different value-conse-
quences. The rejection of ego--non-ego dualism in favor of 
some form of monism aids the preservation and attainment of 
the mystical experience (v). The free choice (f) of this 
goal (v) makes the non-dualistic and consistent (1) organi-
zation of ~ 2:._ ) one 't'lhich is true and real (¥"m). 
8. Tlus assumption is 11 that consciousness as dis-
covered introspectively in ordinary experience is a sign or 
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§ymbol -- a spark -- pointing to the reality mode oC the 
mystical experience." This assumption is an assertion about 
the adequacy o£ a symbol. Adequacy is a psychological 
variant, and thus becomes a matter £or empirical investiga-
tion, which is a combination of r and 1, and thereby not 
subject to choice. 
9. This assumption asserts the basic continuity 
between mind and non-mind. The assumption states that "to 
assert intuition as a criterion of truth is to assert a 
very close link of my mind and the world. 11 There is little 
difference between this assumption and number 7. If I kno1v 
any event outside of my consciousness by intuition (such as 
through synthetic a priori propositions) I must presuppose 
a mental continuum from the external world to my mind. This 
metaphysical notion is a possibility (on the basis oC the 
refractories 1 and r) as the existence o£ Absolute Ideal-
ism sh.o1vs which is made into an actuality and a reality 
by a free choice (f) endorsing the mystical experience as 
the supreme value. 
10. This assumption states that 11 the acceptance oC 
symbolism assumes an intimate, and sometimes causal, inter-
relation bet'tve:en language a nd being. 11 The question here is 
lvhether language makes being, or 'tvhether all of being makes 
our language or (which is the same) is reflected in our 
language. If being is interpreted as ~ ( ~ ) , the 
answer is, no, in either case. Language is one form of L 
one area within ~ If being is interpreted as reality, 
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then the ans1..rer to the first question h..rhether language makes 
being) may be yes, provided the notion of language includes 
the notion of free choice. In that case, free choice as 
a form of, or an expression of, language creates reality. 
In this case, language and being are equated, so that their 
interrelationship can be said to be of the intimate sort 
that must be assumed for mysticism to be a possibility. 
It follows that symbolism (the equating of language 
and reality) is only a possibility if language is understood 
as "creating" reality, which is the vie't'l here represented. 
And without symbolism· there can be no mysticism. 
11. This assumption, 't1Thich is t.hat of "the possi-
bility of acosmism, 11 asserts that "'reality' is not unchanging, 
absolute, and discoverable, but rather is a term applicable 
e.qually well, or 11Tith equal legitimacy, to at least t1,ro 
separate realms or orders. 11 This assumption is in many lvays 
like number 3. Stace must assume that t't'IO equally coherent 
and consistent accounts of all available facts are possible 
(naturalism and mysticism or the temporal and the eternal 
orders) and equivalent -- except for the values 1~Lich are 
endorsed by each of these metaphysics individually. Once he 
assumes this, these questions arise: (i) ~lhy adopt mysticism? 
( ii) Why adopt naturalism? and (iii) l11hy adopt Stace 1 s 
11 t>'lo-orders 11 metaphysics? 
Each of these questions hinges on one or several 
values preserved by these metaphysical views. ~ these 
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vaLues are is difficult but not impossible to state. The 
adoption o:f any of these values as . :final .determiners o:f the 
nature o:f truth and reality is a :free and autonomous choice 
(f). Once Stace admits that more than one consistent and 
empirically coherent system of all the :facts exist~ he must 
face the problem of' how one decides between alternate 
accounts. The answ·er is, :free choice. 
12. This assumption is as :follows: 11 Stace chooses 
to accept the logic o:f naturalism as the so~called 1 true 1 
logic, the logic ,,hich de:fines consistency f'or all other 
logics, the logic which is the measure o:f adequacy :for all 
other logics, the logic to which all other logics must be 
reduced or o:f which they must be a sub-class, and ultimately, 
the logic which is definitive of reaLity." The relation 
here to Heretism is self-explanatory. The choice o:f logic 
hinges on the choice of' a value preserved. This choice is 
:free (:f). That there are many possible logics is a 
corollary o:f the contemporary investigations and discoveries 
about the nature of logic. Consistency is a constant among 
log ics. Other :features depend on rules and axioms chosen. 
Mysticism as a theory o:f reality can be made consistent 
and its logic can be discovered and developed. Modern log ic 
has shown that a logic can be chosen -- there is no a 
priori connection bet,,een experiences or Sein ( L ) and a 
specific logic. The connection that is made (between logic 
and experience) is based on a value that is to be preserved 
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or created. The choice of desideratum, the value that it is 
desirable to preserve, is, in turn, a free and autonomous 
decision (f). It is this decision, finally, which deter-
mines the ultimate meaning of "reality," and with it, that 
of "truth. 11 
In conclusion, l'le see that most of the assumptions 
on ·which mysticism lll'as discovered to be based are grounded 
on a free choice, one ld'lich is usually about values. 
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Relation Between Heretism and Previous 
Attempts at Reconciliation 
Heretisn1 is a :far more radical statement o:f how 
philosophic divergencies can be reconciled than the positions 
o:f lvlontague and Schiller developed in Chapter I. 
On the other hand, Pepper's discussion of' "root 
metaphors" in connection with positivistic conventiona1ism1 
is incorporated in Heretism. Positivistic conventionalism 
is a re:fusal to grant independent (that is, non-experience-
able) ontological status to constructs. Pepper's under-
standing o:f positivistic conventionalism is not unlike the 
distinction in this dissertation between a construct and an 
in:ference. Finally, positivistic conventionalism turns out 
to be an e:f:fort at radical empiricism. And this latter 
commi.tment is not unlike the :fundamental concept (or anti-
category) o:f ~ ( LC ) developed in this Chapter. 
Pepper's notion o:f a "root metaphor" is that of' a 
categorizing agent. The scheme or structure in terms of' 
which :facts are 11 explainedn is something drawn :from immediate 
experience. Heretism contends that Pepper's theory of' 
concept-, theory- and hypothesis-formation in terms o:f root 
metaphors is merely one possibility among many. It is 
1 c:r •• P• 42 • 
unsound to limit a .priori the Jl(!.SS·ib ilitie,s _ o£' oo.ncept~.f'..ormation 
(called "classifications or organizations, C11 in Heretism). 
Cerf' in his article1 suggests that a criterion of' 
meaningfulness is accepted, not discovered. Such is car-
tainly the view of' Heretism. 
Seypell2 calls attention to the fact that pragmatism 
and existentialism, and by extrapolation he should also 
have included mysticism, find correspondence as a definition 
of' truth 11 insuf'f'icient." Again, the epistemological dif'f'i-
culties as well as the axiological consequences of' corres-
pondence as a definition of truth have been amply discussed 
in this dissertation. Furthermore, f'or Seypell truth is an 
appea1. 3 An appeal is not the same as a free choice of' 
values (f'), but it does address itself to such a choice. We 
must note his use of' the 'tfOrd 11 appeal" rather than 11 proo:f'. 11 
Finally, Seypell notes the great similarity bet't\l'een 
existentialism and mysticism. 4 The irrationalism o:f 
existentialism as w·ell as of' mysticism must be viewed, in 
the light of Heretism, as an Urentschluss (f) to reject what 
goes in ordinary language under the name of' "reason." 
(This is not to reject consistency in the minimal sense 
of' 111. 11 ) 
1 ££:.., PP• 55f'f • 
2 . 
.££:.., P.• 55 • 
3~, p. 58. 
4£!.:.., pP. 58-59- · 
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Meyerho:f:f reminds us that existentialism and 
emotivism ~eject both the a priori and the naturalistic 
1 justification of ethics. This, in fact, is incorporated 
in the concept o:f v in Heretism. The basis o:f theories 
of reality and theories o:f truth is a value, v. The subject 
o:f ethics or axiology is the study o:f v. Heretism holds 
that v is true or :false, ultimately, only to the degree 
that it has been chosen :freely and autonomously. There can 
be no proof in any other sense. 
De Boer2 suggests, in a general sort o:f way, the 
fact that (i) a value is at the root o:f concept-formation, 
(ii) that the srune is true o:f metaphysical positions, and 
:finally, (iii) that this value depends on a choice. He 
seems to hold, in :fact, that existentialism and positivism 
represent two :fm~damental and different decisions about 
values. 
Hocking3 lists some of the presuppositions o:f 
positivism, including the :fundamental one that "analysis 
sho·w·s the way to reality. 11 Heretism, expanding on this 
point, maintains that analysis is one o:f many possible ways 
o:f organizing Z: ; or, to put it in another way, positivism 
is one o:f many possible methodological approaches in terms 
o:f which L_ can be interpreted and organized. Hocking 
1 
.2£:.., p • .59:f. 
2 
.91:.!.., p. 6,5:f. 
3 
.9.£!., P• 66:f· 
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opposes Cartesian Dualism and suggests that basic 
lveltanschauungen be determined by value judgments and 
choices. 
Landgrebe1 deals with the ~unction o~ metaphysics. 
He calls attention to the importance and inescapability o~ 
metaphysical constructions. In this 1..ray it can be argued 
that Russell's Positivism is more than mere methodology; 
it is a metaphysics. Landgrebe also calls attention to the 
important researches o~ Uexkllll, which sho1..r that the Ges-
talten or organizations o~ perceptions within what Heretism 
re:fers to as L are determined by value-considerations. 
These value-considerations may be unconscious. Heretism 
points out, however, that they are, as are all values, 
theoretically capable of free choice, although this is not 
always the case in an actual practical situation. 
Heinemann2 lists in detail the assumptions of modern 
philosophers, both rationalists and empiricists, as they 
folloli' ~rom Descartes and Locke. He ~ormulates antitheses 
to these assumptions to show that these are assumptions only 
and not facts, and to present at the same time the assump-
tion s of a contrary philosophy, such as existentialism. 
Heretism proposes a similar approach. The assumptions dis-
cussed in this dissertation, hOl'i'ever, are those o~ positivism 
and mysticism. Also, these assumptions here are presented 
1~, PP• 67ff . 
2£!..!_, PP• 75~76. 
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and uncovered in far greater detail than was done by 
Heinemann.. H.eretism then goes further to point out that 
these assumptions embody values (v) and that these values, 
in turn, are or can be chosen freely and autonomously (f). 
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Concluding Remarks 
A few more relevant points reg arding some of the 
corollaries, and the defenses, of Heretism must be p re-
sented. 
In g eneral, there are four areas in which this 
di s sertation co ntends t h at it is important or makes a 
contribution to the thought of man. In the first place, 
Heretism seeks to follow the natural bent of the human mind 
by seeking means for achieving g reater and g reater un ity a s 
the natural and process of man's cogni t ive activity. In 
the attemp t to d iscover one common base for all metaphysics, 
t h e growth towards unity, that is, 11 compreh ension 11 in both 
mean ings of the t erm (understanding and encompassing ), will 
be advanced another notch. Secondly, such synthesis of 
diverg ent ph ilosophical viet-~oints is a sy nthesis in t h e 
Hegelian sen se of aufheben. A synthesis is achieved by 
reducing conflicting philosophies to instantiations of 
one all-encompassing p rincip le the free ch oice of values. 
Here t-'le have one 'tli'Orld viet-11' (a meta-metaphysics) which 
purp orts to exp lain and account for all types of apparently 
contradictory metaphysical commitments. From a Heg elian 
p ersp ective, Heretism, to the ex tent that it is successful, 
is p rog ress in ph ilosophy. In the third place, Heretism 
lends itself to expansion and g eneralization. The area of 
application of this scheme is intended to transcend t he 
specific systems discussed. Fourth, with the introduction 
of the f element at the root of a metaphysics, the non-
log ical is p laced in what it is hoped is a proper relation 
to the rest of' the constituents of knowledge. At t he 
same t ime, the f, in the 
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central and decisive position it occupies, is sho"'m to be 
of an extra-logical nature. Heretism hopes to show the 
precise relation bet"'.,een the logical ( 1) and the empirical 
(r) and the extra-phenomenal (versus the noumenal), · especi-
ally extra-logical to each other. Heretism also hopes to 
be able to account for the possibility of describing the 
extra-logical so that the former will not contradict the 
latter by its definition of phenomenology as the free 
interchange of logical systems, based on psychological 
expediency. The paradox of ultimate circularity, which 
is an exclusively log ical puzzle, can be circumvented by 
the proper use of the phenomenological method which is an 
extra-logical or meta-logical method, setting itself no 
limits of meaningfulness, as is the case with positivism, 
for instance. 
One of the frequent and supposedly most crushing 
criticisms of Heretism is either that 11 all theories of reality 
are true, 11 or, what is worse, that this view gives as much 
credibility to the 11Hitler-Rosenberg anthropology and cos-
mology" as t .o any . othery such as that of' standard science 
and democracy. This objection to Heretism is evidence of' a 
fundamental misinterpretation of the position here defended. 
First (and this reply is the least important), unless one 
is a pragmatist, the consequences do not make an anthropology 
either true or false. So th.is objection is no objection 
against Heretism. 
443 
Second, an anthropology and a cosmology, to be true 
and correspond to the real, must be one consistent (1) way 
of organizing all availabl.e refractory empirical facts ( r). 
This is a minimum requirement. Only a.:fter this requirement 
has been fulfilled can the value (or disvalue., in this case) 
be assented to or rejected :freely . (:f). The Hitler-Rosenberg 
anthropology and cosmology does not even meet this pre-
liminary, ~ gua . !!.2!! requirement o:f a valid theory. It 
is therefore cognitively worthless. 
Third, it :is conceivable that two opposing anthro-
pologies and cosmologies, each o:f lihich satisfies the re-
quirements 1 and r, can be constructed. By "opposing" systems 
here :is meant systems l'lh:ich preserve or endorse ·opposing 
values. Fundamental questions of value cannot ever be 
settled by reason. In that case we end with an ultimate im-
passe, a struggle of wills, a fight o:f individual :freedoms, 
perhaps a war. Such may well be an accurate account of some 
of mankind's most tragic moments. Should it be possible, by 
a sufficient number of ~ hoc hypotheses, to render the 
Hitler-Rosenberg anthropology and cosmology consistent (and 
this the author o:f the dissertation doubts), then the only 
t ·ruly :fundamen tal objection to it, that which makes it genu-
inely :false, :is that the author has refused to commit h:imsei:f 
tQ the values (or d:isvalues) t hereby p reserved . To put it 
:in another l'lay , the author has committed himself to the 
destruction of the values or disvalues p r eserved by and em-
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bodied in the Hitler- Rosenberg cosmology and anthropology. 
That is the meaning of it being false. There is no other 
way, in the very last analysis, of how systems ought to 
be chosen. The Urentschluss, the ultimate metaphysical 
commitment, is 11 painfully11 free. 
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FREEDON AS THE BASI S OF TRUTH AND REALITY IN 
RUSSELL'S POSITIVISH AND STACE 1 S NYSTICISM 
(Publication no. 
Peter Koestenbaum, Ph.D. 
Bost on University Graduate School, 1958 
:Major Professor: Professor Peter A. Bertocci 
Purpose. The central purpose 9f the dissertation 
is to localize the ultimate g rounds of philosophic (and 
p articularly metaphysical) differenc es, w·ith the g oal of 
achieving an eventual synthesis. T o do this, the d:ii.sser-
tat ion (1) analyzes the nature of metaphysical systems i n 
e ene r a l, (2) seeks a p erspective (termed a meta-metaphysics) 
from 't'lhich a ny metaphysical system can be derived, a n d (J) 
p roposes to combine phenomenological and non-phenomenolog ical 
methodolog ies. 
~ethod . First, the dissertation reviews represen-
tative attempts of philosophic synthesis. Those dealing 
'tvith the g eneral p roblem of synthesis, 'tvithout specifying 
any part icular one , are by Schiller, Montague, and Pepper . 
One s p ecific attempt discussed consists of several syntheses 
of the existentialist and linguistic-analytic methods . 
l.s·50 
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Second, the dissertation presents an extended 
analysis of t1vo antithetical philosophies : Rus-sell's 
p ositivism and Stace 1 s mysticism. By discovering the funda-
mental assumption s in each of these t1.vo conceptions of 
truth and reality and the values embodied and preserved 
by them, a comparison can be made "!.'lith the vie1.v to finding 
the precise area of differences and agreements . 
Results. Russell is sho•~ to hold that an accept-
able definition prescribes ~ describes. He rejects 
coherenc e and 1varranted assertibility theories of truth, 
a n d defines truth as 11 logical, not e p istemolog ical, corres-
p ondence.n The fundamental assumption in Russell 's corres-
pondence definition of truth is the postulation of quali-
tative metaphysical dualism, l".rhile the values embodied i n 
his conception o f definition and of truth are those found 
i n the belief in the existence of an external world, in-
cluding, of cours e, the existence of other minds . 
Russell, at times , conceives of rea lity as a rtcon -
struction11 (a noti on first developed in his log ic) of 
sensory perspectives, and at times as an inference from 
data. Fourt een assumptions are involved in the co n cept io n s 
of r eality . .Among them 1.ve find 11 the universe is knowable 
through reas on , 11 11 the g iven is a clue to a reality beyond , 11 
11 the transcendent (in Kant ' s sense) use of the laws of 
inference is valid, 11 and rtthe simple is more likely to 
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correspond 11Tith events beyond sensations than the complex. 11 
Stace's position on mysticism is first examined as an 
int erpretation of the mystical experience, and then as a 
theo ry of reality. The mystical experience may be characterized 
as either an experience of value, truth, or reality . In 
myst icism as a theory of reality, value, truth, and reality 
each has a , special ontological status. To understand 
mysticism is to kno't..r the interrelations of these terms . 
Since 11 a~ssumption 11 i s a logical term and mysticism 
is alogical, the phenomenological analysis of the mystical 
experience :linvolves "priorities" (genetic, log ical, pheno-
. ' 
~enological, axiolog ical) in addition to assumptions. 
the t't..relve assumptions we find "naturalism and mysticism are 
t1vo orders of one reality, 11 "the mystic can leg itimately 
h h • ' ' t • II II t 1 • 1 • t • c oose 1s own mean1ng cr1 er1on, ex ra- og 1ca cogn 1 1011. 
is possible, 11 "reality itself is extra-logical, 11 and 11 subject-
object bifurcations are not necessary. 11 
Conclusions. The u1. timate g roun·d for accepting these 
assumptions, priorities, and values is the p ossibility of 
ch oosing them freely, spontaneously, and autonomously. 
Russell must justify t he p ossibility of corresp ondence (truth) 
and h is r:1etaphysical dualis~ (reality) on the g rounds that th.ey 
embody values "t·rh ich :~e has , in :fact, :freely c h osen to 
accept. Stace's assumptions and p riorities are likewise 
true and real because the values they embody are :freely 
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chosen. The dissertation constructs a meta-metaphysics t hat 
di scloses p ositivism and mysticism (and any other empirically 
coherent metaphysics) as equal;ty adequate world-views, differ-
ing only i n the free commitment (Urentschluss) to these 
g rounding assumption s and values. 
The exposition of this meta-metaphysics is the 
detailed description of its fundamental categ ories (the 
g iven, freedom, value, the logical and empirical refractory, 
and org a n izations of this g iven). Each of the above 
assumptions, priorities, and values is then interp reted in 
terms of this meta-metaphysics. 
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